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Abstract  
A country’s human capital has been neglected as a potential determinant of inwards 
foreign direct investment (FDI), both in theory and empirical research. When human 
capital has been included in models of the determinants of FDI, it appears simply as 
a control variable or one of the variables in a “kitchen sink” approach, usually 
without any theoretical rationale for its inclusion or critical discussion of the 
measures used. The mis-specification that may result from this is advanced as one of 
the potential explanations for the very diverse findings in previous literature and the 
failure of the meta-regression analysis (MRA) reported in this thesis to find an 
‘authentic’ effect of human capital on inwards FDI. Accordingly, this research seeks 
to fill this gap, by identifying the mechanisms through which human capital is 
expected to attract FDI to European transition economies and drawing conclusions 
about the most appropriate measures of human capital given the characteristics of the 
former communist (education) system. The ‘productivity-enhancing’ skills and traits 
that (foreign) investors are likely to value in such economies are identified and the 
manner in which these skills are developed is analysed. In the light of this analysis 
the conventional human capital measures used in empirical analyses are critically 
assessed. These contributions are used to develop an empirical model for estimating 
the effect of human capital on inwards FDI at country-, sector- and industry-level in 
12 European transition economies during the period 1995-2008. Consistent with the 
results of previous studies, as suggested by the MRA, no significant effect of 
traditional volume measures of human capital on FDI inflows/stocks is found. 
However, some evidence is presented in this thesis indicating that the quality 
dimension of human capital as measured by cognitive skills proxies may affect 
inwards FDI in the manufacturing sector. Accordingly, several potential explanations 
for the findings and some of their implications for future macro-level research 
focusing on the effects of human capital are explored.  
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Preface 
 
From having virtually no inwards foreign direct investment (FDI), over the two 
decades of transition the formerly centrally planned European economies have 
managed to attract a share of global foreign direct investment (FDI) stock nearly 
three times larger than their share of global output. This FDI has been an important 
source of external capital, but it also played a crucial role in modernising and 
restructuring these economies at firm- and economy- level, and facilitating their 
overall transformation to a market economy. However, the success of individual 
European transition economies in attracting inwards FDI has been far from equal, 
which has motivated extensive empirical research on the locational factors that drive 
inwards FDI in this group of countries. This research has, by and large, neglected the 
quality of the labour force as a factor that may affect foreign investors’ choice of 
investment destinations, which is somewhat surprising as at the outset of transition 
this was considered one of European transition economies key advantages in the 
global competition for FDI. A few studies include human capital as a control 
variable, but the choice of measures often appears to be arbitrary and lacks a 
theoretical rationale based on an underlying relationship between human capital and 
FDI. This neglect reflects the lack of attention that human capital receives in FDI 
theory and empirical research in general.  
Accordingly, this thesis seeks to address these gaps in the literature by: analysing the 
reasons why, theoretically, countries with relatively larger human capital 
endowments are expected to attract higher volumes of FDI; utilising the insights 
gained, as well as the results of a meta-regression analysis, to inform the choice of 
human capital measures to be used in empirical investigations in European transition 
economies, considering the specific characteristics of their (pre-transition) education 
systems; and empirically estimating the relationship between human capital and FDI 
in a sample of 12 European transition economies for which data is available: Albania, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
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Following most empirical research on locational determinants of FDI, the hypotheses 
developed in this thesis are initially tested using country-level data. However, 
recognising that the relative weight attached by foreign investors to different host 
country characteristics is likely to vary according to their motivation for undertaking 
FDI, the relationship between human capital and FDI is further investigated using 
sector- and industry-level manufacturing FDI data. The industry-level analysis is 
considered of particular interest in this research because the size of the elasticity of 
FDI to human capital is likely to depend on the technological intensity of the activity 
they intend to undertake in the host economy. Accordingly, the sector/industry level 
analysis, which appears to be the first of this kind to investigate the effect of human 
capital on FDI, can be considered as one of the most important contributions of this 
thesis to the empirical literature on FDI determinants in European transition 
economies and beyond.  
An empirical investigation at firm-level was also considered, but later dismissed due 
to lack of availability of, and access to, usable firm-level data. The severe limitations 
of firm-level FDI data availability across Europe appears to be the main reason why 
there has been limited micro-level research on (the determinants) FDI to date (CEPR, 
2012). The availability (and accessibility) of data for the purpose of such research 
appears to be particularly limited for European transition economies. An initial 
research into firm-level data sources identified four databases which provide 
comparable data on firms from several European economies to European transition 
economies, none of which appear to be publicly available. The first two, EBRD’s 
foreign investment survey used by Smarzynska-Javorcik (2002) and the PECODB 
database (Alessandrini, 2000, cited in Resmini, 2000, p. 666) used by Resmini 
(2000) and Altomonte and Resmini (2001), were dismissed because they cover 
investment decisions only in the first years of transition. This was considered a major 
limitation in the context of transition which is characterised by quick and major 
changes in the business environment, and in the economy/society overall. The other 
two databases, Amadeus and Zephyr by Bureau Van Dijk, appear to be suitable for 
this analysis because they provide up to date information regarding the investment 
decisions of a large number of European firms, but the high financial cost of 
accessing this data has prevented the inclusion of a firm-level investigation in this 
thesis. 
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This thesis is structured as follows. The first question addressed in Chapter 1 of this 
thesis is “Why should European transition economies seek to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI)?”. The list of benefits from inwards FDI conventionally cited in 
literature is initially assessed to establish the importance of FDI for host countries, 
followed by an examination of the characteristics of European transition economies 
which are argued to make FDI even more important in the context of transition from 
a centrally planned to a market economy. Subsequently, the analysis focuses on the 
characteristics of European transition economies’ level and quality of human capital 
development that may affect the desirability of their workforce to foreign investors. 
Accordingly, the next two questions addressed in this chapter are: “What is the 
(relative) volume and quality of European transition economies’ human capital?” 
and “How do European transition economies differ from other economies in terms of 
their human capital formation and labour market structure?”. To answer these, an 
overview of traditional measures of educational attainment and direct measures of 
cognitive skills is provided, as well as an assessment of some key characteristics of 
these economies’ education systems and labour markets that directly affect the 
formation of their human capital. The final question addressed in Chapter 1 is “How 
successful have European transition economies been at attracting FDI since the fall 
of communism”. To address this question, a statistical overview of FDI patterns in 
the sample and in individual economies is provided.  
The initial question addressed in Chapter 2 of this thesis is “How are FDI flows 
explained in economic theory?”.  A review of different approaches to explaining the 
determinants of FDI is used to examine the conditions that must be satisfied for a 
firm to decide to undertake FDI, in the first place, and the factors that are expected to 
affect its location decision. To inform the empirical investigations of this thesis, a 
question that is of particular interest in this review was “Does availability/quality of 
human capital in potential investment destinations affect a firm’s choice of 
location?”. Having found very few references to human capital in FDI theory, an 
underlying theoretical rationale for a relationship between human capital and 
inwards FDI is sought in macroeconomic growth theory, where human capital has 
gained a central role in recent decades. Accordingly, the question “How does human 
capital affect labour- and total factor-productivity (growth) at macroeconomic 
level?” is next addressed in this chapter in an attempt to draw conclusions on the 
16 
 
mechanisms through which it may affect the profitability, and hence location 
decisions of, foreign investors. Finally, having established in Chapter 1 that foreign 
investors may affect the skills of the host country workforce, the final question 
addressed in this chapter “Is there likely to be an endogeneity problem in the 
empirical analyses in this thesis due to reverse causation in the relationship between 
human capital and FDI?”.  
Having previously provided a theoretical rationale for a relationship between human 
capital and inwards FDI, the next question addressed in Chapter 3 is “Does the 
current empirical evidence support the hypothesis that inwards FDI is attracted by 
higher levels of human capital?”. A critical review of previous studies shows no 
apparent consensus: positive, insignificant, and even negative effects of human 
capital on FDI have been reported. Therefore, a meta-regression analysis (MRA) is 
estimated as a means of quantitatively analysing the results of previous literature. 
The first question addressed by the MRA is “Is an ‘authentic’ effect of human 
capital on inwards FDI evident in previous research?”. MRA estimates provide an 
“average” of the estimated empirical effects which synthesises the results of previous 
research. In this context, a second important question to be addressed by the MRA is 
“Can the contradictory results be explained by different characteristics of the 
original studies?”. The conclusions drawn from the MRA warrant a deeper analysis 
of how human capital is likely to affect labour productivity (and FDI) and whether 
the conventionally used measures are appropriate.  
The analysis in Chapter 4 builds on the discussion in Chapter 2 on the channels 
through which human capital is expected to affect inwards FDI by addressing the 
question “What are the specific productivity-enhancing characteristics of human 
capital that (foreign) investors value and where/how are these developed?”. To 
address this question, some key assumptions of human capital theory and growth 
theory are critically appraised and implications for the measurement of human 
capital in empirical research are developed. A list of cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills that are expected to be valued in a market economy is identified and the 
manner in which these are formed is researched as a matter of importance both from 
a policy perspective and for informing the choice of appropriate human capital 
measures in applied research. This generic discussion is further contextualised to 
European transition economies, utilising the specific characteristics of their human 
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capital identified in Chapter 1. Accordingly, the next research question to be 
addressed in Chapter 4 is “What are the appropriate measures of human capital 
when estimating its effect on inwards FDI in European transition?”. It is argued in 
this research that there are transition-specific factors beyond those related to human 
capital that need to be accounted for and the theoretical framework provided in 
Chapter 2 needs to be extended accordingly. Hence, the final question addressed in 
Chapter 4 is “Which are the transition-specific factors that can affect inwards FDI 
in European transition economies and how should they be controlled for in empirical 
investigations?”. 
Drawing upon the analyses in Chapter 2 and 4, a baseline model was specified in 
order to address the key question of Chapter 5: “Do European transition economies 
with higher levels of human capital manage to attract more inwards FDI?”. Initially, 
the effect of different human capital measures on FDI inflows is estimated using a 
panel-robust Fixed Effect (FE) estimator, Driscoll-Kraay estimator and two-way 
cluster robust estimator. However, since the human capital variables used here 
change slowly over time, the Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD) estimator 
which also utilises cross-country variation is favoured on the grounds of higher 
efficiency. Accordingly, the estimations are also carried out using a FEVD estimator. 
Finally, considering arguments in favour of using FDI stocks as the dependent 
variable, the effect of human capital on FDI is estimated in a stock-adjustment 
framework using the Corrected Dynamic Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDVC) 
estimator. The other question addressed in this chapter is “Do the transition-specific 
characteristics of human capital affect the level of inwards FDI received by 
European transition economies?”. To answer this the baseline model is augmented 
with proxies to account for the extent to which the workforce of these economies has 
been affected by the characteristics of human capital formation during communism 
analysed in Chapters 1 and 4.      
Chapter 6 extends the empirical investigation of the previous chapter to a sector- 
and industry-level. The first question addressed in Chapter 6 is “In which economic 
activities is any relationship between inwards FDI and human capital expected to be 
stronger?”. To answer this, a classification of economic sectors is first provided 
based on their association with different types of FDI and the manufacturing sector is 
identified as the sector where inwards FDI is likely to be more sensitive to the 
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measures of human capital. Accordingly, the next question addressed in this chapter 
is “Do European transition economies with higher levels of human capital manage 
to attract more inwards FDI to their manufacturing sector?”. To answer this 
question, the effect of different human capital variables on manufacturing FDI is 
estimated in a stock-adjustment framework using the LSDVC and System GMM 
(Generalised Method of Moments) estimators using, respectively, aggregate 
manufacturing FDI stocks and country-industry pairs of FDI stocks as an 
independent variable. Next, drawing from the skill-biased technical change 
hypothesis, it is hypothesised that the effect of human capital on FDI is likely to be 
stronger in more technology-intensive manufacturing industries. Accordingly, the 
last question to be addressed in this chapter is “Is there a (stronger) effect of human 
capital on FDI in medium- and high-technology manufacturing industries compared 
to that in low-technology industries in European transition economies”. Similar to 
the approach above, a System GMM estimator is used on country-industry pairs of 
FDI stocks to address this question. 
Chapter 7 synthesises the main findings of this thesis and lists its main contributions 
to knowledge and identifies its main limitations. The first question addressed in this 
chapter is “How can the (largely insignificant) findings of this thesis be explained?”. 
After having examined alternative potential explanations, the final question to be 
addressed is “(How) do the findings of the empirical investigation challenge the 
conventional view on the relationship between human capital and FDI at theoretical 
level and the way in which this is investigated empirically?”. This chapter concludes 
with suggestions for further research and explores some wider implications of this 
thesis’ findings for future macro-level research involving measures of human capital. 
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1.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to provide the context for the research conducted in this thesis by 
answering three questions. First, this chapter will provide arguments as to why 
inwards foreign direct investment (FDI) is expected to be beneficial from a host 
country’s perspective, with special reference to European transition economies. 
Second, this chapter will present the trends of inwards FDI in European transition 
economies since the beginning of transition and its distribution among individual 
economies. The importance of FDI for these economies is then discussed in terms of 
its contribution to capital accumulation and beyond and it is argued that the positive 
effects of FDI in the context of transition can exceed those in other economies. After 
arguing that inwards FDI can be highly beneficial for European transition 
economies, the chapter will assess human capital formation in these economies as 
one of the factors that may attract FDI. In particular, this chapter will investigate 
how the (legacy of) communist education systems and labour markets have affected 
the workforce of these economies, seeking to answer the third question: why and 
how this workforce is likely to differ from that of developed economies? 
Although the aim of this chapter is to provide a context for the analyses in the rest of 
this thesis, the analysis is kept narrow and tightly based on the research questions to 
be investigated. Namely, this chapter does not seek to provide inclusive discussions 
on the process of transition from a centrally-planned to a market- economy, their 
education systems and labour markets in European transition economies, or general 
patterns of FDI and its effects in these economies, topics which have been analysed 
extensively in previous literature on transition economies. Rather, this chapter seeks 
to identify and analyse the key aspects of these topics that are argued to be directly 
related to the potential relationship between human capital and FDI and in this 
specific context and, as such, will inform the investigations that are undertaken in the 
rest of this research.   
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 explains why European 
transition economies should seek to attract FDI and assesses how successful they 
have been at this over the last two decades. More specifically, Sub-section 1.2.1 
examines the nature of FDI and its potential benefits for the host economy, whilst 
Sub-section 1.2.2 extends and contextualises this discussion for European transition 
economies and provides a statistical overview of inwards FDI in these economies. 
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Sections 1.3 analyses measures of the quantity and quality of human capital 
formation in European transition economies. In particular, it discussed the type of 
skills that their (pre-transition) education systems tended to emphasise. Section 1.4 
continues to analyse the dimensions of labour markets in these economies that may 
determine their attractiveness to foreign investors. In particular, it examines the level 
of labour costs in these economies and emphasises the importance of considering 
how the (legacy of) specific characteristics of pre-transition labour markets have 
shaped the skills and attitudes of the workforce. Section 1.5 summarises the findings 
and explains how these motivate the key research questions that will be addressed in 
the rest of this research.  
1.2 Why should European transition economies seek to attract 
FDI? 
This section seeks to establish the importance of inwards FDI for European transition 
economies and to illustrate the extent to which these countries have managed to 
attract FDI over the last two decades since the fall of communism. Sub-section 1.2.1 
starts with a more generic discussion focusing on the nature of FDI and the ways in 
which host economies can benefit from it, whilst Sub-section 1.2.2 identifies and 
analyses key dimensions of the transition process that are argued to make FDI even 
more important in this context. In presenting this analysis the focus of this sub-
section is on dimensions of European transition economies that are considered to be 
closely related to the focus of this research programme. More general discussions on 
various aspects of the transition process and these countries’ overall economic 
development during transition can be found, among others, in Lipton et al. (1990), 
World Bank (1996), Blanchard (1997), Roland (2000), Blejer and Skreb (2001), Filer 
et al. (2001), Campos and Coricelli (2002), Jeffries (2002), World Bank (2002) 
Winiecki and Kondratowicz (2005), Bandelj (2007), Lieberman and Kopf (2008), 
EBRD (various years) and UNECE (various years). General patterns of FDI inflows 
into European transition economies and their effects have also been extensively 
documented and analysed by previous studies, among which are: Lankes and Stern 
(1998), Kaminski and Riboud (2000), Hunya (2000a,b; 2004), UNECE (2001), 
Sohinger, 2005, Kalotay (2001; 2010), FIAS (2007), UNCTAD (various years) and 
EBRD (various years).  
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1.2.1 The (potential) benefits of FDI for the host economy 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) accounts for the largest share of external capital 
flows into developing and transition economies (UNCTAD, 2011). From a host 
country’s perspective, FDI is considered to be more attractive compared to other 
forms of international capital flows, i.e. portfolio investment and other investments 
such as commercial loans or trade credits, partly because it is (largely) non-debt 
creating and relatively more stable (UNECE, 2001; Albuquerque, 2003). UNCTAD 
(2011) shows that the volatility of FDI inflows as measured for each year by the 
relative standard deviation (i.e. coefficient of variation) for the preceding ten years 
has been considerably lower compared to that of portfolio and other investment 
during the period 2001-2010 (Figure 1.1 below). The Figure below further suggests 
that, despite experiencing higher volatility compared to previous years, global FDI 
has remained considerably more resilient compared to other types of investment 
during the latest financial crisis. 
Figure 1.1: Volatility of global FDI inflows, 2003-2010 
 
Source: World Investment Report 2011 (UNCTAD, 2011) 
One of the reasons why FDI is less volatile compared to financial investment lies in 
the nature of ‘direct’ investment and the duration of the commitment it involves. The 
commitment of the investment when undertaking foreign direct investment is, by 
definition, considered to be of a long-term nature. According to IMF and OECD 
definitions (IMF, 1993, 2009; OECD, 1996, 2008), direct investment is an 
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investment made by a resident entity of one economy (the ‘direct investor’) aimed at 
establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise that is resident in another economy (the 
‘direct investment enterprise’), including the reinvestment of any profits made by the 
direct investment enterprise. According to this definition, the ‘lasting interest’ 
involves the acquisition of at least 10% of the shares or voting power of the direct 
investment enterprise by the foreign investor. The ‘lasting interest’ is considered to 
imply a strategic long-term relationship between the entities and a significant degree 
of influence by the direct investor in the management of the direct investment 
enterprise. This distinguishes FDI from portfolio investment which typically 
involves a lower share of ownership/voting power held by the foreign investor and 
generally no influence in the management of the direct investment enterprise.  
The long-term nature of FDI and the involvement of the foreign investors in the 
management of the enterprise are argued to make the investors more prone to 
transfer both technology in the form of capital goods, and technological and 
managerial know-how to the direct investment enterprise. De Mello (1997, p. 9), for 
instance, argue that this is because direct investment allows the foreign investor to 
retain “formal control of the technology and knowledge transferred”. The association 
of FDI with the purchase or in kind transfer of capital goods is argued to make it less 
reversible because fixed assets are more difficult to liquidate (UNECE, 2001). 
Moreover, together with the transfer of know-how, this appears to represent the 
single most important reason why FDI is argued to benefit the host economies more 
than any other type of foreign investment or domestic fixed capital formation, a 
proposition examined in the rest of this sub-section. Considering that, as Blomström 
and Kokko (2003, p. 3) point out, multinational enterprises (MNE) “undertake a 
major part of the world’s private R&D efforts and produce, own, and control most of 
the world’s advanced technology”, the scope for transfer of advanced capital goods 
and technological know-how to the host country through the foreign investment they 
undertake appears to be large. Consistent with the arguments above, FDI is widely 
recognised as one of the most powerful channels for the transmission of technology 
and know-how across countries, especially from developed to developing and 
transition economies (e.g. Blomström et al., 1996; World Bank, 2008a). The 
association of FDI with such transmission in turn is the starting point for most 
arguments that link FDI to numerous benefits for the host economy, discussed 
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below, and ultimately faster economic growth (de Mello, 1997; Blomström and 
Kokko, 2003; Ozturk, 2007; Deng et al., 2009; Weber, 2010).  
According to orthodox FDI theory which is reviewed in Section 2.2, foreign 
investment will occur only under the condition that an MNE (believes it) has, or will 
gain, a firm-specific advantage by locating production in a foreign country. The 
possession of this firm-specific advantage, usually in the form of superior technology 
and/or knowledge, is what is expected to more than offset the inherent difficulties of 
operating on foreign soil, allowing MNE’s to compete successfully with domestic 
firms and those in the countries they may wish to export to from the investment 
destination (Blomström and Kokko, 2003; Ford et al., 2008). With this argument as a 
starting point, foreign investment enterprises are inherently expected to have higher 
(labour and) total factor productivity compared to their domestic counterparts in the 
same sector. Thus, the mere operation of MNE affiliates in the host economy is 
expected to be associated with technological progress and increased productivity 
(UNECE, 2001; Uzagalieva et al., 2010). By increasing the competitiveness of the 
industries in which they enter, MNE’s will influence the structure of production and 
employment in the host economy. If inwards FDI is predominantly directed towards 
high-technology and high-skill intensive sectors and/or stages of production, it can 
drive the host economy towards greater specialisation in high value-added activities 
(Resmini, 2000; UNECE, 2001; UNCTAD, 2002). Similarly, FDI can increase 
competitiveness, and by implication, the size, of exports, improving the host 
country’s external financial position. In addition, FDI can affect the composition of 
the host country’s exports, potentially towards goods and services with a higher 
R&D content, thereby helping the host economy to move up the global value chain 
(UNCTAD, 2002; Sohinger, 2005). The development of higher value added (stages 
of) production in the host country, i.e. the production of more valuable products, in 
turn, generate more income (and profits for the companies) and create higher-skill 
and higher paying jobs which are relatively more sustainable because they are less 
wage-elastic.  
In the process of production, MNE’s can also affect the skills of the host countries’ 
workforce and enhance their R&D capabilities. In order to be able to successfully 
perform their jobs in the foreign affiliate enterprises, local employees and managers 
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are expected to learn from the parent firms or expatriate staff based in the host 
country. Regardless of the form of this transfer of knowledge, i.e. whether this is 
done through formal training or just learning by doing, the MNE will this way 
augment the knowledge and skills of the host country’s workforce (de Mello, 1997; 
Blomström and Kokko, 2003). Furthermore, FDI can enhance the technological 
capacity of the host country by financing and undertaking R&D there. The World 
Bank (2008a) argues that although this is not a common in the case of developing 
and transition economies, there is an increasing trend of MNE’s undertaking R&D in 
these countries. Finally, in addition to the direct effect of MNE’s through the transfer 
of knowledge to their local employees, they may also affect the skills of the host 
country’s workforce indirectly. Namely, to the extent that MNE’s seek skilled 
labour, their presence in the host market may encourage individuals to upgrade their 
skills, e.g. through education and training, in order to secure a job in these firms 
which, evidence suggests, tend to pay higher wages compared to their domestic 
counterparts (Onaran and Stockhammer, 2008; Andrews et al., 2009; Eriksson and 
Pytlikova, 2011).  
The potential effects of FDI discussed above refer to the transfer or development of 
technological and managerial know-how by the foreign investors, directly, i.e. under 
the control of the parent company, or through the provision of appropriate incentives 
for this to occur. However, know-how can also leak, or ‘spill over’, to the host 
economy through multiple channels, with or without the foreign affiliates’ will or 
intention. These ‘spillovers’ of technological and organisational know-how from the 
foreign investment enterprise can affect the whole industry where the enterprise 
operates, as well as to other related industries through forward and backward 
linkages.  
First, firms in the MNE’s own industrial sector may be affected by positive 
spillovers in several ways. Just by observing the operation of the MNE, domestic 
firms can learn about new products, production techniques, inputs, and management 
and marketing practices, which they can replicate or modify in order to improve their 
productivity (UNECE, 2001; World Bank, 2008a; Vahter, 2010 Fu, 2012). Managers 
and employees who have gained direct knowledge and experience in the foreign 
investment enterprises can subsequently quit, transferring their new skills to other 
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employers or using them to establish their own firms (Blomström and Kokko, 2003; 
World Bank, 2008a;  Fu, 2012). Moreover, even the mere increase in competition 
from the MNE’s can be beneficial for the host market. Namely, the entry of MNE’s 
can reduce the market power of existing firms and introduce new and/or better 
products or services in the market and, by doing so, it may ‘force’ its competitors to 
introduce new products and production techniques and to increase their investment in 
human capital (Blomström et al., 2000). Finally, FDI may encourage the formation 
of industrial clusters in the host economy, creating a self-reinforcing effect by 
attracting further FDI, i.e. the ‘agglomeration economies’ effect to be discussed in 
Section 2.3.  
Second, MNE’s may affect the firms in upstream and downstream industries in the 
recipient country. The upstream industries may benefit simply because MNEs may 
increase the demand for intermediate products. In addition, local suppliers to the 
foreign investment enterprise may be trained and advised by the MNE in order to 
improve their production standards and/or design to the level required by the MNE 
(World Bank, 2008a). The MNE’s supplier can then deploy this new know-how 
more broadly, i.e. in the production of other products and/or products for other 
clients. Similarly, positive spillovers can occur in downstream industries. Namely, 
the buyers of the MNE’s products may receive technical assistance or training from 
the MNE; and they can benefit from the higher competition between the suppliers in 
terms of lower prices and/or introduction of new varieties of intermediate goods by 
the MNE.  
The potential effects of FDI discussed above have direct implications for the way 
FDI is expected to ultimately affect economic growth in the host country, as 
explained later in this section. However, first it is important to note that the positive 
spillovers from FDI do not occur automatically and the size of spillovers depends on 
the type of activities that are undertaken in the host economy by the MNE’s as well 
as the “absorption” capacities of the domestic firms and other business environment 
and institutional factors, as explained later in this section.  
The positive spillovers are going to be limited if MNE’s intentionally limit the 
affiliates’ access to the technology adopted and the R&D they undertake, for instance 
if they fear that intellectual property rights are not protected (Dunning, 1994; 
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UNECE, 2001). In this case the scope for technical advancement and technological 
learning in the host country would be limited, regardless of the absorptive capacities 
of the host economy. By the same token, the spillovers to downstream industries will 
be limited if the foreign affiliate only buys low value-added intermediate products 
from local suppliers (and importing higher value-added products or producing them 
in-house). Moreover, FDI may also have negative effects on the host country’s 
economy, although these appear to taken into consideration relatively rarely in 
academic research and in policy-making. This can occur if MNE’s deploy too few, or 
the “wrong” kind of technological capabilities (Dunning, 1994; UNECE, 2001), for 
instance if the host country is relatively well endowed with cheap low-skilled labour. 
If the level of technology deployed is low and the production of foreign affiliates in 
the host country is restricted to low value-added activities, even the direct positive 
effects (i.e. within the control of the foreign affiliate), such as increased productivity, 
export competitiveness and improvement of a country’s position in the global value 
chain, may not occur or may even be negative. Further, the ‘competition effect’ of an 
MNE’s entry does not necessarily improve competition and encourage incumbent 
firms to innovate and/or increase their productivity. On the contrary, its entry can 
reduce competition in the domestic market by ‘crowding out’ incumbent firms, i.e. 
forcing them out of the market because they may not be able to invest in upgrading 
their technology and know-how in order to compete with the MNE (UNECE, 2001). 
Finally, concerns have also been raised about potential negative effects of inwards 
FDI related to host countries’ national security (e.g. if foreign investors have 
excessive control over strategic industries that are important defence capabilities) 
and excessive influence of foreign investors in host countries’ policy-making (Golub, 
2003). 
The potential effects of FDI on the host economy discussed above, both direct and 
through spillovers, have implications for the way FDI is treated in growth theory. In 
a neoclassical growth framework (e.g. Solow, 1956) long-term economic growth is 
determined by technological change which is assumed to grow exogenously at a 
constant rate. In this setting, there is no scope for FDI to influence the rate of 
technological change through the channels discussed earlier; therefore FDI can be 
treated as merely a means of funding capital accumulation in the host economy. 
Foreign capital is essentially equivalent to domestic capital and, as such, it can only 
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have a short-term impact on the host country’s output growth. In an endogenous 
growth framework, on the other hand, knowledge and technological advancement are 
endogenously determined and they are of crucial importance in explaining long-term 
growth (Section 2.3 provides a more detailed discussion). In this framework, the 
growth-enhancing potential of FDI is much greater than that predicted by 
neoclassical models (e.g., Balasubramanyam et al., 1996). As explained earlier, FDI 
is likely to be associated with the introduction/development of new technology and 
know-how, both directly and through spillovers. In endogenous growth models, to 
the extent that FDI causes or encourages human capital development and technical 
change in the host economy, it can be treated as an “engine of growth”, affecting not 
only short-term output movements, but also long-term economic growth.  
Accordingly, with endogenous growth models (Romer, 1990; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991) as a starting point, Borenzstein et al. (1998) develop a theoretical 
model in which FDI as a channel of technology advancement is the main determinant 
of economic growth in developing economies. In this model, MNEs due to their 
superior ‘knowledge’, i.e. what is referred to as the ‘ownership advantage’ in FDI 
theory reviewed in the next chapter, can introduce new capital goods at a lower cost 
compared to domestic firms. Therefore, FDI can increase the rate at which advanced 
technology is introduced, therefore increasing economic growth in the long run. 
However, Borenzstein et al. argue that the effect of FDI on growth depends on the 
level of human capital in the host economy. According to these authors, the level of 
human capital (measured by the average years of secondary schooling for males in 
their model) determines the size of the effect of FDI on growth because it affects the 
ability of a country’s workforce to understand, adopt, and adapt, the new 
technologies embodied in FDI. This argument is consistent with the Nelson-Phelps 
hypothesis (discussed further in Section 2.3) according to which human capital 
facilitates technology diffusion.  
Consistent with the theoretical arguments that suggest the effects of FDI can be 
diverse and depend on host country characteristics, empirical evidence on the 
benefits of FDI has been mixed (De Mello, 1997; Blomström and Kokko, 2003; 
Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004; Ozturk, 2007; Smarzynska-Javorcik, 2008; Smeets, 
2008). There appears to be some evidence of positive spillovers, from foreign 
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affiliates to domestic firms, regardless of domestic firm characteristics (Jensen, 
2009; Havranek and Irsova, 2010; Vahter, 2010); and of a positive effect of FDI on 
growth at a macro level, unconditional of host country characteristics (Campos and 
Kinoshita, 2002; Nath, 2009; Ekanayake and Ledgerwood, 2010). However, the 
literature at large does not appear to come to clear conclusions. Rather, as Lipsey and 
Sjöholm (2004, p. 25) conclude in their review of studies addressing FDI and 
economic growth, “the main lesson might be that the search for a universal 
relationship is futile”. Accordingly, the consensus view that seems to emerge 
currently from the empirical literature, consistent with the theoretical arguments 
discussed earlier in this section, is that a positive impact of FDI is not automatic and 
it depends crucially on the absorptive capacity of the host economy and/or its firms. 
Different authors have identified different determinants of the absorptive capacity of 
the host economy. The most widely cited appears to be the level of human capital, as 
hypothesised by Borenzstein et al. (1998) above and empirically supported by the 
same study as well many others (e.g. Xu, 2000; Ford et al., 2008; Wang and Wong, 
2009). Other factors determining the (size of) FDI effects in terms of positive 
spillovers and economic growth at country level have been found to be: well-
functioning markets (Balasubramanyam, et al. 1996), a higher technological level of 
the host economy’s firms (Pessoa, 2008; Havranek and Irsova, 2010), strong 
safeguarding of intellectual property rights (Smarzynska-Javorcik, 1999), benevolent 
financial systems and financial market regulations (Hermes and Lensink, 2003; 
Alfaro et al., 2004; Durham, 2004; Wang and Wong, 2009) and high level of host 
country openness (Basu et al., 2003; Havranek and Irsova, 2010; Weber, 2010). 
1.2.2 Inwards FDI and its effects on European transition economies  
1.2.2.1 A statistical overview of inwards FDI and its contribution to financing 
investment  
Until the beginning of the 1990s, European transition economies had negligible 
stocks of FDI due to previous restrictive policies that had been implemented 
primarily for doctrinal reasons (UNCTAD, 2008a). However, beginning in the 1990s 
these countries implemented extensive reforms: they liberalised trade, implemented 
privatisations of state-owned enterprises and made efforts to improve their 
macroeconomic performance. In hand with these, European transition economies 
created regulatory frameworks that were favourable to FDI. They have removed 
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most barriers to foreign investment, provided them ‘national treatment’ (i.e. the same 
treatment as domestically-owned firms) and protection of their investment, including 
protection from expropriation, the right to transfer profits abroad and to repatriate 
any invested capital (Witkowska, 2007; UNCTAD, 2008b). In addition, most of 
these countries provided various incentive packages for foreign investors in the form 
of tax exemptions for varying periods (up to ten years), duty-free imports of (high-
tech) equipment, job creation benefits, training grants, etc. (UNCTAD, 2008b). 
Partly reflecting these policy changes, European transition economies managed to 
attract increasingly larger FDI inflows until the beginning of global financial crisis, 
reaching a record of USD 75 billion in 2007. Figure 1.2 shows the aggregate FDI 
inflows into European transition economies which, as explained in the Preface, refer 
to the sixteen Central and Eastern European (CEE) and Baltic economies: Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.  
Figure 1.2: FDI inflows into European transition economies, 1992-2010 (Billion USD)*  
 
 
 
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on UNCTADStat (UNCTAD, 2012)  
*FDI inflows were aggregated for the whole sample of European transition economies. 
They are measured in US Dollars at current prices and current exchange rates.   
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Despite the large drop in FDI inflows in 2008-2010, FDI stocks in European 
transition economies have seen a generally rising trend since the beginning of 
transition (Figure 1.3 below).  Similarly, during the transition period these 
economies managed to attract an increasing share of global FDI stock from 0.7 in 
1994 to a peak of 4.3 percent in 2008 which is high relative to their share of global 
population (1.8 percent) and output (1.5 percent), calculated based on data from WDI 
(2010). The European transition economies’ share of global FDI, however, 
experienced a slight decline in the following years, which corresponds with the 
global financial crisis.  
Figure 1.3: FDI stocks in European transition economies, 1993-2010 (Billion USD)* 
 
 
 
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
Source: Own calculations based on UNCTADStat (2012)   
*FDI inflows were aggregated for the whole sample of European transition economies. 
They are measured in US Dollars at current prices and current exchange rates.   
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Table 1.1: Distribution of FDI stocks, 2010 
Country Share of FDI (%) 
Poland 27.0 
Czech Republic 18.1 
Hungary 12.8 
Romania 9.8 
Slovak Republic 7.1 
Bulgaria 6.7 
Croatia 4.8 
Serbia 2.9 
Estonia 2.3 
Slovenia 2.1 
Lithuania 1.9 
Latvia 1.5 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 1.0 
Montenegro 0.8 
Macedonia, FYR 0.6 
Albania 0.6 
Total 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on UNCTADStat (UNCTAD, 2012) 
 
However, once the size of their economies is accounted for, a different picture 
appears (see Figure 1.4 below). From the Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) above, only the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Hungary seem to 
stand out in terms of their success in attracting FDI stocks, suggesting that Poland 
and Romania are top destinations mainly due to the size of their market. Other top 
performers, having accounted for the size of their economy, are Montenegro, Estonia 
and Bulgaria, followed by Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia. An initial glance at the 
characteristics of the top performers suggests that some of other factors driving the 
FDI distribution within European transition economies, in addition to the size of the 
economy, could be the speed of reform and transformation to a market economy, 
privatisation opportunities, (prospects of) EU accession and availability of natural 
resources. For instance: 
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary and Estonia are renowned for being fast 
reformers among European transition economies (OECD, 2001; Sohinger, 2005) 
The major share of Bulgaria’s inward FDI has been accumulated in the wake of its 
accession to the EU and in years after that (Kalotay, 2008; UNCTAD, 2011) 
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Both Bulgaria and Croatia have undergone large-scale privatisations in the recent 
years (EBRD, various years; UNCTAD, various years). The domination of 
privatisation-related FDI appears to be indicated by the unusually high FDI inflows 
in these countries in the years when these privatisations took place (UNCTAD, 
2012).  
Montenegro has experienced considerable FDI inflows in the tourism sector and, 
related to this, its coastal real estate sector (e.g. ESI, 2012). 
Figure 1.4: FDI stocks as a share of GDP, 2010 (%) 
 
 
 
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 Source: UNCTADStat (UNCTAD, 2012)     
 *FDI stocks measured in US Dollars at current prices and current exchange rates.   
 
The importance of FDI is perhaps most clearly indicated by its contribution to gross 
fixed capital formation (GFCF) in the host economy. A review of the (unweighted) 
average shares of FDI in European transition economies in their GFCF indicates that 
FDI has played a significant role in supplementing domestic investment since the 
beginning of the transition period. Table 1.2 below shows that all European 
transition economies with the exception of Slovenia have had average shares of FDI 
in GFCF in excess of 13 percent in the period 1992-2009. Slovenia also appears to 
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be an exception in that it has managed to achieve very high investment rates in this 
period (its average being ranked fourth in the sample), despite the limited 
contribution of FDI. On the other hand, those relying more heavily on FDI are 
Bulgaria with an FDI/GFCF ratio of almost 40 percent, Estonia and Hungary at 
ratios of over 25 percent, and Macedonia and Slovak Republic at a ratio exceeding 
20 percent. Overall, the shares of FDI in GFCF in European transition economies, 
with the exception of Slovenia, appear to be high by international standards: almost 
all the countries’ averages (by far) exceed the average shares of around 9 and 11 
percent for the group of developed and developing economies, respectively, in the 
same period (UNCTAD, 2012).   
Table 1.2: Average* FDI/GFCF and GFCF/GDP ratios, 1992-2009 
Country FDI/GFCF (%) GFCF/GDP (%) 
Bulgaria 38.9 18.9 
Estonia 27.5 28.0 
Hungary 25.6 21.7 
Slovak Republic 21.0 28.3 
Macedonia, FYR 20.8 17.7 
Czech Republic 19.4 27.3 
Latvia 19.3 22.7 
Croatia 18.2 20.8 
Serbia and Montenegro*** 17.3 15.0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina** 16.5 22.6 
Poland 16.3 20.1 
Romania 16.1 22.2 
Albania 13.9 21.5 
Lithuania 13.9 22.5 
Slovenia  6.6 24.0 
Source: Own calculations based on UNCTADStat (UNCTAD, 2012); WDI (2010) 
*The reported figures refer to unweighted averages 
**Data covers the period up to the break up of Serbia and Montenegro (until 2007) 
***Data for Bosnia and Herzegovina covers only the period after the war (from 1996) 
A note of caution seems to be is in order when interpreting the shares of FDI in 
domestic investment. This ratio implicitly assumes that FDI contributes to gross 
capital formation, i.e. either in kind transfers physical capital or the provision of the 
funding necessary for its purchase. However, the definition of FDI does not specify 
the use of the funding: FDI may involve investment in physical capital, but also 
mergers and acquisitions, i.e. a change in ownership which does not necessary 
contribute to fixed capital formation. This concern has been previously raised by 
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Lipsey (2000) who fails to find empirical support for the hypothesis that FDI has a 
positive effect on capital formation in developing economies. Accordingly, various 
studies have argued that this could especially be a cause for concern in transition 
economies where, as discussed later, a considerable share of FDI has involved 
enterprise acquisitions in the form of privatisations (Krkosa, 2001; UNECE, 2001). 
However, despite these concerns, Krkosa’s (2001) empirical investigation suggests a 
positive relationship between FDI and GFCF in Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
economies. The results of this study further suggest that the impact of FDI on capital 
formation in these economies is substantially higher than other sources of finance 
such as domestic credit and capital market financing. One reason why a significant 
relationship is found between FDI and domestic investment in these CEE economies, 
despite the high share of FDI related to privatisation, may be that the old vintage of 
the capital in the formerly state-owned companies made it necessary for foreign 
investors to invest in physical capital upon acquisition. Kalotay (2001) and Meyer 
and Estrin (2001), for instance, note a tendency of privatisations made by foreign 
investors in these economies to be followed by new investment in physical capital, 
often exceeding the size of the initial investment. However, the importance of FDI 
for transition economies may be best illustrated by the effects it has had on the real 
economy, discussed next.   
1.2.2.2 The effects of inwards FDI in the context of European transition 
economies 
At the outset of transition high levels of inward FDI were considered as essential for 
the successful and speedy transformation of the formerly centrally-planned 
economies (Lipton et al., 1990; Donges and Wieners, 1994; Sachs, 1997). Therefore, 
it is no surprise that virtually all European transition economies appear to have put 
the attraction of FDI high in their policy agendas during the transition period. In 
terms of “financial flow effects”, revenues from privatisation-related FDI have 
served as a means for some of the European transition to finance their budget 
deficits, reduce their external debt and/or boost their foreign reserves (UNECE, 
2001). However, as explained above, the potential for FDI to (positively) affect the 
economy by far exceeds any improvement in the external financial positions, and it 
is argued here to be greater in these economies compared to that in other economies 
due to the specific nature of the transition.  
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At the outset of transition, European transition economies were left with deep 
structural distortions inherited from the previous system. In communist economies 
the structure of the economy did not necessarily correspond to the demands of the 
market or the comparative advantages of regions and countries (Filer et al., 2001). 
The structure of production and employment reflected the priorities of the central 
planners: industrialisation of the production structures formerly focused mainly on 
agriculture and development of military power (e.g. Brunello et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, their resources were mainly channelled towards heavy industry, while 
the production of consumptions goods and the service sector was not considered as 
important (e.g. Lipton et al., 1990; Filer et al., 2001; Campos and Coricelli, 2002). 
Moreover, their manufacturing sectors were extremely biased toward heavy industry 
and once the communist system collapsed they faced chronic excess demand because 
“they produced goods...without benefits...for consumption” (Lipton et al., 1990, 
p.79). On the other hand, these economies had price distortions and shortages of 
consumption goods inherited from the previous system which contributed to 
macroeconomic imbalances such as hyperinflation and high current account deficits 
(Kalotay, 2001). In this respect, foreign enterprises through their day-to-day 
operations, i.e. their production and pricing practices, contributed to the amelioration 
of the price distortions inherited from the previous system; the elimination of 
shortages of goods and services that were demanded in the market and the reduction 
in host countries’ trade deficits (Kalotay, 2001).  
In addition to these structural problems, the ex-communist economies were also 
characterised by inefficient technologies and obsolete physical assets in their existing 
industries (Filer et al., 2001; Orts et al., 2005). Under these conditions, considerable 
resources were needed to fund required fixed investment for restructuring at the level 
of the enterprise and the economy overall. However, the European transition 
economies had limited domestic resources to finance this investment and, given their 
low domestic savings rates (Demekas et al., 2005; Sohinger, 2005), it was very 
important for these economies to be able to rely on foreign capital for this purpose. 
Given that developed economies represent the largest source of greenfield project in 
transition economies (UNCTAD, 2011) and most research and development (R&D) 
takes place in MNEs located in the developed economies, it is reasonable to expected 
that FDI can provide the advanced technology and know-how needed. Accordingly, 
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FDI has recognised as an important source of technological progress in transition 
economies (Campos and Coricelli, 2002; Campos and Kinoshita, 2002; Uzagalieva 
and Kocenda, 2010). Foreign investment companies have also been documented to 
introduce new products, and management, marketing and organisational practices not 
previously used in these economies (Kalotay, 2001; Pavlínek, 2002); promote a new 
work ethic (Filer et al., 2001); improve (labour) productivity, value added of their 
products and export competitiveness (Smith et al., 1997; UNECE, 2001; Hunya, 
2000a, 2002; UNCTAD, 2003); and, consistent with knowledge spillover, to FDI has 
been found to positively affect process innovation in incumbent firms in the industry 
it enters (Vahter, 2010).  
In the previous sub-section it was argued that FDI can affect the industrial 
specialisation of the host country and its position in the global value chain. Resmini 
(2000) argues that these effects can be especially large in the context of transition 
where major changes are occurring in the structure of the economy and export 
patterns. However, these effects have not been uniform across European transition 
economies. Significant structural changes due to FDI have been argued to have taken 
place in those European transition economies which accessed into the European 
Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007 (Kalotay, 2010). The most successful countries in 
materialising these effects are those countries of the CEE which are considered as 
early reformers, e.g. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia (Hunya, 2000a; 
UNCTAD, 2003). On the other hand, Kalotay (2010) points out that the economies 
of South-East Europe (SEE) (except Bulgaria and Romania which accessed into the 
EU in 2007) benefited from FDI-induced structural changes to a much smaller 
extent.  
Finally, the effects of FDI in the context of transition are argued to extend beyond 
those that would be expected in a context of a mature market economy. Transition 
economies, with the partial exception of ex-Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland, had no 
recent experience with private business or markets, which made them poorly 
equipped to (successfully) operate private enterprises and integrate them into the 
world market (Kalotay, 2001; Mihalyi, 2000). In these circumstances, FDI has been 
argued to have a crucial role in strengthening the emerging private sector and 
establishing the institutions necessary for the efficient operation of the market 
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(Kalotay, 2001; Sohinger, 2005). This appears to be particularly the case when it 
comes to privatisation-related FDI, as discussed next. 
FDI has played a major role in the privatisation of formerly state-owned industries in 
European transition economies (Kalotay and Hunya, 2001; UNCTAD, various years; 
EBRD, various years). Privatisation to foreign investors has been shown to be 
associated with superior post-privatisation performance relative to other types of 
privatisation (Smith et al., 1997; Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002; Lizal et al., 2002; 
Kocenda and Svejnar, 2003). Some of the likely reasons for their superior 
performance can be related to: the relatively poor skills of domestic owners to 
operate in a market economy (Harvylyshyn and McGettigan, 1999); the dispersed 
ownership structure created by other methods such as mass privatisation and insider 
privatisation (Claessens et al., 1997; Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002); and, in the case of 
the latter, the likely resistance to restructuring by the managers/employees (Carlin 
and Landesmann, 1997). Perhaps the most important role of privatisation-related FDI 
can be attributed to the privatisation of services such as fixed and mobile 
telecommunications, utilities, banking and insurance, all of which, according to 
Kalotay (2001), have been rapidly upgraded as a result. Here it is argued that FDI in 
these services is particularly important in a transition context. The reliable supply of 
(innovative) services in the telecommunications and utilities industries can directly 
encourage the development of the emerging private sector by decreasing the 
operating costs of private enterprises. Involvement of foreign investors in banking 
and insurance, on the other hand, in addition to helping stimulate an improvement in 
the quality of the services (Kalotay, 2001) and facilitation of financial deepening 
(Schwaiger and Liebeg, 2007), is likely to have a positive effect in terms of 
increasing trust in the financial sector and improving businesses’ perception of the 
business environment. 
In a similar manner, Kalotay (2001) argues that all privatisation-related FDI, 
regardless of the industry, has played a role in increasing the transparency of 
economic transactions, a key feature distinguishing a market economy from the 
previous system. He finds a positive correlation between the share of sales to 
foreign-owned companies and the level of perception of transparency, as measured 
by Transparency International. On the other hand, the correlation between insider 
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privatisation and state ownership and the degree of transparency is found to be 
negative, which, Kalotay argues, is indicative of this type of privatisation leading to 
a similar way of enterprise management with that practiced under the previous 
system. However, privatisations to foreign investors can also be argued to send a 
signal that the host country’s government is genuinely committed to establishing a 
market economy. Consistent with this argument, Sohinger (2005) argue that the 
(speed of) market-based and growth-inducing reforms in transition economies have 
been partly driven by the desire of their governments to attract FDI. 
Further, considering the limited domestic resources in European transition 
economies, it is not clear that some of the larger privatisations could have been 
carried out without the involvement of strategic foreign investors. If these 
privatisations could have been undertaken by domestic private investors, it is unclear 
that they could have successfully restructured and managed, considering the lack of 
knowledge and experience in operating enterprises in a market economy.  
Considering the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence discussed above, 
arguments that FDI has contributed greatly to the amelioration of structural and 
macroeconomic distortions in European transition economies, as well as the speed 
and success of their transformation (Bevan and Estrin, 2004) appear to be warranted. 
In fact, these arguments may explain why FDI has been found to be a significant 
determinant of economic growth in European transition economies (Campos and 
Kinoshita, 2002; Nath, 2009), unconditional of the level of human capital or other 
factors in the host economy, a finding not common for other samples of countries, as 
explained in the previous sub-section. 
1.3 Human capital formation in European transition economies  
The previous section has documented very large disparities in inward FDI within 
European transition economies, even after accounting for the size of their 
economies/population. The different degrees of success in attracting FDI have 
motivated numerous empirical investigations on the factors that drive FDI into 
(European) transition economies (Lansbury et al. 1996; Smarzynska-Javorcik, 2002; 
Kinoshita and Campos, 2003; Serbu, 2005; Bellak et al., 2009; Riedl, 2010; 
Kudriavceva, 2011). These studies have identified various generic- and transition 
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specific- determinants of FDI, but, by-and-large, they tend not to investigate the 
effect that stocks of human capital in these countries may have played in attracting 
FDI. This is somewhat surprising considering that, at the outset of transition, the 
high level of human capital in these economies was expected to represent one of 
their key advantages in competing for FDI (e.g. UNECE, 2001; Kinoshita and 
Campos, 2003; Bevan and Estrin 2004), especially in combination with the relatively 
lower wages compare to Western Europe (Magda et al., 2011), as discussed in the 
next section. The rest of this section will analyse some key dimensions of human 
capital formation in European transition economies that may be relevant to foreign 
investors when choosing their investment location. Namely, the level of educational 
attainment of their workforce is discussed in Sub-section 1.3.1, followed by an 
examination of the mix of occupations and type of skills emphasised in Sub-section 
1.3.2. Finally, Sub-section 1.3.3 provides an assessment of the quality of European 
transition economies’ education systems and the extent to which they develop skills 
that are considered relevant in a dynamic market economy. More general discussions 
of the characteristics of these economies pre-transition education systems and the 
skills they developed have been provided, among others, by World Bank (1996), 
EBRD (1997), Micklewright (1999), Berryman (2000), Pe’teri (2000), Mertaugh and 
Hanushek (2005), Marks and Tesar (2005) and Lamo et al. (2010). 
1.3.1 Educational attainment of the workforce 
Conventionally in the economic literature a country’s human capital endowment is 
measured by rates of educational participation and levels of attainment. Based on 
such quantitative educational outcomes, the formerly planned economies were 
believed to be well-endowed with human capital. In the first decade after transition, 
literacy rates in European transition economies ranged between 96.7 and 99.7 
percent, with a calculated (unweighted) average of 98.1 percent (WDI, 2010). With 
an average of approximately 8.9 years of schooling in the population aged 15-65 in 
1990, they were ranked much closer to advanced economies than to developing 
economies in this respect (Table 1.3 below).  
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Table 1.3: Average years of education in the working age population, 1990 
Country Average years of schooling  
Czech Republic 10.8 
Slovak Republic 10.5 
Advanced economies 9.6 
Romania 9.3 
Estonia 9.2 
Albania 9.0 
Lithuania 8.9 
Hungary 8.8 
Bulgaria 8.8 
Poland 8.5 
Slovenia 8.0 
Latvia 8.0 
Serbia 7.9 
Croatia 7.8 
Developing economies 5.2 
Source: Extracted from Barro and Lee (2010) 
 
However, a breakdown of educational attainment figures according to the level of 
education completed shows that the gap between European transition economies and 
developed economies increases significantly at tertiary education level (Figure 1.4 
below). Namely, whilst the percentage of the working age population who had 
completed secondary education was 28% higher in 1990 in the developed economies 
than in the European transition economies, the percentage of those who had 
completed tertiary education was 123% higher1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1
 The figures for the percentage of population who have completed secondary education were 
calculated based on Barro and Lee (2010) by adding the share of population who have completed 
tertiary education to the original figures. This was because the original Barro and Lee (2010) data 
refer to the share of population who have completed secondary education as the highest level of 
education, so it automatically excludes the share of the population who have completed secondary 
education and have continued to complete tertiary education. 
Figure 1.5: Educational attainment of the workforce, 1990 (%)
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However, the most important differences with regard to human capital between 
transition economies and developed economies appear to be related not to the 
quantity, but to the quality of education. Despite the apparently relat
of educational attainment of transition economies, serious concerns have been raised 
with regard to the quality and relevance of the mix of skills developed under the 
previous system in a market economy, as discussed below. 
1.3.2 The mix of occupations and types of skills provided
In the previous system, the centrally planned production meant that the mix of 
occupations needed in the economy could be planned and developed accordingly. 
These economies were focused on the manufacturing sect
service sector (Filer et al., 2001; Campos and Coricelli, 2002; Rutkowski et al., 
2005) and their education systems were geared towards producing the mix of 
occupations appropriate for this structure. They tended to develop hig
occupation- or even firm
vocational education (World Bank, 1996; Filer et al., 2001). Table 1.4 below 
illustrates the emphasis of these education systems on vocational/technical upper
secondary education at the outset of transition. Estonia and Lithuania appear to be 
exceptions in having, respectively, around a fifth and a third of students enrolled in 
this type of education in 1990. In the other economies for which data is available t
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unweighted average share of vocational/technical enrolments is 60 percent, ranging 
from 47.2 in Bulgaria to 78.4 percent in Romania. By 2008, however, the emphasis 
on vocational/technical education has declined considerably in most of these 
countries, whilst remaining the same or increasing to a lesser extent in other ones2. 
This appears to indicate that the centrally planned economies over-valued and over-
emphasised this type of education. 
Table 1.4: Emphasis of vocational/technical education, 1990 and 2008* 
Country 
Share of vocational/technical enrolments (%) 
1990 2008 
Romania 78.4 60.0 
Poland 68.4 24.7 
Czech Republic 63.9 69.1 
Slovak Republic 63.2 15.0 
Slovenia 61.0 59.7 
Croatia 58.0 63.1 
Hungary 55.7 63.7 
Albania 55.3 8.9 
Latvia 48.1 36.8 
Bulgaria 47.2 47.1 
Lithuania 34.5 28.4 
Estonia 20.5 33.0 
Source: Own calculations based on TransMONEE (UNICEF, 2010) 
*Figures for Croatia and Slovenia refer to 1991 and 1993 instead of 1990, respectively, 
whilst those for the Slovak Republic refer to 2007 instead of 2008.    
 
 
Moreover Marks and Tesar (2005, pp. 26-27) argue that even the universities of 
centrally planned economies had “an explicit orientation towards enhancing 
production”, being focused on vocational education and the advancement of 
technical and scientific knowledge. Subjects such as business and social sciences, on 
the other hand, were largely neglected in the centrally planned economies (World 
Bank, 1996; Mertaugh and Hanushek, 2005). Such a composition of human capital 
in terms of the types of skill and the occupational mix raises serious questions of its 
adequacy in a market economy for two reasons. First, there was a lack of qualified 
individuals in subjects such as economics, management, marketing and law, each of 
these areas being crucial to the efficient functioning of a market economy. Second, 
                                                            
2
 In some of the countries the share of vocational enrolments remains surprisingly large, however  the 
composition and content of these courses are likely to have changed to reflect the demands of the new 
market economy, e.g. expansion of the business education at the expense of technical education 
(Jeong et al., 2008)   
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vocational training which was emphasised in these systems tended to develop 
specific skills which were relatively more valuable for operating specific technology 
(Krueger and Kumar, 2004). This approach may have been appropriate for a 
centrally planned economy where technological change was slow and it was 
customary for individuals to be prepared for a specific occupation and to remain in 
the same job throughout their lives. On the other hand, general, conceptual-based, 
education is superior in developing more general skills (Krueger and Kumar, 2004; 
Filer et al., 2001) which are transferable across jobs and occupations. In particular, 
Bowles and Gintis (1976) argue, academic education enhances creativity and 
problem-solving skills, compared to vocational training which promotes specific 
skills. However, the education systems of the centrally planned economies appear to 
have been generally less successful, or even less interested, in developing these skills 
and traits conventionally attributed to general education. 
Reflecting the desire to keep the established social order, education systems in the 
centrally planned economies were prone to promoting conformity, whilst largely 
discouraging individual initiative and critical thinking (Mertaugh and Hanushek, 
2005). This approach was reflected throughout the education system, e.g. in the lack 
of autonomy for educational institutions (Marks and Tesar, 2005) and their detailed, 
centrally-prescribed, curricula, textbooks and teaching methods (Micklewright, 
1999). However, perhaps most importantly, this approach was reflected in the 
instruction and evaluation methods adopted in the classroom, as they directly 
contributed to the mix of skills and behavioural traits that were developed/promoted 
under this system. Marks and Tesar (2005), for instance, argue that the instruction 
and evaluation methods adopted by universities under central planning “stressed 
familiarity with lecture materials and facts rather than independent studies and a 
capacity for analytical thinking which could lead to innovative thought” (p. 27). This 
is line with the arguments of other studies which hold that the education systems of 
these economies emphasised mastery, or memorisation, of knowledge and facts 
rather than critical thinking and problem-solving skills (World Bank, 1996; EBRD, 
1997; Berryman, 2000). Indeed, rather than not promoting critical thinking and 
creativity, the previous educational systems actively discouraged these due to their 
potential to undermine the established order. By virtue of enforcing conformity to 
rules and authority, these education systems promoted docility, discouraged self-
initiative and suppressed individuals’ sense of self-efficacy. These latter personal 
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traits represent additional characteristics of human capital which are especially 
relevant in dynamic market economy, as discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
1.3.3 The quality of education provision 
In addition to the distinctive features of the human capital formation process 
discussed above, more general concerns have been raised about the quality of 
education provided. There was no national system of quality assurance (World Bank, 
1996; Micklewright, 1999). The guaranteed employment provided for all graduates 
in the centrally planned economy meant that there was no evaluation feedback from 
the market, either in terms of the needed skills, or in terms of the quality and 
relevance of the skills provided to graduates (World Bank, 1996; Filer et al., 2001; 
Marks and Tesar, 2005). Marks and Tesar (2005) also argue that universities under 
central planning were in essence focused on certification rather than knowledge 
creation and transfer. On the other hand, educational institutions, like other (state-
owned) enterprises, were led by a central plan and had to meet their targets of 
“production”. In the absence of mechanisms of quality control, this meant that they 
could adjust their academic standards in order to achieve the required numbers of 
professionals in specific fields (Pe’teri, 2000). This argument is in line with the 
relatively low repetition rates found in many transition countries and evidence of 
human capital stock overvaluation compared to countries with comparable levels of 
development and efficiency of their education systems (Beirne and Campos, 2007).  
The deficiencies of the centrally-planned education systems described above appear 
to be consistent with quality measures of their human capital derived from standard 
international test scores. Although these measures are not available for all European 
transition economies and for long time-spans, these results are indicative of the types 
and quality of skills their education systems develop. An observation that is 
immediately visible when reviewing the results of different cross-country tests is the 
diversity in the (relative) performance levels, both across European transition 
economies, and of the same economies in different tests and/or different points in 
time. The following paragraphs briefly summarise these results and identify some 
stylised facts from an assessment of three relevant international studies of cognitive 
skills in which different European transition economies participated in one or more 
rounds. The first two tests discussed here cover students in compulsory education 
46 
 
(usually at the 8th grade), whilst the last one covers the countries’ working age 
population. 
The first two tests, the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS; 
IEA, 2000a,b; 2008), and the Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA; OECD, 2004, 2007, 2010a) differ in two ways. TIMSS measures students’ 
academic competence in mathematics and science and it was administered in four 
rounds (1995, 1999, 2003, 2007). PISA, on the other hand, focuses on three themes, 
alternating between in each round: reading, mathematics and science; therefore, its 
results may not necessarily be comparable across years or with TIMSS. Second, 
whilst TIMSS tests academic competence and can be regarded as a measure of 
success of education systems at imparting knowledge, PISA seeks to measure 
functional competence, i.e. ability to use knowledge to solve real-life problems 
rather than mastering curriculum. As such, PISA can be considered to measure 
competences that are more general in nature and, as argued above, can be viewed to 
be more relevant in a dynamic modern economy and in the process of transition  
A review of TIMSS results (IEA, 2000a,b; 2008) shows that some of the European 
transition economies achieved satisfactory scores, especially in the earlier rounds 
(e.g., the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Bulgaria 
have scores that were significantly above the average of the participating countries in 
the 1999 round). A few of the European transition economies tend to have average 
scores (e.g. Lithuania and Latvia), and the rest have scores significantly below the 
average (e.g. Romania and Macedonia in 1999, and the new participating countries 
in 2007, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia). The performance of these countries, 
however, does not always remain similar across years, as discussed later in this 
section.  
Although the TIMSS and PISA results are not strictly comparable because they refer 
to different points in time and the same countries are not always covered in different 
tests, the overall performance of European transition economies in PISA again 
cannot be considered as satisfactory. In the second and/or third rounds of PISA in 
2003 and 2006 (OECD, 2004, 2007) which focused on mathematics and science 
respectively, Estonia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic achieve 
scores that are significantly above the OECD average. Similar to its performance in 
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TIMSS, Hungary stands in the middle, with a score that is not significantly different 
from the OECD average, and almost all other countries consistently have 
significantly lower scores (Croatia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Romania 
and Serbia). Two striking difference are noted when comparing differences between 
their TIMSS and PISA performance: Bulgaria which was a top performer in TIMSS 
1999 has a score significantly lower than the OECD average in PISA 2006, whilst 
Poland which was a bottom performer in the former test manages to achieve a score 
that is not significantly different from the OECD average in the latter test. These 
differences may be partially explained by the fact that the tests were conducted at 
different points in time, meanwhile the education systems in these economies 
appears to have been changing. The improved performance of Poland appears to be 
as a result of successful reforms that this country has undertaken starting from 1999 
(OECD, 2010a) and it is consistent with the major improvement of this country’s 
performance in PISA reading tests between 2000 and 2009, discussed below. The 
fall in Bulgaria’s performance also seems to reflect a general deterioration of its 
education system. This country’s results are consistent with TIMSS 2007 (IEA, 
2008) that reports this country experienced the largest deterioration in TIMSS 
performance since 1995.  
The performance of European transition economies in the PISA tests focused on 
readings appear to be even weaker than that in mathematics and science. In PISA 
2000, all participating economies from this group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Latvia) scored significantly lower than the OECD average. In PISA 2009 
(OECD, 2010a), only Poland from this group managed to reach a score that is 
significantly higher than the OECD average, joined by Estonia which is a new 
participant and also performs above average. Hungary reaches the OECD average 
score, similar to other tests, leaving all the other European transition economies 
(except for Bosnia and Herzegovina that does not participate) with significantly 
lower scores.  
However, transition economies also appear to differ from other economies in terms 
of the types of skills they develop. PISA measures and analyses the student 
performance in terms of different types of skills. PISA 2009, for instance, analyses 
three different aspects of reading: accessing and retrieving information, integrating 
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and interpreting it, and reflection and evaluation. The results of this analysis appear 
to support the arguments above, according to which educations systems in European 
transition economies focused on imparting knowledge rather than developing the 
ability to critically evaluate information. Here, all the countries which PISA 2009 
(OECD, 2010a, p. 71) lists as being significantly lower on the ‘reflect and evaluate’ 
subscale compared to one or two of the other subscales are European transition 
economies (Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Montenegro, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia), 
suggesting that this is a specific characteristic of these particular education systems3.  
PISA also provides information on the distribution of student scores within countries 
and disaggregates student performance according to six proficiency levels. The 
students reaching the highest proficiency level in reading, according to OECD 
(2010a), are those that are able to comprehend, thoroughly analyse and evaluate, 
both explicit information and unstated implications provided in the text. The share of 
students performing at this level is argued by OECD (2010a, p. 49) to be particularly 
important because these skills are “...greatly valued in knowledge economies, which 
depend on innovation and nuanced decision making that draw on all the available 
evidence”. Like in the case of previous indicators, most European transition 
economies perform poorly in this respect (see Table 1.5 below). The percentage of 
students reaching level 6 proficiency is lower that the OECD average of 0.8 percent 
in all European transition economies. Poland and Estonia are, again, the best 
performers among these economies, approaching the OECD shares of 0.7 and 0.6 
percent, respectively, followed by Hungary, Slovak Republic and Slovenia with 
shares of 0.3 percent. Albania, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia, on the other hand, 
have no students performing at the highest level of proficiency. The mean scores of 
the top 5 percent of the students appear to follow the same pattern as the number of 
students reaching proficiency level 6: Poland and Estonia leading, followed by the 
more advanced CEE and Baltic countries, Croatia and Bulgaria, leaving the other 
four SEE countries behind with significantly lower scores. The only exception in 
these patterns appears to be Bulgaria, with an unusually high share of students who 
                                                            
3
 On the other hand, countries performing significantly better on the ‘reflect and evaluate’ subscale 
compared to one of two of the others are Hong Kong-China and all the English-speaking countries, 
with the exception of Ireland (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United 
States). 
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reach the highest proficiency in comparison to its relative performance of in terms of 
top students’ mean score. 
Table 1.5: Performance of top students in reading, PISA 2009 
Country 
Top 5% of students 
(average score) 
Students with proficiency 
level 6 (%) 
Poland 640 0.7 
OECD average 637 0.8 
Estonia 633 0.6 
Czech Republic 627 0.4 
Hungary 623 0.3 
Slovenia 623 0.3 
Slovak Republic 621 0.3 
Croatia 611 0.1 
Latvia 610 0.1 
Lithuania 608 0.1 
Bulgaria 603 0.2 
Serbia 572 0.0 
Romania 564 0.0 
Montenegro 558 0.0 
Albania 538 0.0 
Source: Extracted from PISA 2009 (OECD, 2010a) 
 
Finally, the relatively poor performance of European transition economies also 
extends to the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS; OECD, 2000) which, in 
contrast to the previous tests, measures the cognitive skills of the working age 
population. The IALS seeks to measure individuals’ ability to understand concepts 
and apply them effectively in practice. Although few transition economies 
participated in this test, the results indicate a similar pattern with PISA and TIMSS 
whereby Czech Republic stands out as the top performer of this group and is ranked 
relatively well, whereas the other countries, Hungary, Slovenia and Poland are 
ranked at the bottom.  
Overall, the performance of European transition economies in international tests of 
cognitive skills can be summarised as follows.  
European transition economies, on average, perform worse than developed 
economies, consistent with concerns regarding educational quality that have been 
raised by various authors, discussed at the beginning of this sub-section. 
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These economies perform relatively better in tests of mathematics and science 
compared to those in reading. This is may be partially explained by the structure of 
their economies and employment, discussed in the previous section.  
The education systems of European transition economies appear to be significantly 
better at imparting knowledge (i.e. developing skills of retrieving and interpreting) 
information, than at developing the ability of students to reflect on and evaluate this 
new information.  
The top performers in this group appear to be from Central and Eastern Europe: 
Estonia, the Czech Republic, and, to a lesser extent, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
and Hungary. These are also some of the countries that have been most successful at 
attracting FDI, as explained in the previous section.   
Like overall performance, top students’ performance and the share of the most able 
students varies significantly within European transition economies. The ranking of 
the countries in terms of best-performing students tends to follow their mean 
performance.  
The economies of South-Eastern Europe appear to be among the weakest performers 
in all the tests in which they participate (with the exception of Bulgaria in earlier 
years). Similarly, these countries tend to be, on average, less successful at attracting 
FDI. 
The performance trends of countries such as Bulgaria and Poland suggest that, 
despite expectations that education systems are likely to be prone to inertia, 
educational performance is not “written in stone”. The experience of Poland, in 
particular, suggests that, if appropriately designed and implemented successfully, 
educational reforms can have significant effects within a relatively short period of 
time. 
The level of educational attainment, and especially the quality and mix of skills 
provided by (pre-transition) education systems, in turn, is likely to have implications 
for the quality of the labour force in European transition economies and their 
attractiveness to foreign investors. These and other characteristics of these 
economies’ labour markets which can affect foreign investors’ decisions are 
discussed in the next section.  
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1.4 Labour markets in European transition economies 
The development of the European transition economies labour markets after the fall 
of communism has been documented and analysed extensively, among others, by 
Svejnar (1999), Boeri, (2000), Filer et al. (2001), Campos and Coricelli (2002), 
Havlik (2005), Barr (2005), Rutkowski et al. (2005), Commander and Kollo (2008), 
Flabbi et al. (2008) and Brunello et al. (2011).  The focus of this section is narrower: 
it seeks to identify and examine some key dimensions of the labour markets that may 
affect the desirability of these countries’ workforce to foreign investors. The first 
sub-section examines the levels, and trends, of labour costs in European transition 
economies. The second sub-section focuses on other characteristics of these labour 
markets inherited from the communist system: the mix of occupations and labour 
(im)mobility, skill shortages in the labour market, and a low level of labour 
productivity and prevailing work ethics. 
1.4.1 Labour costs 
At the outset of transition, low labour costs compared to the rest of Europe 
(combined with high educational attainment, discussed earlier) were considered to be 
a key factor that could attract foreign investors (e.g. Kinoshita and Campos, 2003; 
Serbu, 2005; UNCTAD, 2008a). The first part of this sub-section provides a 
statistical overview of wage levels and trends in European transition economies, and 
then continues to assess other aspects of labour markets which are argued to 
challenge and/or augment this conventional view. 
Table 1.6 below presents the average level of gross monthly wages in European 
transition economies in 1995, a few years into the transition period. The definition of 
gross wages varies in different data sources, but Bellak et al. (2008, p. 22) explain 
that in the database by the Vienna Institute for International Studies (WIIW, 2010) 
used here, gross wages refer to “net wages plus personal income tax and social 
security contributions of employees, fringe benefits, bonuses, vouchers, etc.”. Bellak 
et al. argue that this measure is imperfect for FDI studies because, among other 
problems, it does not include non-wage labour costs, and therefore does not represent 
the total cost of labour (i.e. including employers’ contributions to social security and 
benefit plans) which would be a more relevant measure to be taken into 
consideration by the foreign investors. However, the gross wage is used here as it 
appears to be the only one for which data is available for the sample of European 
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transition economies under consideration here (excluding Serbia and Montenegro). 
Table 1.6 reveals diversity in the level of average wages in the sample in the early 
years of transition which does not appear to be necessarily related to the level of 
advancement in transition. Two ex-Yugoslav republics, Croatia and Slovenia appear 
to stand out with average wages that are around twice as high as the (unweighted) 
average of the sample, followed by the more advanced transition economies of CEE, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, with notably lower figures. The 
Baltic economies which were also considered more advanced in the process of 
transition, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, have lower wages that the average, together 
with the less-advanced economies of SEE, Romania,  Bulgaria and Albania.    
Table 1.6: Labour costs in European transition economies, 1995 
Country Average gross monthly wage (EUR)* 
Croatia 518 
Slovenia 467 
Czech Republic 294 
Hungary 291 
Poland 267 
Slovak Republic 239 
Estonia 194 
Latvia 159 
Romania 127 
Lithuania 113 
Bulgaria 106 
Albania 75 
Source: Own calculations using WIIW (2010) data  
*EUR conversion using exchange rate data from Penn World Tables (PWT, 2009)  
 
The level of wages in European transition economies has increased rapidly during 
the years since 1995. Figure 1.6 presents the trends of (unweighted) average gross 
wages for two groups of transition economies: the CEE and Baltic economies that 
have accessed into the EU in 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) and the rest, i.e. the SEE 
economies (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania). The data presented in Figure 
1.6 below shows an increase in wages during 2000-2008 which appears to follow a 
similar trend in the two groups of economies, regardless of their level of 
development and EU accession. In both groups, the average level of wages has more 
than doubled during these nine years, this change being slightly more pronounced in 
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the SEE group. However, there are significant differences in the average level of 
wages in these groups throughout the period. In 2000, the level of monthly wages in 
the economies that have accessed into the EU is around EUR 400, which is 80% 
higher than that in the SEE, EUR 220. As wages in the SEE have since increased at 
faster rate, the difference between the two had declined by 2008, by which time 
wages in the more advanced group of transition economies were 63% higher 
compared to the SEE. 
Figure 1.6: Monthly wages in European transition economies (EUR), 2000-2008 
 
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Source: Extracted from WIIW (2010)     
 
Despite the rapid increases in labour costs illustrated above, on average, absolute 
labour costs have remained considerably lower in European transition economies 
compared to other European countries. Table 1.7 below presents the average gross 
monthly wage in European transition economies and in selected European economies 
for comparison. In 2008, the (unweighted) mean value of monthly wage in the 
selected European economies4 is approximately four times as high as that in 
European transition economies. The country with the highest average wage among 
these economies is Slovenia, with a wage that is equal that in Portugal, the country 
which, according to Eurostat (2012), has the lowest average wage among these 
selected Western European economies. The pattern of wages within the transition 
                                                            
4
 The selected Western European countries include those with the highest and the lowest wages in 
Europe.  
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economies in 2008 remains similar to that in 1995, with Slovenia, Croatia and the 
CEE and Baltic economies being ranked the highest and the SEE economies at the 
bottom.  
Table 1.7: Comparison of wages with selected Western European economies, 2008 
Country   Average gross monthly wage (EUR) 
Switzerland  3924 
Germany  3450 
Finland  3162 
Sweden  3132 
France   2798 
Austria  2732 
Spain  2101 
Portugal  1391 
Selected Western European economies (average) 2836 
Slovenia  1391 
Croatia  1044 
Czech Republic  903 
Poland  834 
Estonia  824 
Hungary  788 
Slovak Republic  723 
Latvia  680 
Lithuania  623 
Montenegro  609 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  569 
Serbia  560 
Romania  477 
Macedonia, FYR  428 
Bulgaria  268 
Albania   227 
European transition economies (average) 684 
Source: Own calculations using data from WIIW (2010)  for  European transition economies and 
Eurostat (2012) for the Western European economies 
 
Finally, it should be noted that a comparison of absolute labour costs, both in terms 
of the gross wage measure used here and in terms of total labour costs, is still 
insufficient for providing full information on the attractiveness of a country’s 
workforce in FDI studies. The assessment of an investment location according to this 
type of measure would have to assume that the quality, and productivity, of the 
workforce that can be attained in different locations is homogeneous. Therefore, 
(real) unit labour costs which measure labour costs accounting for differences in 
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labour productivity have been argued to convey much more relevant information to 
foreign investors (Holland and Pain, 1998; Bellak et al., 2008). Accounting for 
productivity differences has been argued to be of particular importance in the context 
of transition economies where, empirical evidence suggests, labour productivity 
attained is likely to be significantly lower compared to developed economies (Bellak 
et al., 2008, p. 23). Unfortunately, as there appear to be no (publicly) available data 
for unit labour costs for the European transition economies, the analysis in this 
section has to be restricted to absolute wage costs and, as such, it should be 
interpreted with caution. The rest of this section continues to examine other specific 
characteristics of labour markets in European transition economies which may partly 
explain why labour productivity here tends to be lower compared to developed 
economies, and hence may affect the attractiveness of these economies to foreign 
investors. As these characteristics are inherited from, or mainly arise as a result of, 
the previous system, a contextual discussion of the relevant characteristics of the 
communist labour markets and the major developments during the transition period 
are provided first.      
1.4.2 The legacy of communism and labour productivity: structural 
change, workforce skills, labour (im)mobility and cultural factors 
In the former communist economies of Europe and the Soviet Union education, 
employment and wages were centrally planned and regulated, just like the structure 
of economy. As explained in the previous section, these economies were overly-
focused on manufacturing, and largely ignored services. The priorities of the state 
were reflected beyond the relative size of the sectors in terms employment. Wages 
were set based on a centrally determined administrative grid which favoured the 
manufacturing sector. The level of wages in this sector was higher than that in the 
services, regardless of employees in services being, on average, more educated 
(Flanagan, 1998; Brunello et al., 2011). More generally, the wage grids were argued 
to have favoured physical work to intellectual work because they kept narrow 
differences between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers (e.g. Newell, 2001). 
This was supported by empirical studies that find low wage returns to education 
during the communist system compared to those found in developed economies 
coupled with significant increases in the education premium once the wages were 
market-determined during the transition period (Flanagan, 1998; Newell and Reilly, 
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1999; Orazem and Vodopivec, 1997; Campos and Jollife, 2003; Andren et al., 2005; 
Fleisher et al, 2005; Munich et al., 2005; Flabbi et al., 2008; Hung, 2008).  
After the fall of communism the situation in the (labour) market changed drastically 
and rapidly. The liberalisation of the market combined with changes in external trade 
patterns, previously focused (exclusively) on the Soviet Union and other communist 
economies meant that a major reallocation of resources, including labour, was 
required. The size of sectors such as mining, manufacturing and utilities decreased, 
both in terms of their contribution to GDP and to employment, whilst that of the 
service sector increased significantly (Newell, 2001; UNECE, 2001; World Bank, 
2002; Boeri and Terrell, 2002; Rutkowski et al., 2005; Brunello et al., 2011). There 
were also changes within the manufacturing sector, the share of consumer goods 
increasing at the expense of heavy industry (e.g. UNECE, 2001). The share of 
agriculture, another major sector during communism, either remained the same, or 
increased (e.g. in Poland and Romania) as individuals turned to agriculture in 
response to the loss of jobs in industrial jobs (Rashid et al., 2005; Rutkowski et al., 
2005).  
The reallocation of resources throughout the economy meant that the demand for 
workers of different occupations changed during transition. Traditional industries 
declined or disappeared altogether, whereas previously small industries and 
completely new ones were flourishing, thus requiring a large share of the workforce 
to change occupations if they were to find a job. In Estonia, for instance, it is 
estimated that between 35 and 50 percent of the employed individuals changed their 
occupations in the first five years of the transition period (Campos and Dabušinkas, 
2003). In accordance with the structural changes described above, it was 
occupational groups such as plant and machine operators, clerks, professionals and 
craft and related trade workers that contracted in Estonia, whereas that those in 
service industries increased. Also consistent with the expansion of the service sector, 
Newell (2001) shows that in European transition economies there was an increase in 
the employment of non-manual workers, especially in managerial, professional and 
technical occupations.  
The reallocation of employment between industries in European transition 
economies was coupled, and partially driven, by the contraction and/or privatisation 
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of (formerly) state-owned enterprises and the creation of new jobs mainly in the 
emerging private sector (e.g. Boeri and Terrell, 2002). The reallocation of 
employment to the private sector and the abolition of the wage grids meant that the 
price of labour would be allowed to reflect labour market conditions and worker 
productivity. Accordingly, the market valuation of different types of skills replaced 
the distortions of wages and incentives enforced by the previous system (Magda et 
al., 2011), namely the undervaluation of highly-skilled labour and the overvaluation 
employees working in the manufacturing sector. Consistent with a decompression of 
wages, empirical evidence documents a rise in the returns to education throughout 
ex-communist European economies during the process of transition, as explained 
earlier in this section. The increase in returns to education have been argued to be at 
least partly driven by the expansion of skill-intensive services such as finance, 
insurance, real estate, tourism, consulting and information services (Orazam and 
Vodopivec, 1997). Consistent with this view, there was a rise of relative wages in the 
service sector and a fall of those in agriculture and production sectors (Newell, 
2001).  
However, studies of individual earnings appear to provide valuable information on 
more than merely changes in the labour market due to wage decompression and 
rising demand for skilled labour. Many of these studies tend to find that returns to 
education during the transition period depend on the type of education: whilst rates 
of return to general education, both tertiary and secondary, are found to have 
increased, those to vocational/technical secondary education were found to have 
either decreased or remained the same compared to the communist period (Flanagan, 
1998; Chase, 1998; Campos and Jollife, 2007). Whilst previous wage decompression 
and the rising demand for skilled labour can explain the rising education premium 
for tertiary- and general secondary- education, it does not explain the apparent 
differences between the labour market outcomes of vocational and general secondary 
education graduates during transition. These differences appear to be consistent with 
the differences in the type of skills imparted by general vs. vocational education, 
discussed in the previous section. Namely, it appears that the skills imparted by 
general education equipped workers to respond (more easily) to changes in the 
labour market, whereas the occupation- and/or technology-specific skills imparted by 
vocational education frequently became obsolete with the technological and/or 
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structural changes in these economies. Accordingly, many studies have argued that 
the specificity of skills of the labour force played a significant role in the 
manifestation of skill-shortages, low worker adaptability and high levels of (long-
term) unemployment in European transition economies (Flanagan, 1998; Boeri, 
2000; Rutkowski et al., 2005; Rutkowski, 2007; Commander and Kollo, 2008). 
With the above arguments as a starting point, Lamo et al. (2010) investigate the 
effect of skill specificity on labour mobility in two European transition economies, 
Estonia and Poland. These economies went through major reallocation shocks at the 
same time, but Poland’s education system was characterised by a much greater 
emphasis on vocational secondary education during the communist period. The 
empirical investigation in Lamo et al. suggests that, in both countries, holding a 
general degree is associated with better labour market outcomes during the transition 
period: individuals with vocational degrees suffered from longer unemployment 
spells. Similarly, older individuals holding such degrees were more likely to leave 
the labour force through early retirement schemes, indicating that the labour market 
offered relatively more/better opportunities for general secondary education 
graduates. Further, Lamo et al. develop a theoretical model to analyse the effect of 
initial education skill-specificity on labour market adjustments when sectoral 
demand shifts require the reallocation of workers across firms and industries. 
According to their model, over-specialisation has led to much higher and persistent 
unemployment in Poland compared to Estonia. Furthermore, the effect of skill-
specificity on unemployment is higher compared to labour market institutions such 
as wage rigidity and employment protection. The conclusion of this analysis, thus, 
appears to strongly support the hypothesis that the emphasis on specific skills 
developed through vocational education represented an obstacle to labour mobility in 
early transition where labour market flexibility was especially important due to the 
rapid technical and structural changes in the economy. 
A potential problem with the empirical evidence above could be that individuals 
might self-select into different types of education, in which case the labour market 
outcomes would reflect their personal characteristics (e.g. innate intelligence or 
social status) and not necessarily their educational experience. However, considering 
that in the communist system the structure of incentives was such that students were 
encouraged to select vocational curricula and employees with vocational education 
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were overvalued in the labour market, Lamo et al. (2010) argue that self-selection is 
unlikely to significantly affect the results of these labour market studies. On the 
contrary, they argue, if there would be any self-selection, it would be that more 
rather than less-able individuals would choose vocational education. Based on this it 
is argued that the relatively lower returns to vocational education are due to the 
specificity of skills this type of education imparts which in turn limits the mobility of 
workers across occupations.  
However, the problem of labour (im)mobility in European transition economies 
cannot be attributed exclusively to skill-specificity. Other characteristics of their 
labour markets and education system characteristics as well as cultural factors 
inherited from the communist system, discussed in the previous section, are also 
likely to have inhibited mobility of labour during the transition period. The 
certification received from formal education essentially secured an individual a job 
in the occupation he/she was qualified for. Then individuals typically stayed in the 
occupations they were qualified for through this initial education, often without even 
changing their workplace, and thus they were not accustomed to changing jobs or 
occupations. Similarly, having worked in the same jobs throughout their careers, 
moreover in an environment where technical change was slow, workers did not have 
to, and were not used to, learning new skills after having completed initial education. 
These factors, along with a high incidence of skill-specificity, have also been argued 
to have to have slowed down the process of labour market adjustment in European 
transition economies (e.g. Filer et al., 2001). 
Another factor restricting labour mobility has been argued to be lack of training 
which would provide individuals new skills and prepare them to perform the new 
jobs being created (in the newly emerging industries). During the previous system 
lifelong learning virtually did not exist, largely because it was unnecessary since 
workers did not change jobs and technical change was not frequent. The legacy 
appears to continue as even the most advanced European transition economies which 
are now EU members, with the exception of Slovenia, lag far behind the rest of EU 
in this respect. Rutkowski (2007), for instance, point out that the percentage of adults 
participating in some form of education and training in the best-performing countries 
in the EU is 25 percent, which is five times higher than that in the transition 
economies which have joined the EU in 2004 and 2007.  
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Finally, there are other characteristics of communist labour markets in addition to the 
level of skills and occupational mobility which may affect the attractiveness of their 
workforce to foreign investors. In the communist system employment was 
considered a guaranteed right and accordingly a zero unemployment rate was sought. 
Seeking to guarantee the right to have a job, it was common for enterprises which 
were state-owned to employ more employees than needed (Boeri and Garonna, 
1993); indefinite contracts were normally offered, regardless of employee- or firm- 
performance (Rashid et al., 2005; Munich et al., 2005). The almost complete job 
security provided by the state meant that workers did not have incentives to provide 
effort at work in order to keep their jobs. Similarly, there were no performance-
related wage- or other- incentives which would motivate workers to work harder or 
to further develop their skills after initial schooling. These employment arrangements 
are exactly the opposite of those expected to increase labour productivity. In 
addition, the desire to keep wage differentials between individuals low despite 
differences in their qualification has been argued to be another factor which kept 
employee productivity low (e.g. Commander and Kollo, 2008). The (lack of) work 
ethics and culture promoted in this system is unlikely to have changed 
instantaneously once labour markets were liberalised, especially if workers on 
average had already spent a large part of their career under the communist system.  
Considering the apparent deficiencies of the workforce in transition economies, in 
terms of both (mix of) skills and cultural factors, it is not surprising to see that firms 
operating in these economies tend to report skill shortages and increasingly saw 
inadequate workforce skills as a key obstacle to doing business. The Business 
Environment and Enterprise Survey (BEEPS, 2005) conducted in the economies 
covered in this research suggests that filling vacancies for skilled workers is time 
consuming. Table 1.8 below summarises the number of weeks it took the surveyed 
firms in BEEPS (2005) to fill a vacancy for skilled worker, averaged across the 
economy. As in every other indicator analysed in this chapter, the data reveals 
disparities across European transition economies. The countries with the highest skill 
shortages, where it took a firm over a month to hire a skilled worker, are Slovakia, 
Croatia and the three Baltic economies, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania.    
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Table 1.8: Time required to fill a vacancy for a skilled worker, 2005 
Country Number of weeks* 
Slovakia 6.1 
Latvia 5.6 
Estonia 5.4 
Croatia  4.7 
Lithuania 4.4 
Slovenia 3.5 
Hungary 3.4 
Czech R 3.2 
Albania 3.0 
Serbia and Montenegro 2.8 
Macedonia  2.5 
Poland 2.4 
Bulgaria 2.4 
Romania 2.4 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.9 
Source: Own calculations based on BEEPS (2005) 
*Averages of the figures reported by firms across the country 
 
However, it should be noted that these figures are not strictly comparable across 
countries because they may reflect different labour market conditions. These figures 
are expected to depend on the number of available skilled workers in the economy, 
especially those that are not currently employed. On the other hand, they also reflect 
the demand for skilled workers, which, in turn, depends (partly) on the structure of 
the economy, and particularly on the technological level and the added value in 
activities/stage of production carried out. Therefore, it may not be surprising that 
counter-intuitive positive (though low) correlations were found between the length of 
time it takes to fill a vacancy and the percentage of population who have completed 
secondary/tertiary education in a country.  
Rutkowski et al. (2007, pp. 20-26) summarise further evidence suggesting labour and 
skill shortages in European transition economies during the previous decade in terms 
of growing vacancy rates, particularly in construction and manufacturing and 
increasing dissatisfaction with the level of workforce skills. Rutkowski et al. argue 
that these difficulties arise largely as a result of skill mismatches, rather than mere 
labour shortages. They show that in virtually all transition economies that have 
joined the EU there are high levels of “excess supply” of unskilled workers who 
cannot fill the emerging vacancies because they do not possess the required skills. 
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Further, Rutkowski et al. document increases in unit labour costs, i.e. increases in 
labour costs exceeding the increases in labour productivity in some of these 
economies, which they argue are a result of pressures on wages caused by skill 
shortages.  
Taken together, the evidence presented in this section challenges the conventional 
argument that European transition economies should expect to attract FDI primarily 
through lower of labour costs. This argument seems over-simplistic for two main 
reasons. Firstly, any advantages that these economies may have with regard to labour 
costs are expected to wither, especially if the skill shortages they face are not 
overcome. Secondly, this section and the previous one have shown that most of these 
economies are not doing enough to overcome the skill shortages/mismatches by 
providing high-quality initial education and further training. Moreover, whereas skill 
formation can be affected by public policy or private sector investment, the cultural 
factors which cause the workforce in these economies to have lower productivity 
compared to other economies with longer market economy experience are likely to 
be highly prone to inertia and may take more time to change. Namely, it could be 
argued that the behavioural traits and/or (lack of) work culture and labour mobility 
promoted in the communist education systems and labour markets can only be 
significantly diluted as new cohorts who have been raised/educated after the fall of 
this system enter the labour market. Therefore, it is argued here that the age structure 
of the workforce may be another relevant labour-related factor affecting foreign 
investment in European transition economies.  
Table 1.9 below presents data on the share of working age population that has been 
educated in a post-communist system from age 14 or younger, the share of the labour 
force aged 30 years or younger in 2008. In this respect, Albania appears to stand out 
with half of its working age population younger than 30, which is considerable 
higher than the rest of the sample where it ranges from 28 to 37 percent, with an 
(unweighted) average of 33 percent.  
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Table 1.9: Working age population educated after the fall of communism (%), 2008 
Country Working age population aged 16-30 (%) 
Albania 51 
Estonia 37 
Latvia 36 
Lithuania 36 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 35 
Macedonia, FYR 35 
Poland 34 
Romania 34 
Slovak Republic 33 
Bulgaria 31 
Croatia 30 
Hungary 29 
Czech Republic 28 
Slovenia 28 
Source: Own calculations based on World Development Indicators (WDI, 2001) 
*Figures refer to the share of population aged 0-14 at the outset of transition (year 1992) 
in the total working age population in 2008 
 
In conclusion, this section has argued that in addition to conventional measures of 
the level of educational attainment of the workforce and labour costs, there are 
additional dimensions of post-communist economies which can significantly affect 
the level of (labour) productivity that foreign investors can achieve in these 
economies and which should be taken into account in empirical investigations of FDI 
determinants.  
1.5 Conclusion 
The first part of this chapter has provided arguments in favour of the importance of 
attracting inwards FDI from the perspective of the host economies, in general, and 
European transition economies, in particular. First, it was argued that its contribution 
is likely to extend far beyond the improvement of host countries’ external financial 
positions and capital accumulation. Primarily due to its association with the 
transfer of technology and know-how, FDI was argued to potentially affect 
productivity growth in the host country in many ways, directly and through 
spillover effects. For instance, inwards FDI was argued to be able to increase firm 
productivity and export competitiveness, develop labour force skills, and improve a 
country’s position in the global value chain. Further, it was argued that in the ex-
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communist European economies, in particular, the potential for the benefits of 
FDI is even greater due to the specific context of transition with, among others, 
inherited structural distortions, obsolete human and physical capital, insufficient 
domestic savings to fund investment and lack of “market behaviour” experience. 
This chapter has also provided a statistical overview of FDI flows and stocks during 
the transition period. This appears to suggest that, overall, European transition 
economies have been relatively successful at attracting FDI over the last two 
decades. However, the distribution FDI stocks within in this group of countries is 
far from even, even after accounting for the size of their economies/population.  
The second part of this chapter has discussed some key aspects of human capital 
formation and labour markets in European transition economies which may be 
relevant in foreign investors’ decision-making. An initial statistical overview has 
shown that these economies had similar levels of primary and secondary education 
attainment to those of developed economies, but they lagged behind at the level of 
tertiary education. Compared to developed economies, human capital formation in 
these economies was argued to be different in terms of the type of skills it 
developed, e.g. through over-emphasising vocational education, but also in terms of 
the lower quality of education provided, as measured by international tests of 
cognitive skills. However, these economies are not homogeneous in terms of 
human capital endowments: there appear to be significant differences across 
European transition economies in both the quantity, and the quality, of human 
capital. The differences in human capital, in turn, are likely to affect the 
attractiveness of host countries’ labour markets to foreign investors. This motivates 
the key research question of this thesis: “To what extent can the differences 
between the volumes of inward FDI across European transition economies be 
explained by the differences in their human capital quantity and quality of human 
capital?” 
Further (specific) characteristics of labour markets in European transition economies 
were argued to affect their attractiveness to foreign investors. In particular, it was 
argued that excessive job security, wage compression and lack of performance-
related incentives kept employee motivation and productivity low during 
communism, and this (lack of) work culture could be difficult to change quickly. 
As a result, indicators of labour costs are likely to be particularly imperfect for 
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conveying information on the relative attractiveness of a country’s labour market in 
the context of transition, whilst other indicators related to the age structure of the 
population may become especially relevant. Finally, it was argued that these 
context-specific characteristics of European transition economies’ labour force 
should be taken into consideration when investigating the relationship between 
human capital and FDI in these countries. The potential relationship between these 
characteristics and foreign investment, as well as their implications for the measuring 
human capital are discussed further in Chapter 4, after providing a theoretical 
framework to link human capital to inwards FDI and a meta-regression of studies 
that empirically investigate this relationship in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively.  
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2.1 Introduction 
Having provided in Chapter 1 an introduction to the nature of FDI and its potential 
benefits for the host country, this chapter aims to provide a critical appraisal of the 
theoretical literature on FDI and the underlying theory of the FDI-human capital 
relationship. There is a vast and diverse literature which comprehensively analyses 
FDI from different perspectives; however, there appear to be very few studies that 
recognise the different conceptual and theoretical approaches or try to reconcile these 
with the approach they take. Similarly, there appear to be no inclusive reviews which 
present, classify, discuss and appraise the merits of different approaches or attempt 
to bring them together5. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an 
exhaustive and comprehensive review of all the different approaches, this chapter 
aims to partly fill this gap in the literature by providing a brief, but concise, critical 
review of the main arguments and models associated with the major approaches to 
FDI in economic theory. This review of theory will be used to identify the potential 
determinants of inwards FDI and thus inform the specification of the models for the 
empirical analyses of this thesis. 
Another major gap in FDI theory is the relatively rare inclusion of the host country’s 
human capital as a relevant factor in the decisions of foreign investors. Even when 
human capital is present in an FDI study, it is not accompanied by an explicit 
theoretical framework within which its relationship with FDI is addressed. This 
chapter aims to fill this gap by explicitly discussing mechanisms through which a 
host country’s human capital can affect inward FDI based on human capital theory 
and contemporary growth theories. Inferences from this theoretical framework, 
together with the results of a meta-regression analysis which is presented in the next 
chapter, will inform the choice of human capital measures for the later empirical 
analysis. Finally, this chapter will discuss the possibility of reverse causation: the 
effect that FDI can have on human capital development in the host economy.    
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the different 
approaches to FDI in economic theory and identifies and discusses the instances 
                                                            
5
 Faeth (2009) represents a partial exception because it classifies and examines a large number of 
theories, though not all approaches are included (e.g. game theoretic approach and agglomeration 
economies). Dunning’s OLI paradigm and review of literature (Dunning, 1988; Dunning and Lundan, 
2008) also represents another partial exception because it brings together a number of different 
theories, but again not all of the major approaches are included. 
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where human capital is, implicitly or explicitly, referred to. Early FDI theories, both 
neo-classical and market failure-based, are discussed in sub-section 2.2.1; the OLI 
paradigm and new trade theory models are discussed in sub-sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, 
respectively, while other recent approaches such as that of game theory, policy 
competition and agglomeration economies are discussed in sub-section 2.2.4. Section 
2.3 discusses the relationship between a host country’s human capital and inward 
FDI. Sub-section 2.3.1 draws on a comprehensive analysis of the growth-effects of 
human capital in economic growth theory to provide arguments as to why human 
capital should be expected to attract inward FDI. The potential reverse causation in 
this relationship, i.e. the effects of foreign investors on the development of human 
capital in the host country, is discussed in Section 2.3.2 and the findings of the 
chapter are summarised in Section 2.4.  
2.2 Theories of foreign direct investment 
2.2.1 Early FDI theories 
2.2.1.1 The neoclassical approach 
Prior to the 1960s, capital transfers between countries were explained using the 
theory of portfolio capital movements, according to which international capital flows 
are driven by differences in interest rates across countries (Nurkse, 1933; Ohlin, 
1933; Iversen, 1935). Similar neoclassical models which share the limitations of 
portfolio capital movement theory were developed in the 1960’s by Heckscher-
Ohlin, MacDougall-Kemp and Aliber. The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model of trade 
theory explains FDI in a comparative advantage framework. At it is simplest form, 
this general equilibrium model involves two countries, two factors of production 
(labour and capital) and two goods. The model is based on some key underlying 
assumptions: perfect competition, absence of transaction costs, homogeneity and 
differing factor intensities of the two goods and factor endowments of the two 
countries, leading to differing factor prices. According to this model, under an 
assumption of factor immobility, countries will specialise in the production of 
commodities which are intensive in factors they are comparatively well endowed 
with and export them in return for commodities which are intensive in factors they 
are comparatively poorly endowed with, hence leading to price equalisation. Thus, 
under factor immobility, this model predicts that comparatively capital-abundant 
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countries will export capital-intensive commodities. If, on the other hand, this 
assumption is replaced by that of capital mobility, then capital will move to capital-
scarce countries where returns to capital are higher until the price of capital is 
equalised across countries. Hence, the H-O model, like portfolio capital movement 
theory predicts that capital will respond to interest rate differentials. This outcome is, 
in essence, shared by the MacDougall-Kemp model (MacDougall, 1960; Kemp, 
1964) and Aliber’s (1970) exchange rate theory, which represent extensions of the 
neoclassical approach to FDI. The first model introduces the possibility of host 
countries manipulating returns to capital, and hence cross-border capital movements, 
by introducing taxes. The second model introduces failures in exchange rate markets 
which allows firms from countries with strong currencies to raise capital more 
cheaply than their counterparts from countries with weak currencies, hence enabling 
them to finance foreign activities more cheaply.  
Trying to explain the failure of the neoclassical approach to explain the small FDI 
flows to labour-abundant developing countries, Lucas (1990) provides another 
extension of this approach which includes human capital and political risk as further 
determinants of FDI. In this model, Lucas replaces labour with ‘effective labour’, 
i.e., labour adjusted for human capital differences across countries, to show that rate 
of return differentials across countries almost disappear once these differences are 
accounted for. Although Lucas does not model FDI flows directly, it represents one 
of the few examples in theoretical discussions of FDI that points out the importance 
of human capital and explicitly identifies labour productivity as the mechanism for 
its influence on FDI. The other determinant of capital flows into developing 
countries that Lucas introduces, ‘political risk’, is presented as a form of capital 
market imperfection which may cause the absence of capital flows predicted by 
neoclassical theory. If capital flows are viewed as borrowings (FDI), with capital 
flowing from the developed (capital-abundant) to the developing (capital-scarce) 
countries in the first period, and then interest payment (repatriated profits) flowing in 
the reverse direction in the next period, then developing countries can gain by 
terminating the contract when the repayment period begins. Lucas argues that 
developed countries will foresee the possibility that developing countries will choose 
to act in this manner and this will cause them not lend capital (i.e., invest) in the first 
place.  
70 
 
In summary, the theories discussed above have some common features. They all 
approach capital flows from a macroeconomic perspective, ignoring the individual 
firm, and they explain international capital flows in terms of relative factor prices. 
However, as explained in the previous chapter, FDI differs from portfolio capital 
flows in two important aspects. When making a foreign investment, multinational 
enterprises (MNE) are typically expected to retain control of the resources or rights 
transferred to the subsidiary. Further, unlike mere financial capital flows, FDI 
typically involves a transfer of a bundle of resources, including technology and 
managerial know-how. This implies that firms invest in a foreign country expecting 
to earn an economic rent on this combination of resources, including their organising 
ability (Hymer, 1976). Moreover, the neoclassical models above are based on strong 
assumptions which limit their ability to explain FDI in the real world. Assumptions 
of perfect competition, free and instantaneously transferable technology, constant 
returns to scale, homogeneity of inputs and absence of transaction costs have been 
heavily criticised and modified in subsequent theories which are discussed in the rest 
of this section. 
2.2.1.2. Theories of market failure  
In contrast to the macro-level neoclassical models discussed above, various theories 
were developed that put the firm, rather than a country’s capital availability, at the 
centre of the FDI analysis. These theories recognise that markets are not perfect and 
assert that it is the very existence of market imperfections that induces a firm to 
engage in multinational production. Hymer (1976) and Kindleberger (1969) argue 
that in order for firms to engage in FDI, they must possess some kind of advantage 
specific to their ownership which is sufficient to compensate for the inherent 
disadvantages they face in competing with domestic firms. Such disadvantages, 
Faeth (2009) explains, arise due to foreign investors having less information, higher 
uncertainty and the physical distance from their affiliates and differences in culture, 
business ethics, the legal system and regulations. Such ownership-specific, non-
financial, advantages imply the presence of structural market imperfections such as 
product differentiation (an imperfection of commodity markets), managerial 
expertise, new technology or patents (an imperfection of factor markets) or 
government intervention. 
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Linking the ownership advantages with factor endowment distribution, Vernon 
(1966) develops a theory of product cycles which explains FDI as a decision between 
exporting and investing in foreign production. According to him, the ability of firms 
to innovate depends on the structure of their country’s factor endowments, 
institutions and markets, giving firms of certain countries advantages relative to 
others. According to this theory, the innovatory product is initially produced in the 
home country for both the domestic and foreign markets. However, as the product 
becomes ‘standardised’ and consumers’ demand becomes more price-elastic, the 
innovating firms turn to foreign production seeking cost-efficiency by reducing their 
labour costs.  
While the above theories explain what enables a firm to become an MNE, 
internalisation theory focuses on another key dimension of FDI. Namely, it aims to 
address the question of why should cross-country value-added activities be organised 
by hierarchies instead of being left to market forces, i.e., why should a firm own 
production facilities in a foreign country instead of trading intermediate products 
through the market. According to Buckley and Casson (1976), there is high risk and 
uncertainty in intermediate product markets which causes high transaction costs and 
it is the balance between these and the cost of ownership that determine whether a 
firm will engage in FDI. The choice ultimately depends on firm-, industry- and 
country-specific factors. Other reasons for internalising transactions are the 
appropriability problem that arises as a result of the public good nature of technology 
(Magee, 1977) and reputation concerns (Hennart 1982, 1991). However, the 
internalisation approach is limited in its ability to explain the pattern of FDI because 
it does not take into account locational factors, i.e. why a firm chooses a certain 
location for its foreign production activities.     
In summary, the theories discussed in this sub-section do recognise FDI as a distinct 
form of capital flows beyond that of mere financial capital. They put the firm at the 
centre of the analysis and rely on market imperfections that arise in the real world to 
explain the existence of FDI. Separately, they address different aspects of MNE 
activity: why some firms become MNEs (the ownership advantages), why they 
choose to organise cross-country transactions within the firm (internalisation theory) 
and, to a limited extent, why firms turn to foreign production (product cycle theory). 
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However, individually, they do not provide a complete framework for analysing all 
FDI or an agreed basis for estimating equations of its determinants. That is what 
Dunning (1988) with his OLI paradigm aimed at providing a holistic and general 
explanation which could more fully address the extent and pattern of FDI. 
2.2.2 The OLI paradigm 
Dunning’s (1980) eclectic paradigm of international production ‘envelopes’ the 
explanations of different macroeconomic and industrial organisation theories which 
are complementary and context specific (Dunning, 2000a). As such, it (at least 
partially) accepts, and builds on, the different theories of FDI discussed in the 
previous section. For instance, it accepts that traditional trade theory can explain the 
production of some types of products (where production and trade can be explained 
solely by the spatial distribution of factors of production), but that this theory fails to 
address the ownership of governance of their production activities (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008). Production of other products requires resources or capabilities with 
which not all firms are equally endowed, in which case the factor endowments 
theory with perfect markets is not applicable. In such cases, Dunning and Lundan 
(2008) argue, in order for firms to engage in FDI, two types of market failure must 
be present: a structural market failure which enables firms of a foreign country to 
have, or gain, an advantage over domestic firms in their home market (termed above 
as the ownership-specific advantage), and the inherent failure of markets to trade 
intermediate products at a lower transaction cost compared to a hierarchical 
organisation (as the internalisation theory asserts). According to Dunning’s 
paradigm, the nature of MNE activities can only be explained if all three elements 
are brought together. The cross-border characteristic of international production is 
explained by the ownership (O) advantages of a country’s firms and the spatial 
distribution of resources of the home and host countries (locational advantages - L). 
However, the ownership of these activities is explained only when the internalisation 
advantage (I) is brought in, i.e. the firms’ (own perception of) superiority in 
governing the combination of O and L assets compared to market forces and/or the 
ability to exercise monopoly power over the assets by governing them. Hence the 
OLI paradigm’s main hypothesis is that the level and structure of firm’s foreign 
value-added activities depend on the following conditions being satisfied 
simultaneously: the extent of the presence of an ownership-specific (O) advantage 
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(1); the extent to which the firm believes it is in its best interest to internalise (I) the 
use of its O advantages rather that to sell them or their rights of use to other firms 
(2); the extent to which the firm believes it is in its best interest to utilise its O 
advantages in foreign locations, the choice of which, in turn, depends on each 
country’s competitive advantage (3). Finally, provided that the above conditions are 
satisfied, foreign value-added activities depend on the extent to which the firm 
believes foreign production is consistent with its stakeholders’ long-term objectives 
(4) (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, pp. 99-100). 
In the OLI framework (Dunning and Lundan, 2008), the ownership advantage may 
be asset-specific (Oa) – the ownership of intangible assets such as technology, 
managerial, marketing and entrepreneurial skills – or (formal or informal) 
institutional assets (Oi) such as the firms’ organisational systems, norms and 
incentive structures. Alternatively, it may refer to transaction-cost minimising (Ot) 
advantages which lower transaction costs due to the common governance of asset-
specific and complementary assets. These may include advantages such as exclusive 
or more favourable access to inputs or product markets which arise in established 
firms (as opposed to their de novo counterparts), or in terms of the ability of MNEs 
(as opposed to other firms) to diversify risk and make use of the international 
distribution of resources. Ownership advantages are affected by the cultural, legal 
and institutional environment in the firms’ home country.  
Location-specific advantages within the OLI framework (Dunning and Lundan, 
2008) are very diverse and affect both home and host countries. They are related to 
the spatial distribution of natural and created resources and the cost, quality and 
productivity of inputs (including labour).6 Further, they are related to the size of 
markets, communication and trade costs related to transportation, and artificial 
barriers to trade. The legal and regulatory framework, economic system, government 
policies, and investment incentives and disincentives can also affect the country of 
both source and destination of FDI, as can the cross-country differences with regard 
to language, culture, business ethics and politics. Finally, the destination of FDI may 
                                                            
6
 The quality and productivity of labour appears to implicitly refer also to a high level of human 
capital. However, it may also refer simply to quality and productivity of labour in economic activities 
that do not necessarily require highly-skilled labour. Namely, it may refer to lower levels or skill or 
simply a sort of “physical productive capacity” which is in line with some of the empirical literature 
on FDI (discussed in Chapter 4) which uses health indicators as measures of human capital.  
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be affected by agglomeration economies and spillovers, as well as by the 
infrastructural provisions in the host country (including that of education).   
Internalisation advantages in the OLI paradigm arise either as a means of avoiding 
transaction costs that arise due to market failure or for exploiting market failure. 
Through internalisation, firms are able to avoid search, negotiation and contract 
enforcement costs; they are more easily able to control the quality of intermediate 
and final products and supplies of inputs. Alternatively, they can engage in 
(anti)competitive activities such as transfer pricing, cross-subsidisation and tax 
liability minimisation.    
In conclusion, the value that the OLI paradigm adds to FDI theories is the argument 
that it is not the presence of an advantage per se, but combination(s) with other 
advantages that determine FDI flows. For instance, it argues that it is not the just the 
possession of managerial experience or technology, but the also the gains from 
internalising their use which gives a firm an advantage over its domestic competitors 
(in the foreign country). Hence, the unique argument of the OLI paradigm is that the 
value of the combination of the OLI variables as a whole exceeds that of the sum of 
its parts (Dunning, 2001).     
Building on previous work by Behrman (1972), Dunning and Lundan (2008) 
distinguish between four types of FDI according to the investors’ motives: market 
seeking, efficiency seeking, natural resource seeking, and strategic asset or capability 
seeking. 7 Market-seeking FDI refers to investments that are made for the purpose of 
supplying the market of the destination country or those of countries adjacent to it. 
Efficiency-seeking FDI refers to rationalisation of FDI in a way that allows firms to 
benefit from geographically dispersed activities due to factor-endowment differences 
or economies of scale and scope. Interestingly, Dunning and Lundan includes the 
availability and, by implication, cost of highly-motivated unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour in their third category of ‘natural resource-seeking’. Like most FDI literature, 
they make no reference here to the importance of labour skills or productivity related 
                                                            
7
 Even though Dunning and Lundan (2008) term this category as natural resource seeking originally 
this is not restricted to natural (or ‘physical’) resources and therefore it is referred to in this discussion 
as resource seeking. 
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to skills8, implicitly assuming these to be irrelevant and restricting the focus only to 
labour costs. Labour skills are only identified in the next category, strategic asset-
seeking FDI. This type of FDI refers to investment that is undertaken for the purpose 
of protecting or advancing the firm’s long-term competitiveness, e.g. through 
mergers to gain strength over competitors or acquiring its suppliers. The motivation 
for this type of FDI, according to Dunning and Lundan (2008, p. 69) is “...to acquire 
technological capability, management or marketing expertise and organisational 
skills” (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, p.69). This is the only instance where skilled 
labour appears as a determinant of FDI in Dunning’s paradigm; however, this 
argument is too limited because it appears to apply exclusively to inwards FDI in 
technologically-advanced, countries and exclusively to the facilitation of innovation. 
However, in this thesis it is argued that, theoretically, human capital is also likely to 
be a relevant factor in foreign investors’ decisions through other mechanisms and 
this should apply across countries, types of FDI and sectors of economic activity 
(even though the level of relevance may vary).  
2.2.3 New trade theory  
New trade theory provides an alternative framework for analysing FDI, integrating 
OLI’s firm-based approach into general equilibrium models. This industrial 
organisation approach to trade theory introduces features of product differentiation, 
imperfect competition and economies of scale. Within the new trade theory, two 
strands of models have been developed: models of vertical firms, which combine the 
OLI approach with the factor endowments theory, and models of horizontal firms, 
which combine this approach with proximity and concentration advantages. These 
two strands of previously mutually exclusive models have been recently integrated 
into the knowledge-capital (KK) model. The following sub-sections discuss the 
vertical, horizontal and KK model, respectively. 
2.2.3.1 Vertical models   
Helpman (1984) attempts to explain international trade using a general equilibrium 
model where firms’ decisions to become multinational play a central role. Helpman’s 
model integrates features such as economies of scale, product differentiation and 
monopolistic competition into traditional factor endowment theory to examine the 
                                                            
8
 Note that the characterisation of labour force as ‘highly-motivated’ implicitly relates to its 
productivity, but not to its level of skills.  
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location choices of MNEs’ production. Firms are assumed to have an ownership 
advantage in terms of management, marketing and/or R&D, a firm-specific input 
which Helpman terms as ‘general purpose input’ (H), the use of which is assumed to 
be internalised by the firm. Differentiated products are produced using labour and the 
H factor, both of which are immobile across countries, but the latter is assumed to be 
able to serve production activities without being located in the production plant. The 
optimal factor-proportions (and prices) differ between countries and, provided that 
the differences are so high that prices cannot be equalised by trade of goods, firms 
producing differentiated products will wish to geographically fragment their 
production. The country with relatively higher endowments of H will be the firms’ 
choice for the parent country, hosting headquarters and their activities, while the 
other one will host the production plant. The presence of economies of scale in 
production, an assumption of this model, induces firms to have a single production 
plant. In addition, trade costs and tariffs are assumed to be zero in this model, 
leaving no further motivation to have plants in other countries, therefore excluding 
the possibility of horizontal MNEs which are discussed in the next sub-section.   
This type of model implies that skilled-labour intensive headquarter activities will be 
carried out in the parent country, while production activities will be located in 
unskilled-labour intensive countries. However, as Zhang and Markusen (1999) point 
out, this prediction does not match FDI patterns in practice as the most (unskilled) 
labour abundant countries receive very little FDI. Like Lucas (1990), Zhang and 
Markusen turn to the (un)skilled workforce to explain the failure of theory to predict 
FDI flows. They posit that, notwithstanding that unskilled-labour intensive activities 
are undertaken abroad, foreign investors still have direct requirements for skilled 
workers in the host country in terms of engineers, technicians and managers, as well 
as indirect requirements in terms of infrastructure and legal institutions. Focusing on 
the direct requirements, Zhang and Markusen’s model predicts that as the differences 
in skilled-labour endowments between the parent and host country increase, i.e. the 
latter become sufficiently skilled-labour scarce, inward FDI will fall to zero. While 
this model, unlike the majority of FDI theories, does point out the requirements of 
foreign investors for human capital explicitly, it does not go further to address the 
rationale as to why human capital is relevant; it appears implicitly. It appears that 
Zhang and Markusen are referring to human capital’s productivity-enhancing effects 
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and possibly to adoption and/or adaption of technology (discussed in the next 
section), since they point out the importance of engineers in particular.  
2.2.3.2 Horizontal models  
The horizontal models strand is relatively more developed, perhaps because this type 
of FDI, which seeks to supply foreign markets, is more prevalent in practice 
(Markusen, 1995, 2002). Unlike the vertical models of FDI discussed above, 
horizontal models are typically based on one of the following assumptions: the use of 
only one factor of production, symmetric factor endowments across countries, 
therefore excluding the motivation for splitting different stages of production 
activity. On the other hand, they recognise the existence of trade costs and tariffs, 
hence the motivation for foreign production as a means of avoiding these costs or 
gaining access to markets which can only be served locally. Similar to vertical 
models, Markusen’s (1984) horizontal model incorporates knowledge-based 
ownership advantages due to R&D, marketing, scientific and technical workers, 
product differentiation and product newness and complexity. These knowledge-
based assets have two features which facilitate FDI: they can be transferred more 
easily between production plants and they often are of a joint-input nature because 
they can be used in multiple production plants without diminishing in value. The 
joint-input nature of knowledge capital gives rise to firm-level economies of scale 
because, like a public good, it can be supplied to additional plants at a very low cost. 
Under these circumstances, MNEs arise because they are more cost-efficient, i.e. a 
multi-plant firm, compared to individual single-plant firms, has to make only one 
investment in knowledge capital. 
Extensions of Markusen (1984) include Horstmann and Markusen (1987) and 
Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000). Horstmann and Markusen (1987) further 
develop a model where, as in the original one, there are assumed to be trade costs 
and tariffs and firm-level economies of scale (due to knowledge capital) which 
provide motivation to have multiple production plants. On the other hand, there are 
also assumed to be plant-level economies of scale which provide motivation for 
producing only domestically and exporting goods to foreign markets. The existence 
of MNEs then depends on the trade-off between the advantages of directly accessing 
foreign markets and those of scale economies in production, hence the term 
proximity-concentration hypothesis. The model predicts that, in equilibrium, MNEs 
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will arise in industries where transportation costs, tariffs and firm-specific fixed costs 
representing knowledge capital are high relative to plant-level fixed costs. Markusen 
and Venables (1998, 2000) extend the general equilibrium models to explicitly 
consider the lack of symmetry in country size and factor endowments. Their models 
predict that that the importance of MNEs relative to trade increases as countries 
become more similar in size and relative factor endowments. 
2.2.3.3 Knowledge-capital (KK) models   
Integrating the horizontal and vertical models above, Markusen et al. (1997) develop 
the knowledge-capital (KK) model which simultaneously incorporates features of 
both models, therefore permitting both types of MNEs to arise endogenously. In 
particular, the assumptions of trade costs and differences in factor intensities are 
combined, providing motivation for both horizontal and vertical FDI. The KK 
model, like the vertical model, assumes that knowledge-based activities can 
contribute to production activities without being at the same location. Like the 
horizontal model, it assumes that these activities can be applied simultaneously in 
multiple production plants (at low marginal cost). In the KK model with two 
countries, two factors (skilled and unskilled labour) and two goods (one 
homogeneous with constant returns to scale and one with firm- and plant-level 
economies of scale), predictions about MNE activity vary with parameter values. 
Horizontal MNEs dominate when transportation costs are high and the host and 
destination countries are similar in size and relative endowments. Intuitively, if 
market size differs, the bigger market is favoured and, if factor endowments differ, 
vertical fragmentation is favoured unless transportation costs are high. 
2.2.4 Other approaches  
2.2.4.1 Policy competition models   
This approach to FDI addresses the incentives that governments provide to attract 
FDI. The location choice of MNEs in these models depends on various factors that 
can be affected by government policy such as wages, taxes, subsidies and labour 
market flexibility. These models suggest that firms choose a location based on a 
combination of wages and level of taxes (Black and Hoyt, 1989; Haaparanta, 1996). 
However, Haufler and Wooton’s (1999) model predicts that fiscal incentives are 
typically relatively less important than market size and therefore small countries find 
it hard to attract FDI even with lower taxes. According to Haaland and Wooton 
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(1999), firms gain from agglomeration effects and hence government subsidies 
should have the role of attracting the first investor which is needed in order to create 
a modern sector, i.e. to introduce a new, more technologically advanced, sector in the 
domestic economy. In Haaland and Wooton (2001a) there is a trade-off between 
initial subsidies and labour market flexibility, but, according to their model, only the 
latter has long-term effects on inward FDI. Another variable which is predicted to be 
relevant in this approach is the unemployment level; locations with flexible labour 
markets and high unemployment (and therefore low opportunity cost of 
employment) attract FDI (Haaland and Wooton, 2001b). It appears that the term 
‘labour’ in this model refers to unskilled labour because high unemployment in a 
country does not necessarily lower the price of skilled labour: the latter is more 
likely to depend on the unemployment rate of skilled labour, a distinction which this 
model, like most FDI literature, does not consider. 
2.2.4.2 Game theory  
The game theoretic approach (Jacquemin, 1989; Veugelers, 1995; Graham, 1998) 
explains the decision to engage, or not, in FDI as a firm’s (perceived) optimal move 
based on the action, or likely response, of other ‘players’. Like Hymer (1976) and 
other market-failure theories, this approach argues that MNEs arise in markets with 
concentrated power. In such markets, the actions of one firm affect the market price 
and the actions of other firms. Graham (1998) develops a model which addresses 
FDI decisions in a world with two countries and two firms, each of them a 
monopolist in their home market, to show that the presence of a cost-advantage (or 
O-advantage in Dunning’s paradigm) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
to explain FDI. When each of these firms enters the other’s market, it causes the 
incumbent firm to lose a share of its monopoly profits. In this setting, a firm may 
enter the foreign market even though it may not have the cost-advantage: this 
becomes the best response to the entrance of the foreign firm in its own market, 
causing a reduction of its monopoly profits. The foreign firm, on the other hand, 
takes this likely response into account when making the decision to enter the market 
initially, and may decide not to enter the foreign market despite its cost-advantage, 
weighting the profits gained in that market against the profits lost in their domestic 
market due to the other firms ‘punishment’. This approach, however, appears to deal 
with horizontal FDI which aims to supply the foreign market, and it is not clear to 
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what extent it applies to vertical FDI which does not necessarily involve entrance 
into a market as a seller. 
2.2.4.3 Agglomeration economies  
Based on the ‘new economic geography’ approach (Krugman, 1991) FDI is argued 
to be prone to ‘agglomeration forces’, as a result of which FDI in a host country can 
increase even without any changes in other locational determinants. This self-
reinforcing effect can arise if foreign investors cluster in specific locations because 
they benefit from positive externalities arising from the presence of previous foreign 
investors, e.g. due to the possibility of technological and knowledge spillover, the 
presence of a specialised workforce, or linkages to suppliers/customers of specialised 
intermediate products. Evidence consistent with the presence of agglomeration 
effects as a locational determinant of FDI has been found, among others, by: Cheng 
and Kwan (2000), Blattner (2006), Bobonis and Shatz (2006) and Riedl (2010).  
In conclusion, the review of FDI theory in this section suggests that human capital is 
largely ignored in FDI analyses. The theories that do consider human capital do not 
directly model the relationship between human capital and FDI or explicitly address 
its theoretical foundation(s) which implicitly mostly appears to stem from the effect 
of human capital on productivity and/or its ability to affect the incidence and speed 
of the adoption of new technology. Further, this literature does not elaborate the 
relevant skills that foreign investors seek in terms of the level and type of human 
capital and, by implication, the relevant measures of human capital in relation to 
FDI. As will be seen in Chapter 3, a similar gap in literature is also manifested in the 
empirical studies which address the role of human capital as a determinant of FDI; in 
most of the empirical literature the choice of the human capital measure is not even 
discussed and often appears to be a result of data availability rather than a specific 
theoretical rationale. This thesis aims to fill these gaps in the current literature by 
explicitly considering the theoretical rationale for human capital as a determinant of 
FDI and, based on this and recent developments in growth theory, to derive a model 
with appropriate measures for empirically testing this relationship in the subsequent 
chapters.  
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2.3 Human capital and the attraction of FDI 
Although generally insufficiently recognised and inappropriately addressed in FDI 
theory, human capital has gained a central focus in economic growth literature in the 
last two decades (Temple, 2001; Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2003; Goldin and Katz, 
2008; Jones and Romer, 2010; Breton, 2012; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011a). 
The relationship between human capital and economic growth, discussed in the first 
sub-section below, can inform the analysis of human capital in relation to FDI. 
However, in the previous chapter it was argued that causation in the human capital-
inward FDI relationship can also work in the opposite direction: foreign enterprises 
can develop the skills of the workforce in the host country. Such feedback effects 
from FDI to human capital pose a potential problem in the empirical estimations to 
be undertaken in the subsequent chapters because they may cause the key 
regressor(s), i.e., human capital variable(s), to be endogenously determined. The 
second sub-section below explores the possibility of reverse causation by assessing 
the theoretical arguments and, where available, empirical evidence, linking FDI to 
human capital development in the host economy. 
2.3.1 The role of human capital in economic growth theory 
From a theoretical viewpoint, the rationale for human capital being a factor that 
determines the location of firms’ value-added activities can be derived from human 
capital theory and theories of economic growth. In the former (neoclassical) theory 
(Schultz, 1961; Becker 1964; Mincer, 1974) human capital is considered a means of 
production; investment in human capital through schooling, training or work 
experience enhances the skill level of individuals and hence their productive 
capacity. Their productive capacity in turn determines their wage level, i.e. returns to 
schooling. Hence, according to this view, human capital obtained through education 
translates into productivity and productivity translates into the wage level; in the 
simplest neoclassical labour market, the observed wages perfectly reflect 
productivity.  
The human capital theory approach was incorporated in theories of growth after the 
1980s (e.g. Lucas, 1988; Mankiw et al, 1992). Mankiw et al. (1992), for instance, 
incorporate human capital into the standard neoclassical growth model developed by 
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Solow (1956).9 Instead of assuming a homogeneous labour input, Mankiw et al. 
distinguish between uneducated and educated labour, the latter being proxied by the 
share of labour force that has completed secondary education. In line with human 
capital theory, an increase in educational attainment (assumed to be highly correlated 
with human capital investment) enhances the productivity of the workforce and 
hence the level of output produced in the economy. In this augmented Solow model, 
the accumulation of human capital is one of the determinants of the steady-state 
growth paths of economies. However, despite the impact of human capital on the 
steady-state level of output, i.e. the height of the steady-state path, its impact on 
growth rates is only transitional. Once the growth of human capital ceases (i.e. the 
increase in the proportion of the population with secondary education in Mankiw et 
al., 1992 ceases, which is inevitable), its effect on the growth rate of output will 
cease. Steady-state growth rates in this model, as in the traditional neoclassical ones, 
are determined by the rate of technological advancement which may take the form of 
new products, markets and processes. However, despite the crucial role of 
technological change recognised by neoclassical models, this component is not 
modelled but rather assumed to be growing constantly at an exogenous rate. New 
growth theories discussed next go further and attempt to endogenise growth, either 
by modelling the economic forces underlying technological change, as in Romer 
(1990), or by allowing long-run growth to be determined by human capital 
accumulation, as in Lucas (1988). 
Lucas’s (1988) contribution in endogenous growth theory, like the human capital 
augmented Solow model above, treats human capital as one of the inputs in the 
process of production. However unlike Mankiw et al. (1992) who define human 
capital simply as the proportion of population who have attained a certain level of 
education, in Lucas’ model (part of) human capital is not necessarily tied to 
individuals. Human capital in this model is acquired by schooling as well as by 
experience (i.e. ‘learning-by-doing’) and it does not display diminishing returns to 
scale, which allows it to become an ‘engine of growth’. This feature of the model is 
obtained by the presence of “inheritance of human capital within families of goods as 
                                                            
9
 In a simple neoclassical growth accounting framework, output is a function of factor inputs: capital 
and labour which is assumed to be homogeneous (hence human capital is not a relevant factor). The 
part of growth that cannot be explained by factor accumulation, referred to in the literature as the 
‘Solow residual’, represents the total factor productivity in the economy which in the neoclassical 
growth theory is assumed to grow exogenously at a constant rate.   
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well as within families of people” (p. 28). The first is obtained when the skills 
previously acquired for producing goods is, at least to some extent, useful in learning 
to produce new ones which are continuously being introduced (even though 
diminishing returns to acquiring skills for existing goods apply); the second is 
achieved by applying the technology of acquiring human capital to families rather 
than individuals, allowing for the initial human capital of new family member to be 
dependent on that attained by older members of the family, i.e. by allowing for a 
inter-generational transfer of human capital. An implication of Lucas’s model is that 
human capital accumulation, and thus growth of output, can continue even after that 
of educational attainment of the current population in the economy ceases. In this 
model (implicitly at least) the mechanism through which education affects growth is 
by increasing the productivity of the workforce and it is the change in, rather than. or 
in addition to, the stock of, human capital that affects growth.  
Also with Solow’s model as a starting point, Romer (1990) develops an alternative 
approach to endogenising growth by addressing the economic factors underlying 
technological progress. In Romer’s model technological change arises largely as a 
result of an intentional search for new ‘ideas’ on the part of profit-maximising firms 
or inventors. ‘Ideas’ refer to the advancement of the technology of production, 
allowing “...a given bundle of inputs to produce more or better output” (Jones, 1998, 
p.72); they range from the instructions for designing an engine and the formula for 
creating a drug to new approaches to retailing (e.g. e-commerce) or human resource 
management (e.g. paying an efficiency wage). The difference between ‘ideas’ and 
‘objects’ is central to Romer’s model and to the mechanism through which human 
capital affects growth. Ideas are inherently different from other economic goods 
because they are non-rivalrous but in this setting they must be only partly 
excludable, i.e. their use by one firm or person does not preclude or in any way limit 
their use by others, though the inventor/firm can prevent their use by other firms for 
the purpose of production.10 Ideas are intertwined with human capital because they 
                                                            
10
 Because of their non-rivalrous nature, ideas need to be produced only once and thus their producers 
incur only a fixed cost and no (or trivial) marginal cost. In this case, marginal cost pricing which is a 
feature of perfect markets would result in negative profits. Hence, ideas must be at least to some 
extent excludable in order for market incentive to exist for inventors/ inventing firms to develop ideas 
and for technologic to progress in this model. Partial excludability in Romer (1990) is defined as the 
inventor/inventing firm having a property right over its use in production but not in future research for 
the purpose of designing new ideas. In this way, the creators of new ideas can benefit from the stock 
of the existing ideas in the economy. 
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are largely developed as a result of research and development (R&D) activities 
which are human capital intensive in nature. The difference between human capital 
and ideas is that the former is inherently tied to a physical individual (i.e. ‘an object’) 
which makes it rivalrous, while the latter is not11, and thus can be used by anyone 
with knowledge of it once it has been created. The non-rivalrous nature of ideas in 
Romer’s model has the implication that they can be accumulated infinitely, 
regardless of the individuals who invented them. The non-excludability of ideas, on 
the other hand, has the implication that the stock of ideas is an input in the 
production of new ideas and in Romer’s model it increases the productivity of human 
capital in their production. These two features allow ideas, and thus human capital, 
to have a lasting effect on growth rates in the long-run. In this model, like in Lucas’s, 
human capital has a central role in explaining long-term growth rates but the (main) 
mechanism of its influence is less direct. The crucial role of human capital in this 
model stems from its intensive use in the creation of knowledge (ideas) which is 
added to its traditionally recognised role as an enhancer of productivity in the 
production of the final output. The new mechanism through which growth is affected 
by human capital also implies that, unlike Lucas’s and Mankiw et al.’s models 
above, Romer’s model relates a country’s long-term growth rate to the stock of 
human capital rather than changes in the stock.  
Though the idea of human capital having a central role in the process of economic 
growth became influential only in the late 1980s, its distinctive nature beyond a 
simple factor of production was recognised much earlier by Nelson and Phelps 
(1966). Their approach to human capital is in some respects very similar, and can be 
considered as complementary, to that of Romer (1990). Both models link human 
capital, technology and economic growth: Romer focuses on innovations, while 
Nelson and Phelps focus on the diffusion of frontier technology, both recognising the 
respective processes to be conditional on the level of human capital and having a 
crucial role on economic growth. Nelson and Phelps argue that the main role of the 
human capital12 is not to provide individuals with the ability to perform current tasks 
                                                            
11
 In reality ideas are usually tied to physical objects (e.g. a formula is tied to a piece of paper and 
software is tied to a CD-Rom), but the cost of replicating them is negligible compared to the cost of 
producing the original so it is reasonable to assume these costs away. 
12
 In their original paper, Nelson and Phelps use the term education which is implicitly assumed to be 
synonymous with human capital. In this research, however, it is recognised that equating educational 
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more effectively, but to enable them to adapt to change, i.e. to perform, or learn to 
perform, different tasks. According to them, because education enhances individuals’ 
ability to receive, understand and process information, it prepares workers to adapt to 
the new technology more quickly, but it also enables managers to better follow, 
understand, assess and discriminate between new technologies, thus reducing the risk 
(and increasing likelihood) of introducing new technology earlier rather than waiting 
to inform their decision on the experience of other firms. For these two reasons, the 
quantity and quality of human capital is argued to determine the gap between frontier 
technology and actual technology used in practice at the economy level. Technology, 
thus, is not transferred instantaneously in this model and it is actual technology, 
made of both new and old technologies, that determines total factor productivity and 
thus economic growth. The Nelson-Phelps approach has been subsequently extended 
to incorporate “domestic” innovation (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005; Vandenbussche 
et al., 2006), a threshold level of human capital as a condition for technological 
catch-up (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005) and concern with the composition of human 
capital in terms of skill level and type of education (Vandenbussche et al., 2006 and 
Krueger and Kumar, 2004, respectively). This approach has also been embedded into 
a general equilibrium model (Cosar, 2011) in which skilled workers enhance 
productivity at firm level by adopting new techniques from a growing stock of world 
knowledge. In the Nelson-Phelps approach, like in Romer (1990), it is the levels of 
human capital rather than changes in it that are important. Hence, to some extent the 
approaches of Romer and Nelson and Phelps to human capital can be thought of as 
variations of the same idea in essence, complementing each other in explaining 
innovation and technology diffusion within the setting of developed economies, and 
the diffusion of technology from these to developing economies. Another feature 
which these two models and that of Lucas share is the presence of externalities 
which give rise to increasing returns to scale with respect to human capital either 
because skills are (partly) transferrable to the production of new goods and to the 
next generation (as in Lucas, 1988), or because innovators and imitators benefit from 
the existing stock of knowledge (as in Romer, 1990 and Nelson and Phelps, 1966, 
respectively).  
                                                                                                                                                                            
attainment to human capital attainment is an over-simplification of the relationship between the two, 
an issue which is to be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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The consensus which persists in economic growth theory regarding the positive role 
of human capital in the growth process appears to be largely, though not 
universally13, shared by the empirical literature. Despite the difficulties of measuring 
human capital which are discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the relationship between 
human capital (typically proxied by quantity of educational attainment) and 
economic growth has been supported by various empirical analysis, including Barro 
(1991, 1997), Mankiw et al. (1992), Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) and Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2008). As far as the specific approaches discussed above are 
concerned, attempts have been made to empirically discriminate between the effects 
of human capital stocks and its accumulation on growth but, as Hanushek and 
Woessman (2008, p.632) conclude in their review, “it is beyond the scope of current 
data to draw strong conclusions about the relative importance of different 
mechanisms”. Both hypotheses have received empirical support by various studies. 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994, 2005), Hojo (2003), Di Liberto et al. (2011) find 
support for the effect of stocks of human capital, while Mankiw et al. (1992), Temple 
and Woessmann (2006), de la Fuente and Domènech (2006), Cohen and Soto (2007) 
find support for the effect of human capital accumulation on economic growth. 
However, here it should be noted that, theoretically, there is no reason for these 
models to be considered as mutually exclusive, which would explain the lack of 
conclusiveness in their empirical results. Empirically, evidence consistent with the 
coexistence of both these mechanisms is found by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2005), 
Sunde and Vischer (2011) and, indirectly, by Hanushek and Woessmann (2009a, 
2011a). In accordance with this line of thought, the endogenous growth model of 
Vandenbussche et al. (2006) which is discussed later in this section recognises the 
importance of human capital as a determinant of both productivity enhancement and 
innovation/technology adoption.  
Consistent with the original idea of Nelson and Phelps (1966) regarding the 
importance of human capital to the adoption of new technologies is the skill-biased 
                                                            
13
 The relationship between human capital and growth is not considered as proven by some studies. 
For instance, Bils and Klenow (2000) argue that the relationship between education and growth could 
be caused by reverse causation or by omitted factors that are related to both human capital and 
growth, while Pritchett (2006) argues that cross-country differences that are found in the growth 
effects of human capital may be due to differences in the institutional environment which induce 
different types of activities, some of which are productive and some counterproductive from a social 
perspective.  
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technical change (SBTC) hypothesis (Machin, 2004). The starting point of this 
hypothesis is the empirical observation of improvement in employment outcomes for 
tertiary education graduates since the 1980s in developed economies, despite their 
increasing numbers. The rising relative wages and employment of skilled workers 
that have accompanied the continuous increase in their supply appear to be contrary 
to predictions of a simple supply-demand model. These simultaneous changes in the 
composition of human capital and labour market outcomes may be explained by a 
model in which these outcomes are determined by a ‘race’ between the demand and 
supply of skilled and unskilled labour (Manning and Manacorda, 1998), in which the 
relative demand for skilled workers increases more than their relative supply. 
According to the skill-biased technical change hypothesis, the persistent shift in the 
demand for skilled workers can be attributed to the new productivity-enhancing 
technologies that are being introduced into workplaces, which can be operated only 
by individuals who have the necessary skills (which are implicitly assumed to stem 
from their education).  
Consistent with the skill-complementary nature of technology maintained by this 
hypothesis, Caselli and Coleman (2006) maintain that countries may choose the 
technology which is best suited to their relative factor endowments; thus, unskilled-
labour abundant countries may choose technologies to take advantage of this factor. 
Similarly, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) develop a model where, due to the 
deficiencies in skilled labour, technologically less-advanced countries may choose 
local technologies rather than the more advanced skill-complementary ones 
developed in the advanced countries, even when the latter are available. When these 
arguments are applied to FDI, it follows that host country skills affect not only 
foreign investors’ decisions to invest in a country, but also the level and type of 
technology that is transferred. Similar arguments have been made previously by de 
Mello (1997, p. 30) who argues that foreign investors may select technologies to 
transfer to the recipient countries depending on their specific productive and 
institutional characteristics. The importance of human capital in determining the 
choice of technology has also been confirmed by case studies presented in UNCTAD 
(1999) and Ritchie (2002). Another relevant implication of the skill-biased technical 
change hypothesis is the increasing importance of skills over time to firms, which 
has found support in literature (Murnane et al., 1995; Katz and Autor, 1999; Goldin 
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and Katz, 1998, 2008) and may also apply to the influence of human capital on FDI. 
Accordingly, Miyamoto (2003) argues that global shifts in labour demand towards 
more highly skilled labour due to the skilled-biased technical change explain, at least 
partially, the increasing importance of human capital as a FDI determinant indicated 
by some empirical studies discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis (e.g. Noorbakhsh et 
al., 2001). 
A final implication of this approach is the importance of the composition of human 
capital, and tertiary education graduates in particular, for technology adoption which, 
as previously discussed, is maintained to be directly linked with economic growth. In 
this respect, the skill-biased technological change hypothesis is consistent with the 
arguments of (mostly) recent growth models, discussed next, which emphasise the 
importance of the composition of human capital in terms of levels of education, 
types of skills and mix of occupations.  
Vandenbussche et al. (2006) develop an endogenous growth model in which 
technological progress depends on both innovation and imitation. Under the 
(reasonable) assumption that innovation is a relatively more skill-intensive activity 
compared to technology adoption, this model predicts that returns to high-skilled 
human capital rise as economies approach the technological frontier and rely more 
on innovation. In this model, (the share of) high-skilled human capital contributes to 
total factor productivity growth (TFP) through innovation in advanced countries. In 
countries farther away from the technological frontier, however, it is (the share of) 
low-skilled human capital that mainly contributes to TFP growth through the 
adoption of technologies developed in the advanced countries14. The different 
growth-enhancing effects of different levels of human capital predicted by this model 
have been empirically supported by Vandenbussche et al. (2006) and Di Liberto et 
al. (2011) who use tertiary and lower level educational attainment as proxies for high 
and low skill levels, respectively, and by Soukiazis and Cravo (2008) who use patent 
ratios and average years of schooling as such proxies. However, Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2009a, 2011b), investigating the growth-enhancement effects of the 
                                                            
14
 This model is, to some extent, consistent with the argument of Aghion and Howitt (1998) who posit 
that secondary and tertiary education attainment best reflects the number of potential 
researchers/developers in the economy and should be expected to be associated with an increase in 
innovation.  
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quality of schooling on growth (as measured by international test scores) find 
evidence that is inconsistent with this view. The effect of the share of students who 
have achieved basic literacy on economic growth does not vary with the level of 
development, but the effect of the share of top performers is significantly larger in 
countries with initial lower levels of output. Hanushek and Woessmann (2009a) 
argue that basic literacy captures the effect of human capital as predicted by 
neoclassical theory, while top performance in these tests captures the effect of human 
capital as predicted by the Nelson-Phelps approach. The findings of Hanushek and 
Woessmann imply that, contrary to one of the predictions of Vandenbussche et al. 
(2006), it is high-skilled human capital that is required for technology adoption in 
less developed economies and accelerates convergence with the advanced 
economies.  
Another view on the composition of human capital and growth points out the 
relevance of the specific type of skills, both in terms of general vs. specific skills and 
the mix of occupational skills. Krueger and Kumar (2004), for instance, posit that 
general skills provided by general education are more suitable for operating new 
technologies, while specific skills provided by vocational education are more 
suitable for operating old technologies. They develop a model with endogenous 
technology adoption by firms which shows that when the rate of technological 
progress increases, countries with initially similar growth rates can diverge. 
Countries with conceptual-based education experience higher growth rates compared 
to those that focus of skill-specific education. Similarly, Goldin and Katz (2008) 
argue that the focus of the American education system on general skills based on 
formal education (as opposed to specific on-the-job training) may be a key 
dimension in explaining the ‘exceptionalism’ of this education system which they 
see as a driver of the country’s economic success in the twentieth century.       
Cosar (2011) points out that it is not appropriate to aggregate human capital when 
analysing technology adoption. Because not all graduates are equally suitable for this 
activity, he posits that the share of tertiary graduates in sciences and engineering in 
the workforce is a more appropriate measure when measuring the capacity for 
technology adoption in a country. In this line of thought, but focusing on 
technological improvement instead of adoption, Murphy et al. (1991) argue that the 
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allocation of talent across occupations can influence economic growth. Here it is 
argued that when able (or ‘talented’) individuals engage in productive activities, they 
improve the technology and create positive spillovers as others learn from them, 
increasing productivity and ultimately output. However, when the able engage in 
rent-seeking activities15 which merely redistribute wealth, they improve and expand 
these activities. As a result, the returns to productive activities decreases, further 
discouraging talent from entering the latter and ultimately depressing growth. To test 
these hypotheses, Murphy et al. investigate the growth effects of the share of college 
enrolments in engineering and law as proxies for productive and rent-seeking 
activities, respectively, and find evidence consistent with their theory: the share of 
engineering in total enrolments has a positive effect on growth while that of law 
enrolments has a negative effect. Finally, recent economic growth research 
emphasises the quality, rather than just the quantity, of education as a determinant of 
economic growth. Schoellman (2009), Soto (2010) and Hanushek and Woessmann 
(2009a,b; 2011) find evidence of a positive relationship between the quality of 
education and economic growth. Consistent with this, Lavy (2010) finds that the 
effect of instructional time on the level of cognitive skills (as measured by PISA 
scores) in much larger in developed economies than in developing economies. 
In contrast to the theories discussed above, Acemoglu and Autor (2012) propose a 
novel approach to explaining ‘what human capital does’ and how it affects a 
country’s economic growth. In a critique and extension of Goldin and Katz’s skill-
biased technical change hypothesis, Acemoglu and Autor (2012) argue that the 
orthodox human capital view underlying this hypothesis, i.e. that human capital 
increases productivity by augmenting effective units of labour, is an over-
simplification. Instead, they propose a task-based approach where it is not the skills 
of the workers per se that produces the higher output, but the application of these to 
the tasks needed in production. Accordingly, the effect of human capital varies 
depending on the complexity of tasks that are undertaken. Acemoglu and Autor test 
the complementarity of skill complexity and human capital using a state-level panel 
model for the USA in which economic growth is explained by the changes in human 
capital, as well as the initial level of task complexity (as measured by the share of 
                                                            
15
 Rent-seeking activities, according to Murphy et al. refer to employment in government bureaucracy, 
army, organised religion and law and financial services. 
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employees in professional, managerial and technical occupations), and the 
interaction term between the two. The most notable finding of this investigation is 
that the effect of the level of human capital, as measured by average years of 
education, is conditional on the level of complexity of the tasks on use. Perhaps most 
relevant for this thesis is the finding that the gains from higher levels of schooling, as 
measured by the growth of average years tertiary education attained by the 
population, are higher in states with a higher level of initial task complexity. The 
growth of average years of lower-than-tertiary education attained, on the other hand, 
is a positive and significant predictor of economic growth, but its effect is not 
conditional on the complexity of tasks performed.  
A conclusion that follows from the discussion in this section is that there is a strong 
theoretical framework linking human capital to economic growth through three 
potential mechanisms, namely: enhancement of workforce productivity, facilitation 
of innovative activities, and adoption of new technologies in the production process. 
Returning to the initial focus of this thesis which motivated this discussion, the 
relationship between human capital and FDI, it is argued here that all these three 
mechanisms are potentially relevant to foreign investors. The first mechanism, 
labour productivity, may appear more obvious and has been relatively more 
recognised by the FDI literature (though more often implicitly than explicitly, as 
argued in Section 2.2). As discussed in Section 2.2, Hanushek and Woessmann 
(2009a) find that the share of students achieving basic literacy, which they argue to 
represent the ‘labour productivity’ effect, is a significant determinant of growth 
regardless of a country’s level of development. Similarly, Acemoglu and Autor 
(2012) find that levels of lower-than-secondary educational attainment have a 
positive effect on growth regardless of the level of skill complexity. Based on these 
findings of growth studies, it can be argued here that the ‘productivity effect’ is 
likely to be important for inwards FDI regardless of the destination country. The 
second mechanism, facilitation of innovations, is referred to by Dunning and Lundan 
(2008) in a particular type of resource-seeking FDI which relates to highly skilled-
labour in technologically advanced countries, but appears largely irrelevant 
elsewhere. Indeed, since foreign value-added activities in transition economies are 
likely to involve later stages in the product life cycle and not be geared towards 
product innovation, this mechanism becomes relevant only once the idea of formal 
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R&D activities is replaced with a more inclusive one, e.g. when considering 
innovations of an organisational and/or marketing nature (Jones, 1998), or process 
innovations on the factory floor or the introduction of new inputs to production 
(Cosar, 2011).16 The third mechanism through which human capital can affect 
inward FDI is through facilitating adoption of technology developed by the parent 
firm in the production process of a subsidiary. This mechanism can be argued to be 
the most important one from the perspective of the host economy because it may 
affect not only the volume of FDI, but also the level of technology employed by 
foreign investors (UNCTAD, 1999; Ritchie, 2002). 
2.3.2 Potential endogeneity in the relationship between human 
capital and inward FDI 
In Section 1.2 it was argued that one of the potential benefits that it conventionally 
associated with inward FDI is the development of the workforce skills. The rest of 
this section provides a critical review of the theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence on this issue, seeking to establish whether there is likely to be an 
endogeneity problem in the empirical analyses of the relationship between human 
capital and inward FDI which will be presented in the next chapters.  
FDI has been argued to develop the skills of the workforce in numerous ways. In the 
short-term, foreign affiliates tend to provide training for their employees. The 
evidence available, although scarce, suggests that MNEs perform significant 
training, and they are more likely to provide training than their domestic counterparts 
(Ritchie, 2002). The effects on workforce skills can extend beyond the firm’s 
domain, as explained in the previous section, if the MNE trains their suppliers or 
buyers, or if the staff of the MNE leave the firm and start another business or work 
for another firm. However, the scope for workforce development by the MNE has 
been argued to be overestimated considering the share and profile and of workers 
that are trained and the type and level of skills that they receive in training. 
Reviewing evidence of MNE training activities in South-East Asia, Ritchie (2002) 
points out that not all employees receive training and those that are more educated, 
younger and in management positions tend to receive more training. Moreover, 
Kapstein (2002) and Ritchie (2002) argue that foreign investors provide higher-level 
                                                            
16
 Though, in the case of FDI, the latter may refer to adaption of technology by a subsidiary.  
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training only to the relatively more skilled and/or educated employees, whereas less 
skilled employees are only provided with the skills necessary to carry out the specific 
processes and operate the specific equipment necessary to perform their jobs. In a 
similar manner, Slaughter (2002) argues that, like any other private firm, MNEs are 
more likely to develop skills that are firm-specific rather than general skills such as 
numeracy, literacy and problem-solving. Taken together, the arguments above seem 
to suggest that MNEs’ training activities do supplement the skills of the workforce in 
the host country, but they should not be expected to substitute for domestically-
provided education and training.  
In the short-term foreign investors can affect skill formation indirectly through 
(voluntarily) supporting local educational institutions (te Velde, 2002), or 
influencing their curriculum choices and the quality and quantity of the vocational 
training they provide (Slaughter, 2002). An example of the latter would be the 
agreement of Costa Rica to expand secondary education in electronics and English in 
order to secure a large investment on an assembly and testing facility by Intel. 
However, in cases such as this one it can be argued that FDI has merely served as an 
incentive to develop (a certain type of) skills and the direction of the relationship is 
not clear-cut. In this spirit, Michie (2002, p. 369) concludes that “human resources 
have more often been developed not so much by the MNEs...but rather by the 
domestic governments themselves as a way of attracting that inward investment. 
Thus...the causal process has been the enhancement of human capital to attract 
inward investment”.  
Over a longer time span, FDI has been argued to increase human capital in the host 
country by providing more employment opportunities and higher wages for skilled 
workers, thus providing greater incentives for individuals to acquire skills through 
education and/or training (Blomström and Kokko, 2003; Eriksson and Pytlikova, 
2011; Wang, 2011). Here, te Velde (2002) distinguishes between the ‘composition’ 
effect and ‘skill-bias’ effect that foreign investors can have on the local labour 
market. The first, according to te Velde, happens if the operations and/or industries 
that foreign investors engage in are relatively more skill-intensive than those in 
which domestically-owned firms do. The second effect refers to ‘skill-bias’ within 
the firm or the sector, i.e. due to foreign investors possessing relatively more 
94 
 
advanced technology (and physical capital) than their domestic competitors, and 
therefore requiring more skilled workers to adopt these technologies (and operate 
more advanced equipment).  
These arguments are implicitly based on a key underlying assumption of 
complementarity between skills and (foreign) capital, an assumption which is stated 
explicitly in what appears to be the only theoretical model linking inward FDI to 
human capital formation in the host country, developed by Egger et al. (2005). In 
Egger et al.’s model, FDI inflows represents a key link through which capital market 
integration affects economic growth in the host country. Similar to the studies above, 
these authors argue that capital inflows provide individuals with an incentive to 
acquire higher education by raising the relative marginal productivity, and thus 
relative wage, of high-skilled to low-skilled labour. Consistent with this, their model 
predicts that capital market integration leads to higher participation in higher 
education in the country receiving foreign capital, which in turn promotes economic 
growth.  
The other key assumption for the arguments above is that foreign investors pay 
employees higher wages than domestic firms, a proposition which appears to be 
widely documented and accepted in economic research, as discussed in Section 1.2. 
The reason(s) why relatively higher wages are observed in foreign-owned firms is 
less clear. This differential may represent a ‘foreign premium’ per se or be due to 
foreign investors achieving higher labour productivity and/or specific employee-, 
firm- and industry- characteristics (Fosfuri et al., 2001; Budd et al., 2006; Heyman et 
al., 2006). However, this appears to be of little importance for the purpose of this 
analysis because as long as foreign investors provide more employment 
opportunities for relatively skilled employees and they pay them relatively higher 
wages, they will provide more incentive for individuals in the host country to invest 
in human capital.  
Empirical evidence on the effect of FDI on human capital development in the host 
country is scarce. In a panel study of 87 countries in the period 1960-2000, 
controlling for endogeneity, Egger et al. (2005) find a positive and robust effect of 
FDI inflows on the educational attainment of the host countries’ population as 
measured by average years of tertiary schooling attained or by the share of 
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population who have completed tertiary education. Similarly, Wang (2011) 
investigates the effect of inward FDI in different industries on the educational 
attainment of the population in the USA. The results of this study suggest that there 
are significant differences in the effects of FDI depending on the industry where 
investment is undertaken. Namely, Wang finds that FDI in the information industry 
increases the average years of tertiary education attained, whilst FDI in 
manufacturing industries has the opposite effect, and that other industries do not 
have any effect.  
The theoretical arguments and empirical evidence above appear to suggest that there 
is potential for endogeneity due to reverse causation in the relationship between a 
host country’s human capital and the volume of FDI it receives. However, the ways 
in which FDI may affect human capital development and the time span for these 
effects to take place is less clear, and the presence of endogeneity is likely to depend 
on the choice of measures that are ultimately used in the empirical analysis. 
Therefore, this issue is further discussed in the empirical chapters of this thesis. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a critical review of different theories which have been 
developed to explain FDI. The review has identified a considerable number of 
potential determinants of inward FDI and it has shown that human capital is not 
taken into account by most of these theories. Further, the few studies that do 
recognise human capital do not to provide arguments as to why it may attract FDI. 
Having found no clear and explicit rationale(s) for a relationship between human 
capital and inward FDI in FDI theory, the chapter sought to explore these through an 
analysis of the role of human capital in economic growth theory. Accordingly, three 
mechanisms through which human capital could affect inward FDI were identified: 
productivity enhancement, facilitation of technology adoption and facilitation of 
innovation. Finally, it was argued that there may be reverse causation in this 
relationship, an issue which should be treated with caution in the empirical analyses 
conducted in the rest of this research. 
The theory discussed in this chapter, however, does not yet provide a suitable 
theoretical framework for analysing FDI in transition economies. Relevant 
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transition-specific factors that may influence the relationship between human capital 
and FDI will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis after a review of empirical 
evidence on the relationship between human capital and FDI in the next chapter. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Having established the importance of FDI in the context of European transition 
economies in Chapter 1 and the reasons why a country’s human capital may be a 
factor affecting their level FDI inflows in Chapter 2, this chapter analyses previous 
studies that have estimated the effect of human capital on the FDI. A cursory 
examination suggests that the empirical literature is unable to provide conclusive 
results about the effect of a country’s quantity and quality of human capital on its 
ability to attract inward FDI. Though the number of studies which control for human 
capital in FDI studies is relatively small, these studies provide a wide range of 
results, sometimes contradictory within studies and inconsistent with the results 
expected from orthodox economic theory. Further, within this limited number of 
studies there is a wide variety of samples of countries analysed, model specifications 
and measures of human capital and FDI used, making it very difficult to come to a 
conclusion regarding the impact of human capital on FDI. Alternatively it may be 
that this ambiguity of empirical results stems from the lack of a ’universal 
relationship’ between human capital and FDI across different countries since the 
attractions of different levels of human capital development may differ between 
countries with different characteristics and different types of FDI. In this setting, 
meta-regression analysis (MRA) provides a convenient means of quantitatively 
analysing and estimating the influence of alternative model specifications and data 
characteristics that shape these results. It provides a quantitative summary of the 
results found in different studies, enabling the identification and quantification of a 
genuine underlying effect, beyond the publication bias that may arise as a result of 
researchers searching for significant results that are in line with economic theory 
(Stanley 2005 and 2008). MRA also provides an assessment of the sensitivity of 
estimated results to different characteristics of the studies (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989). 
Therefore, this analysis can potentially provide explanations as to why the empirical 
results appear to be “contradictory or overly varied” (Stanley 2005, p. 132). To date, 
meta-regression methods do not appear to have been applied in this area of human 
capital and FDI research. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides a critical review 
of studies that estimate the effect of human capital on FDI. Sub-section 3.2.1 reviews 
studies that estimate this relationship in mixed samples, whilst Sub-sections 3.2.2, 
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3.2.3 and 3.2.4 reviews studies that focus on developed, developing, and transition 
economies, respectively. The several studies focusing on (regional) FDI determinants 
in China are reviewed in Sub-section 2.5. Section 3 reports on the meta-regression 
investigation performed on studies of the human capital-FDI relationship. The MRA 
model and the results of its estimation are presented in sub-sections 3.1 and 3.2, 
respectively. Section 4 considers the implications of the findings for the empirical 
analyses undertaken in the following chapters of this thesis.  
3.2 The effect of human capital on FDI: A review of literature 
In the previous chapter it was argued that the mechanism(s) through which a host 
countries’ human capital is expected to affect inward FDI may differ depending on 
the foreign investors’ motivations for undertaking FDI, which in turn may be related 
to the host countries’ level of development and other characteristics. Seeking to 
identify any such patterns that may exist, empirical evidence on the relationship 
between human capital and FDI is analysed separately depending on the country, or 
sample of countries, that this evidence comes from. Accordingly, evidence from 
mixed samples of countries is first reviewed, followed by that for developed- and 
developing- economies. Evidence from transition economies is reviewed separately 
both because of their special relevance to this research programme and their specific 
characteristics that extend beyond the level of development, discussed partly in 
Chapter 1. Finally, evidence from China is reviewed in a separate sub-section, even 
though this is also a transition economy. This is done for two reasons: first, China 
differs in many ways from other transition economies (as well as from developed- 
and developing- economies), and, second, a significant portion of the literature on 
the human capital-FDI relationship comes from studies of regional FDI in that 
country. The complete list of identified studies that have estimated the effect of 
human capital on FDI to date, and a summary of study characteristics and results, is 
presented in Table 3.1 at the end of this section.  
3.2.1 Evidence from mixed country samples 
The evidence on the human capital-FDI relationship from studies using mixed 
samples of countries appears to be far from conclusive. In a cross-section analysis, 
Kucera (2002) finds a positive effect of both literacy rates, and average years of 
education in the population aged 15 and over, on (average) net FDI inflows during 
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the period 1993-1999. A similar result is found by Shatz (2003) in a large sample of 
109 developing, developed and transition economies. He finds a positive effect of 
human capital on FDI as measured by the value of sales of MNE affiliates (excluding 
banking) in the host country. Estimating a Tobit regression using data from 1995, he 
finds FDI to be positively affected by the average years of education in the 
population aged 15 and over. The author reports that the same result is found when a 
similar measure is used, that is the proportions of the population with completed 
primary, secondary and tertiary education. The average years of schooling in the 
population is also used by Alfaro et al. (2004) in their study of determinants of total 
capital inflows (i.e. FDI and portfolio capital) in a similar sample of 47 economies. 
In this study, cross-section analysis is employed to explain the average of FDI 
inflows per capita across the period 1970-2000 in terms of the initial level of human 
capital endowment and averages of other determinants. The average years of 
schooling in the population is found to have a positive effect on per capita capital 
inflows, but its level of significance varies in different specifications and turns 
insignificant when different measures are used for capital flows (e.g. gross capital 
inflows). It is not clear how the effect of human capital on capital inflows estimated 
by Alfaro et al. (2004) relates to its effect on just FDI inflows, but considering the 
long-term commitment that FDI involves compared to portfolio investment, it is 
reasonable to expect that human capital would be a relatively more important 
determinant of the former. Another weakness of both this study and Shatz (2003) and 
Kucera (2002) is their failure to exploit the temporal variation in the data, a 
weakness that is likely to be especially relevant in the case of human capital, the 
importance of which as a determinant of FDI is considered to have increased over 
time (e.g. Noorbakhsh et al., 2001). In this respect, studies that use panel data appear 
to be superior.  
However, the results of panel studies also, do not provide conclusive evidence on the 
effect of human capital on FDI. Blanton and Blanton (2007) and Alsan et al. (2006) 
both find that FDI inflows were not significantly affected by human capital in the 
1980s and 1990s, as measured by (female) enrolment rate in secondary education 
and the percentage of population who have completed secondary schooling, 
respectively. In a slightly more recent period, Chousa et al. (2008) do find a 
significant effect of literacy rates on FDI flows into 17 developed and developing 
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economies in South-East Asia, as does Al-Sadig (2009) for a larger sample of 117 of 
developed, developing and transition economies. Similarly, in an industry-level 
dynamic panel analysis covering nearly the same period (1995-2004), Bellak et al. 
(2009) find FDI flows in 10 developed and transition economies to be positively 
affected by human capital, here measured as the share of (medium and high) skilled 
hours worked in total hours worked in each industry. Finally, contrary to theoretical 
predictions, the effect of human capital on FDI has also been found to be negative. 
At firm level, Urata and Kawai (2000) investigate the determinants of Japanese FDI 
in manufacturing in 117 developed and developing economies during the period 
1980-1994. The results of their logit estimation suggest that higher enrolment rates in 
secondary education in a host country decreases its probability of being chosen as a 
location for investment.    
A common weakness of the studies reviewed above, but also other empirical studies 
addressing human capital, is the inability to control for the quality of education. Choi 
(2007) attempts to overcome this weakness by including international test scores of 
primary and secondary school student achievement in maths and science as a 
measure of cognitive achievement and a proxy for education quality (at primary and 
secondary level). In this study a panel estimation is employed to investigate the 
effect of education quality on the intensity of bilateral foreign-owned firms’ business 
activity (measured by affiliate sales) between the US and 32 partner countries in the 
period 1985-2004. After controlling for differences in quantity of human capital 
(measured by the share of skilled labour17), Choi finds that an increase in the quality 
of education in the partner country leads to an increase in the intensity of bilateral 
foreign affiliates’ business activity. While this analysis does not provide evidence 
that education quality affects inward FDI in particular, it does suggest that this may 
be a relevant dimension when measuring human capital in relation to FDI. However, 
it should be noted that the effect of education quality does not appear to be robust, as 
it is only significant in one of the specifications reported and it is not clear why this 
specification is the preferred one.  
The use of mixed samples of countries for the purpose of analysing the effect of 
human on FDI may be inappropriate because the importance of human capital as an 
                                                            
17
 Skilled labour share is defined by the ratio of skilled occupation categories (as defined by the 
International Labour Organization) in the total employment. 
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attractor is likely to be different in different groups of countries. For instance, if 
developing countries tend to receive relatively more FDI in the primary sector where 
the demand for local labour can be expected to be largely for lower-skilled workers, 
the effect of human capital on inwards FDI is expected to be small, or even 
insignificant. For this reason, studies with samples of countries of similar level of 
development, reviewed in the following sections, may be more informative.   
3.2.2 Evidence from developed economies 
Evidence from developed economies appears to almost uniformly support the 
hypothesis that relatively high levels of human capital is a locational advantage for 
attracting FDI. Nicoletti et al. (2003) estimate a dynamic panel to analyse the 
determinants of inward FDI in 19 OECD countries in the period 1980-2000. This 
study finds that human capital, as measured by average years of schooling in the 
working age population exerts a positive effect on stocks of inward FDI in these 
countries, a result which is robust across their different specifications. Another 
variable which may be related to human capital, R&D intensity which is measured as 
a country’s business expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP, also appears to 
exert a robust positive effect on the stocks of inward FDI in these OECD countries. 
Also in a dynamic panel analysis, Agiomirgianakis (2006) find the secondary school 
enrolment ratio to positively affect FDI inflows (as a share of GDP) in 20 developed 
economies in the period 1975-1997.   
From the US, evidence in favour of the human capital-FDI relationship comes from 
studies at state, industry, and firm level which use a variety of different human 
capital and FDI measures. In a cross section analysis for US states for the years 
1987-1992, Nachum (2000) finds that the share of population enrolled in tertiary 
education has a positive effect on the number of foreign investors in professional and 
financial services, having controlled for labour productivity. Axarloglou (2005) 
investigates the determinants of annual FDI flows in 20 manufacturing industries in 
10 US states using panel data for the period 1974-1994. Controlling for unit labour 
costs (or separately labour productivity and labour costs at industry level), they find 
a state’s per capita spending on higher education positively affects the level of FDI 
inflows it receives. At firm level, Woodward (1992) uses a logit model to estimate 
the probability of US counties being chosen by Japanese investing firms in a twenty 
year period starting from 1980. Controlling for the wage and value-added created in 
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manufacturing, the study finds that the median year of schooling in the population 
aged 25 and older increases a county’s probability of being chosen as a location.  
Evidence from the European countries on the human capital-FDI relationship is not 
as strong. Majocchi and Presutti (2009) fail to find an effect of the percentage of the 
workforce with secondary and tertiary education, or the number of research 
institutions, on the value of foreign investment in their cross-section data from nearly 
four thousand foreign affiliates in Italian regions in 2004. Rodriguez and Pallas 
(2008) estimate the effect of human capital on inflows of FDI at regional level in 
Spain. Their panel estimation which covers the period 1993-2002 suggests that the 
percentage of employees who have completed secondary education (or over) affects 
regional FDI positively, but the results are not robust across specifications. In this 
analysis, the difference between labour productivity and cost per employee is also 
found to have a positive effect on FDI inflows. 
3.2.3 Evidence from developing economies 
The evidence from developing economies tends to suggests that human capital 
endowment exerts a positive effect on the level of FDI an economy receives. One of 
the key studies in this field is that of Noorbakhsh et al. (2001), one of the few studies 
that actually have human capital as the primary focus of their FDI analysis. 
Noorbakhsh et al. employ a panel estimation to investigate the impact of human 
capital on FDI flows into 36 developing economies in the period 1980-1994. For 
human capital, they use secondary school enrolment ratios as well as two stock 
variables: the number of accumulated years of secondary education present in the 
working age population and number of accumulated years of secondary and tertiary 
education in the working age population. The results of this study suggest that, 
controlling for labour cost and availability of labour, all three measures of human 
capital are significant determinants of net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP. 
According the magnitude of coefficients, human capital appears to be one of the 
most important determinants, but it is interesting to note that it only becomes 
significant when more recent years (after 1991) are included in the estimation, 
suggesting that human capital only became a significant determinant in this period.   
In accordance with the findings of Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) the average years of 
schooling in the population has also been found to positively affect FDI into 
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developing economies in the panel studies by Jaumotte (2004 – dynamic panel), 
Faini (2004) and Desbores and Azémar (2008). Also using a panel estimation, 
Checci et al. (2007) find that net FDI inflows (as a percentage of GDP) are positively 
influenced by the share of population who have attained secondary education (or 
above). However, the share of population with tertiary education attainment does not 
appear to affect FDI inflows into their sample of 63 developing countries in the 
period 1985-2000. The authors note that the absence of a significant relationship 
between the share of population with tertiary education and FDI inflows may be 
attributed to the inability to control for the sectoral differences of FDI in different 
geographical regions, but make no attempt to address this problem indirectly by 
controlling for regional differences. Other panel studies covering samples of 
developing economies either do not find any evidence in favour of a positive human 
capital-FDI relationship, or find evidence of a negative relationship. In an earlier 
study covering the period 1975-1988, Narula (1996) finds an insignificant effect of 
enrolment rates in tertiary education on inward FDI stocks. Taken together, these 
results may be interpreted to suggest that tertiary education attainment in particular 
does not attract FDI to developing economies. However, in the case of Narula 
(1996), it can be also be argued that another reason for the lack of a positive effect 
could be due to the (relatively) early period which this study covers, to the extent 
that human capital has become a (more) important FDI determinant over time, in 
accordance with Noorbakhsh et al.’s findings above. Majeed and Ahmad (2008) also 
find an insignificant effect of illiteracy rates of the population on FDI inflows (as a 
percentage of GDP) in 23 developing countries in the period 1970-2004. Mina 
(2007) on the other hand, is the only panel study (1980-2002) that finds a negative 
effect of a human capital measure on FDI inflows in developing economies. This 
finding may be partly explained by the atypical economies of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) which is Mina’s sample. Since these six countries are oil-producing 
economies, to the extent that FDI is primarily resource-driven, it is less likely to be 
affected by human capital. However, this explanation does not explain a negative 
effect on FDI. One reason for this may be the choice of the human capital variable 
adopted by this study. Measuring human capital merely in terms of the share of 
secondary education in total education may be very misleading because this measure 
can be high due to low enrolments in tertiary education and/or low coverage in the 
level of primary education. In this case, high values of this measure would in fact 
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reflect low levels of human capital formation and therefore give rise to the negative 
effect which is observed in this study.  
Nunnenkamp (2002) takes a different approach from the conventional macro-models 
and analyses FDI using microeconomic data as well as indicators he develops from 
data obtained through three surveys (1992, 1996 and 1999) of institutions of 28 
developing countries. Simple correlations suggest that the per capita FDI stock is 
only significantly correlated with average years of schooling in the population in 
1999 but not earlier – consistent with the conclusion of Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) that 
human capital has become more important in more recent years. When correlations 
of this variable with FDI inflows per capita are estimated, however, they are 
significant in all four periods. Nunnenkamp also includes other variables from the 
survey related to human capital quality and cost; (1) availability of trained people, 
education and quality of apprentice schemes and (2) trade unions’ power and labour 
market legislation are included in the as components of indicators termed as 
“complementary factors of production” and “factor costs”, respectively. The first 
component is mainly found not to be significantly correlated to either of the FDI 
measures, while the second is negatively correlated to both. However, no conclusion 
can be drawn from this because these indicators are comprised of many components, 
those regarding labour being merely a few of them.  
The evidence from single (developing) country studies is even less conclusive. Two 
studies using cross-section Vietnamese data and secondary education human capital 
measures, Pham (2001) and Nguyen and Nguyen (2007), both find human capital to 
significantly affect FDI at regional level. In a OLS estimation for (averaged) data 
covering the period (1988-1998), Pham (2001) find the percentage of population 
enrolled in secondary education to positively affect the level of committed, as well as 
implemented, FDI inflows in Vietnamese regions. Similarly, Nguyen and Nguyen 
(2007) find the number of high school graduates in a region to positively affect both 
FDI in 2006 and cumulative FDI  in the period 1988-2006 as measured by value of 
inflows (in an OLS estimation) as well as by the number of projects (in a negative 
binomial estimation). However, this study does not control for the size of the 
population/cohort, therefore the effect of the human capital variable may be merely 
reflecting the age structure of the population. Bouoiyour (2003) also finds a positive 
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effect of enrolment rates in secondary schools on the FDI flows that Morocco 
received in the period 1960-2000. Ismail and Yussof (2003), on the other hand, find 
no effect of the number of professionals and technical workers in time-series 
estimations of FDI inflows in Thailand and the Philippines between 1985 and 1999, 
controlling for the average wage in manufacturing. Moreover, this measure is found 
to negatively affect Malaysian FDI during this period, while also in a time-series 
estimation, Tsen (2005) finds that another human capital measure – federal 
government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP – has a positive effect 
on the value of foreign investment in the country’s manufacturing industry. 
However, it is not clear that expenditure on education is a good measure of human 
capital in FDI studies for two reasons. First, there appears to be no evidence that 
cross-country expenditure on education determines student performance 
(Woessmann, 2006). Second, it could be argued that the coefficient on human capital 
in cross-country studies could be prone to (upward) omitted variable bias if variables 
that affect both expenditure on education and inward FDI are not included in the 
model.    
Finally, two studies from developing economies follow an innovative approach in 
measuring human capital. Deichmann et al. (2003) use the student-teacher ratio as an 
(inverse) measure of education quality. In a logit estimation aiming to explain the 
decision of 293 foreign firms who invested in Turkey in 1995, they find that the 
student-teacher ratio (which represents lower quality) exerts a negative effect on the 
probability of a Turkish region being chosen by foreign investors. However, this 
proxy chosen for education quality is prone to serious criticism: in addition to only 
measuring only one (potential) aspect of education quality, research seems to find 
little evidence of a significant effect of class size on student attainment (Hanushek, 
2003; Woessmann, 2006). Mody et al. (1999) on the other hand develop a measure 
of human capital which is not explicitly related to educational attainment. In their 
1993 survey, they ask 173 Japanese firms who are engaged in FDI to rate different 
qualities, including labour costs and labour quality, in seven Asian countries. These 
variables are then used to explain the firms’ prior as well as future investment in 
these countries. The cross-section analysis of this data suggests that firms’ perceived 
labour quality in Asian countries is a significant determinant of the both their current 
shares of investment and their declared likelihood of expected investment in these 
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countries in the next three years, but this is not the case with their perceptions of 
labour cost. However, as Mody et al. note, firms’ perceptions of labour quality may 
be more related to the experience of workers gained in industry and not necessarily 
related to formal educational attainment. While this study’s reliance solely on 
subjective perceptions and lack of explicit control for educational attainment may be 
considered a weakness, its results challenge the appropriateness of the conventional 
usage of formal educational attainment as a measure for human capital in relation to 
FDI. 
3.2.4 Evidence from transition economies 
While the empirical evidence from developing and developed economies tend to 
provide evidence of a positive relationship between human capital and FDI, even 
though not conclusive, evidence from transition economies appears to be very mixed 
and contradictory. The measures of human capital most used in studies covering 
these economies are those concerning tertiary education. Using stock measures of 
tertiary education, Majocchi and Strange (2007) and Broadman and Recanatini 
(2001) fail to find a positive relationship between human capital and FDI in Central 
and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and Russia, respectively. The first study 
estimates a logit estimation using data on 272 Italian investors in seven CEECs in the 
period 1990-2003 and finds that a country’s percentage of the labour force that with 
higher education attainment does not significantly affect their probability of being 
chosen as an investment location. In an OLS estimation using Russian regional data 
for the period 1995-1999, Broadman and Recanatini (2001) find that the percentage 
of currently employed persons with higher education attainment does not have a 
significant effect on cumulative FDI. However, when the annual net inflows are 
considered, the effect of the human capital variable becomes significant in the last 
two years of the period. Using a similar human capital measure, Serbu (2005) 
estimates a panel model of (bilateral) FDI stocks from OECD countries to three 
CEECs (Hungary, Slovakia and Romania) in the period 1997-2000. Controlling for 
unit labour costs relative to source country which appears not to exert a significant 
effect, Serbu finds that the share of the economically active population with tertiary 
education has a negative effect on the stocks of FDI they receive. However, these 
results appear not to apply to all three countries: in Romania and Slovakia the effect 
of both human capital and relative unit labour costs is negative, while in Hungary the 
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former affects FDI positively and the latter does not have a significant effect. The 
author explains the differences as being caused by the different “quality” of FDI in 
these countries, i.e. Hungary receiving FDI in high-value added sectors (Ernst & 
Young, 2011), while Romania and Slovakia predominantly received FDI in low-
technology manufacturing. In another panel study of six CEECs for the period 1996-
2000, Görg and Greenaway (2002) find a negative effect of tertiary level enrolment 
rate on the stocks of FDI received from the UK. They argue that could possibly be a 
result of FDI in this region being predominantly vertical and, as a result, being 
primarily driven by labour cost considerations (which are not controlled for in their 
regression analysis). Tøndel (2001), on the other hand, finds both secondary and 
tertiary education enrolment rates to have an insignificant effect on total annual FDI 
inflows in 25 Central Eastern European and Baltic countries (CEEB) and 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as in these groups separately.    
Similarly, there appears to be little evidence of secondary education measures 
affecting FDI in transition economies. Kinoshita and Campos (2003) investigate the 
determinants of FDI using a panel of 25 transition economies between 1990 and 
1998. Their findings suggest that per capita FDI stock can be explained by labour 
costs and availability of natural resources, but not by the quality of labour which is 
represented by the enrolment rate in general secondary education. The authors 
provide two potential explanations for this: FDI in these countries is not directed 
towards the more technologically sophisticated industries or there is lack of cross-
country variance as most countries in the sample have similar high rates of secondary 
school enrolment. When the sample is divided into CEEB and CIS countries in an 
attempt to control for sectoral differences in FDI, results suggest different 
determining factors. Labour costs become insignificant for both groups while human 
capital turns significant but negative in the latter. The negative significant coefficient 
on human capital is contrary to theoretical expectations and it appears to be related to 
sectoral effects because the effect of natural resources turns positive (and significant) 
in this sub-sample. These results appear to suggest that FDI in the primary sector is 
deterred by higher levels of human capital, a result which appears to be consistent 
with that of Mina (2007) for oil-producing countries.  
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Unlike the studies above which use secondary and tertiary level education data, Fung 
et al. (2008) use the illiteracy rate of the population as a measure for human capital. 
Their static and dynamic estimations for 15 CEECs in the period 1990-2004 suggest 
that, controlling for the level of wages in manufacturing, a lower illiteracy rate of the 
population (i.e. higher human capital endowment) positively affects FDI inflows. 
Finally, Carstensen and Toubal (2004) use gross enrolment in tertiary and secondary 
education relative to gross enrolment in all levels of education (i.e. including primary 
education) as a proxy for the fraction of medium and higher-educated workers in the 
workforce. In a dynamic panel using bilateral flows to seven CEECs from OECD 
countries (1993-1999), they find this measure of human capital to affect FDI inflows 
positively, controlling for unit labour costs relative to the host country. However, as 
discussed in the previous section, such relative measures may give a misleading 
picture of human capital endowment. Though, it could be argued that this effect is 
likely to be smaller in the case of this particular study because it includes both 
secondary and tertiary education, and because enrolment rates in primary education 
are more likely to be similar across countries.  
3.2.5 Evidence from China  
To date, China is the country where the relationship between human capital and FDI 
has been most studied. In this context, a variety of estimation techniques and human 
capital measures have been used, which allows for comparisons to be made among 
studies and potential patterns in results to be identified. These studies investigate the 
distribution of FDI among Chinese provinces using mostly panel and cross-section 
regional data as well as logit estimations using firm level data of foreign investors 
across China.  
A wide range of both stock and flow human capital measures are used, starting from 
literacy rates to numbers of scientists and engineers. One of the most frequently used 
measure of human capital in Chinese studies of FDI is the (il)literacy rate of the 
population. Lower levels of illiteracy rate (i.e. higher levels of human capital) were 
found to have a positive effect on provincial FDI by Broadman and Sun (1997) in an 
OLS cross-section estimation, Cheng (2007) in a logit of firm-level Japanese 
investors’ data and Coughlin and Segev (2000) in a panel model. On the other hand, 
the same measure is found to have the opposite effect or no effect on provincial FDI 
in another panel study by Zhang and Fu (2008). Another measure of human capital 
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which may be considered analogous to the literacy rate, the percentage of population 
(above age 6) with primary education or above, is found to have an insignificant 
effect in panel studies when its current values are used (Cheng and Kwan 2000a; 
Gao, 2005) but a positive one when lagged values are used (Gao, 2005). The same 
effect is observed for analogous measures of junior and senior secondary education 
(Cheng and Kwan 2000a; Gao 2005) and tertiary education (Gao, 2005). The 
measure for human capital in these studies (and in Cassidy and Andreosso-
O’Callaghan 2006), however, has the weakness of covering very young, school-age 
population; as a result, it may be distorted by different age structures across regions. 
Similar stock variables of education are also found to have a positive effect on FDI 
in other studies. Using firm-level data of Japanese and South Korean investors, 
respectively, Cheng (2006) and Kang and Lee (2007) find the percentage of adult 
population with secondary education to have a positive effect on FDI inflows, whilst 
Cassidy and Anderosso-O’Callaghan (2006) find a positive effect of the population 
aged 6 or over with tertiary education on provincial levels of Japanese FDI stock. 
Other studies use stock human capital variables, but are more specific in the types of 
skills they measure, e.g. the number of scientists and researchers in the workforce 
(Wei et al. 1999), number of engineers, scientists and technicians as a percentage of 
total employees (Sun et al. 2002), or the percentage of technical or skilled workers 
(Hong and Chin 2006, and Hong 2007, respectively). These studies, too, find a 
positive effect of human capital on inward FDI.  
Studies of FDI in China that choose flow measures of human capital, on the other 
hand, appear to give less conclusive results. The percentage of population that is 
enrolled in secondary education appears to have a positive effect on FDI in one study 
that uses this measure (Zhang, 2001). However, when the same measure is 
considered at tertiary level, both positive (Fung et al. 2002; Fung et al. 2003) and 
insignificant results (Fung et al. 2006; Li et al. 2008; Hong et al. 2008) have been 
found. Finally, Cheng and Kwan (2000b) use the number of teachers and staff (per 
10,000 population) in universities and secondary education as well as the ratio of 
farming to non-farming population, but finds no significant effect of these measures 
on FDI.   
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Finally, Lin (2011) and Du et al. (2012) investigate the effect of labour quality at 
firm-level and finds a positive effect of their education measures, however the 
methodology of these studies appears to be seriously flawed. First, they use data 
from a survey of firms that are already operating in China and, as such, it cannot 
examine the factors that affect the whole population of potential investors’ location 
decisions. Further, in Lin (2011) the educational level of firms’ current employees is 
used as a proxy for human capital, therefore the positive effect of labour quality on 
FDI that this study finds appears to be consistent with the explanation that foreign 
investors employ higher-qualified employees.   
Table 3.1 below summarises the characteristics of studies that have estimated the 
effect of human capital on FDI to date and their empirical findings.  
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Table 3.1: Empirical studies estimating the effect of human capital on FDI 
* In this table, 'singificant' refers to coefficients significant at 5% level or less 
Study Sample Period  
Data/            
Estimation 
technique 
Dependent variable  Human capital 
measure (result*) 
Independent 
variables related 
to human capital 
(results*) 
Comments 
  1 - MIXED              
Urata and Kawai 
(2000) 
Japanese 
manufacturing 
FDI in 117 
developing and 
developed 
economies 
1980-1994 Logit 
Dummy, 1 if the country 
is the chosen as the 
location for investment  
Enrolment rate in 
secondary education (-) Wage (-) 
When sample is 
divided in 
developing and 
developed 
economies, the 
results stay the 
same for the 
first group, but 
the human 
capital becomes 
positive and 
wage becomes 
insignificant for 
the latter group  
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Kucera (2002) 
85 developed 
and developing 
economies 
1993-1999 
Cross-
section 
OLS 
Annual FDI inflows, 
averaged over a seven 
year period.  
Literacy rate (+)   
The effect of 
human capital is 
not found to be 
robust across 
specifications. 
However, 
authors report 
that the average 
years of 
educational 
attainment for 
population aged 
15 has a higher 
level of 
significance. 
Shatz (2003) 
109 developed, 
developing and 
transition 
economies 
1995 Tobit 
Sales of US MNE 
affiliates in the host 
country (excluding 
banks) 
Average years of total 
education in the 
population age 15 and 
over (+) 
  
The absolute 
sizes of the 
education 
coefficients and 
their t-statistics 
are highest for 
total and 
primary 
education, while 
they fall with 
the increase of 
the level of 
education 
Average years of 
primary education in the 
population age 15 and 
older (+) 
Average years of 
secondary education in 
the population age 15 
and older (+) 
Average years of total 
education in the 
population age 25 and 
older (+) 
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Alfaro et al. 
(2004) 
47 developing, 
developed and 
transition 
economies 
1970-2000 
Cross-
section 
OLS 
Inflows of capital (FDI 
+ portfolio capital) per 
capita, averaged across 
the sample 
Average years of 
schooling in the 
population, initial value 
(+) 
  
Effect of human 
capital is not 
robust across 
specifications 
Alsan et al. 
(2006) 
75 developed 
and developing 
economies 
1980-2000 Panel Annual gross FDI inflows 
Percentage of 
population aged 25 or 
above who have 
completed secondary 
schooling (insignificant) 
    
Blanton and 
Blanton (2007) 
Developing and 
developed 
economies 
1980-1997 Panel Annual net FDI inflows 
as a percentage of GDP 
Female enrolment rate 
in secondary education 
(insignificant) 
 
  
Bellak et al. 
(2009) 
10 developed 
and transition 
economies 
1995-2004 Dynamic panel 
Total stock of inward 
FDI in each industry 
Low-skilled hours 
worked in each industry 
as a share of total hours 
worked (-) 
Labour cost 
(insignificant), 
labour 
productivity 
(insignificant); 
Government-
financed R&D as a 
percentage of 
GDP (+) 
Effect of human 
capital is robust 
across 
specifications 
Al-Sadig (2009) 
117 developed, 
developing and 
transition 
economies 
1984-2004 Panel Annual net FDI inflows per capita 
Illiteracy rate (-) 
    Enrolment rate in 
secondary education (+) 
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2 - 
DEVELOPED              
Woodward 
(1992) 
Survey of 540 
Japanese 
investing firms 
in US counties 
1980-1989 Logit 
Dummy, 1 if the region 
is the chosen as the 
location for investment  
Median year of 
schooling completed in 
the population age 25 
and  older (+) 
Value-added per 
manufacturing 
hour 
(insignificant); 
Hourly wage in 
manufacturing 
(insignificant) 
Effect of human 
capital is not 
robust across 
specifications 
Nachum (2000) US states 1987 and 1992 
Cross-
section 
OLS 
Number of foreign 
investors in financial 
and professional services 
Share of population in 
higher education (+) 
Labour 
productivity 
(insignificant) 
  
Nicoletti et al. 
(2003) 
10-19 developed 
economies  1980-2000 
Dynamic 
panel 
Total stock of inward 
FDI 
Average years of 
schooling in the 
working age population 
(+) 
R&D intensity: 
country's business 
expenditure on 
R&D as a 
percentage of 
GDP (+) 
Effect of human 
capital is robust 
across 
specifications 
Agiomirgianakis 
(2006) 
20 developed 
economies  1975-1997 
Dynamic 
panel 
Annual FDI inflows as a 
percentage of GDP 
Secondary school 
enrolment ratio (+)     
Rodriguez and 
Pallas (2008) Spanish regions 1993-2002 
Dynamic 
panel Gross inflow of FDI 
Percentage of 
employees who have 
completed upper 
secondary education or 
over (+) 
Difference 
between labour 
productivity  and 
average cost per 
employee (+) 
Effect of human 
capital is not 
robust across 
estimation 
techniques 
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Narula (1996) Developed 
economies  1975-1988 Panel 
Stock of inward FDI per 
capita 
Gross enrolment rate in 
tertiary education (+)     
Axarloglou 
(2005) 
20 
manufacturing 
industries in 10 
US states 
1974-1994 Panel 
Annual FDI inflows 
Real per capita state 
spending on higher 
education (+) 
Average hourly 
earnings in each 
industry in each 
state (-); Labour 
productivity 
(insignificant) 
  
Unit labour costs 
(insignificant) 
Annual FDI inflows 
relative to the total of 
the states in the sample  
Real per capita state 
spending on higher 
education, relative to 
the other states in the 
sample (+) 
Average hourly 
earnings in each 
industry in each 
state 
(insignificant); 
Labour 
productivity (+) 
Unit labour costs 
(insignificant) 
Majocchi and 
Presutti (2009) 
3984 foreign 
investors in 
Italian regions 
2004 
Cross-
section 
OLS 
Value of foreign 
investment 
Percentage of workforce 
with secondary and 
tertiary education 
(insignificant) 
Number of 
research 
institutions 
(insignificant) 
  
  
3 - 
DEVELOPING             
Narula (1996) Developing 
economies  1975-1988 Panel 
Inward FDI stock per 
capita 
Gross enrolment rate in 
tertiary education 
(insignificant) 
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Mody et al. 
(1998) 
6 developing 
economies 
(Asia) 
1993 
Cross-
section 
OLS 
Share of their foreign 
investment in Asia 
Perceived labour quality 
(+) 
Labour costs 
(insignificant)   
Logit Likelihood of expected investment in Asia 
Perceived labour quality 
(insignificant) Labour costs (-)   
Noorbakhsh et al. 
(2001) 
36 developing 
economies 1980-1994 Panel Net FDI inflows/GDP 
Secondary school 
enrolment ratio (+) 
Labour cost 
(insignificant); 
growth rate of 
labour force (+) 
Human capital 
is one of the 
most important 
FDI 
determinants, 
but not 
statistically 
significant when 
regressions are 
estimated for 
the periods 
1983-1988 and 
1983-1991 
Number of accumulated 
years of secondary 
education present in the 
working age population 
(+) 
Growth of labour 
force (+) 
Number of accumulated 
years of secondary and 
tertiary education in the 
working age population 
(+) 
Growth of labour 
force (+) 
Pham (2001) Vietnamese provinces 
1988-
1998/1991-
1998 
Cross-
section 
OLS 
Committed/Implemented 
FDI inflows 
Percentage of 
population in middle 
secondary school (+) 
  
  
Bouoiyour (2003) Morocco 1960-2000 Time-
series 
FDI inflows (excluding 
privatisation) Secondary school 
enrolment ratio (+) 
Unit labour costs 
in industry 
(insignificant) 
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Deichmann et al. 
(2003) 
293 foreign 
investors in 
Turkish regions 
1995 Logit 
Dummy, 1 if the region 
is chosen as the location 
for investment  
student/teacher ratio (-)      
Ismail and 
Yussof (2003) 
Malaysia, 
Thailand and the 
Philippines  
1985-1999 Time-
series Annual FDI inflows 
Number of professional 
and technical workers in 
the country (- in 
Malaysia, insignificant 
in Thailand and the 
Philippines) 
R&D intensity: 
country's business 
expenditure on 
R&D as % of 
GDP (- in 
Malaysia, 
insignificant in 
Thailand and the 
Philippines); 
Average 
manufacturing 
wage 
(insignificant) 
  
Faini (2004) 92 developing 
economies 1980-2000 Panel FDI stock/GDP  
Average years of 
schooling in the  
population (+) 
    
Jaumotte (2004) 71 developing 
economies  1980-1999 
Dynamic 
panel Annual FDI inflows 
Average years of 
schooling in population 
(+) 
    
Tsen (2005) Malaysia  1980-2002 Time-
series 
Value of foreign 
investment in approved 
projects in the 
manufacturing industry 
Federal government 
expenditure on 
education as a 
percentage of GDP (+) 
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Checci et al. 
(2007) 
63 developing 
economies 1985-2000 Panel Net FDI inflows/GDP 
Population share with 
secondary education 
attainment (+) and with 
tertiary attainment 
(insignificant) 
    
Nguyen and 
Nguyen (2007) 
Vietnamese 
provinces 
1988-
2006/2006 
Cross-
section 
OLS 
Cumulative FDI inflows 
(1988-2006) 
Number of high school 
graduates (+) Wage (+) 
  
Annual FDI inflows 
(2006) 
Number of high school 
graduates (insignificant) 
Averag wage 
(insignificant) 
Negative 
binomial  
Cumulative number of 
projects (1988-2006) 
Number of high school 
graduates (+) Averag wage (+) 
Number of projects 
(2006) 
Number of high school 
graduates (+) 
Averag wage 
(insignificant) 
Mina (2007) 
6 developing 
economies 
(Asia) 
1980-2002 Panel Annual FDI inflows  
Secondary school 
enrolment as a 
percentage of total 
school enrolment (-) 
  
The sample 
consists of oil 
producing 
countries of the 
Gulf 
Cooperation 
Council (GCC) 
Chousa et al. 
(2008) 
17 South and 
East Asian 
economies 
1996-2005 Panel Annual net FDI inflows per capita Literacy rate (-) 
 
  
Desbores and 
Azemar (2008) 
28 developing 
countries 
(Africa) 
1985-2004 Panel Annual net FDI inflows  
Average years of 
schooling in the 
population over age 15 
(+) 
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Majeed and 
Ahmad (2008) 
23 developing 
countries 1970-2004 Panel  
Annual FDI inflows as a 
percentage of GDP 
Illiteracy rate of the 
population 
(insignificant) 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
4 - 
TRANSITION              
  
4.1 - European 
and 
Commonwealth 
of Independent 
States 
            
Broadman and 
Recanatini (2001) Russian regions 1995-1999 
Cross-
section 
OLS 
Cumulative net FDI 
inflows 
Percentage of currently 
employed persons that 
have completed higher 
education in the initial 
period (insignificant) 
Average wage at 
initial period 
(insignificant) 
  
Annual net FDI inflows  
Percentage of currently 
employed persons that 
have completed higher 
education in the initial 
period (insignificant/+) 
Average wage at 
initial period 
(insignificant) 
The human 
capital variable 
becomes 
significant in 
1998 and 1999. 
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Tondel (2001) 25 CEEB and CIS countries 1994-1997 Panel Annual FDI inflows 
general secondary 
enrolment rate 
(insignificant) and 
tertiary gross enrolment 
rate (insignificant) 
Average wage 
(positive)  
 
 
Human capital 
variables remain 
insignificant 
when sample is 
divided in 
CEEB and CIS 
countries. 
 
 
 
Kinoshita and 
Campos (2003) 
25 CEEB and 
CIS economies  1990-1998 Panel 
Cumulative net FDI 
inflows per capita 
 general secondary 
education enrolment 
rate (insignificant) 
Nominal wage rate 
(negative) 
 
 
 
When sample is 
divided in 
CEEB and CIS 
countries, 
labour costs 
become 
insignificant for 
both groups 
while human 
capital becomes 
negative in the 
CIS sample 
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4.2 - Central 
and Eastern 
Europe 
            
Gorg and 
Greenaway 
(2002) 
6 CEECs 1996-2000 Panel Stock of inward FDI from the UK 
Enrolment ratio in 
tertiary education (-)   
Authors report 
that similar 
results are found 
for enrolment in 
secondary 
education.  
Carstensen & 
Toubal (2004) 7 CEECs 1993-1999 
Dynamic 
panel 
Annual bilateral FDI 
inflows  
fraction of medium and 
higher-educated 
workers in labour force 
(gross enrolment in 
tertiary+secondary 
education divided by 
gross enrolment in total 
enrolments (+) 
ULC relative to 
source country 
(negative) 
The effect of 
human capital is 
found to be 
robust across 
specifications. 
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Serbu (2005) 3 CEECs  1997-2000 Panel Bilateral FDI stocks 
Economically active 
population with tertiary 
education (-) 
ULC relative to 
source country 
(insignificant) 
Interactions of 
human capital 
with country 
dummies reveal 
differences 
between 
countries: 
RULC exert a 
negative effect 
in Romania and 
Slovakia but no 
significant 
effect in 
Hungary, while 
human capital 
exerts a 
negative effect 
in the first two 
and a positive 
one in the latter. 
Majocchi and 
Strange (2007) 
272 Italian 
foreign investors 
in 7 CEECs 
1990-2003 Logit 
Dummy, 1 if the country 
is chosen as the location 
for investment  
Percentage of labour 
force with higher 
education (insignificant) 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fung et al. (2008) 15 CEECs 1990-2004 
Panel 
(static and 
dynamic) 
FDI inflows Illiteracy rate of population over 15 (-) 
Average wage in 
manufacturing 
(insignificant) 
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  4.3 - China           
  
 
 
Broadman and 
Sun (1997) 
Chinese 
provinces 1992 
Cross-
section 
OLS 
FDI stock in end of 1992 Illiteracy rate (-) Average wage (insignificant)   
Coughlin and 
Segev (2000) 
Chinese 
provinces 1990-1997 Panel Sum of FDI inflows  
Illiteracy rate in the 
population over 15 (-) 
Average wage (-); 
Labour 
productivity (+) 
  
Wei et al. (1999) Chinese provinces 1986-1995 Panel 
Annual flows of 
pledged/realised FDI  
Number of scientists 
and researchers in the 
workforce (+) 
    
Cheng and Kwan 
(2000a) 
Chinese 
provinces 1985-1995 
Dynamic 
panel 
Cumulative of FDI 
inflows 
Percentage of 
population 6 years or 
older with Senior high 
education or above 
(insignificant) 
    
Percentage of 
population 6 years or 
older with Junior high 
education or above 
(insignificant) 
Percentage of 
population 6 years or 
older with Primary 
education or above 
(insignificant) 
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Cheng and Kwan 
(2000b) 
Chinese 
provinces 1985-1995 
Dynamic 
panel 
Cumulative FDI inflows 
from 1979 to the 
reporting year 
Number of teachers and 
staff in universities per 
10,000 population 
(insignificant) 
  
  
Number of teachers and 
staff in secondary 
education per 10,000 
population 
(insignificant) 
  
Ratio of farming to non-
farming population 
(insignificant) 
  
Zhang (2001) Chinese provinces 1987-1998 
Cross-
section 
OLS/panel 
  
Percentage of 
population in secondary 
education (+) 
Average wage in 
manufacturing 
(insignificant) 
When the 
sample is 
divided in sub-
samples 
covering shorter 
time periods, 
the significance 
of human 
capital is found 
to be increasing 
over time.   
Fung et al (2002) Chinese provinces 1990-1999 Panel 
Annual FDI inflows 
from the US/Hong Kong 
Ratio of students 
enrolled in tertiary 
education to total 
population (+) 
Average wage (-) 
Human capital 
(wage) has a 
stronger 
(weaker) 
influence on US 
FDI than Hong 
Kong FDI  
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Sun et al. (2002) Chinese provinces 1986-1998 Panel Annual FDI inflows  
Number of research 
engineers, scientists and 
technicians as % of total 
employees (+) 
Average wage (-)   
Fung et al (2003) Chinese provinces 1990-2000 Panel 
Annual FDI inflows 
from Japan/Hong Kong 
Ratio of students 
enrolled in tertiary 
education to total 
population (+) 
Average wage (- 
for Hong Kong, 
insignificant for 
Japan) 
  
Gao (2005) Chinese provinces 1996-1999 Panel  
Annual FDI inflows as a 
percentage of country's 
total FDI 
Percentage of 
population 6 years or 
older with primary 
education or above, 
measured in current 
period (insignificant) 
and in 1990 (+) 
Average wage in 
industry (-) 
When the 
sample is 
divided 
according to 
source country, 
all human 
capital variables 
are found to 
positively affect 
FDI from 
developed 
economies, but 
not that from 
developing 
economies. 
Percentage of 
population 6 years or 
older with junior 
secondary education or 
above, measured in 
current period 
(insignificant) and in 
1990 (+) 
Percentage of 
population 6 years or 
older with senior 
secondary education or 
above, in current period 
(insignificant) and in 
1990 (+) 
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Percentage of 
population 6 years or 
older with tertiary 
education or above, 
measured in current 
period (insignificant) 
and in 1990 (+) 
Cassidy and 
Anderosso-
O'Callaghan 
(2006) 
Chinese 
provinces 1996 OLS 
Japanese FDI stock in 
1996 (cumulative 1990-
1996) 
Percentage of 
population 6 years or 
older with tertiary 
education or above (+) 
Average wage 
divided by labour 
productivity (+) 
  
Cheng 
(2006)/Cheng 
and Stough 
(2006) 
764 Japanese 
investors in 
Chinese 
provinces 
1997-2002 Logit 
Dummy, 1 if the 
province is chosen as the 
location for investment  
Percentage of adult 
population  with Junior 
high education or above 
(+) 
Average wage in 
manufacturing (+) 
Effect of human 
capital is 
significant in 
either group 
Fung et al. (2006) Chinese provinces 1990-2002 Panel Annual FDI inflows  
Ratio of students 
enrolled in tertiary 
education to total 
population 
(insignificant) 
Average wage 
(insignificant)   
Hong and Chin 
(2006) 
1775 foreign 
logistics firms in 
Chinese cities 
1992-2001 Logit 
Dummy, 1 if the city is 
chosen as the location 
for investment  
Percentage of skilled 
workers (+) Average wage (-)   
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Cheng et al. 
(2007) 
764 Japanese 
investors in 
Chinese 
provinces 
1997-2002 Logit 
Dummy, 1 if the 
province is chosen as the 
location for investment  
Illiteracy rate of adults 
(-) 
Average wage in 
manufacturing (+) 
Effect of human 
capital is 
insignificant in 
all sub-samples  
Kang and Lee 
(2007) 
10167 South 
Korean 
investors in 
Chinese 
provinces 
1988-2002 Logit 
Dummy, 1 if the 
province is chosen as the 
location for investment  
Percentage of high 
school graduates in the 
population (+) 
Average wage (-)   
Hong (2007) 
1775 foreign 
logistics firms in 
Chinese cities 
1992-2001 Logit 
Dummy, 1 if the city is 
chosen as the location 
for investment  
Percentage of technical 
workers in a city (+) 
Average wage rate 
(-)   
Li et al. (2008) Chinese provinces 1993-2005 Panel Annual FDI inflows  
Ratio of students 
enrolled in  tertiary 
education to total 
population 
(insignificant) 
Average wage in 
industry 
(insignificant) 
  
Hong et al. 
(2008) 
Chinese 
provinces 1990-2003 
Dynamic 
panel Annual FDI inflows  
Percentage of 
population in higher 
education (insignificant) 
Host country's unit 
labour costs as a 
percentage of that 
of the source 
country 
(insignificant) 
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Zhang and Fu 
(2008) 
Chinese 
provinces 1999-2003 Panel 
Annual FDI inflows as a 
percentage of 
GDP/population 
Illiteracy rate (+ or 
insignificant) 
Productivity of 
foreign funded 
industrial 
enterprises 
(insignificant); 
Average wage in 
manufacturing (+) 
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3.3 A meta-regression analysis of the effect of human capital on 
FDI 
A search of studies was conducted in order to identify relevant papers for the 
purpose of this MRA. Search in electronic databases such as EconLit and Social 
Science Research Network (SSRN) as well as the Internet (using Google and Google 
Scholar), were conducted with the key words “FDI + human capital”, “foreign direct 
investment + human capital”, “FDI + skill”, “foreign direct investment + skill”, “FDI 
+ education”, “foreign direct investment + education”, “FDI + labo(u)r quality”, 
“foreign direct investment + labo(u)r quality”. Additional studies were identified 
from the references in the literature. A total of 62 econometric analyses, both 
published and working papers, were identified which empirically estimate the effect 
of different measures of human capital on inward FDI. The studies were not assessed 
for quality before being selected for inclusion in this MRA. Some of these, however, 
were excluded because of not having reported their estimated effects of human 
capital on FDI (Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003; Hong et al., 2008; Dutta and 
Yeboah, forthcoming); entering only a squared human capital term (Hanson 1996); 
having reported the same regression results in another paper (Cheng 2006) or 
analysing FDI and portfolio flows jointly (Alfaro et al. 2004). Of the regressions 
reported in the remaining studies, only preferred regressions are included in this 
MRA. If the authors do not explicitly state their preferred regression(s), all 
regressions are included except for those which are reported as clearly inferior (e.g., 
random-effects estimation if Hausmann test favours fixed-effects, or regular panel 
estimation when system GMM is used in the case of dynamic panels). The resulting 
sample of 341 regressions from 56 studies was initially used to estimate the meta-
regression. An initial examination of a leverage plot indicated the presence of several 
observations with very large squared standardised residuals and one high-leverage 
observation. After a further investigation using Cook’s distances and DFFIT 
statistics (Belsley et al., 2004), the observations from Kang and Lee (2007) were 
identified as problematic (see Appendix 3.1 for printouts and explanations). The 
peculiarity of these regressions appears to arise from the unusually large sample of 
over 17,000 observations which is many times larger than the typical macro-level 
studies, and even other firm-level studies included in this analysis. Perhaps partly as 
a result, the t-statistics in this study  
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3.3.1 The meta-regression model 
The starting point of modelling MRA in economics is a simple model which 
regresses a study’s reported effect (such as estimated coefficients or elasticities) on 
an intercept and its standard error (Stanley 2008). As the literature on the effect of 
human capital on FDI uses a variety of measures, scales and estimating techniques, 
the estimated effects must be standardised in order for them to be comparable across 
studies. For this purpose, the partial correlation coefficient between the dependent 
variable, the FDI measure, and the explanatory variable of interest, the human capital 
measure, in the original studies is calculated18. In the simplest MRA, the calculated 
partial correlation coefficients (PCC) are regressed on an intercept (α) and a measure 
of precision (the standard error of the PCC):     
ii
PCC
ii SEPCC εβα +⋅+= 0                                                       (3.1) 
However since the original studies included in the MRA differ with regard to data, 
sample-size and specification, the variances of the original estimates are likely to 
vary, and therefore the errors in the meta-regression ( iεˆ ) are likely to suffer from 
heteroskedasticity (Stanley 2005, p. 321). As a remedy for this potential problem, the 
method of weighted least squares (WLS) can be used in order to obtain efficient 
estimates. Accordingly, Equation (1) is divided by the standard errors of the partial 
correlation coefficient, PCCiSE , (Stanley 2008), giving a dependent variable which is 
the t-statistic of the estimated effect in the original studies19: 
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 Following Greene (2008, pp. 29-31), the partial correlation coefficient between a dependent 
variable y and the independent variable of interest z (PCCyz) is calculated using the t-statistic of 
variable z, tReg, and the degrees of freedom, dofReg,  from the original regressions:  
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 According Fisher (1954, p.194), the standard error of the PCC is calculated using the formula
  Re g
i
iPCC
i t
PCCSE = . Hence, dividing the partial correlation coefficient by its standard error yields 
the t-statistic from the original regression
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The bivariate equation provides the basis for estimating the “FAT-PET”, tests which 
are used to indicate the presence of publication bias and the genuine effect in the 
reviewed literature, corrected for such bias. The Funnel Asymmetry Test (FAT) 
examines the hypothesis H0: 00 =β  which, if not rejected, indicates the presence of 
publication bias, its sign identifying the direction of the bias (Egger et al., 1997; 
Stanley, 2005 and 2008). Referring back to Equation (1), in the absence of 
publication bias, the observed effects should vary randomly around the true value, 
independent of the standard error and thus no relationship between the original 
estimated coefficients and their standard errors are observed (i.e. 00 =β ). A 
significant relationship, on the other hand, may be considered as evidence of 
publication bias in the literature. Card and Krueger (1995) explain that publication 
bias may arise when editors are predisposed to accept papers consistent with the 
conventional view, when researchers consider such results as a means of model 
selection and when editors and reviewers favour significant results as opposed to 
insignificant ones. Under estimation bias, the average effect found in the literature 
may be overestimated and this bias can be identified and quantified using MRA.  
In this MRA, as explained earlier, it is not identifying publication bias, but the 
potential genuine effect in the literature that is of main interest. Stanley (2005, p. 
309) explains that MRA can be utilised to “see through the murk of random 
sampling error and selected misspecification bias to identify the underlying statistical 
structures that characterise genuine empirical effect...beyond publication bias”. 
Stanley proposes the precision-effect test (PET) as an indication of a “genuine 
underlying effect” in the sampled empirical literature, referring to the effect net of 
publication bias (controlled for by β0 in this equation). PET consists of testing the 
hypothesis H0: 0=α in Equation (2),αˆ being the estimate of the genuine effect 
corrected for selection bias. Hence, if the null hypothesis is not rejected, this is 
considered as evidence of a genuine effect.  
The bivariate models presented above are commonly used to quantify publication 
bias in empirical literature and estimating the underlying genuine effect in the 
literature but, like any economic research, these tests can be biased when relevant 
variables are omitted (Stanley 2005). The systematic heterogeneity of the estimated 
effect of human capital on inward FDI in the literature may reflect differences in 
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these studies in their choice of model specification, data and estimation technique, 
and these should be accounted for explicitly in the MRA model. Further, when there 
is a large amount of unexplained heterogeneity and large publication bias, the 
precision-effect test can be biased in favour of rejecting H0: 0=α , i.e. not finding a 
genuine effect (Stanley, 2008). Accordingly, following Stanley (2005), a more 
general meta-regression model is developed which has FAT-PET embedded in it. 
This model will serve as a means of exploring the sources of heterogeneity in the 
empirical literature which investigates the effect of human capital on FDI and their 
influence on the size of the estimated effects in the original literature. Following 
standard applications of MRA (Stanley 2001; Stanley 2005; Doucouliagos and 
Stanley 2009; Efendic et al., 2011) additional independent variables are included 
which relate to characteristics of the original studies with regard to the data, 
estimation techniques and model specification. These additional explanatory 
variables augment Equation (2) above: 
           
11
1
Re
i
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kiPCC
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kPCC
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g
i uZSESE
t ∑ +++= λβα                              (3.3) 
where kiZ are  k=1,2,....,K are the explanatory variables, each weighted are as large 
as 65, compared to an average of less than 2 in the sample. Considering the above, 
the regressions from Kang and Lee (2005) were excluded from the sample and the 
results in the rest of this chapter were estimated using a sample of the remaining 335 
observations from 55 studies20. The studies included in the meta-regression are 
indicated by an asterisk in the list of references.  
by PCC
iSE
1
and kˆλ are their estimated coefficients which measure their respective 
impacts on the underlying empirical effect. 
The explanatory variables to be included in this MRA analysis are presented in Table 
3.2 below, whilst their summary statistics and correlations between them are 
presented in Appendix 3.2. These include the characteristics of the dependent 
variable and independent variable of interest for this study, human capital, used in 
                                                            
20
 Initial results suggested a genuine effect in the literature, however the sensitivity analysis suggested 
that this result is driven by the presence of the outliers in Kang and Lee’s (2007) data and it 
disappears once this study is excluded.  
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the original studies. The measures of FDI were classified as stock, fdistock, or flow 
(the reference category).21 The measures of human capital were classified as flow, 
hcflow, and stock, the reference category (i.e. enrolment rates vs. educational 
attainment)22. The measures of human capital were further classified according to the 
level of education they refer to: average/median year(s) of schooling, avgyred; 
secondary education, secondary; tertiary education, tertiary; or secondary and 
tertiary education combined, sectert; and primary education23, the reference 
category. An additional variable is included in the MRA model for input-based 
human capital variables, such as expenditure on education, number of staff employed 
in education and student-teacher ratio. Other variables, discussed next, include 
characteristics of data used and estimation techniques.  
In the previous section it was argued that the effect of human capital may vary 
according to the (sample of) countries included in the empirical investigation. 
Accordingly, dummy variables were created which indicate the groups of countries 
in the original studies: developed, for developed economies; transition, for transition 
economies; mixed, for mixed samples including countries from more than one group; 
and china, for regional studies from China. This leaves samples of developing 
countries as the reference category.  
As noted above, there are indications in the literature that the importance of human 
capital in relation to FDI has become greater through time (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001), 
implying that the period of time in which the effect of human capital on FDI is 
investigated may influence the estimated effect of human capital; the median year, 
(ln)medianyr, of the period covered in the study is used as a proxy for the recentness 
of the data. To the extent that studies published in refereed journals are of a higher 
quality, their estimates may be considered more reliable than those from working 
                                                            
21
 The value of foreign-funded projects and the decision of a firm to invest in a country (in qualitative 
dependent variable models) were classified as flow measures because they refer to a one-off 
investment. The number of foreign affiliates in a host economy and the value of their sales were 
classified as stock measures. 
22
 Perceptions of labour quality by foreign investors, number of research institutes and 
number/proportion of population with certain qualifications were classified as stock measures of 
human capital because they refer to the quality of the current stock of labour in a country. Perception 
of quality was classified with the measures that do not specify the level of education (average/median 
years of schooling), while the other measures were classified as tertiary and secondary and tertiary, 
respectively. 
23
 Measures of (il)literacy are included in the ‘primary education’ category. Illiteracy is made 
comparable to literacy (and primary education) by multiplying its (coefficient and) t statistic by -1.  
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papers. Accordingly, a dummy variable, published, is included to distinguish 
between published and unpublished papers, though it was not possible to identify 
whether each journal used external referees. Assuming that data collection methods 
and econometric techniques improve over time, it can be expected that more recent 
studies are likely to provide more reliable estimates. In order to account for this 
effect, the year of publication of a study, (ln)pubyr, is included.24 The length of the 
period covered in the analysis, (ln)period, also enters the equation as a further 
measure of the reliability of the original study’s estimates (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989). 
Finally, the more explanatory variables are included, i.e. controlled for, in the 
original model, the more reliable the estimated effect of human capital on FDI can be 
considered. Hence, the total number of explanatory variables in the model, 
(ln)tnoexp, is also included in the MRA25.    
Potential differences that may arise due to different types of data and estimation 
technique   are captured by classifying the studies into those that use: cross-section 
OLS estimations, crosssection; time-series estimations; timeseries; limited 
dependent variable models (logit, tobit, negative binomial), qualdv; dynamic panel 
models, dynamic, and static panel ones, the reference category. As discussed in 
Section 2.2, FDI inflows are likely to be (in part) determined by previous activity of 
foreign investors in the country, i.e. values of lagged FDI should be controlled for, 
making the distinction between static and dynamic panel estimation particularly 
important. Hence, static and dynamic panels are coded accordingly in the MRA 
model. Another issue related to modelling the relationship between human capital 
and FDI is potential endogeneity, as discussed in Section 2.3. Endogeneity may 
affect the size of the estimated coefficient on human capital, therefore any attempt 
made to control for endogeneity in the original study is coded and controlled for in 
this MRA using a dummy, endogeneity. Finally, the presence of relevant control 
variables related to labour such as unadjusted cost, labcost, and productivity or unit 
labour costs, labprod, is coded. 
                                                            
24
 For published papers, the year of the publication of the working paper is used in order to achieve 
comparability between published and working papers. In case there is no information on the year the 
working paper is published, this is assumed to be two years earlier than the journal publication. 
25
 Time and country dummies in fixed-effects panel models are also included because they too may 
account for the explanatory power of the model.  
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However, not every study characteristic can be coded and analysed since, in the 
words of Stanley (2001, p. 137), “the number of studies is limited and most studies 
entail a unique combination of techniques, independent variables, data, time periods 
and other research choices”. 
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Table 3.2: Definitions of MRA variables     
 
Variable 
 
Description  
tstat 
 
t-statistic of the original human capital estimate.  
 
 
invsepcc 
 
Precision measure of the original human capital estimates, 
PCC
iSE
1
 
. (see FAT-PET above). 
 
fdirel 
 
Dummy, 1 if flow measures are used for FDI, 0 otherwise. 
 
fdirel 
 
Dummy, 1 if FDI is measured relative to population/GDP/total regional or country FDI, 0 otherwise. 
 
hcinput 
 
Dummy, 1 if input-based human capital measure is used, 0 otherwise. 
 
hcflow 
 
Dummy, 1 if flow measures used for human capital, 0 otherwise. 
 
primary 
 
Dummy, 1 if primary education attainment or enrolment rate, or (il)literacy rate is used for human capital, 0 otherwise. 
 
secondary 
 
Dummy, 1 if secondary education attainment or enrolment rate is used for human capital, 0 otherwise. 
 
tertiary 
 
 
Dummy, 1 if tertiary education attainment or enrolment rate is used for human capital, 0 otherwise. 
sectert Dummy, 1 if secondary and tertiary education attainment or enrolment rate combined are used for human capital, 0 otherwise. 
 
qualdv 
 
Dummy, 1 if a limited dependent variable model is used, 0 otherwise.  
 
crosssection 
 
Dummy, 1 if cross-sectional sample is used, 0 otherwise. 
 
timeseries 
 
Dummy, 1 if time-series sample is used, 0 otherwise. 
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dynamic Dummy, 1 if a dynamic panel is used, 0 otherwise. 
 
panel 
 
Dummy, 1 if a panel model is used, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
mixed Dummy, 1 if data from mixed samples is used, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
developed Dummy, 1 if data from developed economies is used, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
transition  Dummy, 1 if data from transition economies are used, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
china Dummy, 1 if regional data from China is used, 0 otherwise. 
 
published 
 
Dummy, 1 if study is published in a journal 
 
lnpubyr 
 
(Natural logarithm of) the year of publication of working paper. 
 
lnmedianyr 
 
(Natural logarithm of) the median year of the period of time covered in the original study. 
 
lnperiod 
 
(Natural logarithm of) the number of years the study covers.  
 
lntnoexp 
 
Total number of explanatory variables in the original model (including dummies in FEM panel models) 
 
labcost 
 
Dummy, 1 if cost-related variables such as wage are present in the model, 0 otherwise. 
 
labprod 
 
Dummy, 1 if productivity or unit labour costs are present in the model, 0 otherwise. 
 
endogeneity 
 
Dummy, 1 if an attempt was made to control for endogeneity, 0 otherwise. 
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3.3.2 Empirical results 
As explained in the previous section, the starting point of MRA is to test for 
publication bias and the presence of a genuine effect in the literature. Publication 
bias arises in the literature when researchers and/or their reviewers and editors prefer 
statistically significant results and results that are in line with the theoretical 
expectations (Card and Krueger 1995; Stanley 2005). Under such circumstances, 
research that does not provide the preferred results is either less likely to be 
submitted or published, and the existing literature provides a biased estimate of the 
effects. Meta-regression analysis provides a means for detecting and controlling for 
publication bias based on the assumption that smaller samples, having fewer degrees 
of freedom and hence larger standard errors of estimated coefficients, are inherently 
disadvantaged in finding significant results. Hence, researchers using small samples 
have to “search” harder to find the “preferred” significant results by trying different 
specifications, measures, estimation techniques, etc. However, in this particular 
MRA, finding publication bias appears to be unlikely for the simple reason that few 
of these studies have human capital as their main variable of interest. When present 
in the model, human capital is in most cases entered simply as a control variable, so 
it is less likely that researchers have been preoccupied with finding a significant 
effect on this variable. Empirically, the presence of publication bias is tested by 
estimating Equation 3.2, which has the FAT-PET tests embedded in it.  
Since there is usually more than one regression included from each study in the 
MRA, observations from the same study are expected to be correlated, and therefore 
a cluster-robust estimation is used for estimating this MRA model. Also, in order for 
each study to have an equal weight in the estimation, despite their differences in the 
number of regressions, a weighted regression is estimated (the weight attached to 
each observation being equal to the inverse value of the number of regressions 
included in the study it comes from). Hence, both the bivariate, and the multivariate, 
MRA results reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 are obtained from weighted, cluster-
robust, estimations.  
Table 3.2 below presents the results of the bivariate MRA Model (3.3), the printouts 
and diagnostics for which are presented in Appendix 3.3. The positive and 
significant estimated intercept of the MRA model suggests that there is publication 
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bias in the human capital-FDI literature. The estimated coefficient of the precision 
measure, the standard error of the PCC, is statistically insignificant, suggesting that 
there is no ‘genuine effect’ in the literature. A potential explanation for this finding 
could be that the empirical literature which has addressed the effect of human capital 
on inward FDI generally does not appear to base the choice of the human capital 
measure on theoretical considerations. As such, the empirical models found in this 
literature may be mis-specified. Such explanations may, to some extent, be tested by 
augmenting the bivariate MRA to include study characteristics so as to explore the 
heterogeneity of results in the literature, as discussed next.  
Table 3.3: Bivariate MRA results (dependent variable: tstat)* 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Model (3.2) 
    
Constant 2.066*** 
  (0.404) 
Invsepcc -0.0202 
  (0.0139) 
Observations 335 
R-squared 0.023 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
*Results from a weighted, cluster-robust, estimation.  
 
The multivariate MRA Model (3.3) was initially specified to include all the variables 
identified as potential sources of heterogeneity in the estimated effect of human 
capital on FDI, however this model appears to be mis-specified and suffers from 
severe multicollinearity (see Appendix 3.4 for printouts and explanations). 
Accordingly, a testing down procedure is followed whereby variables with the 
highest estimated p-values are excluded from the model two by two if they are found 
to be jointly insignificant (see Appendix 3.5 for the testing down procedure). The 
results and diagnostic tests of this parsimonious version of Model (3.3) are presented 
in Table 3.4 below, whilst Appendix 3.6 presents the printouts for these. According 
to the Ramsey RESET test, the null hypothesis that the functional form is correct 
cannot be rejected at the 1% level, although it can be at the 5% level. The level of 
multicollinearity has decreased significantly relative to the full model. The normality 
test suggests that the model suffers from non-normality which appears to be a result 
of outliers because the histogram of residuals appears to be bell-shaped. As this is a 
fairly large sample, it is assumed that the non-normality will not invalidate statistical 
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inference. According to the F-test, the null hypothesis that regressors are jointly 
insignificant can be strongly rejected. 
Table 3.4: Multivariate MRA results (dependent variable: tstat)* 
    (1) 
VARIABLES  Model (3.3) 
      
Constant  -2.378 
   (1.475) 
Invsepcc  0.0159 
   (0.0456) 
Dynamic  0.0554 
   (0.0343) 
Mixed  0.103** 
   (0.0462) 
transition  -0.0980** 
   (0.0393) 
china  0.0620* 
   (0.0331) 
hcstock  0.0394 
   (0.0342) 
secondary  -0.123** 
   (0.0523) 
tertiary  -0.0225 
   (0.0227) 
agvyred  -0.0707 
   (0.0552) 
labcost  -0.102*** 
   (0.0353) 
labprod  0.0958*** 
   (0.0307) 
lnmedianyr  0.872*** 
   (0.313) 
published  -0.0443 
   (0.0376) 
     
Observations   335 
R-squared   0.344 
      
F-test F(10, 54) = 16.55 
  Prob>F 0.00 
Ramsey RESET test F(3, 321) = 3.41 
   0.01 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Max 24.3 
  Mean 6.11 
Skewness chi2(10) = 54.22 
142 
 
  Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Kurtosis chi2(10) = 12.32 
  Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
*Results from a weighted, cluster-robust, estimation.   
 
The multivariate regression appears to be able to explain some of the diversity in 
results that characterises the human capital-FDI literature in terms of study 
characteristics with regard to the sample covered, vintage of data, measure of human 
capital, and presence of certain control variables in the model.  
According to the multivariate MRA results, the estimated effect of human capital on 
FDI appears to be larger in studies that control for labour productivity (or unit labour 
costs) in the host country. Controlling for the level of unadjusted labour costs alone, 
on the other hand, appears to yield lower estimated effects, in accordance with 
expectations.  
A larger effect of human capital appears to be found in studies that cover more recent 
data, as suggested by the positive sign on the median year covered in the study. This 
result is consistent with the hypothesis that importance of human capital as an 
attractor of FDI is increasing over time (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001), as well as with 
increasing demand for skilled labour in the market in general as posited by the skill-
biased technological change hypothesis (Machin, 2004).  
In accordance with the expectations, the estimated effect of human capital variables 
on inwards FDI depends on the sample of countries included in the original studies. 
Compared to studies of developed and developing economies, the estimated effect of 
human capital is found to be, on average, higher in studies using mixed samples of 
countries and regional level studies from China. Perhaps the most striking result is 
the highly significant negative sign of the transition dummy, suggesting that the 
estimated effect of human capital on FDI in samples consisting of transition 
economies is smaller compared to that in all other samples. This finding could be 
considered consistent with the arguments in Chapter 1 that transition economies are 
inferior in terms of the mix, quality and appropriateness of human capital in a market 
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economy context, which would make this human capital relatively less attractive to 
foreign investors.  
The choice of the human capital measure also appears to affect the size of its 
estimated effect on FDI inflows. Namely, using secondary education measures 
decreases the size of the estimated effect of human capital on FDI compared to using 
measures referring to other levels of education, or those not specifying the level of 
education. From a theoretical point of view, there appears to be no explanation as to 
why foreign investors would value secondary education relatively more than other 
levels of education (including primary education). However, one potential 
explanation could be that lower human capital estimates are obtained when using this 
measure because secondary education is relatively more heterogeneous across 
countries, especially compared to primary education (Altonji, 2010). To the extent 
that human capital formation during secondary education is relatively more diverse 
across countries in terms of the skills offered (e.g. mix of general vs. vocational 
education), quality and length of education (i.e. number of years of secondary 
schooling and/or level of compulsory schooling), secondary education measures may 
be less likely to provide a comparable measure for cross-country analyses. In 
addition, there are differences in the exact level of education that the original studies 
use, i.e. lower-, upper- or both levels of secondary education. 
The results of the multivariate MRA with regard to publication bias are not 
consistent with those of the bivariate MRA. Namely, once other study characteristics 
have been controlled for, the apparent publication bias suggested in the bivariate 
regression disappears. Considering that the bivariate regression is likely to suffer 
from omitted variable bias and its problems with its functional form and low R-
squared, the results from the multivariate MRA are argued to more reliable. The 
results with regard to the (non)existence of a genuine effect in the literature, on the 
other hand, remains the same in the multivariate MRA. Despite the attempt to control 
for a wide range of study characteristics that were hypothesised to potentially explain 
the diversity of results found, there appears to be no genuine effect of human capital 
on FDI. A possible explanation for this finding may be the genuine lack of what was 
referred to as a ‘universal relationship’ between human capital and FDI in the 
introduction to this chapter. Namely, it is reasonable to expect that the (size of) the 
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effect of human capital on inward FDI depends on the type of foreign investor 
activity, activities in higher value added sectors or stages of production being more 
affected by human capital compared to lower value added ones. For instance, 
resource-seeking and market-seeking FDI are likely to be less affected by a host 
country’s human capital. If FDI in the primary sector and services sectors (excluding 
the information and computer technologies, ICT, sector) are assumed to correspond 
to these types of FDI, respectively, it follows that a large share of inward FDI is 
expected to be little affected by human capital. More specifically, resource- and 
market-seeking FDI still account for approximately 55% of world inward FDI stock 
in 2006-2008, even after excluding the business activities sector which can be argued 
to be partly efficiency-seeking because it includes ICT services (UNCTAD, 2010a). 
Considering that the vast majority of existing studies does not account for such 
differences and simply estimates the effect of human capital on total inward FDI 
flows/stocks, it is perhaps not surprising that the empirical evidence is so diverse. 
3.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has reviewed studies which estimate the effect of a country’s human 
capital on FDI inflows. The review finds that there is a surprisingly wide range of 
results reported and that studies differ in respect to their measures of human capital, 
estimation techniques, specifications, and countries and time periods covered. 
Therefore, a meta-regression analysis was applied with the aim of quantitatively 
summarising the effect of human capital on FDI and explaining the diversity of 
results that are found in the existing literature. The results of this analysis suggested 
that there is no ‘authentic effect’ of human capital on inwards FDI in the literature 
and that the heterogeneity in results can be partially explained by different 
characteristics of the original studies. Notably, the size of the estimated effect of 
human capital measures of inwards FDI appears to significantly lower in samples of 
transition economies compared to other samples.  
It has been argued that the lack of a ‘genuine effect’ in the literature could partly be 
attributed to the lack of attention that human capital receives in the FDI literature in 
general, which may lead to mis-specification of (at least some of) the models in the 
existing literature. Accordingly, Chapter 4 will examine the relationship between 
human capital and productivity at a micro level, using the insights to identify the 
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most appropriate human capital measures which will be used in the empirical 
analyses for European transition economies in the following chapters. However, the 
failure to find a ‘genuine effect’ is also consistent with a lack of ‘universal 
relationship’ between human capital and FDI, i.e. the attracting effect of human 
capital being conditional on the type of activity that the foreign investors seeks to 
undertake in a location. This hypothesis will be further developed and empirically 
investigated in Chapter 6.  
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4.1 Introduction 
The empirical evidence reviewed in Section 3.2 and the results of the meta-
regression analysis in Section 3.3 does not appear to provide (conclusive) evidence 
in support of the hypothesis that high levels of human capital exert a positive 
influence on inward FDI, especially in the case of transition economies. In Chapter 3 
it was argued that one reason for these findings may be the human capital measures 
used in previous research, which usually tend to be arbitrarily chosen. This, in turn, 
reflects the absence of a sound theoretical argument to relate inwards FDI to a 
country’s stock of human capital. Section 2.3 of this thesis has previously argued that 
human capital should influence inward FDI positively based on its effect on future 
productivity growth derived from macroeconomic growth theories. However, the 
growth literature does not address the question of how human capital affects 
productivity growth and what the specific types of knowledge and skills are that 
enhance individuals’ productivity. As such, growth theory does not provide clear 
guidelines as to the appropriate measures that should be used in empirical analyses to 
represent human capital as a determinant of aggregate growth and future firm 
profitability. Section 2.3 has identified the broad channels through which human 
capital affects a country’s productivity growth: increasing individuals’ productive 
capacity and their capacity to adopt/adapt and advance technology. However, the 
theories discussed in Section 2.3 and economic research in general do not explain 
what the specific skills that facilitate these processes are, or how/where these are 
developed. These are both important issues when considering the influence of human 
capital on FDI, both from a policy perspective and for the measurement of human 
capital in empirical research. This has been recently recognised, for instance, by 
Altonji (2010) who stresses the multidimensionality of ability and skills and 
Hanushek (2010) who proposes an agenda for “new Human capital” research that 
would advance the level of knowledge on “how skills are produced...and...the effects of 
skills on individual and societal outcomes” (p. 2). It is argued in this thesis that these issues 
may be particularly important in the case of transition economies and their stock of 
human capital which, as discussed in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, differ from those of 
market economies in many respects. This chapter aims to inform the choice of 
appropriate human capital measures for investigating the effect of human capital on 
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FDI by analysing the relationship between human capital and (labour) productivity 
growth from the perspective of microeconomics and labour economics research.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis also provided a review of the theoretical framework to 
identify the determinants of inward FDI with an emphasis on the potential influence 
of human capital. The currently espoused theory, however, is limited in its ability to 
explain FDI in transition economies because it does not capture the specific features 
of these economies and the process of transition itself. A second aim of this chapter, 
building on the discussions in Section 2.2, is to fill this gap by providing theoretical 
grounds for the inclusion of other determinants of inwards FDI which may be 
particularly relevant in a transition context. In particular, the chapter analyses how 
key features of transition economies and their education systems may have shaped 
the relationship between human capital and productivity (and, by implication, FDI) 
in this specific context. Based on these analyses and the theory reviewed in Chapter 
2, this chapter provides a rationale for the choice of appropriate human capital 
measures and transition-specific controls that an empirical model for explaining 
inwards FDI in transition should include.   
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 analyses the relationship 
between human capital and productivity: in particular it identifies the productivity-
enhancing characteristics that human capital encompasses and how these are 
developed. Section 4.3 provides an extended theoretical framework for estimating 
the effect of human capital on FDI in the context of transition economies. A critical 
analysis of alternative available measures of human capital in this context and a 
theoretical discussion of transition-specific characteristics that should be 
incorporated in empirical analyses are provided in sub-sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, 
respectively. Section 4.4 summarises the findings of the chapter and their 
implications for the specification of the empirical models to be used in the following 
chapters.  
4.2 The relationship between human capital and labour 
productivity growth in a modern economy 
The macroeconomic growth literature reviewed in Section 2.3 sought to establish the 
relationship between human capital and labour productivity growth largely based on 
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two key assumptions stemming from human capital theory (Becker, 1964; Schultz, 
1974). First, by using educational attainment to measure human capital (e.g. Lucas, 
1988; Romer, 1990; Cosar, 2011), it is assumed that human capital is (primarily) 
developed through formal education. Second, it is implicitly, or explicitly in the case 
of Hanushek and Woessmann (2009a,b; 2011), assumed that the productivity-
enhancing role of human capital is related to the development of cognitive skills. 
These assumptions are critically appraised in the rest of this section with the aim of 
providing a better understanding of how human capital increases productivity both at 
firm and country level.  
As discussed in Section 2.3, in a conventional human capital framework individuals 
acquire skills through formal education and training. The acquired skills enhance the 
individual’s productivity and, as a result, the wages which they are paid in a 
competitive labour market. In this simplistic view, human capital is equated to the 
years of education (and training) an individual has acquired and their earned wage 
perfectly reflects their productivity. Accordingly, the effect of human capital on 
productivity at a micro level is estimated using a so-called Mincerian regression 
(Mincer, 1974) in which (the logarithm of) individuals’ hourly wages is regressed on 
a set of explanatory variables that includes years of education as a measure of 
investment in human capital. The positive relationship between the wage and 
attained education which has been estimated in this manner is usually interpreted as 
evidence of the productivity-enhancing effect of human capital acquired through 
education (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004; Blundell et al., 2005; Checci, 2005; 
Hartog and Oosterbeek, 2007; Colclough et al., 2010; Manacorda et al., 2010; 
Warunsiri and McNown, 2010). From this it follows that firms seeking to gain a 
competitive advantage through higher productivity would prefer workers with more 
human capital, i.e. higher levels of education, to the extent that they do not have to 
reward them fully for the value of their higher marginal product. However, estimates 
based on this simplistic human capital approach are limited in their ability to provide 
reliable information on the causal effect of human capital on productivity. In addition 
to the concerns about using wages as a measure of productivity discussed in the next 
section, human capital theory has been heavily criticised for its assumption that it is 
formal education that actually develops skills and increases productivity.  
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A key problem with estimating the effect of education on productivity and/or wages 
is the potential bias that can result if there are systematic differences between 
individuals who choose to acquire different levels of education. For instance, it is 
reasonable to expect that both individuals’ choices of acquired level of education and 
their success in the labour market are affected by unobserved differences, a key 
example of which is innate ability. This idea forms the starting point of the 
signalling/screening approach to human capital (Arrow 1973; Spence, 1973) which 
in its extreme form maintains that education does not enhance, but merely signals an 
individual’s productivity or any other productivity-related qualities that are valued 
by employers. This signal is necessary because asymmetric information means that 
employers cannot (easily and cheaply) observe an employee’s actual productivity26. 
In this framework, employers use education as a screening device and they are 
willing to pay higher wages for educated employees even though this is not related to 
the effect of education per se, thus giving rise to a positive relationship between 
education and wages, just as predicted by human capital theory. The validity or 
otherwise of the signalling approach does not appear to change significantly 
predictions about the desirability of educated workers. At the micro level, firms 
should still prefer a more educated labour force because the resulting signalling 
facilitates the identification of relatively more productive workers. Even though 
educational attainment now only signals relative ability, under this framework it is 
still reasonable to expect a positive relationship between educational attainment and 
inwards FDI to hold since the quality of the matching of workers to jobs is likely to 
be higher in countries with higher and more diffuse levels of educational attainment.  
Empirically, it has proved difficult to distinguish between the signalling and 
productivity-enhancing effects because, as Weiss (1995) points out, in many cases 
results may be interpreted to be consistent with both frameworks. However, 
empirical investigations by and large appear to lend support to human capital theory 
or the coexistence of these two effects27. For the purpose of this thesis, it is sufficient 
                                                            
26
 In order for education to be an effective signal, however, the (reasonable) assumption is made that 
the costs of obtaining education are sufficiently negatively related to an individual’s innate ability so 
as to make the signalling costs too high for those with low ability. This way, firms’ inference of 
unobserved ability is confirmed by individuals’ choices of the quantity of education they acquire, and 
the inefficiency caused by imperfect information is overcome.   
27
 Empirical analyses in this field include Riley (1979), Boissiere et al. (1985), Ashenfelter and 
Krueger (1994), Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998), Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999), Angrist and 
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to note that the signalling and productivity-enhancing effects of education are likely 
to coexist (Blundell et al., 2005; Hussey, 2011), and that there appears to be no 
convincing evidence from wage equations to undermine the assumption that human 
capital is (partially) developed through formal education. However, as argued above, 
even if the signalling critique is valid, more investment in education is likely to 
increase overall productivity by facilitating the process of matching of high 
productivity workers with high productivity jobs. 
Relatively little appears to be known about the nature of the specific productivity-
enhancing characteristics of human capital and explanation of how education 
develops them. Welch (1970) argues that human capital enhances individuals’ ability 
to adjust to changing economic conditions. By the same token, Schultz (1975) 
defines the relevant human capital as an ‘ability to deal with disequilibria’. Schultz 
emphasises the role of education in enhancing of the ability to perceive new classes 
of problems and the skills needed to solve them. More specifically, Schultz (1975) 
argues that the skills that students acquire in education for solving problems within 
the classroom “appear to have general properties that contribute to their performance 
as economic agents in perceiving and solving problems...” (p. 835). Welch (1970) 
identifies another type of skill that enhances productivity. According to him, in 
addition to enhancing the ability of individuals to accomplish more with given 
resources, i.e. the ‘worker effect’, education enhances the ability to acquire and 
decode information about the prices and characteristics of new potential inputs, i.e. 
the ‘allocative effect’. According to Welch, education increases productivity by 
virtue of developing the ability to critically evaluate new inputs prior to their use and 
to identify and evaluate their productivity effects as they use them. In terms of the 
discussion of growth theory in Section 2.3, Schultz’s ‘worker effect’ would 
correspond to the ‘productivity-enhancing effect’ of education as recognised in the 
neoclassical framework. The ‘allocative effect’, or Welch’s ‘ability to deal with 
disequilibria’, on the other hand, appears to be related to the ‘technology 
development and adoption effect’ as maintained by the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis 
and endogenous growth theories28. Accordingly, Nelson and Phelps (1966), Welch 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Krueger (1991), Aakvik et al. (2003), Chevalier et al. (2004), Herault and Zakirova (2011), Wallace 
and Jack (2011) and Hussey (2012). 
28
 Welch (1970) posits that the ‘allocative effect’ includes, but is not limited to, the ‘innovation effect’ 
identified by Nelson and Phelps (1966).
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(1970) and Schultz (1975) all underscore the increasing importance of education 
when the rate of technological change is high, an argument consistent with the 
observed rises in the education wage premia as the modern knowledge-based 
economy develops (Machin, 2004).  
Because agricultural production has undergone great technical change over time, it is 
argued to be a convenient setting for investigating the human capital-productivity 
relationship (Welch, 1970; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Foster and Rosenzweig, 
1996; Rosenzweig, 2010). The self-employment status of most farmers is another 
key feature which makes agriculture a convenient sector for this purpose (Schutlz, 
1975). Being self-employed, farmers do not have the incentive to acquire education 
to signal their ability in the labour market and they can be assumed to supply their 
maximum effort because they themselves claim the full reward for it, i.e. their 
productivity level is not prone to shirking due to the labour market imperfections 
such as incomplete contracts. Agriculture is also atypical in that it encompasses 
diverse activities which are usually not differentiated according to the level of 
education of the farmer as they are for workers in other sectors, which makes it 
easier to isolate the effect of human capital on productivity (Welch, 1970). 
Moreover, because of the diversity of activities involved, Welch argues that farming 
requires continuous allocative decisions which directly affect productivity. Hence, 
compared to other economic sectors, the more complex ‘allocative effect’ of 
education is likely to dominate over the ‘worker effect’ in determining the output 
eventually achieved.  
Empirical evidence from the agricultural sectors suggests that there is indeed a 
positive relationship between the level of educational attainment and productivity. 
Welch (1970) finds education to have a positive effect on the income of educated 
farmers relative to uneducated ones. Foster and Rosenzweig (1995, 1996) investigate 
the effect of education under circumstances of exogenous technical change in the 
agricultural sector in India. They, too, find a positive effect of farmers’ level of 
education on the profitability of using new technology embodied in imported high-
yielding variety seeds. This evidence supports the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis, 
discussed in Section 2.2, according to which human capital (measured by the level 
educational attainment) enhances productivity by increasing the capacity for 
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technology adoption. Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) go further and empirically 
distinguish the precise mechanism through which education affects the success of 
using the new technology by accounting for farmers’ length of experience with it. 
Accordingly, they distinguish between two potential channels:  the improvement of 
access to external sources of information (e.g. newspapers or instruction manuals) 
and the ability to obtain and decipher information from their own experience with 
new technology. In the former case the effect of education on productivity would be 
immediate, whilst in the latter the effect would increase with time. The empirical 
results suggest that education has virtually no effect on the immediate use of the new 
technology, but it increases the rate of productivity growth as farmers gain 
experience from using it. In line with these findings, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1989) 
find similar results for the effect of education on the effectiveness of contraceptive 
use. They find that education has a very small effect on the (self-reported) 
understanding of, and effectiveness in the use of, contraceptive methods which are 
‘easy’ in terms of the information necessary for their use and a limited scope for 
misuse. On the other hand, education increases understating and effectiveness of 
methods which are more complex, i.e. methods for which there is a large scope for 
misuse and no external information, requiring individuals to decipher information 
gained with experience. The empirical evidence, thus, appears to support the ideas of 
Welch (1970) and Schultz (1975), according to which education enhances 
productivity through the capacity to perceive new problems and acquire and decipher 
relevant information which are used to solve them. However, it should be noted that 
the extent to which the findings discussed above can be generalised for different 
economic sectors is not clear. Also, since these studies do not control for ability, the 
possibility that the observed positive relationship arises due to individuals with 
higher innate ability choosing to acquire more education cannot be ruled out. More 
evidence on human capital formation and the role of education in determining 
productivity, in particular are discussed later in this section. 
The studies reviewed above and in Section 2.3 suggest that the development of 
cognitive skills is the key productivity-enhancing characteristic of human capital. 
According to this, employers (including foreign investors) should value only 
cognitive skills. However, there is considerable economic research that indicates that 
employers also value other characteristics in employees, even though they do not 
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appear to be directly linked to productivity. Bowles and Gintis (1976) and Edwards 
(1976) report evidence that behavioural traits such as docility, dependability, 
consistency and persistence are frequently valued more than cognitive skills in low-
skill employees. Kuhn and Weinberger (2005) cite more recent evidence from US 
survey data which finds communication skills, motivation/initiative, teamwork skills 
and leadership skills as the four most highly-valued skills, followed by academic 
achievement in the fifth place. Other non-cognitive skills/traits valued by employers 
are found to be interpersonal skills, flexibility, honesty/integrity and “work ethic”. 
These findings are consistent with data from Britain, where a higher percentage of 
employers who report skill shortages claim this to be because of workers’ “poor 
attitude, motivation or personality” as opposed to their lack of technical skills (Green 
et al., 1998). 
Theoretically, Bowles et al. (2001a) argue that behavioural traits that are seemingly 
unrelated to an individual’s productivity may actually influence it under conditions 
of economic disequilibrium and contract incompleteness. In a dynamic economy, 
they argue, non-cognitive traits such as the degree of risk-aversion, self-directedness 
and efficacy (i.e. belief that one’s actions can determine the outcomes one 
experiences) can influence the ability of individuals to capture disequilibrium rents. 
Whilst this combination of behavioural traits, risk-aversion in particular, appears to 
be especially related to the entrepreneurial ability of individuals, there are also other 
productivity-enhancing traits which are more relevant to contractual employment 
under contract incompleteness. Examples of these traits are a low time-discount rate, 
i.e. attaching a higher value to retaining one’s job in the future; high efficacy, i.e. 
attaching a higher weight to the one’s behaviour as a determinant of the probability 
of retaining one’s job; high utility from having a job relative to being unemployed, 
e.g. experiencing shame from being fired or receiving unemployment benefits. 
Bowles et al. (2001a,b) develop a model to explain how such behavioural traits, 
which they refer to as ‘incentive-enhancing preferences’, cause employees to supply 
more effort on the job, all others equal. In conditions of incomplete (employment) 
contracts where the level of employee effort is endogenously determined, employers 
value these traits and are willing to pay a premium for them. Empirically, the 
importance of non-cognitive skills for labour market success is supported by 
Heckman et al. (2006). Accounting for reverse causation, Heckman et al. find that 
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individuals’ perception of control they have over their lives (i.e., degree of efficacy) 
and their perception of self-worth to be positively related to the amount of education 
an individual acquires and, controlling for the level of their education, also the wages 
they receive given their schooling decisions. Finally, Brunello and Schlotter (2011) 
summarise evidence that non-cognitive skills/traits (e.g. motivation) can affect 
cognitive test scores and therefore argue that these skills are likely to account for part 
of the effect of cognitive skills on individual labour market success and country level 
economic growth that has been found in most economic research, as discussed in 
Section 2.3. 
The research analysed above provides information on the types of skills and traits 
that may affect productivity at individual, firm and economy level. However, this 
research does not analyse where or how these skills are developed, although 
frequently it is assumed that the cognitive ones are developed through formal 
education. Challenging to some extent the role of education, is recent research which 
suggests that skill-formation is a life-long process which begins from the time when 
the child is in the womb and it is prone to multiplier effects, making earlier stages in 
life crucial (Cunha et al., 2006). This view points to a relatively greater role for the 
family than formal education, and to earlier stages of education compared to later 
ones. From a policy perspective, however, it may still be the role of formal education 
that should be particularly analysed because it is this stage where policy 
interventions are relatively easier and morally justifiable. Hence, it is important to 
stress that, in addition to the evidence for the relationship between the level of 
individuals’ education and their ultimate productivity reviewed earlier in this section, 
there is further evidence to suggest that education develops both cognitive skills 
(Boissiere et al., 1985; Moll, 1998; Heckman et al., 2006) and non-cognitive skills 
(Heckman et al., 2006) specifically. The precise manner in which schooling develops 
these skills, however, has been largely neglected by economic research. As discussed 
earlier, Schultz (1975) hypothesises that schools develop market-relevant critical 
evaluation and problem-solving skills due to the general properties of the problems 
that are solved in the classroom. Market-rewarded behaviours, on the other hand, are 
believed to be reinforced in schools by their virtue of subjecting students to 
interactions and systems of reward that are similar to those of the workplace (Bowles 
et al., 2001a). Consistent with this hypothesis, Edwards (1976) has found that the 
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same behavioural traits that are rewarded with higher grades in high schools are also 
related to the higher positive ratings by supervisors in the workplace.  
In summary, the research reviewed in this section suggests that (foreign) firms 
seeking high productivity advantages rather than cost advantages are likely to be 
attracted by economies with superior human capital stocks. This market-relevant 
human capital is comprised of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills which appear 
to be at least partially developed through formal education. The nature of these skills 
appears to be related to both the quality and type of education, rather than just the 
amount of time that individuals spend in formal schooling. As explained in Section 
2.3 the development of cognitive skills appears to depend on the quality of the 
education system, and not just the amount of instructional time. Further, it was 
argued in this section that individuals who have pursued general education pathways 
and/or those that possess problem-solving (as opposed to mere knowledge) may be 
more attractive to (foreign) firms. Skills of problem-solving and critical thinking and 
traits of self-directedness and efficacy were stressed to be particularly important in a 
dynamic market economy with constantly changing conditions and high rates of 
technological change. The value of these skills can be argued to be even greater in 
the process of transition towards a market economy which involves major and rapid 
changes throughout the economy. They are also likely to be particularly important to 
foreign investors who are expected to predominantly employ high productivity 
strategies. Namely, the ownership-specific advantage which, as discussed in Section 
2.2, is considered a precondition for FDI to take place, can be in the form of their 
ability to raise capital more easily and cheaply than the indigenous firms and/or in 
the form of advanced technological know-how. To the extent that the foreign 
investors engage in more capital-intensive production and/or posses more advanced 
technology, more highly-educated workers increase their affiliates’ productivity. On 
the other hand, as discussed in Section 1.3, it is unclear whether, and to what extent, 
education under central planning developed the skills that appear to be valued in a 
market economy which, in turn, has implications for the measures that are 
appropriate to be used in this context. The next section aims to address this latter 
question by critically evaluating measures of human capital used in previous FDI 
research as well as investigating potential new measures based on the theoretical 
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arguments presented in this section and the specific features of human capital in 
transition economies discussed in Sections 1.3 and 1.4. 
4.3 Explaining inward FDI in transition economies  
4.3.1 Choosing appropriate human capital measures  
Previous empirical research on FDI determinants has used a variety of measures for a 
country’s human capital. The measures most often used in this literature include 
expenditure on education, wages, labour productivity, unit labour costs, and different 
measures of the quantity of educational participation or attainment. However, input-
based measures of human capital such as expenditure on formal education (per 
student) or class size appear to be inferior to other direct measures of output (e.g. 
completion of education) because empirical analyses do not appear to indicate a 
consistent relationship between the quantity and quality of educational inputs and 
student achievement (Hanushek, 2003, 2006; Woessmann, 2006). Therefore, the rest 
of this section focuses on the remaining measures and proposes new ones which have 
not been previously used in FDI studies. 
In a human capital theory framework, discussed in the previous section, an 
individual’s wage level can be used as a proxy for their level of skills. Based on this 
view, the average level of wages in the destination country has been used as a proxy 
for the quality of human capital in empirical studies of FDI in transition economies 
(Resmini, 2000; Rasciute and Pentecost, 2008). However, this simplistic view is 
based on the assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets with perfect 
information and complete contracts where, in equilibrium, each worker is rewarded 
according to her/his marginal productivity. In reality, the wages of workers are 
affected by a range of factors that are not related to their productivity. The level of 
wages (across countries) may differ according to other employee-, firm- 
characteristics, as well as overall labour market characteristics such as the power of 
trade unions, employment laws, working conditions and non-pecuniary benefits 
(Eriksson and Pytlikova, 2011; Magda et al., 2011). Moreover, to the extent that 
wages are market-determined, they are affected by changes in the supply and 
demand for different types and levels of skill and the differing patterns of 
employment by occupation and sector reflecting differences in the technological and 
capital intensity of production (Freeman, 1986). Therefore not only is the average 
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level of wages an imperfect measure of individuals’ productivity, it also is unlikely 
to provide relevant information to foreign investors who are interested in the 
availability and wages of employees with the specific types of skills they need. In the 
case of transition economies, especially in the early phase of transition, the effect of 
labour market changes is likely to be even stronger because of the mismatch between 
demand and supply for different types of skills as structural change has proceeded, 
discussed in Section 1.4.     
In the theoretical framework reviewed in Sections 2.2 and 4.2, human capital is 
argued to affect FDI through the enhancement of labour productivity. Apparently 
based on this proposition, labour productivity in the destination country has been 
included as a determinant of FDI which may be considered to reflect its human 
capital. Labour productivity in the FDI literature has either been included in addition 
to labour costs (Holland and Pain, 1998), or combined with these and included as 
(real) unit labour costs29 (Lansbury et al., 1996; Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Carstensen 
and Toubal, 2004; Serbu, 2005; Bellak et al., 2007). While such an approach is 
superior to the inclusion of labour costs alone, it remains limited as a means of 
analysing the effect of human capital on FDI for several reasons. Firstly, labour 
productivity depends on the quantity and quality of other factors and their 
combination with labour in the production process. Transition economies, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, are particularly deficient with regard to the vintage of their 
capital, level of technology employed and the quality of management, which implies 
that economy-level measures of labour productivity are even more unlikely to reflect 
the underlying level and quality of their human capital. Secondly, foreign investors, 
due to the introduction of advanced technology, new organisational structures and 
human resource management policies, etc., are likely to be able to raise labour 
productivity relative to that in indigenous firms. Consistent with this argument, 
empirical evidence reviewed in UNCTAD (2007, pp. 150-152) suggests that foreign 
affiliates tend to have higher labour- and total factor- productivity compared to their 
domestic counterparts. For the reasons explained above, a more direct measure of 
human capital is to be preferred when analysing its possible effect on FDI. Thirdly, 
                                                            
29
 Bellak (2008, p. 24) explains that “Real unit labour costs reflect the wage share in value added; a 
positive growth in real unit labour costs indicates a decrease in the share of employers’ profit in the 
value added”, whereas “Nominal unit labour costs are a measure of inflationary pressures caused by 
rising wages...and (their) increase...does not reflect per se a decrease in profitability as this depends 
on the possibility to shift an increase in wage costs on output prices”. 
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even if productivity would perfectly and solely reflect human capital, from a policy 
perspective it is more important to analyse what the productivity-enhancing 
characteristics of human capital are, and how and where they are developed. Given 
these weaknesses, FDI studies, like empirical research in labour economics in 
general, have tended to focus mostly on enrolment rates in education (a flow 
measure), or measures of educational attainment of the population (a stock measure), 
as shown in the review of studies in Table 3.1. The appropriateness of using such 
measures in the context of European transition economies is critically appraised in 
the rest of this section. 
The previous section has provided theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on 
the productivity-enhancing effects of education through the development of 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills which are valued in the labour market. Hence 
relatively high levels of educational participation and attainment of the workforce in 
a country are expected to attract FDI (in higher-value added sectors where a skilled 
workforce is needed). As discussed in Section 1.3, transition economies were 
initially considered to be relatively well-endowed with human capital, but there were 
major concerns raised as transition proceeded about the relevance and quality of the 
skills acquired and the composition of human capital in terms of the mix of 
vocational and general schooling. The deficiencies of these education systems 
discussed previously may have implications for the level and type of FDI that 
transition economies can attract. In particular, the lack of qualified employees in the 
field of management and marketing, discussed in Section 1.3 may deter foreign 
investors, even if there is a highly qualified workforce in general. In a survey of 
expatriate managers of foreign affiliates operating in transition economies, Suutari 
and Riusala (2000) find that foreign investors are faced with severe difficulties in 
recruiting management-level employees and, as a result, relatively expensive 
expatriate staff may have to be hired. Foreign investors, especially those in sectors 
that were not developed in the previous system, may also face difficulties hiring 
technical staff because of the problems of low skill transferability and labour 
mobility discussed in Section 1.4. These problems, in turn, were argued to be partly 
caused by the focus of these education systems on vocational rather than general 
education, discussed in Section 1.3. Their historically greater emphasis on vocational 
education is also likely to represent a further reason why education systems in 
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transition economies are generally inferior in the development of skills which appear 
to be valuable in modern dynamic markets. In the previous section it was argued that 
the productivity-enhancing cognitive skills developed by education are those general 
skills that allow individuals to perceive and solve new problems based on the ability 
to acquire and analyse relevant information. Such skills were argued to be 
particularly important in a dynamic economy by virtue of enhancing ability to adopt 
new technology and they are likely to be especially important in the context of 
European transition economies, considering the rapidly changing economic 
conditions and their outdated technology. However, education systems in these 
economies, as discussed in Section 1.3, have neglected precisely skills such as 
independent critical thinking and problem-solving. A deficiency in these skills may 
be partly attributed to the focus on vocational education (Bowles and Gintis, 1976), 
but it appears to start even from primary education, as suggested by the PISA scores 
reviewed in Section 1.3. 
The workforce in transition economies is also likely to differ from that of developed 
economies with regard to their endowment of the market-relevant behavioural traits 
that were identified in the previous section. Considering that individuals in the 
centrally planned system had secure jobs and were unlikely to have been subjected to 
any performance monitoring, this system is less likely to have enforced productivity-
enhancing traits such as efficacy and a low time-discount rate. Suutari and Riusala 
(2000) and Meyer (2001) argue that the lack of performance-related incentives in the 
previous system left a legacy of low motivation and high shirking among both 
managers and employees. In addition, this system is also likely to have enforced 
conformity and docility, traits which would presumably have previously been 
rewarded in the workplace and more generally in society. Self-directedness, critical 
thinking and creativity that were stressed in the previous section as traits that 
enhance productivity in a market economy, on the other hand, were likely to be 
inhibited or actively discouraged in a planned economy. Consistent with this, 
expatriate managers in transition economies report that local employees tend to have 
little self-initiative and are not innovative or willing get involved in planning 
(Suutari and Riusala, 2000). The education systems of these economies are likely to 
have played a role in creating this mix of non-cognitive skills. Discussing the role of 
education in a market economy, Bowles and Gintis (1976) argue that vocational 
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education enforces adherence to rules compared to critical thinking and creativity. 
However, in the centrally-planned economies such behaviour appears also to have 
been enforced throughout formal education. In particular, the emphasis on 
memorising factual knowledge, traditional instruction methods and the authoritarian 
teaching style adopted, discussed in Section 1.3, are likely to have contributed to the 
“preparation” of individuals for the workplace of the centrally-planned economy. 
Regardless of how/where they were formed, the characteristics of the workforce 
inherited from the centrally-planned economy have implications for the costs of 
operations in a country borne by foreign investors. Namely, it appears that relatively 
more time and resources are required for employee monitoring and control; in 
addition, less autonomy can be given to local employees and more management 
involvement is required to run an organisation, further increasing labour costs 
(especially since highly-paid expatriate managers are likely to be hired). Thus, it 
appears that education systems under central planning neglected the development of 
productivity-enhancing skills and traits which in a market economy are typically 
associated with formal education. Moreover, they are likely to have inhibited such 
characteristics and developed others which in a market economy can have a 
‘productivity-constraining’ effect. The apparent differences between the human 
capital developed under central planning and that of market economies is likely to 
have implications the choice of human capital measures in the context of transition, 
as discussed below.  
The initial discussion above appears to suggest that, from a theoretical viewpoint, 
quantitative measures of educational participation or attainment represent superior 
measures of human capital in FDI studies compared to wages, labour productivity or 
unit labour costs. However, the later discussion in this section suggests that the issue 
of what specific educational measure(s) should be used is more complex.  
Some of the contributions in growth theory, discussed in Section 2.2, have provided 
suggestions about the specific type and/or level of educational qualifications that are 
more relevant to technology adoption. Suitable measures of the size of technology-
supporting human capital have been argued to be the share of tertiary education 
graduates in sciences and engineering in the workforce (Cosar, 2011) or of graduates 
of general rather than vocational education (Krueger and Kumar, 2004). 
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Alternatively, Vandenbussche et al., 2006 argue that the share of the population who 
have completed less than tertiary education as sufficient for ‘imitation’, as opposed to 
innovation, activities, though this does not make these secondary education 
graduates superior in terms of technology adoption to tertiary education graduates 
who are expected to possess higher-level skills. This view appears to be consistent 
with the empirical evidence presented in Acemoglu and Autor (2012), according to 
which tertiary education attainment is complementary to higher task complexity. A 
further implication of the task-based approach of Acemoglu and Autor (2012) for 
this empirical analysis is that the level of task complexity required should be taken 
into account in addition to volume and quality measures of human capital. Though, it 
is not clear how this could be could be (appropriately) operationalised in a macro-
level empirical study of inwards FDI in European transition countries. The measures 
of current skill complexity in the country similar to those used by Acemoglu and 
Autor for the host economy appear to be flawed in this context because they do not 
necessarily reflect the complexity of tasks that foreign investors intend to carry out. 
The most appropriate way to account for skill complexity would appear to be in a 
firm-level setting where proxies from the parent firm could be used. For aggregated 
FDI measures, on the other hand, the best way to control for the effect of task 
complexity appears to be by using industry-level inwards FDI data and investigating 
the effect of human capital conditional on the level of an industry’s technological 
intensity. This approach is taken in the empirical investigations presented in Chapter 
6 of this thesis.  
A deeper analysis of the nature of “market-relevant human capital” and its formation 
provided in the previous section, on the other hand, appears to suggest that the 
education measure of human capital should be more concerned with the quality and 
type of skills offered than the actual level of education. In this respect, it appears to 
be very important to control for the quality of education by the use of direct 
measures of cognitive skills, as discussed later in this section, or for the type of 
education provided. Namely, consistent with Krueger and Kumar’s (2004) 
arguments, it appears that, to the extent that general education is superior to 
vocational education in providing the generic cognitive skills, enhancing creativity 
and enforcing critical thinking, it provides a more appropriate measure of the stock 
of human capital. This especially appears to be the case in transition economies 
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where, because of the large, rapid and persistent structural changes in the economy, 
vocation-specific skills are likely to be depreciating rapidly.     
However, the deficiencies of education systems under central planning identified 
above also raise questions about the appropriateness of using educational measures 
in general in European transition economies. Namely, if the previous section stressed 
critical thinking, creativity and efficacy as the valuable ‘productivity-enhancing’ 
output of education, these education systems appear to have promoted precisely the 
opposite: acceptance of knowledge as factual, adherence to rules, and lack of self-
directedness. In this sense, education under central planning can be argued to have 
developed traits that appear to be in practice ‘productivity-constraining’ in a modern 
market economy. This may partly explain the frequent failure of firm-level empirical 
studies from ex-communist economies to find a positive effect of the level of 
workforce formal qualifications on firms’ productivity or innovation (Czarnitzki, 
2005; Steffen and Stephan, 2008; Nazarov and Akhmedjonov, 2010).  
The (in)adequacy of human capital developed under the previous system suggests 
that the vintage of the stock of human capital should be taken into account when 
analysing the effect of human capital on FDI. In particular, this would imply that 
potential foreign direct investors would be more attracted by younger cohorts of 
graduates that were educated during the transition period in education systems 
undergoing reform (and presumably more responsive to the market needs) and by the 
speed of market-based reforms in public education. This argument appears to be in 
line with the superior performance of young educated employees compared to older 
ones reported by expatriate managers of foreign affiliates operating in transition 
economies (Suutari and Riusala, 2000). In addition, foreign investors may be more 
interested in the skills of younger employees because they are likely to be more 
flexible with regard to working culture, which would enable easier and more 
effective introduction of new working practices and organisational structures. This is 
especially likely to be the case in transition economies, considering their prevailing 
work norms and culture (discussed in Section 1.4 and in the next section).  
Considering the imperfections of quantitative measures of human capital in transition 
economies discussed above, it would desirable to use other measures of skills in 
empirical investigations of FDI. These would ideally be measures of cognitive skills 
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of the workforce, i.e. the quality of human capital, rather than just its quantity as 
measured by educational attainment. The former could be provided by (country-
average) scores of international tests such as TIMMS, IALS and PISA, discussed in 
Section 1.3. Information on the level of functional competence, i.e. ability to apply 
concepts effectively in practice and to solve real-life problems, measured by IALS 
and PISA, appear to likely to be especially relevant when measuring productivity-
enhancing human capital according to the discussions in this and the previous 
section. Such direct measures of cognitive skills have the additional advantage of 
capturing these skills regardless of where and how they are formed. IALS scores, 
which are based on a sample of the working-age population, can be argued to proxy 
for the quality of the stock of human capital in a country; however, data on these are 
only available for a few of the countries covered in this analysis. On the other hand, 
PISA scores have the disadvantage of only being measured for primary 
education/secondary education students and do not necessarily reflect the skills of 
the current workforce, as explained in Section 1.3. Breton (2009) is particularly 
critical of using this measure in high-income economies with stocks of education 
expenditure above $40,000 per adult, where most of the investment in formal 
education occurs in post-compulsory schooling levels. However, this critique is 
considered to be less relevant to the empirical analyses presented in this thesis for 
two reasons. First, as explained in Section 4.2, earlier stages of skill development are 
argued to remain the most important due to multiplier effects. Second, European 
transition economies are unlikely to have reached the high level of expenditure stock 
above which, Breton argues, measures of cognitive skills at compulsory schooling 
level should not be used. 
Another, arguably more direct, way to measure the level and quality of skills in an 
economy is in terms of the actual availability of employees with relevant skills 
reported by the firms operating there. As discussed further in Section 5.2, such 
information for transition economies can be proxied by averaging firm-level survey 
data on the length of the period required to fill a vacancy for a skilled worker. 
However, it should be noted that this measure, too, has its limitations: using country-
average from a sample of existing firms in the economy reflects the current structure 
and technological level of the economy and as such it does not necessarily provide 
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relevant information for potential foreign investors who may have different 
employee needs. 
In conclusion, this section has argued that the specific characteristics of European 
transition economies’ education systems may make their stocks of human capital 
relatively less valuable in a market economy and these should to be taken into 
account when investigating its effect on inward FDI. The effect of the over-emphasis 
on narrowly-defined vocational training can be accounted for by proxies related to 
the proportion of the population who have completed vocational, as opposed to 
general, upper-secondary education. Some of the other deficiencies in terms of the 
type of skills and traits developed in the pre-transition systems can be partially 
accounted for by proxies of the vintage of the stock of human capital. Finally, the 
differences between the education systems of transition economies and those of 
market economies make it especially important to have other measures of human 
capital in addition to quantitative educational attainment ones. Accordingly, 
innovative measures based on international test scores and availability of skilled 
labour were argued to provide valuable information which could be used to 
empirically investigate the effect of human capital on inward FDI.   
4.3.2 An extended empirical framework for transition 
Section 2.2 provided a review of the main theories that aim to explain the patterns of 
inward FDI. This review identified an extensive range of factors that have been 
hypothesised to determine the level and type of FDI that a country receives. The 
most widely-cited determinants include: the level of, or differences in, factor 
endowments, including that of capital, skills and natural resources; the size of the 
host market and its access to other markets; communication and trade costs related to 
transportation as well as artificial barriers to trade; agglomeration economies; 
distance between the home and host country; common language and culture. 
However, the generic theoretical framework that can be drawn from these theories 
fails to reflect some of the specifics of transition from a centrally planned to a market 
economy30. This proposition is supported by the observation that the empirical 
                                                            
30
 Dunning’s OLI paradigm (Dunning and Lundan, 2008) represents an exception in that it recognises 
some of the factors that relate to transition economies more specifically. However, this taxonomy of 
FDI determinants tends not to provide theoretical justification for many of the determinants. In 
addition, the relative importance of these determinants is likely to vary with the context of the host 
and host country, which the OLI paradigm also does not discuss.   
166 
 
literature on transition economies has identified additional determinants of FDI 
specific to this context, partly through drawing on the literature for developing 
economies. However, this latter literature also does not provide a coherent and 
comprehensive theoretical framework for explaining FDI in transition. The rest of 
this section extends the theoretical framework from Section 2.2 by providing 
theoretical arguments for the inclusion of transition-specific factors that have been 
identified in previous empirical research. In addition, the section provides a 
discussion of FDI determinants identified in the generic FDI theory, discussed in 
Section 2.2, which could have a relatively more important role to play in the context 
of transition.    
Following the work of Lucas (1990) and Jun and Singh (1996) on developing 
economies, the literature on transition economies has recognised high levels of 
political and macroeconomic risk as potential determinants of FDI (Bandelj, 2002; 
Kinoshita and Campos, 2003; Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; Fung et al., 2008; 
Furceri and Borelli, 2008; Leibrecht and Scharler, 2009). The former could deter 
foreign investors from investing in a country because of a potential failure to reap the 
returns on their investment due to disruption of their activities in the case of political 
instability. The latter could deter foreign investors because it increases uncertainty, 
making it more difficult for them to plan long-term and predict the market demand 
for their goods. However, in addition to the uncertainty stemming from 
macroeconomic factors which can affect FDI, there is additional inherent uncertainty 
in transition economies. Transition is associated with changes in the legal and 
regulatory framework (e.g. labour market regulation and property rights), 
government policies (e.g. pattern and level of taxation) and fundamental changes in 
the whole economic system, i.e. the establishment of new institutions appropriate for 
a market economy.  
This uncertainty effect appears to be one of the reasons why the speed of reform 
needs to be taken into account when investigating FDI in this group of economies. 
As discussed in Section 2.2, the importance of the quality of the economic system 
and its institutions, policies and legal environment as crucial location factors is 
stressed by Dunning’s OLI paradigm (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). The empirical 
literature on FDI in transition has tended to contextualise these factors in terms of the 
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extent of the rule of law (Kinoshita and Campos, 2003; Kaditi, 2010); progress in 
institutional and legal reform towards a market economy (Carstensen and Toubal, 
2004); or level of regulatory quality, government effectiveness and control of 
corruption (Kaditi, 2010). Underlying this approach is the argument of North (1990) 
about the importance of a clear and business-friendly legal framework and the 
institutions which ensure the rule of law lays in facilitating economic interactions by 
“setting out the rules of the game” of a market economy. Lack of these, on the other 
hand, increase uncertainty and contract enforcement costs (Meyer, 2001). In 
addition, weak institutions can be associated with corruption which is conventionally 
argued to further increase uncertainty and the costs of foreign investors in the 
country (Schleifer and Vishny, 1993) and hence deter them from investing. 
Nevertheless, corruption has been argued to potentially be less of a deterrent in the 
transition context if it serves to bypass regulations and institutions from the previous 
system which are not appropriate for a market economy, even though it still 
increases costs and uncertainty (Meyer, 2001). More generally, in addition to the 
quality of institutions and speed of reform, foreign investors are likely to be 
influenced by the level of economic liberalisation a country has reached (Heriot et 
al., 2008). Namely, they are likely to prefer countries where the government both 
protects the freedom of economic agents (e.g. free movement of goods and capital, 
property rights), and refrains from distorting it (e.g. through corruption and excessive 
bureaucracy). Related to this is another factor specific to transition: the extent of 
privatisation of state/socially-owned enterprises, especially that of state-owned 
monopolies. As discussed in Section 1.2, government policies with regard to the 
method and speed of privatisation may be able to influence FDI both directly through 
determining the opportunities for foreign investment to take place (e.g. sale vs. 
management and employee buy-out), and through signalling to foreign investors the 
level of commitment to establishing a market economy.   
Finally, FDI theories reviewed in Chapter 2 recognise language and institutional and 
cultural proximity as factors that facilitate communication, decreasing transaction 
costs and hence positively influencing inward FDI. In this context there are likely to 
be differences between market economies and transition economies specifically due 
to historical reasons. Firms in the centrally-planned system operated in an 
environment where the availability and price of production resources, the type and 
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level of output supplied and the price and buyer of this output were set by a state-
established central plan. In such an environment, the role of the managers was quite 
different from that of their counterparts in a market economy and there was little 
incentive to provide quality products and ensure customer satisfaction (Suutari and 
Riusala, 2000). Therefore, once the market reforms began, local businesses and their 
managers lacked the experience and knowledge required to operate effectively in a 
market economy. This can deter foreign investment in transition economies because, 
among others, it increases the negotiation costs of the foreign affiliate (Meyer, 2001). 
This type of uncertainty, however, is expected to decrease as transition progresses as 
managers/employees of indigenous firms gain knowledge of operating in a market 
economy, both through formal business education and on-the-job experience and due 
to spillovers from foreign investors. Another major type of uncertainty related to 
investment in transition economies, Benacek et al. (2000) argue, is that which stems 
simply from foreign investors’ lack of experience in operating in these economies, 
considering that the majority of them had virtually no FDI prior to the transition 
process. This type of uncertainty is, too, likely to be reduced with time, the speed of 
this process depending on level of investment undertaken in earlier periods. Hence, 
in this sense, the effect of previous FDI in the country, discussed in Section 2.2, is 
likely to be stronger in the context of transition economies compared to other 
countries, which makes it especially important to control for previous foreign 
investment in the country.     
Another related determinant of FDI that can be argued to be especially relevant in 
European transition economies is the presence of ethnic networks. Recent economic 
research suggests that the presence of migrants from the host country (i.e. foreign 
investor’s destination) in the source country (i.e. source of foreign investment) has a 
positive effect on the host country’s level of FDI inflows (Kugler and Rapoport, 
2007, 2011; Javorcik et al., 2011). Based on the international trade literature, this 
research argues that the presence of ethnic networks serves to overcome informal 
barriers such as those related to language and culture, and to reduce information 
asymmetry that the foreign investor faces when investing abroad (e.g. regarding 
consumer preferences, contract negotiation and enforcement). Similar to the 
arguments about agglomeration economies, it is argued here that the presence of 
ethnic networks can be especially relevant in the case of European transition 
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economies. First, foreign investors, which tend to be from developed countries, are 
faced with a higher level of information asymmetry because they have had no, or 
little, economic relations with European transition economies during the previous 
system. Second, foreign investor are faced with different (or lack of) business 
experience of local firms, different work norms of employees, and a different- and 
changing- institutional framework, as a result of which more local knowledge is 
likely to be required.  
Finally, the level of infrastructural development, which appears to be “taken for 
granted” in developed economies, is frequently included as determinant of FDI in 
empirical studies of developing and transition economies (Urata and Kawai, 2000; 
Campos and Kinoshita, 2003; Palit and Nawani, 2007; Bellak et al., 2009). Bellak et 
al. (2008) argue that the level of development of transport and communication 
infrastructure is typically lower in transition economies than in developed economies 
and it can directly affect the level of productivity that foreign investors can achieve 
in a host country. As such, the extent and quality of the infrastructure affects the 
potential profitability of locating in a host country and should be taken into account 
in empirical analyses of FDI in transition countries.  
Thus, empirical studies of FDI in transition economies, in additional to generic FDI 
determinants, should take into account the political and economic risk associated 
with operating in these countries and institutional factors such as the legal 
framework and rule of law, corruption, the speed of the reform, the method and 
speed of privatisation, and the level of economic freedom. Also, the business 
experience of indigenous firms and the experience of foreign investors in operating 
in a transition economy should reduce the latter firms’ transaction costs, so FDI 
should be expected to increase with time and with the level of previous FDI. Finally, 
the level of physical infrastructure, both in terms of transportation and 
communication, can affect the profitability of foreign investment and should be 
taken into account. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that firms seeking to gain a competitive advantage through 
higher productivity should prefer employees with more human capital, and this is 
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especially likely to apply to foreign investors. However, the productivity-enhancing 
effect of human capital is likely to attract FDI only to the extent that it is translated 
into firm profitability, i.e. it is not fully paid for. The human capital valued in the 
labour market appears to consist of both cognitive- and non-cognitive skills, at least 
partly developed through formal education. Further, this chapter has argued that the 
characteristics of human capital that are productivity-enhancing in a market economy 
are likely to be even more important in a transition context. On the other hand, it has 
been argued that education under central planning differed in many respects to that 
of market economies and is likely to have produced inadequate and inappropriate 
skills for such economies. Hence, it was argued that measures of human capital in 
transition economies should take into account the proportion of general vs. 
vocational educational attainment and the vintage of the human capital stocks of 
transition economies. For the same reasons, the chapter has argued that, in transition 
economies, it is the participation rates of younger cohorts in education and the 
quality of that schooling that are likely to be relatively more important to foreign 
investors. Further, considering the imperfections of measures of education in these 
economies in particular, the chapter proposes additional measures of human capital 
which measure directly the level of cognitive skills and the availability of skilled 
labour. Finally, the chapter has identified FDI determinants which are either specific 
to transition, or likely to have a more pronounced effect in this context: economic 
and political risk, institutional factors, physical infrastructure and previous FDI in the 
country. The analyses in this chapter will be used to specify the models for the 
empirical investigations to be undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6.     
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5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 of this thesis provided an overview of theory which has served to identify 
country-specific locational factors that are expected to determine inward FDI and 
assessed theoretical arguments (based on growth theory) for human capital being one 
of them. However, a review of empirical studies in Chapter 3 found only limited 
support for the hypothesis that a country’s human capital endowment positively 
affects the levels of FDI it receives. The review of empirical evidence in Section 3.2 
revealed inconclusive results, whilst the meta-regression analysis presented in 
Section 3.3 failed to find an overall ‘genuine’ effect of human capital on FDI. One 
potential explanation for these findings has been argued to be the lack of a sound 
theoretical framework to link human capital to FDI, resulting in potentially mis-
specified empirical models in many of the previous studies. Accordingly, the 
discussion presented in Section 4.2 analysed in more detail the possible mechanisms 
underlying the relationship between human capital and FDI with the aim of 
providing guidelines for an empirical investigation and Section 4.3 provided a 
contextualisation of this discussion for European transition economies. Based on the 
analyses presented in Chapters 2 and 4, this chapter specifies an empirical model to 
estimate the effect of human capital on FDI in European transition economies and 
reports the results from various panel estimators, using different human capital and 
FDI measures.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 provides a critical 
discussion of the choice of measures for the empirical specification which draws on 
the analyses undertaken in Chapters 2 and 4. Section 5.3 discusses the choice of 
estimation techniques to be used in this investigation. The diagnostic tests and 
empirical findings from different estimators are presented in Section 5.4, while a 
robustness check of these models estimated in a stock adjustment framework is 
conducted in Section 5.5. The last section summarises the results and provides 
guidelines for the further empirical work presented in Chapter 6. 
5.2 Specification of the variables and data 
5.2.1 The dependent variable(s): FDI measures 
The theoretical analyses in Sections 2.4 and 4.3 provided a number of potential 
determinants of inward FDI to be used in this empirical investigation. In the 
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empirical analyses presented later in this chapter, both FDI flows and stocks are used 
as the dependent variable. The definitions of these measures and the appropriateness 
of using each of them in this empirical investigation are discussed in the rest of this 
sub-section.  
The initial dependent variable in the investigation is the level of net annual FDI 
inflows (measured in current USD)31 provided by UNCTAD (2010b), based on 
IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual 5 (IMF, 1993) and OECD Detailed Benchmark 
Definition of FDI (OECD, 1996). As explained in Section 1.2, according to this 
definition FDI inflows recorded in the balance of payments include both the initial 
transaction as well as subsequent transactions between the foreign investor and its 
affiliates. Accordingly, the FDI inflow data used here include the following 
components: new equity capital of the enterprise purchased by the foreign investor; 
the part of the affiliate’s reinvested earnings accruing to the foreign investor; and 
intra-company loans between the foreign investor and its affiliate (UNCTAD, 
2010b). Bellak et al. (2008) argue that a flow measure of FDI is more appropriate for 
empirically investigating FDI determinants in European transition economies 
because: a stock measure may change due to changes in valuation of already existing 
stock; a flow measure typically includes reinvested earnings; and the role of local 
financing (which would be reflected in the stock measure) is typically low in host 
European transition economies.  
Data on FDI inflows in UNCTAD (2010b) is presented on a net basis, i.e. as the 
difference between credits and debits in the capital transactions between the foreign 
investor and its affiliate enterprise (IMF, 2009, pp. 107-8). Effectively this means 
that divestment in the form of repatriated profits, loans to parent enterprises or 
repayment of inter-company loans are deducted from new FDI inflows32. As the 
purpose of this analysis is to explain investment decisions in terms of locational 
factors, and these forms of divestment are unlikely to be explained by such factors 
                                                            
31
 The use of USD is not expected to affect the results because any changes in the valuation of stocks 
that may exist due to exchange rate variability are picked up by the time dummies since they are 
expected to be universal across countries. The ‘universality’ of ER shocks is automatic in the case of 
the countries that have the same currency, i.e. Euro, and those whose currencies are pegged against 
the Euro; and it is expected to hold also for countries with floating exchange rates assuming that their 
exchange rates with the Euro and US Dollar will move together due to arbitrage effects. 
32
 In the case of banks, however, deposits, bills and short-term loans between the direct investor and 
its affiliate are excluded (UNCTAD, 2010b).  
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except for the share of reinvested profits, gross FDI inflows appear to be the more 
appropriate measure. However, this measure could not be used because it is not 
reported by UNCTAD. Other concerns related to the FDI measure are those related 
to the comparability and overall quality of FDI data are discussed below.  
Comparability of FDI data can be hampered if there is discrepancy between the 
reporting practices of individual countries or the threshold for distinguishing direct 
investment from other investment, i.e. if the 10% threshold recommended by IMF 
and OECD is not adopted (Duce, 2003). The first type of problem usually happens 
due to lack of data on reinvested earnings, since these do not involve cross-border 
transactions and FDI data is usually collected primarily from foreign exchange 
records of central banks (Zhan, 2006). However, this appears to be less of a problem 
for the sample of countries used in this investigation. Fujita (2008, p.112) records 
that in 2006 all the countries included in this sample report all components of FDI, 
except for Albania which does not report reinvested earnings. Another concern with 
FDI inflow data is the overestimation that may result from the so-called ‘round-
tripping’ or ‘trans-shipping’ which is not translated into economic activity in the host 
country, but is channelled either back to its originating country or to a third country 
through special purpose entities (UNCTAD, 2006). UNCTAD (2006, 2007 and 
2010a) provides examples of countries where round-tripping is believed to be 
account for a significant portion of FDI, among which are transition economies such 
as China and Russia but none of the European transition economies included in this 
empirical analysis.  
Dunning and Lundan (2008) further note that FDI (stock and flow) data merely 
represent a proxy for the direct activities of foreign investors, because their foreign-
based affiliates also use financing from other sources and are involved in non-
ownership-based activities. Though in the case of transition economies which, as 
discussed in Sections 1.2 and 4.3, were/are relatively capital-scarce and where local 
firms do not have the experience of operating in a market economy, these factors are 
likely to be relatively less distorting. A bigger concern in this study, however, is the 
use of aggregate measures of FDI. In Chapter 2 it was argued that the determinants 
of FDI vary depending on foreign investors’ motivation and/or sector of economic 
activity. Hence, use of aggregated FDI data at country level is likely to be the single 
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most important limitation of macro-level studies of FDI determinants. Therefore, in 
empirical analyses presented in this chapter proxies are used to control for FDI in the 
primary and financial sectors where, as argued in Section 6.3, the effect of human 
capital is likely to be relatively small.  
Finally, some empirical studies of FDI determinants use stock data in a partial stock 
adjustment framework where foreign investors adjust their stock of investment 
towards their equilibrium or desired level (Jun and Singh, 1995; Cheng and Kwan, 
2000a; Kinoshita and Campos, 2006; Riedl, 2010). Similarly, Bajo-Rubio and 
Montero-Muñoz (1999) and Martinez-Martin (2009) argue that stocks are a better 
measure of FDI, based on the assumption that foreign investors’ strategies are long-
run phenomena which may not be properly captured by (relatively volatile) annual 
investment.  
Cheng and Kwan (2000a) also favour stocks as a better measure of FDI, though on 
the grounds that profitability of investment depends on “the marginal return to 
capital, which is generally a decreasing function of the stock of capital” (p. 382). 
However, considering the agglomeration effects that are expected in the case of FDI, 
discussed in Section 2.2, and the potential effect of the experience of foreign 
investors gained in a transition context, discussed in Section 4.3, it is also plausible 
that, in the time period under discussion, the marginal return to (foreign) capital is an 
increasing function of the previous stock. Thus, whilst not necessarily in the manner 
originally proposed by Cheng and Kwan, previous FDI stock is likely to be relevant 
for current investment.  
Another argument in favour of using FDI stocks as the dependent variable is 
provided by Dewit et al. (2009). According to these authors, stock measures of FDI 
are preferable to flow measures when estimating the effect of independent variables 
that “adjust only in the medium or long run” because flows are short-run measures 
which tend to fluctuate heavily (Dewit et al., 2009, p. 102). This argument appears to 
be particularly relevant for the empirical investigations in this thesis, considering that 
the human capital measures used are likely to change slowly over time, as explained 
in the rest of this chapter. 
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Based on the above arguments in favour of a stock measure, both types of measures 
of FDI are used in this chapter’s empirical analysis. Before undertaking this analysis, 
however, the correlation between stock and flow measures was checked both across 
countries and for each country individually across time. Across countries, current 
flows of FDI appear to be very highly correlated with both current and lagged stocks 
of FDI33, as suggested by the (average) correlation coefficients of 0.9 and 0.85, 
respectively. These correlations appear to suggest that there are increasing short-run 
marginal rates of return to capital, as inflows appear to be larger in countries that 
already have large stocks of FDI. This is also suggested by the positive correlation 
between flows and (current and lagged) stocks of FDI across time, though the 
magnitude varies in different countries (Table 5.1 below).34 
Table 5.1: Correlation between FDI flows and stocks 
   Stocks Lagged stocks 
Across countries  0.9 0.85 
(average 1994-2008)    
     
Within countries     
(1994-2008)    
     
Albania 0.97 0.96 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.73 0.54 
Bulgaria 0.94 0.97 
Croatia 0.88 0.91 
Czech Republic 0.51 0.39 
Estonia 0.88 0.84 
Hungary 0.67 0.48 
Latvia 0.66 0.48 
Lithuania 0.78 0.72 
Macedonia, FYR 0.73 0.62 
Poland 0.87 0.68 
Romania 0.97 0.89 
Slovak Republic 0.44 0.31 
Slovenia 0.55 0.4 
Source: Own calculations based on UNCTAD (2010b) 
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 Correlations of FDI inflows with the previous year’s stock is also estimated because of expected 
agglomeration economies (discussed in Section 2.2) 
34
 In countries such as Albania, the correlation is exceptionally high, partly because the initial stock of 
FDI is very low.   
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In the following empirical analysis, specifications with FDI stocks as a dependent 
variable are estimated as a robustness check and the results presented in Section 5.5.   
5.2.2 Human capital measures 
The results of the meta-regression analysis presented in Section 3.3 suggest that the 
estimated effect of human capital on inward FDI is smaller in transition economies 
compared to any other sample. It was argued there that this finding may be due to a 
lower quality and/or relevance of the skills developed under communism in a market 
economy (discussed in Sections 1.4 and 4.3) or alternatively by the choice of human 
capital measures employed in FDI studies in transition economies. Therefore the rest 
of this section provides a critical review of the human capital measures for which 
comparable data is available to inform the choice of measure(s) in this empirical 
analysis. The possible ways to control for the characteristics of education provided 
under communism that may affect an expected conventional relationship between 
human capital and FDI are also considered. 
Table 5.2 below presents the measures of human capital available for European 
transition economies. Measures referring to literacy rates and enrolment and 
completion rates at primary/compulsory education level are unlikely to be able to 
discriminate between levels of human capital in European transition economies 
because these are universally high across countries and across the period covered in 
this study (see Appendix 5.1 for the descriptive statistics). Therefore, measures 
related to non-compulsory, i.e. upper-secondary and tertiary, education appear to be 
more appropriate in this context. The choice of secondary education variables 
appears to be in contradiction with the MRA results (Section 5.3) which suggests 
that the use of such measures yields lower estimated effects on FDI. However, as 
argued in Section 5.3, this may be due to differences in the exact education level 
(e.g. lower-, upper-, or all secondary education) or differences in the type of 
secondary education provided (e.g. quality, mix of general-vocational education, or 
duration of studies) and there seem to be no theoretical rationale for secondary 
education being less valued by foreign investors compared to other levels of 
education.  
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Table 5.2: Human capital measures for European transition economies 
Source/Measure 
WDI (2010) 
Literacy rate  
  
UNESCO (2010) 
Gross- and net- enrolment rate in primary education (ISCED 1) 
Gross- and net- enrolment rate in secondary education (ISCED 2+3)  
Gross- and net- enrolment rate in  tertiary education (ISCED 5+6) 
  
UNICEF (2010) 
Gross enrolment rates in compulsory education (ISCED 1+2) 
Gross enrolment rates in upper-secondary education (ISCED 3) 
Gross enrolment in general upper-secondary education 
Gross enrolment in vocational/technical upper-secondary education 
Students enrolled in tertiary education (ISCED 5+6) 
Students enrolled in tertiary education per 100,000 inhabitants 
  
Barro and Lee (2010) 
Percentage of population who have completed primary education  
Percentage of population who have completed secondary education  
Percentage of population who have completed tertiary education  
Average number of years of schooling attained by population  
  
Hanushek and Woessmann (2009a) 
Level of students' cognitive skills 
Share of top-performers in cognitive skill tests 
Note: UNESCO's (2006) International standard classification of education (ISCED)  classifies 
levels of education as follows: pre-primary (0); primary (1); lower-secondary (2); upper-secondary 
(3); post-secondary non-tertiary (4); tertiary, first stage (5); and 6 tertiary, second stage (6). 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2, previous studies tend to represent a country’s human 
capital by only one measure of human capital, however this does not appear 
theoretically justified. The inclusion of different measures can identify the relative 
importance of different types/quality/levels of skills to foreign investors. For 
instance, following the work of Hanushek and Woessmann (2009a), the effect of 
direct measures of cognitive skills vs. level of education attained can be compared. 
Similarly, following the work of Vandenbussche et al. (2006), Soukiazis and Cravo 
(2008), Di Liberto et al. (2011), Cosar (2011) and Acemoglu and Autor (2012) in 
economic growth theory, the (relative) effect of specific levels of education can be 
compared. Accordingly, in the empirical analyses presented in this thesis two volume 
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measures of human capital are included in the baseline model, which is later 
augmented with other measures, as discussed in the rest of this chapter. Following 
the contribution of Acemoglu and Autor (2012), the level of task complexity can be 
argued to be an additional human capital variable in the empirical analyses in this 
thesis. However, a proxy for task complexity similar to Acemoglu and Autor’s does 
not appear to be available for European transition economies. Moreover, as argued 
previously in Section 2.3, it is not clear that such a task-based approach is 
appropriate in a macro-level FDI study. 
As for the choice between stock measures which refer to the population residing in a 
country and flow measures which refer to (annual) enrolments in education, it 
appears that the former provide a more appropriate measure for human capital 
endowment because they provide information on the total amount of formal 
education (i.e. human capital) that is potentially available for employment (Le et al., 
2005; Islam, 2009) and not just the cohorts that are currently being educated. 
Considering the arguments above, the human capital measures considered in this 
study are the percentage of population (aged over 15) who have completed 
secondary education, and the percentage of population (aged over 15) who have 
completed tertiary education (TERTedu), as their highest level of education35. 
However, first it should be noted that this secondary education measure as defined in 
the original Barro and Lee (2010) appears to be an imperfect measure of the 
percentage of population who have completed secondary education because it 
excludes the portion of population who have completed secondary education and 
have continued to complete tertiary education. In this case, a higher value of share of 
population with secondary education in a country could arise merely because a 
smaller percentage of the population have completed also tertiary education, thus 
actually representing a lower level of human capital. Accordingly, a new measure is 
calculated as the sum of the percentage of population who have completed secondary 
education and that of the population who have completed tertiary education which 
                                                            
35
 As this measure refers to the highest level of education attained, the use of the percentage of 
population who have completed primary education as a human capital measure would be very 
misleading in the case of European transition economies where educational attainment is generally 
high. Namely, in this context where the proportion of population without any education is uniformly 
low (Barro and Lee, 2010), a higher percentage of population who have completed primary education 
would actually mean that a smaller proportion of the population have completed higher levels of 
education, i.e. it would represent a lower level of human capital.   
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will be used to measure the total share of population who have completed 
secondary education (SECedu). However, further problems/limitations remain with 
the Barro and Lee education data.  
First, they do not provide data on the development of human capital outside of 
formal schooling, which is expected to account for a significant proportion of human 
capital for two reasons. As explained in Section 4.2, research argues that skill 
formation starts early in childhood and this age is important because skill formation 
exhibits multiplier effects. In addition, evidence suggests that formation of both 
cognitive, and non-cognitive, skills continues after formal schooling (Heckman et al., 
1999; Brunello and Schlotter, 2011), which appears to represent a major limitation of 
these measures. This limitation could be overcome to some extent by adding a proxy 
for the level of at least formal training, but such data do not appear to be available 
for the sample of European transition economies investigated here.  
Second, education data presented in Barro and Lee (2010) are not (necessarily) 
observed values of the variables, but estimates of these through backward or forward 
extrapolation based on benchmark data available from censuses/surveys and 
enrolment data. As a result, the data suffers from measurement error, which 
introduces a new component into the error term. The correlation of the error term and 
the explanatory variables, in turn, can cause biased and inconsistent estimates 
(Gujarati, 2004, pp. 526-27; Baum, 2001, pp. 216-17). Accordingly, the use of 
(previous versions of) Barro and Lee data have been argued to cause bias in 
economic growth regressions, especially when differenced values are used (Krueger 
and Lindahl, 2001; de la Fuente and Doménech, 2006; Cohen and Soto, 2007; 
Portela et al. 2010). However, in the most recent version of the data this 
measurement error has been reduced and the reliability of the data, both in levels and 
in changes, has been shown to have improved (Barro and Lee, 2010, p. 4, 12-13). 
Considering this, and the lack of other (superior) sources of stock education variables 
for the sample of countries covered in this sample, the data of Barro and Lee (2010) 
appears to be the best available dataset for the purpose of this empirical analysis.  
Finally, as Barro and Lee (2010) only provide data in 5-year intervals, an estimation 
of the between-values is needed in order enable the use of the maximum number of 
possible observations in this empirical investigation. As the “true” missing values are 
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unlikely to be more related to any other variables than to the actual data points 
available, interpolation of the data was considered to be more appropriate than 
multiple imputation based on other variables. Linear interpolation based on the time 
variable also seems a reasonable solution since SECedu and TERTedu are stock 
variables which vary smoothly over time and are typically expected to follow an 
increasing trend. Hence, constant growth of these variables within the 5-year periods 
was assumed and the between-values were obtained by linear interpolation36. This 
practice was previously used with Barro and Lee data by numerous studies (e.g. 
Chen, 2004; Apergis, 2009; Seck, 2009; Shirotori et al., 2010). However, it is 
recognised here that this procedure exacerbates the measurement error already 
present in the Barro and Lee data and the potential endogeneity bias that this could 
cause.  
The analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that general (upper) secondary education is likely 
to be superior in developing the type of skills that appear to be valuable in a modern 
market economy. In this sense, it may appear that Kinoshita and Campos (2003) 
chose an appropriate measure for human capital: the enrolment rate in general 
secondary education. However, in addition to referring only to current students, the 
use of this measure alone is also unlikely to be a good measure of the total human 
capital endowments of a country by virtue of totally disregarding 
vocational/technical enrolments. An overview of the data on upper-secondary 
enrolments by type of education in Section 1.4 revealed considerable variation in the 
general-vocational mix of upper-secondary provided both across countries and across 
time (which is not necessarily related to changes in total enrolments). This means 
that the use of general (or vocational) secondary measures alone could seriously 
distort the estimated effect of human capital on FDI. Based on general secondary 
figures, for instance, Hungary one of the fastest reformers and a country attracting 
relatively higher-value added FDI (Ernst & Young, 2011) but with a high share of 
vocational enrolments, is relatively less endowed with human capital compared to 
Albania which is a relatively poor performer but has drastically expanded general 
education at the expense of vocational education. This becomes a problem once it is 
recognised that the mix of education provided is unlikely to be exogenously 
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 The interpolation was conducted using the ipolate command in Stata, whereby secedu and tertedu 
are specified to be a function of the time variable. This essentially fits a linear trend between each two 
observed years, i.e. here between years 1995 and  2000, 2000 and 2005 and 2005 and 2010.   
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determined. Namely, it is reasonable to expect that the “survival” of vocational 
education in Hungary is observed because the skills it provides are demanded by the 
labour market which, in turn, may potentially be attributed to the successful reform 
of its education system. This is consistent with evidence of changes within 
vocational education programmes (e.g. substitutions of engineering programmes 
with business ones) discussed in Section 1.4 in the few European transition countries 
that have maintained relatively high shares of vocational enrolments. Considering the 
arguments above, the general-vocational ratio at the outset of transition 
(genvocratio), and not throughout the whole period of study, is used here as a control 
for potential effects of the mix of education. The ratio of general-to-vocational 
enrolments is calculated using data from the TransMONEE database (UNICEF, 
2010). 
The analyses in Section 4.3 also suggest that the communist education systems 
differed from those of developed economies in many ways and they may have 
developed skills and traits that may be irrelevant or even ‘productivity-constraining’ 
in a modern market economy. Therefore, it may be especially important to consider 
the ‘vintage’ of human capital stock in the case of European transition economies 
because foreign investors may value human capital developed under communism 
relatively less than that developed during transition in a (presumably) reformed and 
more market-responsive education system. To control for potential vintage effects, 
two proxies were developed aiming to represent the percentage of the workforce that 
was (at least partly) educated after the beginning of transition. The first proxy, 
edutr1, is a time-invariant variable representing the share of population aged 16-
30 in a country’s working age population in 2008, considering that these 
generations were educated in the communist system only up to (lower) secondary 
education (i.e. up to age 14) or less using WDI (2010) data37. The second proxy, 
edutr2, is a time-variant variable calculated as the share of population who were 
educated in the communist system only up to age 12 or less in a country’s working 
                                                            
37
 This variable was calculated by dividing population aged 0-14 at the outset of transition (year 1992) 
by the population aged 15-64 in 2008. Because data was available for the age group 0-14 as a whole, 
this variable could not be calculated for earlier years because this would also capture generations 
educated under the communist education system, e.g. those aged 0-14 in 1986 include individuals 
who were 14 in 1986 and thus completed education before transition began.     
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age population in the respective year using Barro and Lee’s (2010) and WDI (2010) 
data38.  
Further, it was argued in Chapter 4 that traditional measures of educational 
attainment are imperfect because they fail to account for differences in the quality of 
education provided and the formation of cognitive skills that takes place outside 
formal education. In this respect, it was argued that direct measures of cognitive 
skills may provide more relevant information on a country’s human capital to 
potential foreign investors. Accordingly, a standardised measure of cognitive skills 
(cognitive) developed by Hanushek and Woessmann (2009a) from maths and science 
scores in International Student Achievement Tests (such as PISA and TIMSS 
discussed in Section 1.4) is also used in this analysis39. This measure was chosen as 
opposed to individual PISA and TIMSS scores in order to maximise the sample size, 
since some European transition countries have participated in only one of the 
studies40. As there is only one observation per country available for the standardised 
measure of cognitive skills, the level of cognitive skills (and quality of education it 
proxies) is effectively treated as time-invariant. This is a limitation because, as 
discussed in Section 1.4, there is considerable variation in some of the transition 
economies’ scores (e.g. Bulgaria and Poland), despite the general expectation that 
educational reform is likely to take considerable time to take affect educational 
outcomes. From an empirical point of view, the estimation of this variable may 
become a problem if fixed effects estimators are used, an issue which is addressed 
later in Section 5.3. 
As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, it has been previously argued that the share of 
students performing at the top end of the distribution in International Student 
Achievement Tests, i.e. those that can thoroughly evaluate information, is of 
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 First, the population in the relevant age groups in years 2000, 2005 and 2010 (15-20, 15-25 and 15-
35, respectively) were obtained from Barro and Lee (2010) and divided by the working age 
population (WDI, 2010) in the respective years. Then linear interpolation was used to obtain the 
annual values for the period 2000-2010.  
39
 The international tests used by Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) include: First International 
Mathematics Study (FIMS); First International Science Study (FISS); Second International 
Mathematics Study (SIMS); Second International Science Study (SISS); Third International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS); Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). 
Though, the countries covered in this sample have participated only in (one or both) of the last two. 
40
 The International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) scores were argued in Chapter 4 to represent an 
even more appropriate measure of cognitive skills for the purpose of this analysis since it is based on 
a sample of working-age population, however this could not be used as only four European transition 
economies were included. 
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particular importance in a knowledge-based economy. An analogous measure for the 
workforce of a country may be particularly important to foreign investors to the 
extent that they are able to attract the most able individuals, an assumption that 
appears to be reasonable considering that they pay higher wages than their local 
counterparts, as explained in Sections 1.2 and 2.3, Accordingly, another variable 
from Hanushek and Woessmann (2009a), the share of top-performers41 in a country, 
top, is used as an additional measure of human capital which is intended to proxy for 
the share of individuals at the top of the skill distribution of the workforce.  
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 4, a new measure of human capital is proposed in 
this analysis which provides information on the balance between the demand and 
supply of skilled workers. This measure, vacancy, is calculated as a country-average 
of the length of period required for filling a vacancy for a skilled worker as 
reported by firms already operating in the economy in EBRD-World Bank’s 
Business Environment and Enterprise Survey (BEEPS, 2002, 2005; interpolated for 
in-between years in the same manner as the Barro-Lee data on education). Vacancies 
for skilled workers as opposed to those for managers and professionals were chosen 
because it was considered that these workers are likely to be more relevant to foreign 
investors. This argument is based on the assumption that it is relatively easier and/or 
inexpensive for foreign investors to hire expatriates in the top-management positions 
which are fewer in number; and that the category of professional workers is likely to 
be dominated by teachers and doctors, professions which are unlikely to be relevant 
for a foreign direct investor in the manufacturing sector. However, as explained in 
Section 4.3, this skilled-worker vacancy duration measure is limited in that it 
depends crucially on the current structure of the economy and the technological level 
of the firms currently operating on the economy and may not necessarily reflect the 
availability of type of skilled employees that foreign investors seek. This problem is 
partly addressed in the next chapter by calculating specific values of this variable for 
each industry.   
5.2.3 Control variables 
The review of generic FDI theories in Chapter 2, in conjunction with the discussion 
of the transition context in Section 4.3, have identified a range of factors that are 
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 Hanushek and Woessmann take a score of 600 points or one standard deviation above the OECD 
mean as a threshold for superior performance. 
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theoretically expected to affect FDI inflows in European transition economies. 
Drawing on these discussions, a list of key control variables to be included in the 
model is now provided, together with a critical discussion of the respective measures 
available. Due to degrees of freedom considerations, an attempt was made to keep 
the number of controls in the model as small as possible, which has also sometimes 
affected the choice of controls and/or measures used for them.  
The level of labour costs was recognised by many FDI theories reviewed in Section 
2.2 as a potential determinant of the profitability, and hence, location decisions of 
foreign investors42. In Section 4.3 it was further argued that the effect of the level 
and quality of human capital in a host economy is expected to attract foreign 
investment to the extent that its relative cost is not higher than in other economies. 
Therefore, the cost of labour is controlled for in this empirical investigation using the 
average gross wage paid in the host country, wage, as reported by WIIW (2011). As 
explained in Section 1.4, this measure has the disadvantage of excluding non-labour 
costs (e.g. contributions to social security) and therefore does not account for the 
whole amount of labour costs borne by the foreign investor. However, in the absence 
of data for European transition economies on any alternative measures, the average 
gross wage is used here as a measure for labour costs. In empirical analyses with a 
focus on the relationship between the availability of skilled labour and inward FDI, 
an average wage measure is imperfect because it does not necessarily reflect the 
price of skilled labour, particularly if there are skill shortages in a country. The 
distribution of earnings as measured by the Gini coefficient, gini (UNICEF, 2010), 
was initially used in this empirical investigation as a proxy for the relative wages of 
skilled labour. This was done following arguments and empirical evidence according 
to which the increase in the premium of skill and educational attainment during the 
transition period, i.e. the decompression of wages discussed in Section 1.4, was the 
main factor driving the widening of wage differentials in transition economies 
(Orazem and Vodopivec, 1997). However, upon reflection it was decided that this is 
an imperfect proxy because higher earnings inequality may reflect the relative wages 
of skilled workers, which it was intended to proxy, but will also reflect the 
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 As explained in Section 4.3, labour costs have been sometimes used as a proxy for human capital, 
however this was argued to be inappropriate and therefore in this analysis it is considered as a control 
variable. 
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proportion of skilled workers in the workforce, and therefore it effect is a priori 
ambiguous.   
The size of the host market was identified in Section 2.3 as one of the key 
determinants of inward FDI, in particular in the case of market-seeking investment. 
In empirical studies this has been measured either by a country’s size of population 
(Meyer, 1996) or GDP (Furceri and Borelli, 2008), or by market growth, i.e. growth 
rate of GDP (Agiomirgianakis et al., 2006). Alternatively, or in addition, GDP per 
capita levels have been used as a measure of purchasing power of the population 
(Furceri and Borelli, 2008). In the empirical analyses in this thesis, the size of the 
host market is measured by its level of GDP, gdp.  
Some authors argue that foreign investors may not be only interested in the host 
country’s market, but also its access to other markets (Head and Mayer, 2002; 
Carstensen and Toubal, 2004). Taking into account the size of the adjoining 
countries seems to be especially relevant in the empirical analysis presented in this 
thesis considering that the sample is mostly comprised of small and highly open 
economies. Carstensen and Toubal (2004) have done this by using the host country’s 
potential market size, measured as an average of the host market and its 
neighbouring markets weighted by the inverse of the costs of transportation between 
them. A similar measure, but using the distance between countries’ capitals in lack of 
data for transportation costs, has been considered in this empirical analysis. 
However, the assignment of either of these weights appears to be arbitrary and 
depends on the way distance/cost is measured; for instance, the adjoining markets are 
going to have larger weights if miles are used instead of kilometres. Therefore after 
careful consideration, it was decided to use only the gdp measure for market size.    
Natural resource endowments were identified in Section 2.3 as potential 
determinants of FDI. In addition to a country’s human capital endowment, which is 
the focus of investigation, endowment of natural resources is controlled for in this 
model. The presence of this control is particularly important when estimating the 
human capital-FDI relationship because, as argued in Sections 6.3, natural resource 
driven-FDI is likely to be relatively less attracted by the level and quality of host 
countries’ human capital. The availability of natural resources is intended to serve as 
a control for the level of resource-seeking FDI a country receives. Previous studies 
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of FDI in transition economies have used different measures of natural resources. For 
instance, Deichmann et al. (2003) and Kinoshita and Campos (2003) use a measure 
developed by De Melo et al. (1997) to distinguish between three levels of natural 
resource endowment (poor, moderate and rich); Shepotylo (2010) uses proven oil 
and gas reserves by BP (2010); Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) use a dummy variable to 
indicate oil-producing countries; and Vavilov (2005) uses annual levels of oil 
production. However, all these measures appear to have drawbacks, especially when 
considering the rationale for their inclusion in this particular empirical analysis. First, 
few European transition economies have significant oil/gas reserves; for most of 
them, other natural resources such as ores and metals are likely to be more important. 
In addition, for the purpose of this study, i.e. where natural resources are intended to 
proxy for the (actual) level of resource-seeking FDI, measures of utilisation of 
natural resources rather than reserves are likely to be more appropriate. Based on 
these arguments, an alternative measure for natural resources (primexport) is 
calculated which indicates the share of primary commodities, excluding food items 
and agricultural raw materials, in total exports (based on UNCTAD, 2010c). A 
similar measure, exports of raw materials as a share of GDP, has been previously 
used by Sachs and Warner (1995) and Ali et al. (2010).  
In a similar manner, it is argued in Section 6.3 that FDI in the financial sector is 
market-driven and it is less likely to be affected by human capital availability in the 
host country. To control for this particular type of market-seeking FDI, the share of 
foreign banks in the economy (forbank) as reported by EBRD’s Transition Reports 
(EBRD, various years) is included as a proxy for the level of FDI that a country 
received in the financial sector. An alternative measure available from EBRD, the 
market share of foreign banks (as measured by the share of their assets in total bank 
assets in the country), was considered more appropriate, but significantly fewer 
observations were available.  
Trade costs are another factor which is likely to affect FDI, as suggested by the 
theory reviewed in Section 2.2. In theory, the effect of trade costs is ambiguous: FDI 
can provide a substitute for trade in the case of market-seeking FDI, but these two 
can also be complementary, especially in the case of efficiency seeking FDI where, 
for instance, intermediate products need to be imported and/or final products 
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exported. Ideally, the measure of trade costs would include transportation costs, tariff 
costs and non-tariff barriers. However, data on transportation costs are not available 
for the sample of countries included in this analysis. Previous FDI studies covering 
CEECs have used the share of tariff revenues in the total value imports provided by 
the EBRD Transition Report (EBRD, various years), but have found it to be 
insignificant and argued this to be because of the generally low tariff rates (Bellak et 
al., 2008; Leibrecht and Scharler, 2009). Alternatively, the trade freedom component 
of the Economic Freedom Index (EFI) by Heritage Foundation (2010) can be used. 
The latter has the advantage of taking into account both tariff and non-tariff 
restrictions, such as direct government intervention and quantity, price, regulatory 
and customs restrictions. Because of this, the better availability of data and 
considering the low variability in the share of tariff revenues in imports across these 
countries and time period, the trade freedom component of the EFI (tradefree) is 
used in the empirical analysis presented in this chapter. As explained later in this 
section, other components of this index (excluding investment freedom) are also 
used in this analysis as a measure of economic freedom in general. The reason why 
the component of trade costs in particular is entered as a separate variable is that, as 
explained above, the effect of trade costs on FDI is a priori ambiguous, which is not 
the case with economic freedom. First, however, the correlation coefficient between 
the trade freedom component and the composite index excluding this component was 
checked to see whether these are sufficiently different to warrant their separation. 
The partial correlation was found to be relatively low, at 0.53, therefore the two are 
entered as separate variables in the empirical investigations.  
The level (and cost) of physical and communication infrastructure were identified in 
Section 4.3, as a factor that can affect the level of FDI a country receives. Following, 
Bellak et al. (2009) a composite measure of information and communication 
technology (ICT) infrastructure is created by adding the number of telephone lines 
and broadband- and cellular- subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (ictinfra) provided 
by World Bank (WDI, 2010). This variable provides information on the ease of 
communication, but given the lack of comprehensive and comparable data on other 
infrastructure indicators43, similar measures have been previously used as a proxy for 
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 WDI (2010) provides data on the road and rail networks of countries, but these are usually not 
available for the whole period covered in this empirical analysis.  
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the level of infrastructure development (Kinoshita and Campos, 2003). Thus, the ICT 
infrastructure measure is used in this analysis as a proxy for both the ease/cost of 
communication and infrastructural development more generally. This measure can 
also be considered as a proxy for the level of technological development of the host 
country.  
As discussed in Sections 2.3 and 4.3, foreign affiliates may benefit from 
‘agglomerating’, i.e. locating near other foreign firms, e.g. due to linkages with 
suppliers and/or customers and availability of a workforce with relevant skills. 
Agglomeration economies have been measured by lagged FDI stock in studies using 
the stock of FDI as the dependent variable (Kinoshita and Campos, 2003; Nicoletti et 
al., 2003). Similarly, in studies with FDI flows as the dependent variable, lagged 
flows have sometimes been used (Agiomirgianakis et al., 2006), though is it not clear 
that this is appropriate considering that lagged FDI flows do not represent total 
foreign investor activity in the host country. However, it also not clear that the 
estimated effect of previous FDI stock necessarily represents agglomeration effects. 
Namely, in a partial-adjustment setting (discussed in the previous section), the 
coefficient on previous FDI stock can represent agglomeration effects, but also the 
speed of adjustment to the optimal level of FDI stock.  
Finally, it may be argued that foreign investors ‘agglomerate’ in destinations where 
other (successful) firms in their industry or related industries are based, regardless of 
these firms’ ownership.  Apparently under this assumption, Resmini (2000) uses the 
output share of the manufacturing sector in the host country as a measure of 
agglomeration economies. However, the adequacy of this measure is questionable on 
the basis of the differences that are likely to exist between the technological levels of 
foreign investors and the domestic manufacturing sectors of transition economies. In 
the context of transition where, as discussed in Section 1.2, domestic firms were 
lagging in terms of product quality and technological level (and thus the small pool 
of workers with relevant knowledge, skills and experience), it appears unlikely that 
foreign investors could benefit from ‘agglomerating’ with domestic firms. Further, it 
can be argued that in a transition context there are additional benefits from 
agglomerating with foreign investors in particular, regardless of their sector. This is 
because, as argued in Sections 1.2 and 4.3, the newly created domestic private sector 
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in transition economies had no experience of operating in a market economy and 
there was lack of skills in business management and supporting services. To the 
extent that existing foreign firms in the market provide such services, contribute to 
the development of skills and a new business culture more generally, they are likely 
to attract more foreign investment. Based on the above arguments, the stock of FDI 
in the previous year (l1FDIstock) is used in a partial stock-adjustment framework44 
(in estimations in Section 5.4 where a robustness check is conducted using stock of 
FDI as a dependent variable). Finally, the presence of foreign investors may have 
reinforcing effects, i.e. positively affect the (increase in) stocks of FDI by sending a 
positive signal to new potential investors and helping to reduce the inherent 
uncertainty related to lack of information regarding the host economy, a factor which 
was argued to be especially important in a transition context, as explained in Section 
4.3.    
Progress in the privatization process and overall progress in transition, i.e. reform 
towards a market economy, are transition-specific factors which could affect FDI 
inflows. As explained in Section 4.3, rapid economic reform is likely to be important 
to foreign investors because it reduces the uncertainty from changes throughout the 
economy related to transition. Privatisation is a component of this reform which, as 
argued in Section 4.3, can serve as a signal for the commitment of the government to 
establishing and supporting a market economy. Accordingly, studies of FDI in 
transition economies have frequently used measures of the speed/volume or type of 
privatisation method as a proxy for institutional reform. Holland and Pain (1998) and 
Bevan and Estrin (2004) use a qualitative measure of privatisation methods 
according to the opportunities they create for foreign investors (e.g. sale to outside 
owners has a higher rating than voucher distribution or management-employee 
buyouts). Lansbury et al. (1996) and Bellak et al. (2008), on the other hand, use the 
share of private sector output and the value of privatisation revenues, respectively. 
However, in this analysis it is argued that there are superior measures of institutional 
quality and reform which can be used; nonetheless, a dummy variable indicating 
major privatisations is used as a ‘shock’ variable, as discussed below. 
                                                            
44
 This variable is not used in the model with FDI inflows as the dependent variable because even 
though it is a lag, and thus predetermined, it is not strictly exogenous because it is correlated with the 
time-invariant part of the error term. 
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In the empirical analyses presented in this chapter, the overall transition score 
awarded by the EBRD (various years) in their Transition Report, transition, is 
used as a measure of progress in transition. This is a composite index derived from 
the qualitative assessment of nine areas of reform including: large- and small-scale 
privatisation, enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, trade and foreign exchange 
system, competition policy, banking and non-banking financial institutions, and 
infrastructure reform (EBRD, 2010, pp. 248-50). A composite index is favoured in 
this analysis for the following reasons. First, this appears to be the most 
comprehensive measure of progress in transition, as opposed to the ones related to 
privatisation discussed above. Second, because the interest here is not to identify any 
particular areas of reform, but simply control for overall progress, this measure has 
the advantage of providing sufficient information for the purpose of this analysis 
while not having to enter additional (potentially correlated) measures. This is an 
important consideration in this research since the size of sample is relatively small. 
However, it is argued here that the privatisation of socially- and publicly-owned 
enterprises itself has to be controlled for in FDI studies focusing on European 
transition economies. As explained in Section 1.2, privatisation-related FDI has 
accounted for a significant share of FDI in these countries during (part of) the 
transition period, but privatisations of enterprises represent one-off opportunities for 
foreign investors and their timing is not (necessarily) determined by the variation in 
host country characteristics across time. An initial review of FDI inflow levels of the 
individual economies in this sample reveals sudden and sharp increases which appear 
to be explained by major privatisations waves and/or privatisations of large strategic 
enterprises, which should ideally be controlled for in empirical investigations of FDI 
determinants. Accordingly, various sources, including UNCTAD’s World 
Investment Reports (UNCTAD, various years), EBRD’s Transition Reports (EBRD, 
various years) and Kalotay and Hunya (2000), were reviewed and checked against 
the apparent outlier years for each country in an attempt to identify instances when 
the effect of privatisation-related FDI was particularly large. A dummy variable, 
privatisation, was subsequently created which indicates years when FDI-related 
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privatisations of large enterprises and/or large waves of privatisations took place in 
each of the host economies45. 
The EBRD transition score above measures the progress in transition from a 
centrally-planned to a market economy. However, market economies may differ with 
regard to their level of economic liberalisation and quality of institution, including 
rule of law, which, as discussed in Sections 2.2 and 4.3, determine the quality of the 
business environment and thus can affect the level of FDI a country receives. In this 
empirical analysis, the Economic Freedom Index (EFI) provided by The Heritage 
Foundation (2010), econfree, is used to indicate the level of business friendliness of 
an economy. This index is calculated as an (simple) average of 10 indicators based 
on a wide range of both qualitative and quantitative information (Heritage 
Foundation, 2010, pp. 457-68). As explained earlier in this section, the indicator of 
trade liberalisation is used as a separate control variable. Therefore, the index for the 
purpose of this empirical investigation was recalculated as the average of the rest of 
the components: business freedom, which measures the ease of starting, operating 
and closing a business; the magnitude of the tax burden and the share of government 
spending in GDP; the quality of the property rights laws and their enforcement; the 
level of corruption; monetary freedom, as indicated by price stability and the 
presence of price controls; financial freedom, which combines banking security with 
the extent of regulation/influence imposed by the government; the legal and 
regulatory framework of the labour market; and investment freedom, i.e. the freedom 
of individuals to move capital both across activities within the economy, and across 
borders. The last component draws upon qualitative information on whether there is 
discrimination against foreign investors, whether there are restrictions on land 
ownership and investment in any sectors, how common is expropriation of 
investment without ‘fair’ compensation, whether there are foreign exchange controls 
or capital controls (e.g. in repatriation of profits) and the level of transparency and 
bureaucracy in investment policy implementation. Because this latter component is 
                                                            
45
 Information to construct this variable comes primarily from UNCTAD and EBRD reports. These 
reports were reviewed to identify any cases where large privatisations were made by foreign investors 
in the countries in the sample, in which case the dummy takes the value of one. In addition, the 
information in Kalotay and Hunya (2000) was used in some instances, with the dummy taking the 
value of one if the share of privatisation-related FDI in an economy exceeds the threshold of 40% of 
total FDI inflows.     
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highly correlated with the composite index (with a correlation coefficient of over 
0.7), it is not included here as a separate control variable. 
Political- and economic- risk have been identified in Section 4.3 as factors that can 
potentially affect FDI in developing and transition economies. In studies of transition 
economies, economic risk is often measured by the inflation rate (Kinoshita and 
Campos, 2003; Furceri and Borelli, 2008; Leibrecht and Scharler, 2009). 
Alternatively, political- and economic- risk have often been measured by 
(components of) the Country Risk Indicator (Euromoney, 2010), the International 
Country Risk Guide (PRS, 2010), Country Credit Ratings (Institutional Investor, 
2010) in Bandelj (2002), Carstensen and Toubal (2004), Fung et al. (2008), and 
Leibrecht and Scharler (2009). However, as Bandelj (2002) points out, economic 
conditions usually have a significant weight in the calculation of these indicators and 
it may not be appropriate to include them in models of FDI determinants which 
always have a measure of a country’s GDP level (total or per capita) or GDP growth 
rates. Accordingly, after a review of these indicators’ methodologies, it was decided 
not to include any of these indicators because, in addition to economic performance, 
they tend to include information which is already captured by the Economic 
Freedom Index (e.g. rule of law, corruption, business environment and FDI 
restrictions). However, in this sample there are a few years where some of the 
economies in the sample were harshly affected by political instability, namely, 
Albania during the social unrest in 1997 during the war in neighbouring Kosovo in 
1998-99. Accordingly, a dummy variable, instability, is created to indicate these 
country-year pairs when these host countries have been affected by an unusually 
high level of political instability. 
Another potential FDI determinant in European transition economies identified in 
Section 4.3 was the (prospect of) EU accession. Accordingly, the inclusion of a 
dummy variable for the announcement of EU accession was considered, however 
ultimately it was decided not to include this variable because it is expected to be 
highly correlated with, and/or endogenously determined by, other independent 
variables in the model (e.g. progress in reform or GDP).  
Finally, there are other factors which have been identified in Sections 2.2 and 4.3 
which could not be included due to data limitations. The level of ethnic networks 
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between countries which is typically proxied by the stock of migrants could not be 
included because limited data availability for European transition economies (WDI, 
2010), which would significantly reduce the size of the sample. Similarly, factors 
related to cultural characteristics of European transition economies cannot be 
controlled for.  
Table 5.3 below summarises the variable names, descriptions and data sources used 
in the empirical investigations, whilst the rest of this chapter discusses the estimation 
techniques and reports the empirical results for the models based on the discussions 
in this section.     
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Table 5.3: Variable names, definitions and sources 
Variable 
name Expected sign Description Source 
FDIflow dependent var Inward FDI flows (in current USD) UNCTAD (2010b) 
FDIstock dependent var Inward FDI stock (in current USD) UNCTAD (2010b) 
l1FDIstock + Inward FDI stock (in current USD), first lag UNCTAD (2010b) 
SECedu + Percentage of population over age 15 who have completed secondary education, 
including those who have completed tertiary education (see section 5.2.1) Barro and Lee (2010) 
TERTedu + Percentage of population over age 15 who have completed tertiary education as their 
highest level of education 
Author's calculations based on data 
from Barro and Lee (2010) 
genvocratio + 
The ratio of general to vocational enrolments in upper-secondary education in 1990 
Author's calculations based on data 
from UNICEF (2010) 
edutr1 + Share of population aged 16-30 in a country’s working age population in 2008 (population aged 0-14 in 1992/population aged 15-64 in 2008) 
Author's calculations based on data 
from WDI (2010) 
edutr2 + 
Share of population who were educated in the communist system only up to age 12 or 
less in a country’s working age population in the respective year (see Section 5.2.2 
for explanations) 
Author's calculations based on data 
from Barro and Lee (2010) and WDI 
(2010) 
vacancy - A country-average of the length of period required to fill a vacancy for a skilled 
worker  
Author's calculations based on data 
from BEEPS (2002, 2005) 
cognitive + Standardised measure of cognitive skills derived from maths and science scores in 
International Student Achievement Tests  Hanushek and Woessmann (2009a)  
top  + Share of top performers (i.e. those achieving a score of 600 points or one standard 
deviation above the OECD mean) in International Student Achievement Tests  Hanushek and Woessmann (2009a)  
wage - The average gross wage paid in the host country WIIW (2011) 
l1wage - The average gross wage paid in the host country, first lag WIIW (2011) 
l2wage - The average gross wage paid in the host country, second lag WIIW (2011) 
gini - The distribution of earnings, as measured by the Gini coefficient UNICEF (2010) 
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gdp + Size of the host market as measured by its GDP level (in current USD) WDI (2010) 
l1gdp + Size of the host market as measured by its GDP level (in current USD), first lag WDI (2010) 
l2gdp + Size of the host market as measured by its GDP level (in current USD), second lag WDI (2010) 
forbank + Share of foreign-owned banks in the economy (i.e. number of foreign banks/total 
number of banks) 
Author's calculations based on data 
from EBRD (various years) 
primexport + Share of primary commodities, excluding food items and agricultural raw materials, 
in total exports  
Author's calculations based on data 
from UNCTAD (2010c) 
l1primexport + Share of primary commodities, excluding food items and agricultural raw materials, 
in total exports , first lag 
Author's calculations based on data 
by UNCTAD (2010c) 
l2primexport + Share of primary commodities, excluding food items and agricultural raw materials, 
in total exports, second lag 
Author's calculations based on data 
from UNCTAD (2010c) 
tradefree ? Trade freedom component of the Economic Freedom Index Heritage Foundation (2010) 
econfree + Economic Freedom Index, excluding the trade freedom component (i.e. the 
simple average of all other components) 
Author's calculations based on data 
from Heritage Foundation (2010) 
ictinfra + Sum of the number of telephone lines, broadband subscriptions, and cellular 
subscriptions, per 100 inhabitants 
Author's calculations based on data 
from WDI (2010) 
transition + The overall transition score awarded by the EBRD EBRD (various years) 
privatisation + 
Dummy variable, equals to 1 in years when FDI-related privatisations of large 
enterprises took place (see Section 5.2.3) 
Constructed by the author based on 
EBRD (various years), UNCTAD 
(various years) and Kalotay and 
Hunya (2000) 
instability - Dummy variable, equals to 1 in years when a country is affected by political unrest, 
either an internal conflict or one in the region (see Section 5.2.3 for explanation) Constructed by the author 
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5.3 Empirical approach 
To empirically test the hypotheses developed in this thesis, panel data for 12 
European transition economies for the period 1995-2008 is used. Panel data offers 
the advantage of “more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees 
of freedom and more efficiency” (Baltagi, 1985, p. 4). The choice of countries 
(within European transition economies) and the time period covered in this empirical 
analysis were determined by data availability. The countries included are Albania, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia46. Because there is relatively little variation 
in human capital measures across time in the sample (see Appendices 5.1 and 5.2 for 
the descriptive statistics and between-to-within variation ratios), the random effects 
(RE) estimator which utilises both within-, and between-, country variation appears 
to be more suitable than a fixed effects (FE) estimator for the purpose of this 
analysis. By utilising only within country variation, the FE estimator may have a bias 
towards short-run effects if long-run equilibrium relationships between variables are 
reflected in between-country variation reflecting long-term national differences. In 
addition, the use of within variation only means that “the coefficients of variables 
with small within standard deviations are not well identified” (Baum, 2006, p. 223) 
in FE estimation. Finally, the RE estimator can accommodate time-invariant 
variables, it is more efficient and its results can be used for making inferences for a 
wider population, i.e. not just the countries in the sample (Wooldridge, 2002; Baum, 
2006). The possibility of including time-invariant variables makes this model 
particularly appealing in this analysis because some of the new measures of human 
capital introduced in this analysis are (assumed to be) time-invariant. Based on these 
considerations, the initial specification used in this research is the following random 
effects model: 
                                                            
46Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia were not included 
because data for these countries is not available. For Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia 
there is no data for the main human capital variables (from Barro and Lee, 2010). For Kosovo there is 
no data for most variables in the model, while the data for Montenegro and Serbia are not always 
measured consistently, i.e. some variables are measured for these republics separately and others are 
measured for both of them combined or data for Serbia sometimes includes Kosovo. Considering the 
political changes in this period however (i.e. the independence of Kosovo from former Yugoslavia 
and the separation of Serbia and Montenegro), FDI in these countries is unlikely to have been driven 
(mainly) by economic factors which provides a rationale to exclude them from the sample in any case.   
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)(210 itiitiititit uXTERTeduSECeduFDIflow εββββ ++′+++=    ...................(5.1a)              
Where 0β is the overall constant, Xit is a vector of control variables discussed in the 
previous section, and (ui+εit) is the composite error term which consists of the 
individual-specific error component, ui , and the combined time series and cross-
section error component, εit. In the RE model, the overall constant represents the 
mean value of all country constants in the sample which the cross-section error 
component, ui , represents the (random) deviation of each country’s constant from 
this mean value (Gujarati, 2004, p. 647-48). However, a crucial assumption of this 
model is that ui is not correlated with the independent variables in all time periods, in 
which case they would be correlated with the composite error term and the RE 
estimator would be inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore, the appropriateness 
of using RE model(s) in this analysis is tested using the Hausman test (Baum, 2006, 
p. 212 and 230-1).  
If the cross-section country component is found to be correlated with the 
independent variables, the FE model can be used (Equation 5.1b below) can be used. 
In contrast to the RE model where the ‘individuality’ of each country is accounted 
for by the  cross-section error component, ui, in the FE model this is done by letting 
the constant vary for each country, as indicated by its subscript i added to the 
constant term (Gujarati, 2004, p. 642) below:  
ititiititiit XTERTeduSECeduFDIflow εββββ +′+++= 210   .............................(5.1b) 
The FE model has an advantage over the RE model because by using only variation 
within countries (i.e. across time), it resolves omitted variable bias that cross-section 
estimates tend to suffer from; however, that is, assuming that the omitted variables 
(i.e. unobserved effects) are constant over time (Wooldridge, 2010). 
The baseline specification (5.1b) is further extended to test the transition-specific 
hypotheses developed in this thesis47. First, to the extent that general education is 
superior to vocational education in providing the generic cognitive skills, enhancing 
                                                            
47
 As explained in the next section, the Hausman test suggests that the RE estimator is inconsistent or 
the models estimated in the rest of this chapter, therefore FE models are only specified/reported in the 
rest of this chapter.  
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creativity and enforcing critical thinking, as argued in Section 4.3, it would appear 
necessary to provide a more appropriate measure of the stock of human capital. This 
especially appears to be the case in transition economies where, because of the rapid 
and persistent structural changes in the economy, ‘traditional’ vocational skills are 
likely to be depreciating rapidly. Therefore, it appears that the relative importance of 
vocational education should be taken into account when measuring stocks of human 
capital in these economies. To test the hypothesis that countries that emphasised 
general education have managed to attract more FDI, the baseline model above is 
augmented with the ratio of general to vocational enrolments in secondary 
education at the outset of transition (genvocratio).  
ititiiititiit XogenvocratiTERTeduSECeduFDIflow εβββββ +′++++= 3210   ...(5.2) 
Second, if the education system and workplace under central planning developed 
traits that are ‘productivity-constraining’ in a modern market economy, the vintage 
of the stock of human capital should be taken into account when analysing the effect 
of human capital on FDI. Based on this, in Section 1.4 it was argued that potential 
foreign direct investors would be more attracted by younger cohorts that entered the 
market and/or were educated during the transition period, in an education system that 
is reformed or undergoing reform. To test this hypothesis, the baseline specification 
(Model 5.1) is augmented with proxies for the percentage of the workforce educated 
after the collapse of communism (edutr1 and edutr2).  
ititiiititiit XedutrTERTeduSECeduFDIflow εβββββ +′++++= 13210   ............(5.3) 
ititiitititiit XedutrTERTeduSECeduFDIflow εβββββ +′++++= 23210  ............(5.4) 
Finally, the baseline model is augmented with three alternative measures of human 
capital, not previously used in investigations of the effect of human capital on FDI, 
that were introduced in Section 5.2. Accordingly, the following models with the 
number of weeks required for a firm to fill a vacancy for a skilled worker, vacancy, 
and the standardised measure of students’ cognitive skills, cognitive, and share of top 
performers in international student tests, top, were estimated:
  
 
ititiitititiit XvacancyTERTeduSECeduFDIflow εβββββ +′++++= 3210   ..........(5.5) 
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ititiiititiit XcognitiveTERTeduSECeduFDIflow εβββββ +′++++= 3210  ........(5.6) 
ititiiititiit XtopTERTeduSECeduFDIflow εβββββ +′++++= 3210  .................(5.7) 
In the specifications above there is a theoretical possibility of reverse causation in the 
case of some of the variables. The analysis in Section 2.3 suggested that there is a 
possibility of reverse causation in the case of the human capital variables, i.e. that 
FDI can cause an increase in human capital, but it was argued that the presence of 
this problem is likely to depend on the actual measures of education used in the 
empirical investigation. In Section 2.3 it was argued that foreign affiliates can 
develop human capital in the host country directly through training, or indirectly, by 
increasing the education premium for educated individuals. As the human capital 
measures SECedu and TERTedu refer to the percentage of population who have 
already completed a certain level of education, reverse causation is not expected to 
be a problem in this empirical analysis. First, this measure refers to formal education 
and, as such, it does not reflect any direct effect of FDI through further (on-the-job) 
training; in this sense, an actual limitation of the education measures appears to be 
advantageous. Second, as this measure refers to individuals who have already 
completed a certain level of education, any potential indirect effect of FDI through 
increasing the education premium would be realised a time lag of at least the length 
of the period required to complete studies (i.e. typically 3 years for higher 
education). As such, the education variables are argued to be pre-determined, at the 
very least, if not strictly exogenous.  
As explained in Section 1.2, it can be argued that FDI can affect productivity growth, 
and thus the level of a country’s GDP (gdp). FDI can also affect the level of wages 
paid in the host country (wage), as argued in Section 2.3. Finally, it is argued here 
that the share of primary commodities in total exports (primexport) can increase as a 
result of FDI in extractive industries in the previous period. Ideally, a system-GMM 
(general method of moments) estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) for dynamic 
panels would be used which accounts for potentially endogenous variables by using 
lagged levels of endogenous variables and their lagged differences as instrumental 
variables for current differences and levels, respectively. However, this estimator (as 
well as other GMM estimators such as Arellano and Bond, 2001 and Arellano and 
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Bover, 2005) is designed for panels with a large number of cross section units (N) 
and small number of time periods (T) (Roodman, 2006), which makes it 
inappropriate for the sample of 12 countries covered in this analysis. Therefore, in an 
attempt to guard against potential reverse causation lags of the above variables are 
entered into the model (Baltagi, 1995), as previously used in FDI studies by Bandelj 
(2002), Bevan and Estrin (2004), Bellak et al. (2009 and 2008) and Furceri and 
Borelli (2008). Lags of these variables are entered in the model in addition to 
contemporaneous levels.  
Another potential problem which has been recently received attention in panel models is 
cross-sectional dependence, i.e. dependence of (idiosyncratic) errors across cross-
sectional units, which may arise due to spatial dependence, omitted unobserved common 
components (e.g. common shocks) and economic distance (Pesaran, 2004; Sarafidis et 
al., 2009). Theoretically it is plausible for FDI inflows among European transition 
economies to be correlated across the sample for any of the reasons above. First, inflows 
into these countries are likely to be simultaneously affected by global FDI trends (i.e. 
common shocks) increasing in times of economic expansion and contracting during 
global financial crises when companies do not have the means or the will to finance 
investment. Second, there may be spillover effects from foreign investment in 
neighbouring countries (i.e. economic distance), either due to backward or forward 
linkages (as described in Section 1.2, only in this case in a cross-country setting) or due 
to foreign investors’ reduction of uncertainty from the experience gained in the region 
which, in the case of transition economies may be especially relevant due to their 
isolation during communism (as discussed in Section 4.3.2). On the other hand, the 
inflows into these economies may also be negatively correlated if these countries are 
seen as alternative locations (i.e. a form of spatial dependence), competing for a given 
amount of FDI inflows during a certain period. This and exposure to common shocks 
related to global economic trends appear to be a type of ‘universal time-related shocks’ 
which can be removed from the errors by including time fixed effects, as Roodman 
(2006, p. 26) suggests. Accordingly, year dummies are added in each of the above 
specifications, though as Sarafidis et al. (2009, p. 150) note, this will only control for 
these common effects if they have a homogeneous impact on the cross-sectional units, 
which is not necessarily the case. In this particular analysis it is plausible that the effect 
of global FDI trends differ in different European transition economies, depending, for 
instance, on the countries of origin, sectoral composition of their FDI stock or their 
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(perceived) economic stability. Therefore, tests are conducted for each specification in 
this analysis to test for any remaining cross-sectional dependence due to heterogeneous 
impact (Sarafidis et al., 2009) or ‘economic distance’. 
5.4 Estimated results 
5.4.1 Diagnostic testing: Choosing the appropriate estimators 
Model (5.1) was initially estimated using the RE- and FE- estimators. The normality 
test rejects the null hypothesis of normality (based on skewness and kurtosis) of 
fixed effects errors. Therefore, logarithmic transformation is used and in this 
formulation, at the 5% level, the null hypothesis of normality cannot be rejected. 
Although FDI inflows are measured on a net basis and can theoretically take 
negative values, there are no negative FDI inflows in the dataset which would 
preclude the use logarithmic transformation. Accordingly, all specifications 
presented in this research are estimated in natural logarithms.  
Subsequently, other diagnostic tests for the log-log version of Model (5.1) and raw 
correlations between the variables are examined (see Appendix 5.3 for the printouts). 
Apart from the lntop and lncognitive with coefficients of 0.47-0.78, no other human 
capital variables appear to be particularly correlated with FDI stocks/flows in the 
sample. The variance inflation factor (VIF) suggests that there is a high level of 
multicollinearity (with a maximum VIF of 777.28 and mean of 78.75). The 
extremely high multicollinearity is likely to be caused partly by the presence of first 
and second lags of lnwage, lngdp and lnprimexport, which, as expected, are highly 
correlated with the current levels of the variables. The logarithmic transformation 
appears to have rectified the problems with normality that were present in the levels 
equation, but the year dummies do not seem to have absorbed (all) the within-year 
clustering because both Frees’ (1995) and Pesaran’s (2004) tests48 (De Hoyos and 
Sarafidis, 2006) point to the presence of cross-sectional dependence. Moreover, 
modified Wald’s test (Baum, 2006, p. 222) suggests that the model suffers from 
                                                            
48
 Friedman’s (1937) test cannot reject the null of no cross-sectional dependence, however tests by 
Frees (1995) and Pesaran (2004) are preferred because they can provide the absolute correlation 
between cross-sectional units prevents negative and positive correlations in the data adding up to 
cancel each other, “hiding” the cross-sectional dependence presence in the data and giving rise to a 
false rejection of the null hypothesis (De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006). As discussed in the previous 
section, in the case of FDI inflows both negative and positive cross-sectional dependence is 
theoretically plausible and the difference in these tests suggests that this appears to be the case in this 
dataset.  
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group-wise heteroskedasticity, and Wooldridge’s test for panel data (Drukker, 2003) 
suggests that errors are serially correlated. The likely consequences of these 
problems and potential remedies that can be used to improve the validity of statistical 
inference from this model are therefore considered next.    
Without the presence of cross-sectional dependence, Newey-West estimates of 
standard errors (SE) clustered by cross-sectional unit (Newey and West, 1987) could 
be used, which are heteroskedasticity and serial correlation consistent (also referred 
to as HAC SEs). However, in the presence of cross-sectional dependence, these SE 
estimates are still likely to be biased, making hypothesis testing invalid (Driscoll and 
Kraay, 1998; Petersen, 2009; Cameron et al. 2011). In many economic applications 
such dependence is expected to be positive, giving rise to understated standard errors 
and over-rejection of standard hypothesis tests (Cameron et al., 2011; Cameron and 
Miller, 2011). However, in this particular analysis the direction of the bias due to 
cross-sectional dependence is less clear because, as argued in the previous section, 
both negative and positive correlations may arise. In order to estimate SEs robust to 
cross-sectional dependence by country, observations can be clustered by time period 
(Baum et al., 2010), but this imposes the assumption that errors for a given country 
are independent over time which, as suggested by the serial correlation test, appears 
to be violated in this dataset. As a result, the standard errors are again likely to be 
biased, in this case most likely downward due to positive correlation across time, 
giving rise to over-rejection of standard hypothesis tests (Wooldridge, 2002). Thus, 
both these potential solutions have their limitations because they are unable to 
(simultaneously) provide SE estimates that are robust to both contemporaneous and 
serial dependence. Accordingly, recent contributions by Thompson (2011) and 
Cameron et al. (2011) propose combining standard one-way cluster-robust variance 
estimators (such as Newey-West) be extended to two or more non-nested dimensions 
(i.e. two-way or multi-way clustering). Effectively, this means that arbitrary error 
correlations are allowed within two or more clusters of observations, simultaneously. 
For instance, in this analysis, clustering by year allows for contemporaneous errors 
correlation across countries such as those arising from common shocks and 
clustering by country (i.e. the standard HAC SEs) which allows for within-country 
error correlations, the combination of which provides standard errors that are robust 
to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence, 
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simultaneously.49 Accordingly, two-way cluster-robust estimations, based on 
computations of the variance matrix (with a small-sample adjustment) illustrated 
by Thompson (2011) and Cameron et al. (2011) 50, are estimated here in addition 
to conventional panel estimators. However, it should be noted that this method 
relies on large numbers of clusters (i.e. countries and years here) in both 
dimensions51 and despite the small-sample adjustment available, may not necessarily 
provide unbiased estimates in this analysis. Therefore, the results obtained using this 
estimator are presented as a robustness check in the appendices.  
Considering the drawback of a small number of clusters in the data, an alternative 
spatial correlation consistent covariance estimator proposed by Driscoll and Kraay 
(1998) may be more appropriate in this empirical investigation. According to their 
Monte-Carlo simulations, this estimator’s performance is similar to that of the 
Newey-West time-series estimator (which two-way clustering, above, is based on), 
but “despite the fact that it relies on large-T asymptotics, it dominates that of 
common alternatives which do not take spatial dependence into account, even when 
the time dimension is quite short” (Driscoll and Kraay, p. 550). Like the two-way 
cluster covariance matrix method above, the SE estimates obtained this way are also 
robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic, serially correlated and cross-sectionally 
dependent, simultaneously and therefore are appropriate for this empirical 
investigation. Accordingly, the models in this analysis are estimated using the 
Driscoll-Kraay estimator, as adjusted for use with unbalanced panels by Hoechle 
(2007).52  
                                                            
49
 In this particular analysis there may be reasons to cluster also by other variables, e.g. by 
geographical region or by the status of country in the EU accession process if countries within a 
cluster are more likely to compete for a certain amount of FDI, or if they are affected differently by 
common shocks, but the number of clusters in this case would be too small for this type of 
computation (Baum, 2010).      
50
 Two-way/multi-way cluster-robust SE’s have been automated for Stata in Schaffer’s (2005) 
xtivreg2 command for FE and OLS, but they cannot be computed for RE. This command is explained 
in Baum et al. (2003; 2007; 2010). Alternatively, the cluster2 command by Petersen (2009) could be 
used, but this is only available for OLS estimation. 
51
 For instance Nichols and Schaffer (2007) suggest at least 20 clusters in balanced panels or 50 in 
reasonably balanced panels. Similarly, Rogers (1993) suggests that each cluster should contain a 
maximum of five percent of the observations in the sample.   
52
 The computation of the variance matrix has been automated for Stata by Hoechle’s (2007) xtscc 
command. Like the two-way clustering above, this robust estimator is only available in an OLS and 
FE setting.   
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As explained in the previous section, the RE estimator is preferred to the FE 
estimator because of its efficiency but it is it not necessarily consistent, and at this 
point it also appears to be less desirable considering that it cannot accommodate the 
computation of a heteroskedasticity-, serial correlation- and cross-sectional 
dependence consistent variance matrix. Nevertheless, standard diagnostic tests are 
considered to discriminate between FE, RE and OLS. A standard Hausman test 
suggests that the null of no systematic difference between FE and RE coefficient 
cannot be rejected at the conventional 5 percent level of significance. However, 
Wooldridge (2002) argues that this test can be invalid in cases where the 
disturbances are not independent and identically distributed (i.i.d). Accordingly, 
alternative formulations of the Hausman test which allow for temporal dependence 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 290) and for temporal and spatial dependence (Hoechle, 2007) 
were estimated53 which unlike the standard test suggest that the null can be soundly 
rejected. Therefore, it appears that RE estimates are not consistent and therefore 
FE estimation is preferred. Finally, the F test for fixed effects (Baum, 2006, p. 114) 
indicates the presence of significant country effects, implying that a pooled OLS 
estimation would be inappropriate for this model. Based on the above 
considerations, only results from FE models are presented in the rest of this section.  
As explained in the previous section, the use of FE models is inconvenient in this 
empirical analysis because it ‘wipes out’ the effect of time-invariant variables and it 
is inefficient in estimating the effect of variables with little within variance. The 
second drawback in particular, as Plümper and Troeger (2007) note, has been by-
and-large ignored until recently and it should be taken seriously because it not only 
causes the estimated SEs to be larger (and thus the significance of results to be 
lower), but also “leads to highly unreliable point estimates and may thus cause 
wrong inferences in the same way a biased estimator could” (p. 125). As a solution, 
Plümper and Troeger have proposed the fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD) 
estimator, for the estimation of time-invariant variables initially (Plümper and 
Troeger, 2004) and argue in their later contribution that this can be extended to 
include variables with low within variation (Plümper and Troeger, 2007). The FEVD 
approach appears to be appropriate in this analysis not only because of the presence 
                                                            
53
 Wooldridge’s version of the test is automated for Stata in the sigmamore option of the test, while 
Hoechle’s version was estimated based on the code provided by Hoechle (2007, pp. 305-6). 
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of time-invariant variables in some of the models, but also because the main 
variable(s) of interest, (ln)SECedu and (ln)TERTedu, show very little within 
variation which may cause the standard FE estimators to yield imprecise point 
estimates, as noted by Plümper and Troeger (2007) and Greene et al. (2010). 
Therefore, results from the Fixed-Effects Vector Decomposition estimator, 
developed by (Plümper and Troeger, 2004, 2007), are also presented here in 
addition to those from the Driscoll-Kraay estimator. 
The FEVD estimator uses a three-step procedure in which the fixed effects from the 
conventional FE estimator are “decomposed” into: the observed component, 
explained by the variables with (little or) no time variation; and the unobserved 
component, i.e. the residual, which is taken to represent the ‘truly unobserved unit 
heterogeneity’ and replaces the fixed effect (see Box 5.1 for a more detailed 
explanation). First, however, it should be noted that the validity of the FEVD 
estimator when including only time-invariant variables has been seriously questioned 
in some recent contributions (Breusch et al., 2011a; Greene, 2011a). Nevertheless, 
the prevailing consensus after a long and controversial discussion54 appears to be that 
the FEVD estimator becomes useful if variables with small between-to-within 
variance ratios (or ‘slowly changing variables’) are also included in the procedure, 
which is the case in the empirical investigation presented here. Namely, Greene et al. 
(2010, p. 5) argue that “it is the very presence of slowly changing variables and the 
fact that their estimates in a FE setting can be imprecise in a mean-squared error 
sense...may justify the use of the FEVD...” and go on to explain that the inconsistent 
FEVD estimator may be more reliable than the consistent FE because of its lower 
variance, in accordance with arguments put forward in Plümper and Troeger’s (2004, 
2007) original contributions. However, a remaining drawback is that the diagnostic 
problems identified in this empirical investigation cannot be addressed within a 
FEVD framework.  
 
 
                                                            
54
 Contributions include Beck (2011), Breusch et al. (2011a, b), Greene (2011a, b), Plümper and 
Troeger (2011). 
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Box 5.1: The FEVD estimator (based on Plümper and Troeger, 2004, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The three-step FEVD procedure: 
The effect of time-invariant variables and those with low within variation or high between-
to-within variance ratios is estimated as follows:  
Stage 1: A standard FE model is estimated with time-variant variables, itX :  
ititiit XFDIflow εκβ ++= '0
.......................................(5.8) 
Stage 2: The estimated fixed effects from Stage 1, i0β , are regressed on the explanatory 
variables with little- or no- within variation ( itX  and iZ , respectively), i.e. they are 
‘decomposed’ into: the observed component which is explained by these variables; and the 
unobserved component, iθ , which are “taken to represent truly unobserved unit 
heterogeneity” (Greene et al., 2010, p. 4):  
iiiti ZX θλκαβ +++= ''00
^
.........................................(5.9) 
Stage 3: The full model from stage 1, including all time-invariant and time-varying 
explanatory variables, but with the fixed effects now being replaced by the residuals from 
Stage 2, iθ , is estimated by pooled OLS:  
itiiitit ZXy εµθλκα ++++= ''0
.................................(5.10) 
Plümper and Troeger (2004, p. 8) argue that the degrees of freedom have to be adjusted in 
this stage since only one variable ( iθ ) is entered to account for all remaining unobservable 
individual effects. This is done automatically by the 4.0 beta version of the xtfevd.ado 
command used here.  
The selection of variables with high between-to-within variance ratios 
Based on Monte Carlo simulations, Plümper and Troeger (2007) provide the conditions 
under which FEVD is a superior estimator to standard FE, i.e. conditions under which a 
variable should be included in stage 2 of the FEVD estimation. They suggest that a 
between-to-within ratio of 2.8 or above should be included, though they explain that this 
threshold varies greatly depending on the correlation between the unit effects and the 
(almost) invariant variables and can be much lower than this. In this analysis these ratios 
appear to be higher in the case of the main the human capital measures lnSECedu and 
lnTERTedu, with ratios of 4.40 and 3.63, respectively (see Appendix 5.2). Apart from 
these, lngdp and lnvacancy also appear to stand out from the rest with ratios of 2.37 and 
2.50, respectively. Accordingly, these four variables are included in the second stage of 
the FEVD procedure in addition to the strictly time-invariant ones.    
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5.4.2 Estimated results 
Based on the analyses of different estimators in Section 5.3, the Driscoll-Kraay 
estimator and the FEVD estimator are preferred in this empirical investigation. 
Namely, FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs is preferred to panel-robust FE because they 
are heteroskedasticity-, serial correlation- and cross-sectional dependence- 
consistent; and they are preferred to two-way cluster-robust SEs because of their 
superior finite-sample properties. FEVD, on the other hand, is preferred to the other 
versions of FE for estimating the effect of slowly-changing (SECedu, TERTedu, 
gdp, vacancy) or time invariant variables (genvocratio, edutr1, cognitive, top). 
Accordingly, results obtained using the FE estimator with Driscoll-Kraay SEs and 
the FEVD estimator are presented in the main text in rest of this section, whilst those 
from the other estimators are presented in the Appendices.  
Before proceeding with the estimation of baseline Model 5.1 which includes both 
SECedu and TERTedu, five models were estimated: two which include only one of 
these human capital measures separately, two which include measures top and 
cognitive separately, and one with only these four human capital variables without 
controls55. The results of the first four models do not suggest significant effects of 
the human capital variables on FDI. When these four human capital measures are 
entered together without control variables, top is found to be significant and positive, 
whilst cognitive is found to be marginally significant, but negative. However, these 
results do not appear to be robust to the inclusion of control variables as discussed 
below.  
The full Model 5.1 was initially estimated using the Driscoll-Kraay estimator and 
this model was tested down, excluding control variables with t-statistics smaller than 
1 (see Appendix 5.5 for printouts of the testing down procedure). The level of 
multicollinearity in this model has decreased significantly compared to the full 
model and it is now at acceptable levels with a maximum VIF of 6.4 and mean VIF 
of 2.39 (See Appendix 5.3). The parsimonious version of Model (5.1) is considered 
as a baseline model for the empirical investigations in the rest of this chapter.  
                                                            
55
 The market size variable, gdp, is the only variable kept in the model as a control since in the 
dependent variable is not scaled.  
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The results of the Driscoll-Kraay estimator for Model (5.1) do not appear to support 
the hypothesis that human capital exerts a positive effect on FDI inflows (Column 1 
in Table 5.4 below). This finding is confirmed by the panel-robust FE estimator and 
two-way cluster-robust estimator (see Appendix 5.6 for printouts). As the human 
capital variables SECedu and TERTedu have relatively little variability across time, 
the FEVD estimator could be more suitable for identifying their effect on FDI 
inflows. However, this estimator, too, fails to find a significant effect of these 
variables on FDI inflows. The other ‘slowly-changing’ variable in the model, gdp, on 
the other hand, is found to be insignificant in all FE estimations, but it is highly 
significant and positive in the FEVD estimation. This appears to suggest that its 
estimated insignificance of this variable may be observed due to the country fixed 
effects having ‘soaked up’ its explanatory power (Beck, 2001, p. 285). The 
difference in results between the FE estimator(s) and FEVD is consistent with the 
superiority of FEVD estimator in estimating the effect of ‘slowly-changing’ 
variables, in line with the arguments and empirical findings of Plümper and Troeger 
(2007) and Greene et al. (2010). This finding also indirectly suggests that the failure 
to find a significant effect of these human capital measures on FDI inflows (in a FE 
context) is not caused (primarily) by these measures’ low within variation and the 
inefficiency of the FE estimator related to it.   
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Table 5.4: Model 5.1 results (dependent variable: lnfdiflow) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Driscoll-Kraay FE FEVD 
      
lnsecedu -0.120 -0.329 
  (1.189) (0.536) 
lntertedu -0.770 -0.492 
  (0.648) (0.583) 
lngdp -0.247 0.531** 
  (0.365) (0.226) 
lntransition 5.076** 5.076 
  (1.945) (3.278) 
lntradefree -0.496 -0.496 
  (0.384) (0.733) 
lneconfree 1.129 1.129 
  (0.765) (1.314) 
lnforbank 0.335** 0.335 
  (0.131) (0.274) 
privatisation 0.403*** 0.403*** 
  (0.111) (0.112) 
instability -0.611*** -0.611* 
  (0.138) (0.355) 
     
Observations 161 161 
Number of groups 12 12 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Note: Year dummies included, but not reported 
 
In terms of the other controls, the indicator of progress in transition, transition, is 
found to have a positive and significant effect on FDI inflows in the FE estimations56 
(Column 1 in Table 5.4). According to these results, for a European transition 
economy in the sample, a 1% increase in the value of the EBRD transition indicator 
is, on average, associated with an increase of annual FDI inflows by 5.08%, ceteris 
paribus57. Calculated at the mean of the sample, an increase from 3.22 to 3.26 of the 
EBRD progress in transition score is associated with an increase of USD 163.4 
Million in annual FDI inflows. There are two results consistent with market-seeking 
                                                            
56
 The same effect is not found in the FEVD estimation in Column 2, the reason likely being due to 
panel-robust and Driscoll-Kraay FE estimators controlling for the effects of heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation (and cross-sectional dependence), which cannot be done in the case of FEVD.   
57
 The effect of the transition indicator appears to be surprisingly large, perhaps due to its correlation 
with other variables. Further investigations using the more efficient System GMM estimator in 
Chapter 6 can shed light on this issue. 
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FDI. In the results from more efficient FEVD estimator, market size (gdp) is found 
to have a significant effect, with a 1% increase in this variable being associated with 
a 0.53% increase FDI inflows, on average. Calculated at the mean of the sample, an 
increase of USD 480 Million in a country’s GDP is associated with an increase of 17 
Million USD in annual FDI inflows. Similarly, the proxy for FDI in the banking 
sector (forbank) is significant and positive. Finally, controls for political instability 
(instability) and the proxy for one-off privatisation-related FDI (privatisation) are 
highly significant, which is not surprising considering that the latter has accounted 
for significant portions of FDI in European transition economies in certain time 
periods, as discussed in Section 5.2.3. This stresses the importance of controlling for 
these factors when seeking to explain FDI determinants in transition economies, 
which tends to be ignored in the previous literature. The significance and size of the 
control variables in Model (1) from the Driscoll-Kraay estimator are similar in the 
panel-robust FE estimation and two-way cluster robust estimation (Appendix 5.6 
provides these results). 
Table 5.5 below presents results for the two transition-specific human capital 
hypotheses developed in Section 5.2.2 (see Appendix 5.7 for printouts). Overall, 
there does not appear to be evidence in support of the hypotheses that the emphasis 
on general education during the previous system or the share of population educated 
after the fall of communism affect FDI inflows positively. The ratio of general to 
vocational enrolments in upper-secondary education at the outset of transition, 
genvocratio, is found to be statistically insignificant (Column 1), as is the share of 
population aged 16-30 in the working age population in 2008, edutr1 (Column 2). 
As these are time-invariant variables, Models (5.2) and (5.3) could only be estimated 
using the FEVD estimator. 
The effect of the second proxy for age structure, edutr2, is positive and significant in 
the Driscoll-Kraay estimation, as hypothesised (Column 3), a finding that is 
supported by the panel-robust and two-way cluster-robust estimators (see Appendix 
5.7 for printouts). However, before drawing too many inferences from this result, it 
is noted that no significant effect of this variable on inward FDI is found in any of 
the remaining estimations in this thesis. The coefficients on TERTedu and gdp, 
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surprisingly, are negative and significant in the Driscoll-Kraay estimator, but they 
are insignificant in the results of the other estimators. 
Table 5.5: Models 5.2-5.4 results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 5.2 Model 5.3 Model 5.4 
lnsecedu -0.319 -0.365 -0.799 
  (0.530) (0.531) (1.651) 
lntertedu -0.428 -0.574 -1.020** 
  (0.771) (0.527) (0.387) 
lngenvocratio -0.0552    
  (0.366)    
lnedutr1  -1.414   
   (1.508)   
lnedutr2   11.36*** 
    (2.787) 
lngdp 0.514** 0.425** -1.087** 
  (0.229) (0.214) (0.429) 
lntransition 5.076 5.076* -0.931 
  (3.255) (2.985) (3.983) 
lntradefree -0.496 -0.496 -0.478 
  (0.727) (0.716) (0.368) 
lneconfree 1.129 1.129 -0.318 
  (1.321) (1.301) (1.085) 
lnforbank 0.335 0.335 0.334** 
  (0.267) (0.241) (0.122) 
privatisation 0.403*** 0.403*** 0.379** 
  (0.111) (0.110) (0.123) 
instability -0.611* -0.611*   
  (0.358) (0.356)   
      
Observations 161 161 107 
Number of groups 12 12 12 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Note: Year dummies included, but not reported. Models 5.2 and 5.3 estimated using FEVD; Model 
5.4  
estimated using Driscoll-Kraay FE.  
 
The results obtained for the alternative innovative measures of human capital, 
cognitive and vacancy, are presented in Table 5.6 below (see Appendix 5.8 for 
printouts). Similar to the volume measures of human capital, the level of (students’) 
cognitive skills in a country (cognitive) and the share of top performers in cognitive 
tests (top) do not appear to attract FDI inflows into European transition economies 
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(Columns 2 and 3). The availability of skilled labour, as measured by the (average) 
number of weeks required to fill a vacancy for a skilled worker (vacancy) also does 
not appear to have a significant effect on FDI inflows, a finding which is supported 
by panel-robust and two-way cluster robust FE estimators (Column 1). Though, the 
reliability of the latter specification is questionable: the small number of 
years/observations available appears to be insufficient to identify the effect of 
explanatory variables on FDI inflows, as indicated also by the lack of statistical 
significance found for all the variables in the model.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6: Models 5.5-5.7 results (dependent variable: lnfdiflow)  
   (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 5.5 Model 5.6 Model 5.7 
        
lnsecedu 0.493 -0.412 -0.337 
  (1.715) (0.523) (0.486) 
lntertedu 0.346 -0.550 -0.598 
  (6.932) (0.664) (0.634) 
lnvacancy -0.255    
  (6.467)    
lncognitive  2.416   
   (3.885)   
lntop   0.507 
    (0.395) 
lngdp 0.638 0.501** 0.417* 
  (3.151) (0.218) (0.231) 
lntransition 5.193 4.164 4.164 
  (70.00) (3.421) (3.194) 
lntradefree -1.026 -0.607 -0.607 
  (10.18) (0.765) (0.739) 
lneconfree -4.196 1.308 1.308 
  (4.599) (1.210) (1.197) 
lnforbank 0.221 0.538 0.538 
  (3.320) (0.351) (0.332) 
privatisation 0.575 0.395*** 0.395*** 
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  (0.556) (0.125) (0.124) 
instability  -0.669* -0.669* 
   (0.363) (0.362) 
      
Observations 48 148 148 
Number of groups 12 12 12 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Note: Year dummies included, but not reported. Results obtained using FEVD. 
5.5 Robustness check: A FDI stock adjustment model 
As a robustness check, the effect of FDI on human capital is estimated using the FDI 
stock as the dependent variable in a stock (or partial) adjustment model framework. 
According to neoclassical stock adjustment models, the optimal stock of capital is 
not achieved instantaneously, but it is realised in smaller sequential changes (Lucas 
1967; Gould, 1968; Lucas and Prescott, 1971; Blundell et al., 1995). The slow 
adjustment tends to be explained by the presence of costs of adjusting current stock 
which are increasing at the margin, either due to direct installation/dismantling costs 
or to losses from sudden disruptions of production activities. As a result of this 
inability to instantaneously achieve the optimal capital stock, the current level of 
investment will depend both on past investment and investors’ expectations about 
other factors that are expected to affect firms’ profitability. The stock adjustment 
model has been previously used to explain FDI in a country/industry level setting, 
among others, by Jun and Singh (1995), Cheng and Kwan (2000a), Kinoshita and 
Campos (2003), Blattner (2006), Bobonis and Shatz (2007),  Riedl (2010) and 
Kinoshita (2011). 
The stock adjustment model explains the current level of investment as a means of 
adjusting the current stock of FD towards its corresponding optimal level. Following 
Chow (1967) and Cheng and Kwan (2000a), it is assumed that capital adjusts 
according to the following process: 
)ln*(ln/ln ititit YYdtYd −= α
.................................................(5.11) 
Thus, the adjustment process is such that the percentage change in current capital 
stock is proportional to the gap between the optimal stock of capital, Yit*, and 
current stock of capital, Yit.  
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In empirical applications Equation (5.11) is replaced by its discrete version:  
)ln*(lnlnln 11 −− −=− itititit YYYY α
............................................(5.12) 
which, after collecting terms, becomes: 
*lnln)1(ln 1 ititit YYY αα +−= −
..............................................(5.13) 
Thus, the current level of investment is driven by the adjustment effect towards the 
equilibrium level, and the shift of the equilibrium level as a result of changes in other 
factors. The speed of the adjustment process is indicated by the coefficient on the 
lagged capital stock variable, (1-α), which has to be a positive fraction in order for 
the adjustment process to be stable. However, in addition to the adjustment effect, 
(1-α) can also reflect an agglomeration effect, as discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
Accordingly, in previous FDI studies it has been interpreted as a combination of the 
two effects (Cheng and Kwan, 2000a; Kinoshita and Campos, 2003). However, in 
order to estimate the above equation, the unobserved optimal level of investment is 
still needed, which has to be specified in terms of its determinants, Xit:  
itiitiit zXY εηβ ++′=*ln
...............................................(5.14) 
Substituting (5.14) into (5.13) gives a dynamic panel equation which can be 
empirically investigated:  
itiitiitit zXYY εηβα ++′+−= −1ln)1(ln
....................................(5.14) 
The estimated coefficients βi in a dynamic panel model are short-run coefficients, 
representing the effect of the new information on the respective regressors, 
controlling for their (joint) “historical” effects. Greene (2008, p. 469) explains: 
“With the lagged dependent variable, we now have in the equation the entire history 
of the right-hand-side variables, so that any measured influence is conditional on this 
history; in this case, any impact of (the independent variables Xit) represents the 
effect of new information”. Thus, in addition to indicating the speed of adjustment 
towards the equilibrium level, the lagged dependent variable serves as a control 
variable in the model, incorporating the effect of potential “omitted” variables. 
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Finally, it should be noted that in this empirical investigation it is not the speed of 
adjustment of FDI stocks per se that is of interest; however, the dynamics in the 
underlying process must be modelled nevertheless because, as Bond (2002, p.1) 
warns, ‘this may be crucial for recovering consistent estimates of other parameters’. 
Accordingly, the following stock adjustment version of the baseline Model (5.1), and 
augmented models (5.4) and (5.5) are estimated for robustness58:  
itititi
itittiit
ztX
TERTeduSECeduFDIstockFDIstock
εηδβ
ββα
+++′+
+++−=
−
lnlnln)1(ln 211,
.........(5.15) 
itititiit
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..........(5.16) 
itititiit
itittiit
ztXvacancy
TERTeduSECeduFDIstockFDIstock
εηδββ
ββα
+++′++
+++−=
−
ln
lnlnln)1(ln
3
211,
.........(5.17) 
Where  
FDIstock is the stock of FDI (in USD) as reported by UNCTAD (2010b). 
SECedu (TERTedu ) is the share of population who have completed secondary 
(tertiary) education (see Section 5.2 and Table 5.3 for explanations); 
edutr2 is the share of population aged 16-30 in a country’s workforce; 
vacancy is the length of period required to fill a vacancy for a skilled worker; 
Xit are the control variables: gdp, tradefree, econfree, transition, forbank, 
privatisation, instability. (see Section 5.2 and Table 5.3 for explanations); 
tt are time dummies;   
ηi  is an unobserved time-invariant individual effect; and  
 εit is an unobserved white noise disturbance.  
However, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in turn creates other 
problems for estimation which have to be addressed. The correlation of the lagged 
value of FDI stock with the fixed effects gives rise to “dynamic panel bias” (Nickell, 
1981; Bond, 2002), which can be accounted by the methods discussed in the rest of 
this section and in Chapter 6.  
                                                            
58
 As discussed later, only models analogous to Models (5.1). (5.4) and (5.5) in the previous section 
are estimated because the other contain time-invariant variables which cannot be estimated using the 
estimator used here. 
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In a Within Groups (i.e. FE or LSDV) estimator, the observations are transformed 
into deviations from individual means (i.e. across time), eliminating the time-
invariant fixed effects which are the source of inconsistency. However, this 
transformation gives rise to negative correlations between the transformed lagged 
dependent variable and transformed error term, thus causing downward bias 
(Nickell, 1981; Kiviet, 1995). This correlation (and hence downward bias) does not 
decrease with a large N, but it does decrease by increasing the time-dimension 
(Nickell, 1981). In a Monte Carlo study, Judson and Owen (1999) find this “dynamic 
panel bias” to be significant even with a panel of 30 periods, which renders the use 
of Within Groups (LSDV) estimator inappropriate in this sample with a small time-
dimension of 14 years at best. Instrumental variable (IV) and Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimators (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982; Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998), discussed in Section 6.6, have 
been developed to deal with this type of bias, but their properties hold for a large 
number of individuals. Monte Carlo evidence suggests that they can be biased and 
imprecise in small-N samples such as the one in this analysis; in particular, their 
relatively large variances favour LSDV in a small-N context, despite its 
inconsistency (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Kiviet, 1995; Judson and Owen, 1999). 
Accordingly, Kiviet (1995) suggests ‘correcting’ LSDV for dynamic panel bias as 
the best approach to be adopted in this context. Kiviet proposes ‘subtracting’ the bias 
from the estimated LSDV coefficients in a balanced-panel setting based on his 
derived approximation formula of the bias, which is later refined in Kiviet (1999) 
and Bun and Kiviet (2003) and extended to accommodate unbalanced panels by 
Bruno (2005a). Monte Carlo studies find the resulting ‘bias-corrected’ LSDV 
estimator to be preferred to both LSDV- and IV and GMM- estimators for small-N 
dynamic panel data such as the one used in this analysis (Kiviet, 1995; Judson and 
Owen, 1999; Bruno, 2005a, b). Accordingly, the partial adjustment FDI stock model 
in this section is estimated using the corrected dynamic LSDV (LSDVC) estimator 
by Bun and Kiviet (2003), as extended by Bruno (2005a) for implementation for 
unbalanced panels. As System GMM is preferred to Difference GMM in this 
empirical investigation (see Section 6.6 for a discussion), the results presented in the 
rest of this section use bias approximations based on the System GMM estimator as 
an initial consistent estimator. However, it should be noted, being a within-estimator, 
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the LSDVC estimator wipes out the effects of time-invariant variables, and thus 
precludes estimating some of the models proposed in this analysis.  
Table 5.7 below summarises the results of the stock-adjustment models estimated 
using LSDVC (see Appendix 5.9 for printouts). In all three specifications the 
coefficient on the lagged FDI stock is positive and significant, as expected; it is 
below one, indicating a stable dynamic process and it lies in the ‘credible’ range, i.e. 
between the LSDV and OLS estimates, thus not indicating any specification 
problems and/or lack of consistency in estimation (Bond, 2002; Roodman, 2006; see 
Section 6.6 for explanations). 
Similar to the model with FDI inflows as the dependent variable, the partial 
adjustment model does not appear to support the hypothesis that foreign investors are 
attracted by a higher level of human capital as measured by traditional volume 
measures: the percentage of population who have completed secondary (tertiary) 
education, SECedu (TERTedu). The empirical evidence also does not appear to 
support the hypothesis that foreign investment is attracted by higher shares of 
population who have completed education after the fall of the communist system, as 
proxied by edutr2 (Column 2) or by the availability of skilled workers in the 
economy, as proxied by vacancy (Column 3). 
Table 5.7: Models 5.15-5.17 results (dependent variable: lnfdistock) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 5.15 Model 5.16 Model 5.17 
L.lnfdistock 0.783*** 0.812*** 0.800*** 
  (0.0610) (0.0993) (0.171) 
lnsecedu -0.0284 -0.917 -0.937 
  (0.566) (0.866) (1.791) 
lntertedu -0.400 -0.360 0.150 
  (0.278) (0.391) (0.976) 
lngdp -0.0492 0.0502 0.986** 
  (0.196) (0.284) (0.476) 
lntransition 0.348 -1.606 -0.361 
  (0.613) (1.261) (1.832) 
lntradefree 0.158 0.325 0.401 
  (0.171) (0.278) (0.392) 
lneconfree 0.0331 -0.0316 -1.471 
  (0.319) (0.404) (0.902) 
lnforbank 0.0205 -0.153 -0.401 
  (0.0551) (0.138) (0.249) 
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privatisation 0.0830*** 0.0775** 0.0438 
  (0.0284) (0.0339) (0.0550) 
instability 0.148    
  (0.145)    
lnedutr2  1.313   
   (0.946)   
lnvacancy   0.288 
    (0.230) 
      
Observations 154 107 48 
Number of groups 12 12 12 
      
LSDV-OLS range (lagged dependent 
var) 0.66-0.84 0.59-0.86 0.30-0.97 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Note: Year dummies included, but not reported. Models estimated using LSDVC. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a critical appraisal of alternative measures of human 
capital available for European transition economies. It has been argued that stock 
measures of education are superior to enrolment rates because they reflect the 
educational attainment of the whole workforce, and that secondary and tertiary 
education measures are superior to measures of primary education or literacy 
because the latter are uniformly high across European transition economies in the 
period covered in this study. Accordingly, the effect of the percentage of working 
age population who have completed secondary/tertiary education on FDI 
inflows/stocks was tested for a sample of European transition economies in the 
period 1995-2008. Consistent with the findings of the meta-regression analysis in 
Chapter 3, panel-robust FE, FEVD and two-way cluster-robust FE all fail to find a 
positive relationship between these measures and FDI inflows. These results are 
confirmed by a stock-adjustment model using with aggregate FDI stock estimated by 
the dynamic corrected LSDV estimator. 
Similar to the volume measures of human capital, insignificant results are also found 
for the level of students’ cognitive skills as measured by average scores in 
International Student Achievement Tests; for the share of top-performing students in 
these tests; as well as for a proxy of skilled labour availability as reported by the 
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firms operating in the economy. Further, empirical results by and large do not 
support two transition-specific human capital hypotheses developed in this thesis: 
that foreign investors are expected to be attracted by a younger population, educated 
in a post-communist education system and by a higher proportion of a population 
that has completed general (as opposed to vocational) secondary education.  
Thus, there appears to be no robust evidence linking higher availability or quality of 
human capital with the level of FDI inflows/stocks a country receives. One reason 
for this finding may be that human capital is not necessarily important for all types of 
FDI and the weak sectoral control variables used here have been unable to 
(sufficiently) account for these sectoral differences. Therefore, the next chapter looks 
more closely at the structure of FDI according to economic activity and the 
hypotheses developed earlier in this analysis are tested for FDI in economic sectors 
where foreign investors are expected to attach a higher weight to the level and 
quality of human capital in their decision-making.  
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6.1 Introduction 
Using various estimation techniques and human capital measures, the analysis 
presented in Chapter 5 empirically investigated the relationship between European 
transition economies’ level of human capital and their FDI inflows/stocks. This 
investigation did not find support for the hypothesis that a country’s stock of human 
capital attracts FDI, regardless of whether that stock was developed during or after 
communism. Measures of the quantity of education attained by the workforce which 
are commonly used in literature were not found to affect inward FDI, a result which 
is consistent with the lack of a ‘genuine effect’ in previous research as suggested by 
the meta-regression analysis presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis. It has been 
previously argued in this thesis (Section 5.2.1) that the use of aggregate FDI 
measures is a major weakness of empirical studies because the relative importance of 
(locational) factors is likely to depend largely on foreign investors’ motivations for 
undertaking FDI (Section 2.2) and the technological intensity of the specific 
economic activities undertaken in the host country (Section 4.2). Accordingly, the 
use of aggregate measures has also been argued to be one potential explanation for 
lack of the empirical support for a human capital-FDI relationship found in previous 
research and in the analysis presented in Chapter 5. Therefore, this chapter analyses 
the sectoral composition of FDI in European transition economies; it provides 
arguments as to which type of foreign investors (i.e. in which economic sectors) are 
(more) likely to be affected by the host country’s human capital endowment; and 
empirically tests the (relative) importance of human capital endowment for FDI in 
different economic activities.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 provides a statistical 
overview of the sectoral composition of FDI stocks in European transition 
economies. Section 6.3 examines the theoretical arguments on the determinants of 
FDI at sector level and identifies sectors where foreign investors’ decisions are likely 
to be (more strongly) affected by human capital. Section 6.4 provides a review of 
related studies that investigate FDI determinants using disaggregated data. The 
empirical investigations using sector- and industry- level manufacturing FDI data are 
presented in Sections 6.5 and 6.6, and Section 6.7 concludes with a summary of the 
empirical findings. 
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6.2 The sectoral composition of FDI stocks in European 
transition economies 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) provides a FDI 
database for Central, East, and South-East European transition economies (WIIW, 
2011) which contains data on stocks of FDI according to economic activity as 
classified by NACE Rev 1.159. The data reported in this database is collected by the 
host countries’ Central Banks through enterprise surveys. The database contains data 
for all the countries included in the analysis presented in the previous chapter, but 
not always for the whole period under consideration here (1995-2008). Tables in the 
rest of this section refer to data for 2007 because this was the most recent year for 
which data is available for the whole sample. The data, summarised in Table 6.1 
below, suggest that nearly a third of the FDI stocks in the European transition 
economies in this study’s sample are in the manufacturing sector, while the rest is 
highly dominated by services. The second major sector is the financial sector which 
accounts for just over a fifth of the FDI stock, followed by real estate, renting and 
business activities; financial wholesale and retail trade and transport, storage and 
communication (which is dominated by the telecommunication sector where major 
privatisations occurred during transition). However, the sectoral distribution differs 
significantly across the economies in the sample. Manufacturing appears to be a 
major FDI receiving sector, with a share above the weighted average, in the Slovak 
Republic, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Lithuania and Hungary, 
while in most of the other countries FDI is mainly concentrated in services. Notably, 
the financial sector accounts for the largest shares of FDI in Estonia, Latvia and 
South-East European countries (Croatia, Slovenia, Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), but it also makes up a significant share of FDI (11% or above) in each 
of the remaining countries in the sample.  
 
                                                            
59
 The database reports FDI according to the more recent version of NACE Rev 2.1 for only two of 
the countries included in this analysis. The database also provides data on FDI inflows, but these tend 
to be reported for fewer years and they are missing altogether for some countries. Other sources of 
sector-level comparable FDI data for large sets of countries are Eurostat and OECD. However, 
Eurostat covers only a few of the countries included in this analysis, while OECD provides outflows 
of OECD members by sector and by partner country separately, but not outflows broken down by 
sector and host country.  
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Table 6.1: Distribution of FDI stocks according to economic activity (2007) 
NACE Rev 1.1 code and economic activity 
FDI stock  
(MN EUR) Share (%) 
D Manufacturing  138,297.1 31.9 
J Financial intermediation 91,699.5 21.2 
K Real estate, renting and business activities 61,978.2 14.3 
G 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and 
household goods  55,974.5 12.9 
I Transport, storage and communication 35,350.6 8.2 
E Electricity, gas and water supply  21,358.1 4.9 
F  Construction 7,851.3 1.8 
C Mining and quarrying  5,954.2 1.4 
H Hotels and restaurants 3,381.4 0.8 
A&B Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 1,905.1 0.4 
  Other 9,574.8 2.2 
  Total 433,324.6 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on WIIW (2011)  
 
Within manufacturing, around half of the FDI stock is concentrated in the 
manufacturing of transport equipment; basic metals and fabricated metal products; 
food industry; chemical industry; electrical and optical equipment (Table 6.2 
below)60. However, this again is not a uniform distribution across the economies in 
the sample. FDI in the automotive industry, for instance, has gone exclusively to five 
countries: almost 85% is concentrated in Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland, with 
the rest being split between the Slovak Republic and Romania. The same countries 
appear to be major destinations for FDI in the food and chemical industries and 
manufacture of basic metals, fabricated metal products and electrical equipment, 
though FDI in these sectors is not as concentrated as in the automotive industry. Of 
the smaller economies in the sample, Croatia and Slovenia appear to be the only 
destinations that have been more successful at attracting FDI in the major 
manufacturing sectors above. Slovenia has been particularly successful in attracting 
FDI in the chemical industry, whilst Croatia has significant FDI stocks in this 
industry as well as in the food industry and manufacturing of electrical equipment.  
                                                            
60
 The FDI stock figures presented in Table 6.1 are consistent with the data presented in Figure 1.3 in 
Section 1.2 because: (1) FDI stocks here are measured in Euros, whilst those in Figure 1.3 are 
measured in US Dollars and (2) FDI stocks here refer only to the sample of economies which are 
included in the empirical analyses in this thesis, whilst those in Figure 1.3 also include Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia.   
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Table 6.2: Distribution of manufacturing FDI stocks (2007)* 
NACE Rev 1.1 code and manufacturing activity 
FDI stock 
(MN EUR) 
Share 
(%)  
DM Transport equipment 25,205.6 18.9  
DJ** Basic metals and fabricated metal products 18,110.6 13.5  
DA Food products, beverages and tobacco 15,169.3 11.3  
DG 
Chemicals, chemical products and man-made 
fibres 12,547.0 9.4  
DL Electrical and optical equipment 11,613.2 8.7  
DI** (Other) non-metallic mineral products 7,367.9 5.5  
DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 7,047.3 5.3  
DF** Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 6,802.1 5.1  
DH** Rubber and plastic products 6,700.3 5.0  
DD/DE** Wood and wood products; pulp, paper and paper 
products; publishing and printing 
5,648.5 4.2 
 
DB/DC Textiles/leather and textile/leather products 2,635.4 2.0  
DN** Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 1,272.3 1.0  
  Other 13,597.1 10.2  
Total***   133,716.7 100.0  
Source: Own calculations based on WIIW (2011) 
  
*Albania and Bulgaria excluded (data for Albania available for 2003-5, and not available for Bulgaria) 
**The share of the sector is likely to be underestimated because data is not available for all countries 
***The total does not equal that in the previous table because it does not include Albania and Bulgaria 
****n.e.c. refers to 'not elsewhere classified' 
 
In summary, this review of sectoral data reveals a diversity of distribution of FDI 
across the economies in the sample. Economies appear to differ greatly with regard 
to their shares of FDI in manufacturing compared to that in services, as well as their 
shares in different types of services or manufacturing activities. To the extent that the 
characteristics of different sectors where FDI takes place are associated with 
different motivations for foreign production and the foreign investors’ decisions are 
affected by different factors, these differences in the sectoral composition of FDI 
among European transition economies may be conveniently used to assess the 
relative importance of these factors. The next section will argue that foreign 
investors are likely to assign a different relative importance to different locational 
factors, in particular to human capital endowment, depending on their motivation for 
foreign production, which in turn is (partly) reflected in the economic activity they 
undertake in the host economy. Accordingly, the sectors where human capital is 
expected to be relatively more attractive to foreign investors will be identified and 
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the hypotheses developed in the previous chapters will subsequently be tested using 
data at the sector level.   
6.3 Assessing the importance of human capital for different 
economic sectors/types of FDI 
As discussed in Section 2.2, FDI can be broadly categorised into four types 
according to the motivation for foreign production: (natural) resource-seeking, 
strategic asset or capability-seeking, market-seeking and efficiency-seeking 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008). The rest of this section will look more closely at the 
characteristics of these types of FDI and assess the extent to which FDI in different 
economic sectors can be associated with these.  
Resource-seeking FDI is motivated by access to the natural resources of a host 
country in order to minimise costs and/or ensure the security of supplies, as 
explained in Section 2.2. This type of FDI is typically associated with primary sector 
activities, i.e. agriculture, fishing, mining and quarrying (Schulz, 2007; Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008; Hallam, 2009; Gerlach and Liu, 2010), and as such it does not seem 
to account for a significant share of FDI in transition economies (Table 6.1 above). 
As the key determinant of this type of FDI are a country’s natural resource 
endowments (which are location-bound), foreign investment will be relatively less 
affected by other factors, including human capital. Moreover, resource-seeking FDI 
typically involves transfers of resources to the home country which are then used as 
inputs in manufacturing or sold as final products (Schulz, 2007; Gerlach and Liu, 
2010), which means that foreign affiliates have little interaction with the local 
economy; this has been argued to be a further reason why other factors that are 
normally expected to affect FDI are likely to be irrelevant (Schulz, 2007; Walsh and 
Yu, 2010). Consistent with these arguments, empirical analyses appear to suggest 
that FDI in the primary sector is affected by factors such as market size, market 
growth, macroeconomic stability, institutional quality or tax incentives (Dahl, 2002; 
Stöwhase, 2002; Schulz, 2007; Walsh and Yu, 2010). By the same token, it is argued 
here that human capital is unlikely to be a significant factor in attracting FDI in the 
primary sector, but also in some services such as tourism which, as Dunning and 
Lundan (2008, p. 68) point out, are also intended to exploit location-bound 
resources.  
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As discussed in Section 2.2, strategic asset or capability-seeking FDI is intended to 
acquire expertise and technological capability. As such, it can be argued to the type 
of FDI that is most affected by the availability of skilled labour. Though previous 
studies do not associate it with any particular economic sector, it appears that this 
type of FDI is more likely to be found in higher technology intensive industries, to 
the extent that their technologies are high skill-complementary. This type of foreign 
investment is typically directed towards developed countries (Hsu and Chen, 2009) 
and it is not expected to be significant in European transition economies. 
Market-seeking FDI is intended to supply goods or services to the host country 
market or its neighbouring countries, as explained in Section 2.2. Because it is 
primarily motivated by access to markets, this type of FDI is relatively less likely to 
be affected by host country’s factor endowments, and more so by the size and growth 
of the host market and that of the neighbouring countries (Schulz, 2007; Dunning 
and Lundan, 2008; Walsh and Yu, 2010). Hence, it is argued here that human capital 
is again less likely to be a significant factor in foreign investors’ decision-making if 
FDI is undertaken for market-seeking purposes. Market-seeking FDI is typically 
associated with the tertiary sector due to the non-tradable and non-storable nature of 
(most) services which requires them to be produced in the host country where they 
will be consumed61 (Schulz, 2007; Riedl, 2010). Hence, FDI in the tertiary sector, 
including banking, retailing, real estate, business activities, transport and 
telecommunication which are major FDI recipients in European transition 
economies, is considered in this analysis as predominantly market-seeking and 
therefore less likely to be affected by the availability and cost of production factors, 
including human capital62. The classification of FDI in the secondary sector, on the 
other hand, is less straightforward, because it is likely to be driven both by efficiency 
considerations (discussed below) and by access to markets, the latter becoming 
especially relevant for products with high transportation costs and host countries 
with more trade barriers (Schulz, 2007; Riedl, 2010).  
                                                            
61
 Note that although export of services is not always technically impossible (e.g. in banking or 
insurance), it is not likely to be practical and may cost more than operating a subsidiary in the local 
market, as Goldberg (2007) explains in the case of the banking sector.  
62There are some services in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector that are 
tradable due to telecommunication advances, but they cannot be controlled for because of the level of 
aggregation of data available for this sector study. However, such services are likely to account for a 
very small portion of services in the sample under consideration here, so it is unlikely to affect the 
results.  
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Efficiency-seeking FDI, as discussed previously in Section 2.2, aims to reduce 
production costs through a combination of resource- and market-seeking investment, 
typically through carrying out different stages of production in different countries so 
as to exploit differences in factor prices. Therefore, it is argued here that the 
availability and price of skilled labour is likely to be one of the factors considered by 
the efficiency seekers. As this type of FDI is predominantly related to the 
manufacturing sector (Schulz, 2007), it is argued here that if foreign investors’ 
decisions are indeed affected by the availability and/or price of human capital then 
this relationship is most likely to be identified in this sector. Therefore, models 
similar to those developed in Chapter 5 of this thesis are going to be estimated in this 
chapter using the level of FDI stocks in manufacturing sector instead of the 
aggregate measure used previously.  
Finally, as discussed in Section 4.2, previous research indicates complementarity 
between the skills and the level of technology. Based on this, it is argued here that 
the effect of human capital is likely to differ between different manufacturing 
activities according to their level of technological intensity. In this case, the level of 
technological intensity of foreign investment can be argued to be a proxy for the 
level of complexity of the task that foreign investors intend to carry out in the host 
economy, which, according to the arguments and evidence presented in Acemoglu 
and Autor (2012), is expected to determine the required skill intensity of the 
workforce in the host country. The proposition that FDI in different manufacturing 
industries may differ with regard to the relevance they are likely to attach to human 
capital availability is tested using dummy variables to distinguish between groups of 
industries with different levels of technological content, as classified by 
OECD/Eurostat. The classification of industries and the specification of this model 
are discussed in more detail in Section 6.6, after a review of the related empirical 
literature and an empirical investigation using aggregate manufacturing FDI data.  
6.4 Related empirical studies 
Mainly due to data limitations, only a few studies investigate the determinants of 
FDI at sector level (see Table 6.3 below for a summary). As in the case of the FDI 
literature in general (discussed in Chapter 3), human capital tends not to be included 
and, when it is, it is not clear that the measures used actually reflect human capital 
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availability in the host country. For instance, Urata and Kawai (2000), Nachum 
(2000), Bellak et al. (2009), Walsh and Yu (2010) and Kinoshita (2011) use 
measures that reflect the (share of) population currently enrolled in education which, 
as argued in Section 5.2.2, is an imperfect measure because it does not reflect the 
stock of human capital in the workforce. Tsen (2005) uses a measure of federal 
government expenditure, which again is a ‘flow’ measure reflecting only current 
investment in education and, as argued in Section 4.3, it is not clear from empirical 
analyses that higher levels of expenditure are associated with better educational 
outcomes. Finally, Bellak et al. (2009) use the share of low-skilled hours in total 
hours worked in each industry as a proxy for human capital. This proxy has the great 
advantage of measuring the skill level for specific industries, but it may merely 
reflect the technological level of the current firms in the market which may not be 
determined primarily by the skill level of the available workforce. In the empirical 
analysis presented below the relationship between human capital and FDI at sector 
level will be tested using arguably more appropriate measures of human capital: the 
share of population who have completed secondary/tertiary education (controlling 
for vintage effects), the level of cognitive skills and the availability of skilled labour 
as reported by firms currently operating in the manufacturing sector.  
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Table 6.3: Sector/industry level FDI studies 
Study Sample Period  Estimation technique Dependent variable  
Human capital measure 
(result) 
Independent 
variables related 
to human capital 
(results) 
Comments 
1. FDI in manufacturing  
Urata 
and 
Kawai 
(2000) 
Japanese 
firms' 
manufacturing 
FDI in 117 
developing 
and developed 
economies 
1980-
1994 Logit 
Dummy, 1 if the country 
is the chosen as the 
location for investment  
Enrolment rate in 
secondary education (-) Wage (-) 
When the sample 
is divided in 
developing and 
developed 
economies, the 
results stay the 
same for the first 
group, but the 
human capital 
becomes positive 
and wage 
becomes 
insignificant for 
the latter group  
Resmini 
(2000) 
EU firms' FDI 
in 12 CEEC's 
Panel 
(FE) Logit 
Dummy, 1 a certain 
manufacturing sector of a 
certain country is chosen 
as the location for 
investment  
 
Wage differential 
between home and 
host country (+ in 
science-based and 
capital-intesive 
sectors, 
insignificant in 
traditional and 
scale-intensive 
ones) 
This model 
provides 
information 
similar to the 
macro-level ones 
with country-
industry pairs as a 
dependent 
variable in Riedl 
(2010) and Bellak 
et al. (2009), 
below. 
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Tsen 
(2005) Malaysia  
1980-
2002 Time-series 
Value of foreign 
investment in approved 
projects in manufacturing  
Federal government 
expenditure on education 
as a percentage of GDP (+) 
    
Bellak et 
al. (2009) 
10 developed 
and transition 
economies 
1995-
2004 
Panel 
(difference 
GMM) 
Total stock of inward FDI 
in different manufacturing 
industries in different 
countries (i.e. country 
industry pairs) 
Low-skilled hours worked 
in each industry as a share 
of total hours worked (-) 
Labour cost 
(insignificant), 
labour productivity 
(insignificant); 
Government-
financed R&D as a 
percentage of GDP 
(+) 
Effect of human 
capital is robust 
across 
specifications. 
2. FDI in services 
Nachum 
(2000) US states 
1987 
and 
1992 
OLS 
Number of foreign 
investors in financial and 
professional services 
Share of population in 
higher education (+) 
Labour productivity 
(insignificant)   
2. FDI in more than one sector 
Bajo-
Rubio 
and 
Sosvilla-
Rivero 
(1994) 
Spain 1964-1989 
Time-series 
(cointegration 
analysis) 
FDI inflows in 
manufacturing/non-
manufacturing  
  
Unit labour costs 
(insignificant in 
manufacturing, - in 
non-manufacturing) 
  
Stöwhase 
(2002) 
Bilateral 
inflows 
between 12 
EU 
economies. 
1995-
1999 OLS/GLS 
FDI inflows in the 
primary/secondary/tertiary 
sector 
  
Labour cost 
(insignificant)   
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Schulz 
(2007) 
63 developed 
and 
developing 
economies 
1993-
2003 
OLS and 
panel (FE and 
GMM) 
Aggregate FDI inflows, 
and FDI inflows in the 
primary/secondary/tertiary 
sector,  as a share of GDP  
  
Labour cost (- in 
manufacturing , 
insignificant in 
other sectors) 
Labour cost 
included only in 
the cross-section 
OLS regressions.  
Bénassy-
Quéré et 
al. (2007) 
US FDI to 18 
EU economies 
1994-
2002 Panel (FE) 
Companies' stock of 
capital expeditures in 
different industries 
  
Unit labour costs (+ 
or insignificant) 
Potential 
differences 
between sectors 
are not 
investigated.  
Riedl 
(2010) 
8 transition 
economies 
1998-
2004 
Dynamic 
panel (system 
GMM) 
FDI stock in different 
manufacturing and service 
industries in different 
countries (i.e. country-
industry pairs) 
  
Unit labour costs (- 
in manufacturing, 
insignificant in 
services) 
  
Walsh 
and Yu 
(2010) 
26 developed, 
developing 
and transition 
economies 
1999-
2008 
Panel (system 
GMM) 
Aggregate FDI inflows, 
and FDI inflows in the 
primary/secondary/tertiary 
sector,  as a share of GDP  
Enrolment rates in 
primary, secondary and 
tertiary education 
(insignificant) 
    
Kinoshita 
(2011) 
25 CEEB and 
CIS 
economies 
1990-
1998 
Dynamic 
panel (system 
GMM) 
FDI stock in the tradable 
sector as a share of total 
FDI stock 
Tertiary education 
enrolment rate (+) 
Nominal wage rate 
(negative) 
Tradable sector 
includes: 
agriculture, 
manufacturing, 
mining, retail, 
hotels and 
restaurants  
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Most of the previous studies regress FDI in the primary/secondary/tertiary sector, or 
more than one of these in separate regressions for comparison, on a set of country 
level determinants (Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994; Stöwhase, 2002; Schulz, 
2007; Tsen, 2005; Walsh and Yu, 2010). Only a few use more disaggregated 
industry-level data, but either no attempt is made to differentiate between the 
potentially different effects of explanatory variables according to industry (Bénassy-
Quéré et al., 2007; Bellak et al., 2009), or only differences between FDI in service 
vs. manufacturing industries (Riedl, 2010) or tradable vs. non-tradable industries 
(Kinoshita, 2011) are investigated. The analysis presented below will use both these 
approaches to investigate the effect of human capital on FDI. Since, as argued in the 
previous section, human capital is more likely to affect manufacturing (i.e. the 
secondary sector) than resource-based and service industries (i.e. the primary and 
tertiary sectors), the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter will first be tested 
here using data for the (total) manufacturing sector FDI. In Sections 4.2 and 6.3 it 
was further argued that human capital is likely to be relatively more important in 
some manufacturing industries than in others, depending on their capital intensity 
and the complementarity of that capital to skilled labour. Therefore, manufacturing 
FDI data will be broken down further and these potential differences are investigated 
using data for country-industry pairs as the cross-sectional unit of the panel analysis.    
6.5 Evidence from aggregate manufacturing data  
The specification adopted in this part of the sector study is similar to that developed 
in Chapter 5, except that the dependent variable and some of the independent 
variables are now measured at sector level. The dependent variable used in this 
investigation is the annual (aggregate) level of FDI stock in the manufacturing 
sector, (ln)manFDIstock, i.e. sector D in 1-digit NACE Rev 1.1 classification, as 
reported by WIIW (2011)63. Other related measures similar to that used by Kinoshita 
                                                            
63
 The data, originally reported in Euros, was converted to US Dollars based on the historical 
exchange rate data provided in X-rate (2011) in order to be compatible with the GDP data (gdp). As 
the exchange rates are reported on a monthly basis (as an average of daily values), the annual 
exchange rate was calculated as the average of the monthly values reported, weighed by the number 
of days. As previously noted in Chapter 5, the use of USD is not expected to affect the results because 
any changes in the valuation of stocks that may exist due to exchange rate variability are picked up by 
the time dummies since they are expected to be universal across countries. The ‘universality’ of ER 
shocks is automatic in the case of the countries that have the same currency, i.e. Euro, and those 
whose currencies are pegged against the Euro; and it is expected to hold also for countries with 
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(2011) were considered, but they do not seem to be appropriate for this analysis. 
First, specifying the dependent variable as a share of a sector’s FDI stock in total 
FDI was considered; however, this can be misleading because it only provides 
information on the relative size of the FDI in manufacturing, which is determined by 
the factors that attract FDI in this sector, but also other factors that attract FDI in the 
other sectors. For instance, even though two countries may have the same level of 
manufacturing FDI, the share of manufacturing FDI will be lower in the country 
which also has abundant natural resources and hence more resource-seeking FDI. 
Second, the use of FDI stocks in tradable vs. non-tradable sectors was considered, 
but this does not appear to be an appropriate classification for this purpose of this 
analysis because it includes primary-sector activities (e.g. agriculture or mining) 
where the effect of human capital is likely to be smaller, as argued in Section 6.2.   
As previously explained in Section 5.5, in a model with a stock measure, the 
(expected) persistence of FDI has to be accounted for by including the lagged 
dependent variable in the model and the ‘dynamic panel bias’ arising from the 
inclusion of this variable can be addressed using a number of methods. As in the case 
of the aggregate FDI stocks model developed in Section 5.5, the number of countries 
in this sample is too small to allow a GMM approach, and therefore dynamic panel 
bias is corrected by using Bun and Kiviet’s (2003) corrected dynamic LSDV 
estimator, as extended by Bruno (2005a) for implementation for unbalanced 
panels. 
Accordingly, the following LSDV Models are estimated here with similar regressors 
to those used in Chapter 5, with the exception of two variables which are now 
measured at sector level. Namely, a new dummy variable, manprivatisation, is 
created which indicates years when major privatisations of manufacturing enterprises 
occurred in order to control for one-off privatisation-related changes in FDI stock 
and manvacancy now reflects the average of the number of weeks it took firms in 
manufacturing to fill a vacancy for a skilled worker. These two variables were 
created in the same manner as their economy-wide counterparts, privatisation and 
vacancy, explained in Section 5.2. Table 6.4 below presents the list of variables used 
                                                                                                                                                                            
floating exchange rates assuming that their exchange rates with the Euro and US Dollar will move 
together due to arbitrage effects.  
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in this chapter, as well as their definitions and sources whilst Appendix 6.1 presents 
their descriptive statistics and the raw correlations. 
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Table 6.4: Variable names, definitions and sources 
Variable name Expected sign Description Source 
manFDIstock dependent var Inward FDI stock in manufacturing according to NACE 1.1 
classification (in current USD, converted from EUR) WIIW (2010) 
indFDIstock dependent var Inward FDI stock in country i in manufacturing industry j according 
to NACE 1.1 classification (in current USD, converted from EUR) WIIW (2010) 
SECedu + 
Percentage of population over age 15 who have completed 
secondary education, including those who have completed tertiary 
education (see Section 5.2.1) Barro and Lee (2010) 
TERTedu + Percentage of population over age 15 who have completed tertiary 
education as their highest level of education 
Author's calculations based on 
data from Barro and Lee (2010) 
genvocratio + The ratio of general to vocational enrolments in upper-secondary 
education in 1990 
Author's calculations based on 
data from UNICEF (2010) 
edutr1 + 
Share of population aged 16-30 in a country’s working age 
population in 2008 (population aged 0-14 in 1992/population aged 
15-64 in 2008) 
Author's calculations based on 
data from WDI (2010) 
edutr2 + 
Share of population who were educated in the communist system 
only up to age 12 or less in a country’s working age population in 
the respective year (see Section 5.2.2 for explanations) 
Author's calculations based on 
data from Barro and Lee (2010) 
and WDI (2010) 
manvacancy - A country-average of the length of period required to fill a vacancy 
for a skilled worker by manufacturing firms 
Author's calculations based on 
data from BEEPS (2002, 2005) 
cognitive + Standardised measure of cognitive skills derived from maths and 
science scores in International Student Achievement Tests  
Hanushek and Woessmann 
(2009a)  
top  + 
Share of top performers (i.e. those achieving a score of 600 points 
or one standard deviation above the OECD mean) in International 
Student Achievement Tests  
Hanushek and Woessmann 
(2009a)  
medium NA Dummy variable indicating high-tech industries (see Section 6.6 
and Appendix 6.3) 
Constructed by the author based 
on OECD (2011)/Eurostat 
(2011) 
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high NA Dummy variable indicating medium-tech industries (see Section 6.6 
and Appendix 6.3) 
Constructed by the author based 
on OECD (2011)/Eurostat 
(2011) 
SECmed + Interaction term: SECedu*medium NA 
SEChigh + Interaction term: SECedu*high NA 
TERTmed + Interaction term: TERTedu*medium NA 
TERThigh + Interaction term: TERTedu*high NA 
cognitivemed + Interaction term: congnitive*medium NA 
cognitivehigh + Interaction term: cognitive*high NA 
topmed + Interaction term: top*medium NA 
tophigh + Interaction term: top*high NA 
wage - The average gross wage paid in the host country WIIW (2011) 
gdp + Size of the host market as measured by its GDP level (in current 
USD) WDI (2010) 
gdppc 
 
GDP per capita (in current USD) WDI (2010) 
tradefree ? Trade freedom component of the Economic Freedom Index Heritage Foundation (2010) 
econfree + Economic Freedom Index, excluding the trade freedom 
component (i.e. the simple average of all other components) 
Author's calculations based on 
data from Heritage Foundation 
(2010) 
ictinfra + Sum of the number of telephone lines, broadband subscriptions, and 
cellular subscriptions, per 100 inhabitants 
Author's calculations based on 
data from WDI (2010) 
transition + The overall transition score awarded by the EBRD EBRD (various years) 
manprivatisation + Dummy variable, equals to 1 in years when FDI-related 
privatisations of large enterprises took place in the manufacturing 
sector (see Section 5.2.3) 
Constructed by the author based 
on EBRD (various years), 
UNCTAD (various years) and 
Kalotay and Hunya (2000) 
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indprivatisation + Dummy variable, equals to 1 in years when FDI-related 
privatisations of large enterprises took place in the specific industry 
(see Section 5.2.3) 
Constructed by the author based 
on EBRD (various years), 
UNCTAD (various years) and 
Kalotay and Hunya (2000) 
instability - 
Dummy variable, equals to 1 in years when a country is affected by 
political unrest, either an internal conflict or one in the region (see 
Section 5.2.3 for explanation) Constructed by the author 
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Initially, the baseline Model (6.1) is estimated: 
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Where  
manFDIstock is the stock of FDI (in USD) from WIIW (2010); 
SECedu (TERTedu) is the share of population who have completed secondary 
(tertiary) education (see Section 5.2 and Table 5.3 for explanations); 
Xit are the control variables: average gross wage (wage); the size of the host market 
(gdp); trade freedom (tradefree); economic freedom (econfree); ICT infrastructure 
(ictinfra) progress in transition (transition); dummy for major privatisations in 
manufacturing (manprivatisation); dummy for years of political instability 
(instability) (see Table 6.4 above and Section 5.2 for more explanations); 
tt   are time dummies;  
ηi  is an unobserved time-invariant individual effect; and  
εit is an unobserved white noise disturbance.  
The baseline Model (6.1) is subsequently augmented with the share of population 
aged 16-30 in a country’s workforce, (ln)edutr2, and the period required for 
manufacturing firms to fill a vacancy for a skilled worker, (ln)manvacancy, similar 
to Models (5.16) and (5.17) in Chapter 5: 
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Table 6.5 below presents the results of Models (6.1-6.3) estimated using the dynamic 
corrected LSDV model, using System GMM as an initial estimator to correct for bias 
(printouts for these are presented in Appendix 6.2). The variables of interest and the 
controls in these models are insignificant, with the exception of (ln)manvacancy 
which is significant and positive. However, the size of the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable in all these models is above 1, which, as explained in Section 5.5, 
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indicates unstable (explosive) dynamics; in addition, the size of the coefficients is in 
thousands, which seems peculiar considering that these indicate percentage changes 
(as this is a log-log model). Therefore, these results are not considered reliable and 
are not interpreted.     
Table 6.5: Models 6.1-6.3 results (dependent variable: lnmanFDIstock) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Model 
(6.1) 
Model 
(6.2) 
Model 
(6.3) 
        
L.manfdistock 1.110*** 1.088*** 1.201*** 
  (0.0323) (0.0413) (0.145) 
lnsecedu -1,594 -3,266 32,803 
  (7,602) (11,491) (32,124) 
lntertedu -3,575 -1,712 -6,926 
  (2,456) (4,336) (16,241) 
lnwage -1,430 1,134 -1,880 
  (3,519) (4,977) (21,846) 
lngdp 813.2 -1,190 -5,682 
  (3,416) (6,113) (20,281) 
lntransition 7,920 7,844 -67,395* 
  (12,549) (20,537) (40,335) 
lntradefree -86.76 211.0 3,943 
  (2,289) (3,910) (4,908) 
lneconfree -2,989 -4,061 -11,958 
  (4,433) (4,947) (12,905) 
lnictinfra 2,322 2,576 6,223 
  (1,713) (2,359) (6,383) 
manprivatisation 1,064** 1,091* 423.7 
  (508.3) (615.1) (872.1) 
lnedutr2  -13,602   
  
 (12,139)   
lnmanvacancy   5,871* 
  
 
 (3,192) 
      
Observations 123 100 42 
Number of countryid 12 12 11 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Note: Year dummies included, but not reported. Models estimated using LSDVC. 
 
Considering the problems with these model(s), similar ones using industry-level data 
are estimated in the beginning of the next section to examine the average effect of 
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human capital on FDI in manufacturing industries (i.e. the overall effect across 
industries).     
6.6 Evidence from disaggregated industry-level manufacturing 
data 
6.6.1 The empirical model(s) 
In Section 6.3 it was argued that the elasticity of FDI inflows to different human 
capital endowments is likely to differ across different manufacturing industries. This 
hypothesis is tested in this section using WIIW (2011) manufacturing data 
disaggregated by industry. The dependent variable in this investigation, 
(ln)indFDIstock, is the annual level of FDI stock in each manufacturing industry j in 
each country i. This analysis includes the whole list of industries in the 
manufacturing sector disaggregated at 2-digit level according to NACE Rev 1.1 
classification (Eurostat, 2008), i.e. industries DA-DN, as listed in Table 6.2 in 
Section 6.2. The (potential) number of countries is smaller in this sample compared 
to previous empirical specifications because FDI data at NACE 2-digit level is not 
available for Bulgaria.  
Now that the FDI stock is measured at a more disaggregated level, there are some 
instances where negative FDI stocks are observed64. Negative FDI stocks may seem 
counter-intuitive and they are encountered more rarely than negative FDI inflows. 
The reasons for recorded negative FDI stocks may be similar to those for FDI 
inflows, e.g. when the value of loans or trade credits of the foreign subsidiary 
extended to its parent company exceed the parent company’s direct investment in the 
subsidiary, or when the subsidiary suffers continuous losses leading to negative 
reserves. Negative FDI values may be problematic because they cannot be 
transformed into natural logarithms. Previous studies have approached the problem 
of zero or negative values by adding a value of one (currency unit) to zeros so that 
the observation takes the value of zero after the (natural) logarithmic transformation 
and by taking the natural logarithms of the absolute values of the negative 
observations and subsequently multiplying them by -1 so as to reflect the original 
                                                            
64
 A total of seven negative values are observed. Four of these are in the coke, refined petroleum 
products and nuclear fuel industry (DF) in Macedonia in 2000, Lithuania in 2000-01, and Hungary in 
2003; one is in the textiles and leather industry (DB-DC) in the Czech Republic in 2000; and one is in 
furniture, manufacturing n.e.c., recycling (DN) in the Slovak Republic in 2007.  
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sign (Blonigen and Davies, 2004; Neumayer and Spess, 2005; Dalba-Norris et al., 
2010; Mina, 2010). A modified version of this approach is applied here motivated on 
theoretical grounds: negative values are simply changed to the value of 1 USD 
(rather than to negative values obtained by the transformation explained above). As 
explained previously in Section 5.2, the purpose of this analysis is to explain the 
level of advanced direct investment by the foreign investors in their subsidiaries, 
preferably in gross terms, and not the level of trade credits/loans of the latter to their 
parent companies, the level of their repatriated profits, or losses they may incur 
(although it is recognised that the last two may themselves be relevant factors in 
determining the level of the investment that is of interest here). Accordingly, from a 
theoretical perspective, it is considered that the negative FDI inflows/stocks recorded 
due to these phenomena are irrelevant for this analysis and therefore this 
‘interference’ with the data is justified. From the perspective of empirical estimation, 
these transformations are not expected to create any problems because they effect an 
extremely low proportion of the observations in this sample (i.e. a total of 7 
observations out of the total of approximately 1300 that are used in the estimation). 
The human capital measures and most control variables used here are the same as the 
ones used in Models 6.1-6.3 in the previous section; this includes the average 
number of weeks required to fill a vacancy, (ln)manvacancy, which can only 
measured at the level of the manufacturing sector as a whole because BEEPS does 
not disaggregate firms further than the 1-digit NACE classification. The only 
variable from the previous model that can be further disaggregated at NACE 2-digit 
classification level is the privatisation dummy, indprivatisation, which now indicates 
years when privatisations specific to each manufacturing industry took place. As in 
the previous empirical analyses in this thesis, the continuous variables, including the 
dependent variable, are transformed into natural logarithms.  
In addition to the country- and industry-level explanatory variables, a set of country 
dummies (c2-c14) and industry dummies (s2-s12) are included in the model to 
account for any remaining country- and sector-specific factors that may affect FDI 
stocks. Also, as in the previous empirical specifications, a set of year dummies 
(d1996-d2007) is included in the model; as explained in Section 5.3, this is expected 
to (partially) account for the effects of potential cross-sectional dependence that arise 
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due to universal time shocks related to global FDI trends (Roodman, 2006; Sarafidis 
et al., 2009). Accordingly, the initial industry-level model estimated in this section 
is:   
ijtijjititit
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Where 
i denotes the country dimension i=1, 2, ...,13; j denotes the industry j=1, 2, ..., 13; 
and t denotes the time dimension t=1, 2, ..., 13.  
manFDIstock is the stock of FDI in country i in industry j  (in USD) from WIIW 
(2010); 
SECedu (TERTedu ) is the share of population who have completed secondary 
(tertiary) education (see Section 5.2 and Table 5.3 for explanations); 
Xit are the control variables: average gross wage (wage); the size of the host market 
(gdp); trade freedom (tradefree); economic freedom (econfree); ICT infrastructure 
(ictinfra) progress in transition (transition); dummy for major privatisations in 
manufacturing (manprivatisation); dummy for years of political instability 
(instability) (see Table 6.4 below and Section 5.2 for more explanations); 
tt are time dummies 
ci are country dummies 
sj are sector (i.e. industry) dummies; 
ηij  is an unobserved time-invariant individual effect; and 
 εijt is an unobserved white noise disturbance.  
 
This type of model is similar to those previously used in industry-level FDI studies 
by Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) and Bellak et al. (2009). It is analogous to Model 
(5.15) in Section 5.5 in the sense that it provides an estimate of the average effect of 
the independent variables on FDI stocks across different manufacturing industries. 
Namely, it makes use of a larger number of observations (and the benefits associated 
with this are discussed later in this section), but does not exploit the industry-level 
information to shed light on the industries’ different levels of sensitivity to different 
explanatory variables. This can be investigated either through separate estimations 
by industry or industry group, or by adding dummy variables (and interactions) for 
them. The latter approach is adopted here because it provides a convenient means to 
test whether any (potential) observed differences in the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant and it makes use of the maximum number of observations 
available for estimation.   
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In this particular investigation it is the sensitivity of FDI to human capital 
endowment that is of interest. In Sections 4.2 and 6.3 it was argued that, to the extent 
that workforce skills are complementary with technological advancement (embodied 
in capital), the effect of human capital is expected to be stronger in more technology-
intensive industries. Accordingly, industries here are classified on the basis of their 
technological intensity: low, medium and high. The dummy variables indicating 
technological intensity were based on the standard industry classification by 
OECD/Eurostat (OECD, 2011; Eurostat, 2011). OECD and Eurostat classify 
industries based on direct research and development (R&D) intensity, as initially 
proposed by Hatzichronoglou (1997). The original classification by OECD/Eurostat 
is in four categories (low, medium-low, medium-high, and high) based on their R&D 
relative to value-added and gross production statistics. However since only one of 
the manufacturing industries falls in the high-technology category, industries in this 
analysis are classified into three categories: high-technology industries (indicated by 
dummy variable high) in this analysis refer to both medium-high and high categories 
in the original classification; medium-technology industries (indicated by dummy 
variable medium) refer to the medium-low category in the original classification; and 
low-technology industries (indicated by dummy variable low) refer to the same 
category in the original classification. The list of NACE Rev 1.1 2-digit 
manufacturing industries and their respective technological intensity categories is 
presented in Appendix 6.3.      
To test the hypothesis that FDI in medium and high-technology industries is 
relatively more sensitive to human capital in the host economy, the technological 
intensity dummies medium and high are interacted with the human capital variables 
SECedu and TERTedu to form SECmed, SEChigh, TERTmed and TERThigh 
(leaving low-technology industries in the reference category). Model (6.4) above is 
augmented with interactions and with the dummies medium and high in Model (6.5) 
below; although the latter are not of direct interest, they must be included because 
they are ‘constitutive terms’ of the interactions (Brambor et al., 2006). Accordingly, 
the second industry-level specification estimated in this section is: 
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A similar strategy to that applied in Chapter 5 and Section 6.5 above is followed 
whereby the model is augmented with different variables to test the transition-specific 
human capital hypotheses developed in the Chapter 5 and the effect of alternative 
measures of human capital. Accordingly, specifications below are also estimated:  
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Where: 
genvocratio is the initial ratio of general to vocational enrolments in upper-
secondary education; 
lnedutr1 is the share of population aged 16-30 in a country’s working age population 
in 2008; 
lnedutr2 is the share of population who were educated in the communist system only 
up to age 12 or less in a country’s working age population; 
manvacancy is the period required to fill a vacancy for a skilled worker by manufacturing 
firms; 
cognitive is the average level of students’ cognitive skills  
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top is the share of top performers in students’ cognitive skills tests (see Section 5.2 
and Table 6.4 for explanations.)  
The next sub-section discusses the alternative estimators that can be used to estimate 
these models and their suitability, with a special focus on the GMM estimators which 
can now be used with the increase in the sample.  
6.6.2 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimators and their 
suitability for this particular empirical investigation  
As the unit of the analysis is no longer the country, but the country-industry pair, the 
number of cross-sectional units and total observations available for estimating 
models (6.4-6.10) increases significantly. The increase in the number of cross-
sectional units (N) to a potential of 156 country-industry pairs (13 industries in each 
of the 12 countries) is particularly important in this context; the Generalised Method 
of Moments (GMM) estimators which in Chapter 5 and Section 6.5 were ruled out 
due to the small N dimension can now can now be considered. The rest of this 
section provides an appraisal of the GMM estimators’ merits compared to other 
available estimators. The properties of GMM estimators and the conditions that must 
be satisfied in order for these estimators to be consistent are also discussed and it 
evaluates different GMM estimators and their respective options. However, 
(arguably) the most important pre-conditions that have to be satisfied for using 
GMM estimators, large N and small T, are discussed first.    
The unavailability of FDI stock data for some of the pairs slightly reduces the 
number of cross-sectional units65 available for estimation; this happens either 
because some countries do not report data for certain industries or because they 
sometimes report aggregate data for two industries. Further, missing data for some of 
the independent variables (for whole countries, or just for some time periods) do not 
allow the exploitation of the total number of cross-sectional units for which FDI 
stock data is available. Still, the unbalanced dataset of 130 country-industry pairs 
ultimately available for estimation appears to be sufficiently large for using GMM 
estimatiors. Although there are no clear guidelines as to what consists a ‘large N’ 
sample (Roodman, 2006), the Monte Carlo simulations based on which Arellano and 
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 The number of available cross-sectional units, however, is a bit lower than 156 because data is 
missing for some country-industry pairs, either due to missing data for some industry-country pairs, or 
lack of compatibility due to the level of aggregation (e.g. some countries report aggregated data for 
Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel, DF, and that for Rubber and plastic products, DH, whilst 
other report data separately for one or both of these). 
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Bond (1991) conclude that GMM estimators have ‘negligible finite sample biases’ 
(p. 293) are based on a smaller N of 100. For comparison, in terms of the number of 
cross-sectional units (N) in the sample used here is only slightly smaller than that in 
the original GMM application by Arellano and Bond (1991) who estimate a dynamic 
employment equation using an unbalanced dataset of 140 firms; it lies between those 
of similar GMM applications in industry-level FDI stock models in Bellak et al. 
(2009) and Riedl (2010) which employ panels of 108 and 155 country-industry pairs, 
respectively; and it is much larger than the dynamic panel study by Kinoshita (2011) 
with 12-17 cross-sectional units, which can be safely assumed to be far too small for 
consistent GMM estimation (Roodman, 2006, p. 35).  
The sample used here also seems to be appropriate in terms of the time-dimension 
(T) size. The number of years available for estimation ranges from 1 to 13, with an 
average of approximately 10 years per cross-sectional unit. Thus, the number of 
years in this estimation for some of the country-industry pairs is larger than that of 7 
periods which is used in the simulations of Arellano and Bond (1991) and some 
previous applications of GMM estimators (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell 
and Bond, 1999; Mangan et al., 2005; Pugh et al., 2008). However, this should not 
be a cause for concern since the system GMM estimator has been shown by 
Hayakawa (2008) to be consistent in a large-N large-T context, with T as large as 20 
which is significantly larger than the maximum of 13 periods in the sample used 
here. A more detailed discussion of this estimator, its suitability for use in this type 
of sample and a comparison with the previously used estimators is presented next.  
As discussed previously in Sections 5.5 and 6.5, accounting for the dynamics in FDI 
models may be crucial for obtaining consistent estimates in panel models (Bond, 
2002). However, the inclusion of lagged dependent variable creates problems in 
estimation. In OLS estimations (in levels) the lagged dependent variable is positively 
related to the individual-specific time-invariant component of the error term, giving 
rise to upward bias which does not vanish with a large T or large N (Bond, 2002, p. 
4). On the other hand, as explained in Section 5.5, eliminating the fixed effects 
through a Within Group (LSDV) estimator introduces another type of downward bias 
known as ‘dynamic panel bias’, which decreases as the T approaches infinity, but is 
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a serious problem in small-T sample such as the one used here66 (Nickell, 1981; 
Kiviet, 1995). One potential approach for dealing with the problems above, used in 
the empirical models in Sections 5.5 and 6.5 of this thesis, is to correct the LSDV 
estimates for this small-T bias. However, as previously noted, this approach has two 
(potential) disadvantages: the assumption of strictly exogenous regressors and the 
inability to accommodate time-invariant variables.  
The second approach is that of instrumental variable (IV) and Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimators which provide consistent estimates in dynamic panels. 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose estimating a first-difference model where the 
differenced lagged dependent variable is instrumented by either the level or the first-
difference of the second lag of the dependent variable. The differencing eliminates 
the fixed effects from the error term which, if present, would be correlated with the 
lagged dependent variable. However, since the error term in the differenced equation 
would still be correlated with the first difference of the lagged dependent variable 
(∆yi,t-1), Anderson and Hsiao propose ∆yi,t-1 to be instrumented by its lag (∆yi,t-2) or 
by the second lagged level of the dependent variable (yi,t-2). 
The Anderson-Hsiao IV approach is later extended to a GMM framework which, 
unlike the IV approach, allows for information to be exploited for more than one 
instrument per coefficient to be estimated. Accordingly, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
propose a GMM estimation of the first-differenced model where first-differences of 
the (predetermined) lagged dependent variable is instrumented by its lagged levels 
(rather than only one level), i.e. ∆yi,t-1 is instrumented by yi,t-2 like in the Anderson-
Hsiao approach, but also by longer lags like yi,t-3, yi,t-4, etc. etc. Unlike Anderson and 
Hsiao (1982), Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using lagged levels specifically 
(rather than levels or differences), based on evidence from experiments in Arellano 
(1989) and Arellano and Bond (1991), later confirmed by Kiviet (1995), which 
suggests that the use of levels as instruments yields estimates with relatively smaller 
variances. The exploitation of more (potentially) valid instruments in a GMM 
framework means that more information is used in the estimation and thus the 
coefficients can be estimated more efficiently. Monte Carlo evidence in Arellano and 
Bond (1991) suggests that estimates obtained by GMM have variances which are up 
                                                            
66
 The time dimension of the industry-level is approximately 10 years, on average, i.e. it is even 
smaller compared to the ones used for aggregate data in the previous specifications.  
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to five times smaller compared to those obtained by the simpler version of IV 
estimators developed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982), discussed above.  
Later contributions point out two limitations of the Arellano-Bond (AB) approach, 
referred to as the difference GMM estimator for dynamic panels (Ahn and Schmidt, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). First, it has been argued that the instruments used 
in this estimator, i.e. the lagged levels of the variables, may be weak in explaining 
subsequent differences, especially for models where the dependent variable is 
persistent. Roodman (2006, p. 28) explains: “...if y (i.e. the dependent variable) is 
close to a random walk, then difference GMM performs poorly, because past levels 
convey little information about future changes, so that untransformed lags are weak 
instruments for transformed (i.e. differenced) variables”. Accordingly, Blundell and 
Bond (1998) show that weak instruments can cause large finite-sample biases when 
the difference GMM estimator is used in models with persistent series. Second, it has 
been pointed out that difference GMM does not make use of the all the information 
that is available within the data which, if used, can further increase the efficiency of 
the estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
The Arellano-Bond estimator was subsequently augmented by Blundell and Bond 
(1998) to include another equation in levels in addition to the one in differences. The 
approach used in ‘levels equation’, initially outlined in Arellano and Bover (1995), 
involves transforming the instruments to make them exogenous to the fixed effects, 
instead of removing the fixed effects by transforming regressors (as in the 
differenced-equation). Thus, here levels of the (predetermined) lagged dependent 
variable are instrumented by differences, i.e., yi,t-1  is instrumented by ∆yi,t-1, ∆yi,t-2, 
etc., under the assumption that the differences are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. 
The resulting estimator, referred to as system GMM estimator, thus allows the 
exploitation of additional ‘moment conditions’ from the data in levels, which 
increases the efficiency of the obtained estimates (Arellano and Bover, 1995). In 
addition, the system GMM estimator has an advantage over the difference estimator 
when the dependent variable is persistent, in which case past changes may provide 
more information on the current levels (Roodman, 2006, p. 28). Blundell and Bond 
(1998) show that system GMM substantially reduces the biases that arise when such 
models are estimated using difference GMM estimators. Another advantage of 
system as opposed to difference-GMM is that the levels equation which is added in 
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this context allows the estimation of the time-invariant variables which are ‘wiped 
out’ in the Arellano-Bond estimator when only a differenced equation is used.  
Considering the above, the GMM estimators appear to be superior, compared to the 
corrected LSDV models used in the previous estimations in this thesis, because they 
allow predetermined and endogenous regressors to be included in the model, which 
may be the case with some of the variables included in this model (i.e. wage, market 
size and education variables). Further, the system GMM estimator, in particular, 
appears to be superior in this particular analysis for two reasons. First, the dependent 
variable, FDI stock, is expected to be persistent; as explained above, difference 
GMM is expected to perform poorly in these cases. Second, it can be used to 
estimate the effect of time-invariant variables. The inclusion of time-invariant 
variables was already an issue in the previous specifications in this thesis for some of 
the human capital variables such as genvocratio and cognitive, but it becomes crucial 
at the industry-level in this specification because it allows the inclusion of 
technological intensity variables and their interactions with human capital variables, 
SECmed, SEChigh, TERTmed and TERThigh. This allows testing the hypothesis 
of a heterogeneous human capital effect depending on the industry. However, the 
additional moments incorporated in the system estimator are only valid under 
(additional) assumptions regarding the initial conditions process, discussed later in 
this section.  
Further advantages of GMM estimators are that they do not require assumptions 
about the distribution and they allow for heteroskedasticity and within-individual 
autocorrelation can be accounted for using ‘robust’ estimation (Verbeek, 2000; 
Greene, 2002; Roodman, 2006). There are two options available in GMM estimation. 
First, a covariance matrix can be used which is independent of the estimated 
parameters (Windmeijer, 2005); the SE estimates obtained this way are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation within individuals can be 
used in a one-step GMM estimator (Roodman, 2006, p.38)67. Alternatively, a 
“sandwich” covariance matrix can be obtained based on the initial parameter 
estimates (i.e. those from the one-step estimation) and the GMM estimation is rerun 
in the second step, where this matrix is used to reweight the moment conditions 
                                                            
67
 In the xtabond2, this is done using option robust when option onestep (for one-step estimation) is 
specified (Roodman 2006, p. 38). 
 
251 
 
(Windmeijer, 2005; Roodman, 2006); the resulting efficient two-step GMM 
estimator is robust to “whatever patterns of heteroskedasticity and cross-correlation 
the sandwich covariance estimator models” (Roodman, 2006, p. 9). On the choice 
between the two, simulation studies suggest that two-step efficient GMM performs 
better than one-step GMM, with lower bias and somewhat higher precision (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Windmeijer, 2005). However, computed 
standard errors in two-step GMM estimator have been found to be biased downward 
in smaller samples (Arellano and Bond, 2001; Bond, 2002; Windmeijer, 2005). For 
these samples Windmeijer (2005) develops a finite-sample correction for the two-
step efficient GMM estimator which, simulations suggest, greatly reduces this 
problem (at least for the difference-GMM estimator for which simulations are carried 
out). Based on the above considerations, the efficient two-step system GMM 
estimator is used here, applying Windmeijer’s (2005) small-sample correction68. 
Finally, it has been pointed out that the first-differenced equations in the (Difference 
and System) GMM estimators are inconvenient for application in unbalanced panels 
because they magnify gaps in the data (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Roodman, 2006), 
e.g. an observation missing for one period automatically means that the one for the 
next period is also missing because the difference cannot be taken. For this reason, 
Arellano and Bover (1995) propose an alternative to first-differencing, i.e. ‘forward 
orthogonal deviations’ or ‘orthogonal deviations’ which involves subtracting the 
average of all future observations available instead of subtracting the observation of 
the previous period. Roodman (2006, p. 20) explains that this minimises data losses 
due to gaps, whilst lagged observations (i.e. levels) remain valid as instruments 
because they are not involved in the computation of the orthogonal deviations. 
Accordingly, since the panel used here is an unbalanced panel with gaps, orthogonal 
transformation instead of first-differencing is used in order to preserve sample 
size, as recommended by Roodman (2006, p. 43). 
Considering that most of the explanatory variables in this industry-level analysis 
vary only at country level, observations of FDI stocks coming from each of the 
countries are likely be correlated which in turn may bias the coefficients’ estimated 
SEs. For this reason, clustering at country level was considered similar to the one 
undertaken in the empirical estimations in Section 5.4, but this was not applied for 
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 Windmeijer’s (2005) correction is applied in xtabond2 using option robust when twostep option 
(for two-step estimation) is specified, where SE’s are already robust (Roodman, 2006, p. 38).   
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the following reasons. First, the number of clusters in these estimations in this thesis 
is likely to be too small to adjust for clustering effects, as previously explained in 
Section 5.3 and suggested by the results obtained by the two-way cluster estimator 
applied in Section 5.4 in which the size of SEs changed very little compared to those 
obtained using a conventional FE estimator. Second, using the cluster option in 
xtabond2 overrides the default clustering based on the cross-sectional unit which is 
likely to be more important than that at country level. However, it can be argued that 
the potential clustering effects are not likely to be very serious in this analysis 
because their presence is expected to deteriorate the cross-sectional dependence tests, 
which does not appear to be the case here, as explained in the next section.         
6.6.3 Instruments and specification tests in (System) GMM 
estimators  
The lagged dependent variable in a dynamic panel model is predetermined but not 
exogenous, in the sense that it is determined within the model, but by past values of 
the other regressors, while being independent of their present values. The 
instrumentation approach adopted in GMM estimators to address the endogeneity of 
the lagged dependent variable can be used to address the endogeneity of other 
predetermined and endogenous regressors (with a slight modification in case of the 
latter, as explained below).  
As explained in the previous section, the lagged dependent variable in the first-
differenced equation is instrumented by its lagged levels, i.e. ∆yi,t-1 is instrumented 
by yi,t-2 and longer lags (i.e., yi1, yi2,..., yi,t-2). Bond (2002, p. 16) explains that this 
approach is valid under the assumption of serially uncorrelated disturbances, an 
assumption that will be tested through the Arellano-Bond m1/m2 test, explained 
below. Bond further explains that this approach be adopted for any predetermined 
regressors, i.e. regressors that are not correlated with the contemporaneous 
disturbance term, but are correlated with previous disturbance terms. Thus, for any 
predetermined regressor, xit, the valid instruments in the differenced equation would 
be the vector (xi1, xi2,..., xi,t-1). For endogenous regressors, i.e. those that have 
contemporaneous correlation with the disturbance term, xi,t-1 is no longer a valid 
instrument, so the above vector would be replaced by the vector (xi1, xi2,..., xi,t-2). 
Alternatively, under an assumption of strict exogeneity, i.e. no correlation between 
the regressor and past, current, or future disturbance terms, then the 
contemporaneous levels are also valid instruments in the first-differenced equation, 
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making the instrument vector (xi1, xi2,..., xiT). On the choice between the treatment of 
variables in GMM estimation, Bond (2002, p. 17) notes that “while the choice 
between these alternatives may seem a little arbitrary, in most cases these moment 
conditions will be overidentifying restrictions, so that the validity of a particular 
assumption may be tested using the standard GMM tests of overidentifying 
restrictions”. Accordingly, the Sargan and Hansen tests of overidentifying 
restrictions, discussed below, will be used to inform the appropriate treatment of 
variables that are considered as possibly endogenous/predetermined.  
As explained in the previous section, in System GMM additional instruments, i.e. 
differences, are created to instrument for the levels of the lagged predetermined 
variable (and suitable lagged differences can be used in a similar manner as above 
for other predetermined and endogenous variables). However, Bond (2002, p. 17) 
explains that orthogonality to the disturbance term required for instrument validity in 
Difference-GMM above is no longer a sufficient condition; namely, the use of these 
additional moment conditions in the levels equation requires an additional 
assumption of differences in the regressors being uncorrelated with the individual 
fixed effects. Roodman (2006, p. 30), following Blundell and Bond (1998) explain 
that two conditions have to be satisfied in order for this assumption to hold. First, the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable “must have an absolute value less than 
unity, so that the process converges in expectation”; and second, “the deviations of 
the initial observations, yi1, from these long-term convergent values must not 
correlate with the fixed effects”. The “steady-state” assumption and hence the 
validity of the additional moment conditions for the levels equations will be tested 
using the Difference-Hansen test, as suggested by Bond (2002, p. 22). 
The System GMM estimator can create a large number of moment conditions, and 
hence instruments, which can be used in the estimation: for each variable an 
instrument can be created for each time period and each lag distance for the 
corresponding to that period (Roodman, 2006, p. 24). However, caution should be 
taken because not all the instruments are necessarily valid. Namely, GMM estimators 
use lags as instruments under the assumption of errors not being autocorrelated 
which, as explained earlier, would mean they are correlated with the instruments. 
Arellano and Bond (1991, p. 278) warn that “an estimator that uses lags as 
instruments under the white noise errors would lose its consistency if in fact errors 
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were serially correlated” and, accordingly, tests of serial correlation must be 
conducted to ensure instrument validity. For this, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose 
a test of both first- and second-order serial correlation, referred to as m1 and m2 
test statistics, respectively. The m2 statistic tests the hypothesis of no second-order 
serial correlation in the error term of the first-differenced equation, a condition which 
must be satisfied in order for values of the dependent variable lagged two periods or 
to be uncorrelated with the error term, and hence valid instrument to be used in this 
equation.  However, Arellano and Bond (1991, p. 282) note that this condition may 
be satisfied due to a lack of (second-order) serial correlation in the level equation 
errors, or just due to the errors in this equation following a random walk. In the latter 
case the m2 test may become unreliable, i.e. it may wrongly reject the presence of 
second-order serial correlation, which is why the authors propose the m1 statistic as a 
robustness check on this. The m1 statistic discriminates between situations where 
lack of second order correlation is ‘genuine’ vs. those where errors follow a random 
walk by testing for the presence of first-order serial correlation. Here failure to reject 
the null of first-order serial correlation indicates that errors do not follow a random 
walk, thus implying a ‘genuine’ lack of second-order serial correlation. Thus, the 
m1/m2 test indicates instrument validity if (1) there is first-order serial correlation 
and, (2) there is no second-order serial correlation, in the first-differenced residuals.    
The other way of testing for instrument validity is through the Sargan/Hansen test 
of overidentifying restrictions which test whether instruments are uncorrelated with 
the error term. Of the two, the Hansen J statistic has the advantage of being robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, and can be preferred on these grounds 
(Roodman, 2007). On the other hand, this test becomes unreliable with a large 
number of instruments, as discussed below, but Roodman (2006; 2009) provide 
guidelines as to what the ‘acceptable’ p-values for the test are and the signs which 
may indicate the weakening of the test due to instrument count (as discussed further 
in the next section when the tests from the estimations are interpreted). Whilst the 
Sargan/Hansen test above tests the validity of all overidentifying restrictions, the 
difference-in-Hansen test (or C statistic) is used to test the validity of a subset of 
instruments by performing two estimations, with and without a subset of suspect 
instruments (Roodman, 2006, p. 13). Hence, as explained earlier, it can test the 
“stationarity condition” (and hence the appropriateness of System GMM estimator) 
by testing the validity of the additional moment conditions in the levels equation.  
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Another caveat of the System GMM estimators is that the large number of 
instruments created may create problems in finite samples if there is not sufficient 
information available for estimation, but also because it can weaken the Hansen test, 
resulting in failure to reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity with 
implausibly high p-values of up to 1.00 (Roodman, 2006, p. 14). Unfortunately, the 
literature does not provide clear guidance as to what is the ‘appropriate’ number of 
instruments allowed; a number of instruments lower than that of cross-sectional units 
is mentioned as a minimal arbitrary rule of thumb, but even this is likely to be too 
generous (Roodman, 2006, p. 14). Hence, Roodman points out that it is important to 
report the number of instruments and advises testing the robustness of the Hansen 
test statistic/p-value by reducing the number of instruments used in the estimation. 
To reduce the instrument count, Roodman (2006, pp. 22-24) proposes two 
approaches: limiting the lag ranges that are used to generate instruments and 
‘collapsing’ instruments, i.e. creating instruments for each variable and lag distance 
only (and not also for each time period). Both reducing lag ranges and collapsing 
instruments are used here to reduce the instrument count, as necessary to reach 
instrument validity, and results are reported for specifications with different 
instrument counts for examining robustness.     
As discussed previously, the lagged dependent variable coefficient is biased upward 
in an OLS regression and downward in a LSDV regression. Bond (2002) argues that 
estimates from consistent estimators should lie in the range between those obtained 
by these two estimators and this can be used as a type of check on other estimators. 
Bond (2002, p. 5) notes that failure of estimates from theoretically superior 
estimators (in this case system GMM) to follow such a pattern in a seemingly well 
specified AR(1) model may hint at either inconsistency or severe finite sample bias. 
Accordingly, LSDV and OLS estimates of the lagged dependent variable are 
estimated and presented here for comparison along with other standard 
specification tests.  
Finally, the potential presence of cross-sectional dependence also has to be 
considered in a dynamic panel context. As explained in Section 5.3, there appears to 
be a common misconception among applied researchers that the inclusion of time 
dummies eliminates cross-sectional dependence in the errors. However, Sarafidis et 
al. (2009) clearly explain that the presence of such dummies is merely expected to 
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mitigate this problem by removing the ‘homogeneous’ component of the cross-
sectional dependence, i.e. that arising from universal time shocks (under the 
assumption that all cross-sectional units are affected in the same way by these 
shocks). The remaining ‘heterogeneous’ cross-sectional dependence may still be 
substantial and needs to be tested for. Fortunately, simulation evidence in Sarafidis et 
al. (2009) suggests that low levels of cross-sectional dependence do not cause 
noticeable bias in the context of GMM estimators. Nevertheless, it is not clear what 
constitutes ‘low’ levels of cross-sectional dependence in practice, so ideally ruling 
out the cross-sectional dependence through the relevant tests would be preferred.  
Sarafidis et al. (2009) propose a testing procedure for cross-sectional dependence in 
dynamic linear regression models whereby the Arellano and Bond’s (1991) m2 test 
statistic for second-order serial correlation and the difference-in-Sargan (or Hansen) 
test which compares the Sargan (or Hansen) test statistic for all over-identifying 
restrictions and that for the over-identifying restrictions after excluding the 
instruments on the lagged dependent variable. In the model(s) estimated here, the m2 
test does not indicate the presence of second-order serial correlation which, 
according to Sarafidis et al. (2009), implies possibly no cross-sectional dependence. 
According to Sarafidis et al. the difference-in-Hansen test statistic provides another 
means of testing for heterogeneous error cross-sectional dependence. Here, the 
difference-in-Hansen test fails to reject the null which, Sarafidis et al. argue, 
confirms the lack of heterogeneous error cross-sectional dependence by virtue of 
failing to reject homogeneous dependence.  
6.6.4 Estimation results 
Before proceeding with the estimation, unit root tests are conducted to rule out the 
possibility of a cointegrating relationship between variables which might give rise to 
a spurious regression. Madala and Wu’s (1999) Phillips-Perron type test (Phillips 
and Perron, 1988) is used here to test the variables for the presence for unit roots on 
de-meaned data (i.e. subtracting the cross-sectional averages from the series) which, 
Levin et al. (2002) argue, makes the test more reliable by mitigating the impact of 
potential cross-sectional dependence. Madala and Wu’s test is a Fisher-type test 
where p-values from individual tests, i.e. unit root tests for each panel’s time series 
here, are combined to obtain an overall test statistic on whether the panels contain a 
unit root. It should be noted that the consistency of this test relies on large-T 
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asymptotics (Madala and Wu,1999, p. 637), however this was the only available 
option because the other tests are not suitable for unbalanced panels and/or panels 
with gaps (StataCorp, 2009), and therefore they could not be implemented in this 
analysis69. Maddala and Wu’s (1999) Fisher test strongly rejects the null hypothesis 
that all panels contain a unit root for the dependent variable, (ln)indFDIstock and all 
the independent variables with the exception of (ln)TERTedu and (ln)ictinfra (see 
Appendix 6.4 for printouts). Hence, a cointegrating relationship, which would 
require for all variables to contain a unit root, can be ruled out.    
Because, as explained above, GMM estimators do not rely on assumptions regarding 
the distribution, no normality testing is necessary. Also, as explained in the previous 
section, heteroskedasticity is accounted for in the two-step GMM estimator which is 
used here as the preferred estimator; where estimates from the one-step estimator are 
provided for comparison, clustering by cross-sectional unit is used so as to account 
for arbitrary patterns of heteroskedasticiy (as opposed to ‘modelling’ these patterns 
in the two-step estimator).  
Initially, Model (6.4) is estimated treating all the dependent variables (with the 
exception of the lagged dependent variable) as exogenous, exploiting the full set of 
moment conditions available; i.e. for each variable, for each time period and lag. 
However, this initial specification fails diagnostic tests for instrument validity: the 
Sargan/Hansen test and the m1/m2 test for residual autocorrelation, which is not 
surprising considering that the number of instruments is larger than the number of 
cross-sectional units. As a response, the number of instruments is thus reduced 
because, as Verbeek (2000, p. 138) explains, tests may not be able to determine 
which of the instruments are invalid. As suggested by Roodman (2006), and 
explained in the previous section, collapsing instruments and reducing the lag range 
are used to reduce the instrument count. First, instruments are collapsed, i.e. the 
creation of instruments for each time period is ‘suppressed’, but this does not appear 
to be sufficient because the tests again uniformly reject instrument validity. 
Accordingly, the lag range is subsequently reduced in addition to collapsing. Initially 
lags 1-7 are used and then the range is further reduced by excluding farther lags one 
                                                            
69
 The tests/estimations could not be carried out on a balanced sample because the number of 
observations would be significantly reduced. Data points in this sample are missing due the 
inconsistence of coverage of variables/years across countries and due to the exclusion of the negative 
values of FDI stocks, explained in sub-section 6.6.1.  
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at a time until acceptable specification tests are ultimately obtained when using lags 
1 and 2, or lag 1 only (see Appendix 6.4 for printouts). The same instrument count 
could (theoretically) be obtained whilst using farther lags (e.g. 3 and 4), however the 
use of more recent lags as is preferred under the assumption that they are likely to 
convey more (relevant) information (Greene, 2003, p. 309). Between the two 
specifications for which instrument validity cannot be rejected, i.e. using the first lag 
or using lags 1 and 2, the one with both lags is preferred because it maximises the 
use of available information (to an extent that does not jeopardise instrument 
validity).  
Having obtained an ‘acceptable’ specification, the assumption of endogenous 
independent variables is relaxed and other alternatives are further explored (see 
Appendix 6.5 for printouts). Initially, the other ‘extreme’ is assumed by specifying 
all the ‘suspect’ variables, (ln)wage, (ln)gdp, (ln)SECedu and (ln)TERTedu, as 
endogenous, however instrument validity is strongly rejected. Other ‘intermediate’ 
scenarios are further explored based on theoretical considerations, as follows.  
First, it may be argued that due to the way the education variables are measured, 
they are expected to be predetermined rather than endogenous. Namely, potential 
feedback from FDI to the percentage of population who have attained a certain level 
of education would take at least a few years to take effect (or, more precisely, at least 
the length of the respective cycle of studies); and a similar argument would apply in 
case of a (plausible) relationship between the other regressors such as market size 
(i.e. GDP) and education variable; accordingly, a scenario is estimated where the 
education variables are treated as predetermined, whilst keeping (ln)wage and 
(ln)gdp endogenous. Alternatively, considering that (based on the discussions in 
Sections 2.3 and 5.3) the education variables are considered the ones least likely to 
cause endogeneity in this model, another scenario is estimated where these variables 
are assumed exogenous while (ln)wage and (ln)gdp are kept as endogenous. Again, 
both estimations fail the instrument validity tests. 
Second, because the (potential) feedback of FDI on wages, (ln)wage, and on growth 
(and hence in the (ln)gdp variable here), would also take effect with a time lag, these 
variable may be argued to be predetermined in this model. Accordingly, two further 
specifications are tested where these variables are treated as predetermined, whist 
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(ln)SECedu and (ln)TERTedu are treated as exogenous, or predetermined. These 
specifications are, too, fail instrument validity tests. 
Accordingly, all the explanatory variables in the estimations presented in the rest of 
this chapter are treated as strictly exogenous.  
Table 6.6 below summarises the specifications tests and results for the baseline 
Model (6.4), as estimated with two-step System GMM, Windmeijer-corrected 
standard errors, orthogonal deviations and small-sample adjustments70 (see Appendix 
6.6 for printouts of specification tests and results). As explained in Section 5.5, in a 
dynamic model the short-run coefficients represent the effect of the new information 
on the respective regressors, controlling for their (joint) “historical” effects, whilst 
the long-run effects can be obtained by dividing the regressors by (α), i.e. 1 minus 
the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (see Section 5.5 for an 
explanation of the stock adjustment model).The estimated coefficient short-run and 
long-run coefficients for the baseline Model (6.4) are presented in Columns (1) and 
(2) of Table 6.6 below. The Arellano-Bond m1/m2 test for the differenced residuals 
fails to reject second-order serial correlation whilst rejecting first-order serial 
correlation, indicating exogenous, and thus valid, instruments. Instrument validity is 
also indicated by Hansen’s test of over-identifying restrictions71. The p-value on the 
Hansen test is 0.60, which is substantially higher than the (unusually high) threshold 
of 0.25 which Roodman (2007, p. 10) suggests using for this test as a precautionary 
measure; on the other hand, it is not “too good”, i.e. it does not approach the p-value 
of 1.00 which would indicate a weakening of the test due to a large number of 
moments being tested (Roodman, 2007, pp. 9-10). The Difference-in-Hansen test 
also does not reject the null of instrument validity for the GMM instruments in the 
levels equation, indicating that the “stationarity” condition is satisfied and System 
GMM can be used. This is also confirmed by a coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable which is below one, indicating a stable dynamic process (Roodman, 2006, p. 
19). This coefficient is positive and significant, as expected; and it lies in the 
‘credible’ range, i.e. between the LSDV and OLS estimates (see Appendix 6.6 for 
printouts), thus not indicating any specification problems and/or lack of consistency 
                                                            
70
 Small-sample adjustments refer to “small-sample corrections to the covariance matrix estimate, 
resulting in t instead of z test statistics for the coefficients and F instead of Wald chi2 test for overall 
fit” (Roodman, 2006, p. 38).    
71
 The Sargan test is borderline, however this is not considered to be a problem since, as explained in 
the previous section, this test is expected to over-reject the null in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
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in estimation (Bond, 2002; Roodman, 2006). The rejection of first-order serial 
correlation in the differenced residuals by the m1 test combined with the failure to 
reject the null of instrument validity for the ‘extra’ moment conditions by the 
difference-in-Hansen test indicates that cross-sectional dependence is not a problem 
in this model (Sarafidis et al., 2009). The estimated results presented in the rest of 
this chapter satisfy all the specification tests, unless stated otherwise. 
The F-tests for the joint significance of the independent variables soundly rejects the 
null, indicating that the independent variables collectively have explanatory power 
with respect to the dependent variable. Similar to the results obtained from FE/FEVD 
models with aggregate FDI inflows and the LSDV models with aggregate/total 
manufacturing FDI stocks, this model does not find support for the hypothesis that 
the percentage of population who have completed secondary/tertiary education, 
(ln)SECedu and (ln)TERTedu, have a positive effect on inward FDI. According to 
the results, controlling for the historical effects of the “independent” regressors, a 1% 
increase in the level of the economic freedom index by Heritage Foundation, 
(ln)econfree, is, on average, associated with 1.5% increase in the level of FDI stock 
in the manufacturing industries, on average. Calculated at the means of the sample, 
an increase of the economic freedom index from 57.8 to 58.4 is associated with an 
increase of EUR 8.36 Million in the level of annual FDI stocks in a manufacturing 
industry. An increase of 1% in host country’s progress in transition as measured by 
the EBRD overall transition indicator, (ln)transition is, on average,  associated with 
a 2.2% increase in the level of manufacturing FDI stock. Calculated at the means of 
the sample, an increase of the EBRD transition score from 3.22 to 3.25 is associated 
with an increase of EUR 12.26 Million in the level of annual FDI stocks in a 
manufacturing industry. The control for major privatisation (waves) in the specific 
manufacturing industries, indprivatisation, is marginally significant in the short-run.  
The long-run coefficients depict a similar relationship between the stock of FDI and 
the independent variables in the model, with the exception of the privatisation 
variable. Again, economic freedom and progress in transition are the only factors 
that are found to affect manufacturing FDI stocks. In the long-run, an increase of 1% 
in the level of the economic freedom index is associated with a 2.3% increase (i.e. 
EUR 12.82 Million) in the level of FDI stock in a manufacturing industry, on 
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average, whilst an increase of the same magnitude in the transition indicator is 
associated with 3.2% increase (i.e. EUR 17.84 Million).  
Table 6.6: Model 6.4 results (dependent variable: lnindFDIstock) 
  (1) (2)  
VARIABLES Short-run Long-run  
L.lnindfdistock 0.321***    
  (0.112)    
lnsecedu -0.534 -0.785  
  (1.040) (1.577)  
lntertedu -1.015 -1.49  
  (0.829) (1.063)  
lnwage -0.481 -0.708  
  (0.429) (0.647)  
lngdp 0.323 0.476  
  (0.538) (0.802)  
lntradefree -0.0157 -0.023  
  (0.280) (0.413)  
lneconfree 1.555** 2.289**  
  (0.646) (0.894)  
lntransition 2.226** 3.277**  
  (1.109) (1.581)  
lnictinfra 0.394* 0.580  
  (0.232) (0.359)  
indprivatisation 1.300* 1.914  
  (0.692) (1.189)  
Observations 1,283    
Number of id 130    
Number of instruments 47    
     
 
F test: F(42, 129) = 89.93  
  Prob > F = 0.00  
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test: z = -2.13  
  Prob > z = 0.03  
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test: z = -1.06  
  Prob > z = 0.29  
Sargan test:  chi2(4) = 4.89  
  
Prof > chi2 
= 0.08  
Hansen test: chi2(4) = 0.99  
  
Prof > chi2 
= 0.60  
Difference-in-Hansen test: chi2(2) = 0.73  
  
Prof > chi2 
= 0.39  
LSDV-OLS range (lagged dependent var):   0.19-0.47  
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Note: Year dummies included, but not reported. Models estimated using two-
step System GMM.   
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As a robustness check, Model (6.4) was estimated using the one-step System GMM 
estimator (as opposed to the two-step estimator) and/or using first-differences (as 
opposed to orthogonal deviations) in the differenced equation; and with the 
Difference GMM estimator using all these combinations of options. Whilst the 
results of these different specifications differ to some extent with regard to the 
magnitude and/or significance of the other regressors, the results with regard to the 
human capital variables remain largely unchanged, with the exception of the two-
step estimator with first differences in which tertiary education is found to be 
statistically significant, though with a negative sign (see Appendix 6.7 for printouts). 
In addition, as suggested by Roodman (2006), the “robustness” of the Hansen test 
was tested, and approved, by checking for any major changes in its value when the 
instrument count is continuously reduced by: using only one lag, dropping year 
dummies, dropping sector dummies, and dropping country dummies (See Appendix 
6.8 for printouts).  The preferred specification remains with two lags, because it 
utilises more information in the estimation without causing deterioration of the 
specification tests; and with all dummies included because they are found to be 
jointly significant (See Appendix 6.8 for printouts of the joint significance tests).   
Next, the baseline model above is augmented with technological intensity dummies, 
medium and high, and their respective interactions with the education variables: 
(ln)SECmed, (ln)SEChigh, (ln)TERTmed and (ln)TERThigh. This enables to test 
for the hypotheses that FDI in technology-intensive industries is relatively more 
sensitive to human capital availability72. Also, it should be able to shed light on any 
potential relationship between human capital and FDI that may exist only in these 
specific groups of manufacturing industries and therefore could be “hidden” by 
estimating the average effect when data for all industries (or all sectors) are pooled 
together. The estimator and the options used in this model are the same as in the 
previous model. The specification tests and results of the augmented Model (6.5) are 
presented in Table 6.7 below, whilst the printouts for these are presented in 
Appendix 6.9. 
                                                            
72
 This hypothesis can also be tested by estimating and comparing individual regressions for different 
groups of industries. The results of this approach were not any different from the ones reported here, 
but they are not reported because of problems with the specification tests, likely resulting from the 
smaller sample size.  
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Similar to the previous model, this model appears to have no problems in terms of 
specification. In the short-run, the education variables remain insignificant, as are the 
technological intensity dummies and the interactions between these sets of variables. 
The insignificance of these variables indicated by their individual t-statistic was also 
confirmed by F tests for joint significance to ensure that this result was not obtained 
merely due to collinearity between the interactions and the variables themselves (see 
Appendix 6.9 for the joint tests). Contrary to expectations, (ln)TERTmed is found to 
be (marginally) significant with a negative sign in the long-run, indicating that the 
effect of the percentage of population who have attained secondary education is 
lower in medium technology manufacturing industries compared to low technology 
ones. In terms of control variables, economic freedom and progress in transition 
remain significant, with almost identical coefficients as in the baseline model. 
Table 6.7: Model 6.5 results (dependent variable: lnindFDIstock) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Short-run Long-run 
      
L.lnindfdistock 0.319***   
  (0.116)   
lnsecedu -0.708 -1.038 
  (0.996) (1.511) 
lntertedu -0.669 -0.982 
  (0.761) (1.024) 
medium -0.268 -0.39 
  (1.223) (1.793) 
high -0.0317 -0.046 
  (1.116) (1.637) 
lnsecmed 0.330 0.484 
  (0.372) (0.520) 
lnsechigh 0.0870 0.127 
  (0.345) (0.500) 
lntertmed -0.739 -1.084* 
  (0.453) (0.571) 
lnterthigh -0.375 -0.550 
  (0.342) (0.469) 
lnwage -0.481 -0.705 
  (0.429) (0.646) 
lngdp 0.323 0.474 
  (0.541) (0.805) 
lntradefree -0.0110 -0.016 
  (0.283) (0.416) 
lneconfree 1.532** 2.248** 
  (0.656) (0.912) 
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lntransition 2.218** 3.254** 
  (1.113) (1.588) 
lnictinfra 0.392 0.574 
  (0.237) (0.370) 
indprivatisation 1.300* 1.908 
  (0.702) (1.210) 
     
Observations 1,283   
Number of id 130   
Number of instruments 51   
F test: F(48, 129) = 95.50 
  Prob > F = 0.00 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test: z = -2.11 
  Prob > z = 0.03 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test: z = -1.07 
  Prob > z = 0.29 
Sargan test:  chi2(4) = 4.69 
  Prof > chi2 = 0.10 
Hansen test: chi2(4) = 0.94 
  Prof > chi2 = 0.62 
Difference-in-Hansen test: chi2(2) = 0.68 
  Prof > chi2 = 0.41 
LSDV-OLS range (lagged dependent var):     0.17-0.46 
Notes:   
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Results with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors, small-sample adjustments and orthogonal deviations. 
Instruments are collapsed and lag range is restricted to lags 1 and 2.  
lagged (ln)indfdistock is treated as predetermined, and other regressors as exogenous.  
Country, year and sector dummies included, but not reported.   
 
Table 6.8 below presents the results for the transition-specific hypothesis which were 
tested in Models (6.6-6.8). (Printouts of the results, specification tests, and long-run 
coefficients for Models (6.6-6.8) are presented in Appendices 6.10-6.12, 
respectively.) The estimated results do not seem to lend support to the hypothesis 
that foreign investors are attracted by countries that have emphasised general (rather 
than vocational) upper-secondary education, or by a relatively younger workforce 
which is educated in post-communist education system. Contrary to expectations, the 
initial general- to vocational- ratio of enrolments at the outset of transition, 
(ln)genvocratio, i.e. the level of emphasis on general education, is found to have a 
significant negative effect on FDI. The share of population aged 16-30 in 2008, 
(ln)edutr1, is also found to have an insignificant effect on FDI inflows, both in the 
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short- and long-run. The second proxy for the share of population educated after the 
communist period, (ln)edutr2, is found to be insignificant, however, this model has 
problem with the Arellano-Bond m1 test for residual correlation, and therefore it is 
not clear that the results of Model (6.8) are reliable. 
Table 6.8: Models (6.6-6.8) results (dependent variable: lnindFDIstock) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model (6.6) Model (6.7) Model (6.8) 
        
L.lnindfdistock 0.321*** 0.255** 0.247* 
  (0.112) (0.100) (0.134) 
lnsecedu -0.534 -0.683 0.532 
  (1.040) (3.491) (3.940) 
lntertedu -1.015 0.236 -0.289 
  (0.829) (1.482) (1.690) 
lngenvocratio -2.355**    
  (1.038)    
lnedutr1  -3.224   
   (3.169)   
lnedutr2   -2.033 
    (2.538) 
lnwage -0.481 0.0504 -0.177 
  (0.429) (0.770) (0.784) 
lngdp 0.323 -0.302 0.239 
  (0.538) (1.099) (1.150) 
lntradefree -0.0157 -0.560 -0.395 
  (0.280) (0.382) (0.419) 
lneconfree 1.555** 1.247* 1.131* 
  (0.646) (0.672) (0.612) 
lntransition 2.226** 3.906 2.576 
  (1.109) (2.387) (2.958) 
lnictinfra 0.394* 0.000282 0.235 
  (0.232) (0.544) (0.632) 
indprivatisation 1.300* 1.467*** 1.093 
  (0.692) (0.459) (0.682) 
Observations   1,283 1,017 
Number of id  130 129 
Number of instruments   51 51 
Notes:    
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Results with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors, small-sample adjustments and orthogonal 
deviations. 
Instruments are collapsed and lag range is restricted to lags 1 and 
2.   
lagged (ln)indfdistock is treated as predetermined, and other regressors as exogenous.  
Country, year and sector dummies included, but not reported.   
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Table 6.9 below presents the results of the baseline model augmented with the 
measures of human capital availability/cognitive skills. The country-average of 
number of weeks it takes firms in the manufacturing sector to fill a vacancy for a 
skilled worker in manufacturing, (ln)manvacancy, is found to be insignificant, 
though Model (6.9) appears to have problems with instrument validity and therefore 
cannot be considered reliable (see Appendix 6.13 for printouts). However, contrary 
to the previous results for human capital measures obtained in this research, the 
average level of cognitive skills in science and math measured in primary/secondary 
school in International Student Achievement Tests, (ln)cognitive, as well as the share 
of top-performers in these tests (ln)top, are found to have a significant positive effect 
on manufacturing FDI stocks (see Appendices 6.13 and 6.14 for Model 6.10 and 6.11 
printouts, respectively). The size of these effects and the long-run coefficients are 
discussed later in this section. 
 
Table 6.9: Model (6.9-6.11) results (dependent variable: lnindFDIstock) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model (6.9) Model (6.10) Model (6.11) 
        
L.lnindfdistock 0.162** 0.273* 0.273* 
  (0.0644) (0.138) (0.138) 
lnsecedu -5.270 -0.630 -0.630 
  (3.904) (1.050) (1.050) 
lntertedu 2.806 -1.150 -1.150 
  (2.042) (0.896) (0.896) 
lnmanvacancy 0.243    
  (0.480)    
lncognitive  9.368**   
   (3.824)   
lntop   1.679** 
    (0.685) 
lnwage -1.283 -0.344 -0.344 
  (2.259) (0.497) (0.497) 
lngdp 2.474 0.264 0.264 
  (2.157) (0.561) (0.561) 
lntradefree -1.477* -0.101 -0.101 
  (0.795) (0.278) (0.278) 
lneconfree 0.412 1.667** 1.667** 
  (1.531) (0.638) (0.638) 
lntransition 1.482 1.936* 1.936* 
  (4.645) (1.117) (1.117) 
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lnictinfra -1.458* 0.339 0.339 
  (0.866) (0.253) (0.253) 
indprivatisation 1.241 1.285 1.285 
  (0.820) (0.849) (0.849) 
Observations 474 1,190 1,190 
Number of id 129 118 118 
Number of instruments 39 46 46 
Notes:    
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Results with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors, small-sample adjustments and orthogonal deviations. 
Instruments are collapsed and lag range is restricted to lags 1 and 2.   
lagged (ln)indfdistock is treated as predetermined, and other regressors as exogenous.  
Country, year and sector dummies included, but not reported.   
 
Having found a positive effect of (ln)cognitive and (ln)top, interactions of these 
variables were added to test the hypothesis that a higher level of cognitive skills and 
top performer in cognitive tests have a stronger effect on higher-technology 
manufacturing industries. Accordingly, Models (6.10) and (6.11) are augmented with 
technology level dummies, medium and high, and their interactions with the 
respective cognitive skill measures: 
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Table 6.10 below presents the estimated short- and long- run coefficients for Models 
(6.10) and (6.12), the printouts of which are presented in Appendices 6.14 and 6.16, 
respectively. The average level of cognitive skills, (ln)cognitive, remains significant 
in the long-run, with an even higher significance level and size of coefficient 
(Column 2). According to the results, a 1% increase in the standardised measure of 
cognitive skills is, on average, associated with a 9.3% increase in manufacturing FDI 
stock in the short-run and a 12.8% increase in the long-run. Calculated at the sample 
means, the results suggest that an increase of the standardised cognitive score 
measure from 4.75 to 4.8 (note that the maximum in the sample is 5.19) is associated 
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with an increase of a manufacturing industry’s annual FDI stock by EUR 51.8 and 
71.3 Million in the short- and long-run, respectively.    
The inclusion of dummies for industry groups according to technological intensity 
suggests that, in accordance with the hypothesis developed earlier in this chapter, the 
positive effect of cognitive skills is larger in high-tech industries compared to that in 
low-tech industries, as indicated by the significant and positive interaction term 
(ln)cognitivehigh. The size of the effects of both (ln)cognitive and its interaction 
with the high-tech industry dummy remain very large. The estimated effect for low-
tech industries is a bit smaller, with a 1% increase in (ln)cognitive being associated 
with a 7.1% and 9.7%, i.e. EUR 39.6 and 54.1 Million, increase in a manufacturing 
industry’s FDI stock in the short-run and the long-run, respectively73. For high-tech 
industries this effect is larger: a 1% increase in (ln)cognitive is associated with a 
13.1% increase in manufacturing FDI stocks in the short-run and an 17.9% increase 
in the long-run, which at the mean of the sample translates into an increase of EUR 
73 and 99.9 Million, respectively. 
Table 6.10: Model (6.10) and (6.12) (dependent variable: lnindFDIstock) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Model (6.10) Model (6.12) 
VARIABLES short-run long-run short-run long-run 
          
L.lnindfdistock 0.273*  0.274**   
  (0.138)  (0.138)   
lnsecedu -0.630 -0.857 -0.619 -0.852 
  (1.050) (1.470) (1.053) (1.474) 
lntertedu -1.150 -1.582 -1.147 -1.579 
  (0.896) (1.024) (0.896) (1.026) 
lncognitive 9.368** 12.893*** 7.106* 9.788** 
  (3.824) (3.853) (3.727) (4.250) 
medium   -4.394 -6.053 
    (3.517) (4.610) 
high   -9.844** -13.560*** 
    (3.942) (4.586) 
lncognitivemed   2.427 3.343 
    (2.193) (2.895) 
lncognitivehigh   5.928** 8.166*** 
    (2.452) (2.874) 
lnwage -0.344 -0.473 -0.351 -0.483 
  (0.497) (0.722) (0.496) (0.722) 
                                                            
73
 The effect for the high-tech industries is calculated by summing the coefficients on lncognitive and 
lncognitivehigh, e.g. in Column 3 the effect is 7.106 + 5.928 = 13.134. 
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lngdp 0.264 0.363 0.270 0.037 
  (0.561) (0.790) (0.562) 0.7927 
lntradefree -0.101 -0.138 -0.100 -0.138 
  (0.278) (0.394) (0.278) (0.396) 
lneconfree 1.667** 2.294*** 1.668** 2.297*** 
  (0.638) (0.825) (0.641) (0.828) 
lntransition 1.936* 2.664* 1.922* 2.647 
  (1.117) (1.452) (1.117) (1.457)* 
lnictinfra 0.339 0.467 0.342 0.470 
  (0.253) (0.385) (0.253) (0.385) 
indprivatisation 1.285 1.768 1.274 1.755 
  (0.849) (1.387) (0.851) (1.388) 
Observations 1,190   1,190   
Number of id 118  118   
Number of instruments 46   48   
Notes:     
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Results with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors, small-sample adjustments and orthogonal 
deviations. 
Instruments are collapsed and lag range is restricted to lags 1 and 2. 
lagged (ln)indfdistock is treated as predetermined, and other regressors as exogenous.  
Country, year and sector dummies included, but not reported. 
 
Table 6.11 below presents the estimated short- and long- run coefficients for Models 
(6.11) and (6.13), the printouts of which are presented in Appendices 6.15 and 6.17, 
respectively. Similar to the results for (ln)cognitive above, the short-run and long-run 
coefficients on the share of top-performers in cognitive tests (ln)top are significant 
and positive. According to the results, an increase of the share of top performers in 
cognitive tests by 1% (i.e. at the mean of the sample from 7.01 to 7.08 percent) is, on 
average, associated with an increase in manufacturing FDI stock by 1.6% (or EUR 
6.7 Million) in the short-run and 2.3% (or EUR 12.8 Million) in the long-run.  
As expected, the effect of (ln)top is found to be significantly larger in medium-tech 
industries and high-tech industries compared to the base category of low-tech 
industries, as indicated by the significant and positive interactions (ln)topmed and 
(ln)tophigh. An increase of (ln)top by 1% is, on average associated with an increase 
of 1.8% or EUR 10 Million (2.5% or EUR 13.9 Million) in the FDI stock of medium 
industries in the short-run (long-run), and an increase of 2% or EUR 11.2 Million 
(2.7% or EUR 15 Million) in the FDI stock of high-tech industries in the short-run 
(long-run). 
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Table 6.11: Model (6.11) and (6.13) (dependent variable: lnindFDIstock) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Model (6.11) Model (6.13) 
VARIABLES short-run long-run short-run long-run 
          
L.lnindfdistock 0.273*  0.275**   
  (0.138)  (0.137)   
lnsecedu -0.630 -0.867 -0.619 -0.853 
  (1.050) (1.470) (1.056) (1.480) 
lntertedu -1.150 -1.582 -1.141 -1.572 
  (0.896) (1.024) (0.895) (1.027) 
lntop 1.679** 2.310*** 1.353** 1.865** 
  (0.685) 0.690 (0.659) (0.721) 
medium   0.887 1.223 
    (0.644) (0.832) 
high   1.375** 1.896 
    (0.685) (0.852) 
lntopmed   0.534** 0.736** 
    (0.249) (0.304) 
lntophigh   0.670*** 0.924*** 
    (0.256) (0.300) 
lnwage -0.344 -1.473 -0.352 -0.485 
  (0.497) (0.722) (0.496) (0.721) 
lngdp 0.264 0.363 0.272 0.374 
  (0.561) (0.790) (0.563) (0.794) 
lntradefree -0.101 -0.138 -0.104 -0.143 
  (0.278) (0.394) (0.278) (0.396) 
lneconfree 1.667** 2.294*** 1.665** 2.296*** 
  (0.638) (0.825) (0.643) (0.829) 
lntransition 1.936* 2.664* 1.915* 2.641* 
  (1.117) (1.452) (1.115) (1.458) 
lnictinfra 0.339 0.467 0.341 0.470 
  (0.253) (0.385) (0.252) (0.384) 
indprivatisation 1.285 1.768 1.263 1.741 
  (0.849) (1.387) (0.857) (1.396) 
Observations 1,190   1,190   
Number of id 118  118   
Number of instruments 46   48   
Notes:     
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Results with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors, small-sample adjustments and orthogonal 
deviations. 
Instruments are collapsed and lag range is restricted to lags 1 and 2. 
lagged (ln)indfdistock is treated as predetermined, and other regressors as exogenous.  
Country, year and sector dummies included, but not reported. 
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Models (6.10) and (6.11) above were estimated adding the level of development (as 
measured by GDP per capita, gdppc) as a control variable in an attempt to control for 
possible omitted variable bias. The inclusion of this variable does not appear to 
reduce the size of the coefficients on (ln)cognitive and (ln)top (printouts for these 
regressions are presented in Appendix 6.19).   
6.7 Conclusion 
In previous chapters it was argued that not being able to discriminate between 
different economic sectors is a major weakness of FDI studies, particularly when the 
effect of human capital is being investigated. This chapter first looked at the sectoral 
composition of the FDI in European transition economies. An overview of the data 
suggests that nearly one-third of FDI stocks in these economies was in 
manufacturing; the rest is strongly dominated by services, of which financial 
intermediation is the largest industry, whilst the primary sector accounts for a 
negligible share of FDI. Of three sectors, it was argued that FDI in the manufacturing 
sector is most likely to be attracted by the availability (and cost) of human capital 
and therefore any potential relationship between human capital and the determinants 
of FDI are more likely to be identified by restricting the latter measure to FDI in 
manufacturing. Accordingly, a dynamic LSDV model similar to that used in the 
previous chapter was estimated using aggregate manufacturing FDI stocks as a 
dependent variable. Similar to the empirical investigation in the previous chapter and 
the meta-regression analysis in Chapter 3, no significant effect of education variables 
on FDI was found; similarly, no support is found for the transition-specific human 
capital hypotheses developed in Chapter 5.  
It was further argued previously (in Section 4.2) that FDI in some industries is likely 
to be more sensitive to the availability of human capital, depending on their level of 
technological intensity. To test the hypothesis, the independent variable was 
measured at a further disaggregated level (2-digit NACE classification) and dummy 
variables indicating the level of technological intensity were entered, together with 
their interactions with the human capital variables. The (System) GMM results of the 
stock adjustment model with country-industry pairs of FDI stocks as a dependent 
variable do not suggest that there is a positive relationship between the percentage of 
population who have completed secondary/tertiary education and FDI, regardless of 
the level of technological intensity. The results of this model also do not support the 
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transition-specific hypotheses developed in this research. However, contrary to the 
results obtained for the education measures, and in the previous chapter, the level of 
cognitive skills measured in International Student Achievement Tests, as well as the 
share of top-performers in these tests, are found to have a significant positive effect 
on FDI stocks. Moreover, in accordance with the hypothesis developed in this 
research, the positive effect of these variables is found to be stronger for FDI in 
(medium- and) high-tech industries. Except for the previous level of FDI stocks and 
the cognitive skills measure, FDI stocks in European transition economies appear to 
be primarily driven by the level of economic freedom and progress achieved in the 
transition process. 
The empirical analyses presented in this thesis have consistently suggested no 
significant effect of traditional, non quality-adjusted, human capital measures on 
inwards FDI, accordingly the following chapter explores some potential explanations 
for these findings. However, there was empirical evidence indicating that the quality 
dimension of human capital has a positive effect on inwards manufacturing FDI in 
European transition economies, so Chapter 7 also presents a discussion of the 
implications of these results for further macro-level economic research focusing on 
the effects of human capital.  
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7.1 Introduction 
This aim of this thesis was to empirically investigate the effect of human capital on 
inwards FDI in European transition economies. Having found no consensus after a 
review of previous studies that empirically investigate this relationship, the first 
research questions in this research programme were whether an ‘authentic’ effect of 
human capital can be identified (and quantified) in previous research and whether 
the heterogeneity of results can be explained by specific characteristics of previous 
studies. These research questions were addressed using a meta-regression analysis 
(MRA) in Chapter 3. Following a critical review of alternative measures of human 
capital, the next research question addressed concerned whether economies with 
relatively abundant human capital attract more inwards FDI. This research 
question was investigated in Chapter 5 using panel data on aggregate FDI inflows 
and stocks of European transition economies. After a review of different types of 
FDI, the further research questions addressed in this research were whether 
economies that are relatively human capital abundant attract more inwards FDI 
into their manufacturing sector, and whether the effect of human capital is 
stronger in more technologically-intensive manufacturing industries. These 
research questions were addressed in Chapter 6 using panel data on manufacturing 
FDI stocks of European transition economies. This chapter will synthesise and 
analyse the findings of the thesis to provide explanations and implications of the 
findings for future research, and it will list its main contributions to knowledge and 
limitations. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 syntheses the 
findings of this research with regard to the research questions introduced above. 
Section 7.3 appraises the contributions to knowledge and the limitations of this 
thesis. Section 7.4 provides potential explanations for the findings of the empirical 
investigation and explores some of their implications. In addition, this section points 
to further research that can be undertaken in this field. A separate section on policy 
implications is not provided in this chapter considering the lack of significant effects 
found for traditional human capital measures and the need for further empirical work 
to explore the significance of the cognitive skills measures. Section 7.5 concludes by 
looking at the wider implications of this research for future empirical research using 
aggregate measures of human capital. 
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7.2 Main findings  
7.2.1 Analysing the results of the previous empirical literature 
The simple bivariate meta-regression model estimated in Chapter 3 suggested that 
there is no “genuine effect” of human capital on FDI in the previous literature. As 
this lack of a genuine effect may arise due to a large unexplained heterogeneity, the 
bivariate meta-regression model was subsequently augmented with a range of 
variables indicating characteristics of the original studies with regard to the data, 
estimation techniques and model specifications they use. However, in this meta-
regression analysis (MRA) this finding does not seem to be attributed to unexplained 
heterogeneity, as the results of the multivariate model confirm the lack of a 
“genuine effect” of human capital on FDI. This finding was argued to be 
consistent, among other explanations, with human capital not necessarily being a 
relevant attractor for all types of FDI, or in all economic activities; e.g. being of little 
importance in resource-seeking FDI in primary sector activities or in market-seeking 
tertiary sector activities compared to manufacturing activities. The fact that over half 
of the world inward FDI stock is estimated to be market- or resource-seeking 
(UNCTAD, 2010a), and therefore is expected to be (relatively) little affected by 
human capital, makes it difficult for studies using aggregate FDI measures to identify 
any relationship that may exist between human capital and FDI in the rest of the 
economic activities. Therefore, the empirical analyses in Chapters 6 restricts the 
measure of FDI stock to that in manufacturing activities where such a relationship is 
more likely to be found.    
Controlling for different study characteristics related to FDI and human capital 
measures used, methodology, model specification and sample of countries covered in 
the sample, the results of the MRA suggests that there is also no publication bias in 
the previous literature. This finding in not surprising considering that the only a 
small fraction of the studies actually have the relationship between human capital 
and FDI as a focus of their investigation. Rather, human capital tends to be included 
merely as one of many FDI determinants in a “kitchen sink” approach, or simply as a 
control variable in empirical studies that focus on the effect of other locational 
factors on FDI. Under these circumstances, if the researchers are prone to “search” 
for significant results, they are likely to pay (relatively) little attention to the human 
capital variable compared both to their variable(s) of interest and other determinants 
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which are more “established” in FDI theory, as explained in Chapter 2 (e.g. market 
size, trade costs, etc.).  
The results of the MRA suggest that the size of the estimated effect of human capital 
on FDI does not depend on the choice of FDI measure (flow vs. stock) or 
data/estimation technique (cross-section OLS, limited dependent variable model, 
time-series, static panel or dynamic panel). Similarly, the estimated effect of human 
capital does not appear to depend on indicators of “reliability” of the results: the 
quality of data and/or econometric techniques (as proxied by recentness of 
publication), the number of periods covered in the study, the number variables of 
controlled for in the model and whether or not endogeneity was (tentatively) 
controlled for. The estimated effect of human capital on FDI is found to be 
significantly lower if a simple labour cost measure in included the model, but it is 
significantly larger in models where productivity or unit labour costs are 
controlled for. Consistent with the view that human capital is becoming more 
important for (foreign) firms over time (Noorbakhsh et al., 2002; Machin, 2004), 
studies using more recent data find a significantly larger effect of human capital 
on FDI.  
Contrary to expectations, the estimated effect of human capital is not larger when 
stock measures of human capital are used (as opposed to flow measures such as 
enrolment rates), or when output measures are used (as opposed to input measures 
such as spending on education). However, the estimated effect of secondary 
education measures on FDI is lower compared to that of measures referring to 
other levels of education or not specifying the level of education. There does not 
seem to be a theoretical rationale for secondary education being less important to 
foreign investors, but this finding could be partly explained by fact that secondary 
education attainment (to a greater extent than other levels) may actually measure 
different things in different countries because of the differences in education systems 
with regard to length of secondary education or the mix of general-vocational 
education. Compared to primary education, in particular, there may also be more 
pronounced differences in the quality of provision at the secondary level.  
The sample of countries for which the relationship between human capital and FDI is 
estimated also appears to affect the estimated results. The estimated effect of human 
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capital is found to be, on average, larger in mixed samples and regional data from 
China relative to samples of developing or developed economies. In contrast, the 
size of this effect is estimated to be smaller, on average, in samples of transition 
economies. One potential explanation for this finding was argued to be the inferiority 
of the communist education systems in developing skills and traits that are valued by 
(foreign) firms in a market economy, due partly to their curricular content, 
instruction methods and over-emphasis on ‘traditional’ vocational education. 
Accordingly, the level of emphasis on vocational education and the share of 
population educated in a post-communist education system were used in the 
empirical investigations reported in Chapters 5 and 6 in an attempt to investigate the 
extent to which these potential effects may cause foreign investors to value human 
capital developed in transition economies less than that in other countries.   
7.2.2 Does human capital affect total inwards FDI in European 
transition economies? 
Consistent with the results of the meta-regression, the empirical investigations in 
Chapters 5 and 6 do not find support for the hypothesis that volume measures of 
human capital positively affect the level of FDI received in European transition 
economies. This result is consistent across different specifications, regardless of the 
type of the human capital measure, FDI measure or estimator used. In a fixed effects 
(FE) estimation, the share of working age population who have completed 
secondary or tertiary education (Barro and Lee, 2010) are both found to have an 
insignificant effect on net FDI inflows, regardless of whether they enter the model 
separately or simultaneously. These results of the conventional (panel-robust) FE 
estimator are confirmed by the Driscoll-Kraay- and the two-way cluster-robust 
estimators which account for the effects of autocorrelation, cross-sectional 
dependence and group-wise heteroskedasticity. However, since these stock measures 
of education are both variables that change slowly over time, i.e. they have low 
within variation, the FE estimator which utilises only within variation in the 
estimation was argued to be less able to identify any potential relationship that may 
exist between these and FDI inflows. Accordingly, the fixed effect vector 
decomposition (FEVD) estimator was used in an attempt to improve the efficiency 
(i.e. precision) of estimation in order to ensure that the obtained results are not 
merely caused by low within variation in the data. The results of the FEVD 
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estimator also suggest that the share of the working age population who have 
completed secondary/tertiary education do not have a significant effect on FDI 
inflows. Finally, FDI stocks are used as an independent variable instead of net FDI 
inflows and a stock adjustment model is estimated as a robustness check. The stock 
adjustment model estimated using the corrected dynamic least squares dummy 
variable (LSDVC) estimator confirms the insignificant effect of these variables on 
FDI stocks. 
In addition to the more conventional educational attainment measures above, three 
new measures of human capital were used in this investigation: the level of cognitive 
skills as derived by Hanushek and Woessmann (2009a) based on international 
standardised test scores at primary and/or secondary education level; the share of 
top-performing students in these tests (2009a); and the availability of skilled labour 
as measured by the country-average number of weeks it took firms currently 
operating in the economy to fill a vacancy for a skilled worker (BEEPS, 2002, 2005). 
As there is only one observation per country available for the measures of cognitive 
skills, these have to be assumed as time-invariant and, in a FE context, they can only 
be estimated using the FEVD estimator. The availability of skilled workers is 
available for a total of four years but, similar to the education measures above, it has 
low within variation and therefore the FEVD estimator is preferred. However, in the 
case of this variable, a stock adjustment model can also be estimated for using the 
corrected dynamic LSDV estimator. Similar to the human capital measures above, 
the level of cognitive skills, the share of top performers in cognitive tests and the 
availability of skilled workers in the economy are not found to affect the level of 
FDI inflows/stocks. 
7.2.3 Does human capital affect inwards FDI in manufacturing 
activities in European transition economies?  
In Chapter 6 it has been argued that human capital may not necessarily be a relevant 
factor for all types of FDI. If FDI is disaggregated according to economic sectors, it 
has been argued that FDI in primary sector activities such as agriculture or mining is 
driven by the availability of natural resources which are location-bound and therefore 
(relatively) less likely to be affected by the host countries’ human capital availability. 
Similarly, FDI in the tertiary sector activities such as the provision of financial or 
telecommunication services is likely to be primarily driven by the size of the host 
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country market. FDI in the manufacturing activities, on the other hand, was argued to 
be (largely) efficiency-seeking and therefore more likely to be driven by the 
availability and cost of factors of production such as human capital. If aggregate FDI 
data is used, as in most of the previous literature included in the MRA or in the 
estimations in Chapter 5, these sectoral differences may therefore “blur” any 
relationship between human capital and FDI in manufacturing.  
Accordingly, the hypothesis of a positive relationship between human capital and 
FDI was tested in a stock adjustment model restricting the independent variable to 
stocks of FDI in the manufacturing sector only. This hypothesis was initially tested 
using total manufacturing FDI stocks in a corrected dynamic LSDV context, and 
insignificant effects of the share of population who have completed 
secondary/tertiary education and the availability of skilled workers as reported by the 
firms operating in the economy were found. Further, a dynamic panel model with 
country-industry pairs of FDI stocks in manufacturing industries as an independent 
variable was estimated using the two-step System Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator; this way, the average effect of human capital across 
manufacturing sectors is estimated, although more disaggregated data is used. 
Similar to previous specifications using aggregate FDI as an independent variable, 
the results of the System GMM estimator suggest that neither the share of working 
age population who have completed secondary/tertiary education nor the 
availability of skilled workers in the economy have a significant effects on 
manufacturing FDI stocks in European transition economies. These findings 
appear are confirmed by both short-run and long-run coefficients and they appear to 
be robust to different specifications and GMM estimators.  
However, in contrast to the measures of available quantity of human capital above, 
the measures of cognitive skills are found to be significantly and positively 
associated with inwards FDI stocks in European transition economies. Positive 
effects are found, of a feasible magnitude, for both the average level of cognitive 
skill as measured by the scores of primary/secondary students in International 
Student Achievement Tests and the percentage of top performers in these tests. The 
level of development (as measured by GDP per capita) was controlled for in these 
regressions because it was considered a potential source of omitted variable bias 
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which could have affected the results, but the inclusion of this variable did not 
reduce the level of statistical significance or size of the coefficient of the cognitive 
skill measure. The effect of top performers’ share was also found to be robust to the 
inclusion of the development variable.  
7.2.4 Does the effect of human capital vary according to the level of 
technological intensity of inwards FDI?  
After having found no relationship between quantity measures and aggregate FDI or 
manufacturing FDI, the hypothesis that the effect of human capital varies in different 
(manufacturing) industries depending on their level of technological intensity was 
tested. This also provides a means of testing whether such a relationship exists only 
in some specific industries, which would potentially explain why insignificant effects 
of human capital on aggregate or manufacturing FDI were found. Manufacturing 
industries were classified into three groups according to their level of technological 
intensity (based on the standard OECD/Eurostat classification) and the potential 
differences on the effect of human capital on these different groups were investigated 
using interaction terms. As in the previous specifications, no effect of volume 
measures of human capital on FDI was found, nor were there any statistically 
significant differences between the industry groups, indicating that human capital 
does not attract FDI regardless of the level of technological intensity. The effect of 
the level of cognitive skills and that of the share of top performers in cognitive tests, 
on the other hand, was found to vary with the level of industries’ technological 
intensity. In accordance with the hypothesis proposed, the effect of the average level 
of cognitive skills is found to be significantly larger in high-tech industries compared 
to that in low-tech industries, whilst the effect of the share of top performers is 
significantly larger in both medium- and high-tech industries compared to that in 
low-tech industries.  
7.2.5 Can the largely insignificant results be (partly) attributed to 
transition-specific factors? 
It was argued that one potential explanation for the MRA finding that the estimated 
effect of human capital is smaller in samples of transition economies compared to 
other samples could (partly) be due to the inferiority of the communist (education) 
system in developing skills and traits that are relevant in a market economy, 
discussed in Sections 1.3 and 4.3. Accordingly, an attempt was made to control for 
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features of these education systems that may have caused the development of ‘lower-
quality’ human capital in transition economies by including proxies for the 
percentage of population who have completed education after the fall of 
communism. The results are mixed and, overall, they do not lend support to the 
hypothesis that foreign investors are attracted by a younger workforce (educated 
during the transition period). The first proxy of age structure is found to have an 
insignificant effect when a model of aggregate FDI data is estimated using the FEVD 
estimator, and negative in an industry-level FDI model estimated using the System 
GMM estimator. The second proxy for age structure, on the other hand, is found to 
be positive in models using aggregate FDI, though insignificant in models using 
sector- and industry-level manufacturing data.  
Further, one specific feature of the communist education systems which may have 
restricted the development of skills sought by firms in a market economy is their 
stronger emphasis on ‘traditional’ vocational education compared to developed 
economies. This (potential) effect was tested using the ratio of general-to-vocational 
upper-secondary enrolments at the outset of transition. Similar to the results 
regarding the age structure, the evidence is mixed and does not appear to support 
the hypothesis that countries with a stronger emphasis on general education 
manage to attract more FDI. Results of the System GMM estimator suggest that 
there is no significant effect of the initial general-to-vocational ratio in FDI in 
manufacturing industries, whilst the results of the FEVD estimator suggest that, 
contrary to expectations, a higher initial general-to-vocational ratio at the outset of 
transition is associated with lower net FDI inflows.  
7.3 Contributions to knowledge 
7.3.1 Establishing the underlying theoretical rationale for a human 
capital-FDI relationship and choosing appropriate measures of 
human capital  
An initial review revealed many theoretical approaches to the determinants of FDI. 
However, the review of FDI theory shows that the few approaches that make 
reference to human capital as a potential determinant of FDI do not provide an 
underlying theoretical rationale for such a relationship. This research fills this gap by 
addressing the reasons why countries with relatively abundant human capital may 
be expected to attract more FDI. However, the initial attempt to provide this 
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rationale proved to be problematic, largely because of the failure of economic 
research to unpick the meaning of ‘relatively abundant human capital’ and hence 
identify how it is best measured. Therefore, based on previous micro-level studies, 
this research sought to identify the actual skills and traits that ‘human capital’ 
consists of and how these are developed.  
First, human capital theory and growth theory were reviewed to identify the 
mechanisms through which European transition countries with a relative advantage 
in human capital are expected to attract disproportionate amounts of FDI (Section 
2.3). Three main potential channels were identified from growth theory: increased 
productivity, increased ability to adopt new technology and facilitation of 
innovation, of which technology adoption was argued to be likely to be the most 
important because of the type of activities that tend to be undertaken by foreign 
investors in transition economies. Further, the discussion presented in Section 4.2 
looked more closely at what employee characteristics (foreign) firms are expected to 
value in a new market economy and has identified some ‘productivity-enhancing’ 
skills/traits. First, foreign investors are expected to be attracted by relatively 
abundant human capital because it enables, on average, a given worker to perform 
tasks more productively than those in countries with inferior stocks of human capital, 
which is the ‘conventional’ role of human capital as identified in orthodox human 
capital theory. Second, cognitive skills such as the ability to think critically and 
ability to perceive and solve new problems appear to be linked, in particular, to the 
facilitation of innovation and technology adoption. However, contrary to the 
(implicit) assumption usually made in economic research that human capital consists 
of only cognitive skills, non-cognitive skills and behavioural traits were also 
identified as relevant from the (foreign) employers’ perspective. For instance, 
behavioural traits such as self-determination, efficacy and low time-discount rate 
are also expected to be ‘productivity-enhancing’ because, ceteris paribus, they make 
employees supply more effort and reduce the need for monitoring.  
These insights further complicate the problem of measuring human capital in 
economic research and appear to require a re-assessment of the conventional 
measures utilised in empirical studies. The question of both how and where these 
skills and traits are developed appears to be crucial, both to inform the choice of 
appropriate human capital measures in applied economic research and from a policy 
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perspective. A review of relevant research has suggested that formal education is an 
important channel through which these skills and traits are reinforced/developed 
by exposing students to problems with generalisable properties and a system of 
values similar to those that they will face in the workplace. Therefore, measures of 
educational attainment were used as primary human capital measures in this 
research: the share of the working age population who have completed secondary 
education and the share of working age population who have completed tertiary 
education. The higher levels of formal schooling were used under the assumption 
that higher-level skills are predominantly developed in upper-secondary and tertiary 
levels, and considering that there is more variation in this measure in this sample 
across countries and across time.  
Compared to a significant portion of previous literature which uses enrolment rates 
in education as a proxy for human capital, it has been argued here that stock 
measures of human capital such as the ones above are more appropriate because 
they represent the whole of human capital available in the workforce. Enrolment 
rates, on the other hand, only represent a portion of the capital being developed 
currently and they may even be misleading in a ‘catch-up’ scenario if enrolment rates 
are higher in countries that have lower shares of educated individuals have higher 
and/or faster growing enrolments.  
Further, when stock measures are used, careful consideration should be given to 
the way these measures of education are defined and what they actually represent. 
Measures of the share of population who have completed a certain level of 
education defined in terms of the highest level of education completed by an 
individual (as in the Barro-Lee database, for instance) may be inappropriate 
measures of human capital stock. It was argued the percentage of population who 
have completed primary education, or even secondary education, can be highly 
misleading measure of the country’s quantity of human capital. Namely, if a 
higher share of the population have primary education as their highest level attained, 
this automatically implies that a lower share of the population have attained 
secondary and/or tertiary education. In this case, higher values of the human capital 
measure actually represent lower levels of human capital endowment. By the same 
token, in this context a higher level of secondary education attainment could actually 
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be at the expense of tertiary attainment. Therefore, in this research the share of 
working age population who have completed secondary education attainment was 
defined so as to include the share of those who have continued to complete tertiary 
education (i.e. the original value reported in Barro and Lee (2010) plus the share who 
have completed tertiary education and above).  
In the previous literature, a measure referring to a certain level of education is 
(arbitrarily) chosen to represent human capital endowments; or, in a few cases, 
different levels are used as a robustness check, but separately (i.e. in different 
specifications). In this research it has been argued that, theoretically, there it 
appears to be inappropriate to limit the representation of human capital to only 
one measure/level of educational attainment. Also, the use of more than one 
measure could shed light into the specific levels of education that may be 
(relatively more) sought by foreign investors. Upon examination it was established 
that the inclusion of more than one human capital measure did not appear to cause 
any econometric problems (i.e. in terms of multicollinearity), and therefore both the 
share of working age population who have completed secondary education and the 
share of working age population who have completed tertiary education were 
included in the model simultaneously. 
However, it was argued in this research that there are likely to be differences in the 
quality and/or market value of skills offered by different education systems across 
countries which measures of educational attainment alone cannot convey information 
on. A measure of cognitive skills based on standardised test scores was argued to 
provide more accurate information on the quality of (the cognitive component of) 
human capital because: it measures cognitive skills regardless of where and how 
they are formed; it reflects, in part, the quality of education provision; and, in 
addition to knowledge, it seeks to  measure the ability to apply this to solve real-life 
problems, which is a more general competence that has been argued to be relevant 
in a dynamic market economy, and particularly during the process of transition.  
Further, as explained in Section 1.3, PISA tests provide information on the share of 
students reaching the highest proficiency level, i.e. those who can thoroughly analyse 
and evaluate information, a category which has been argued to be particularly valued 
in knowledge-based economies where innovation and decisions-making based on all 
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available evidence is needed. It was further argued in Section 5.2 that foreign 
investors are likely to be particularly interested in the share of the workforce at the 
top of the distribution of (cognitive) skills, as they can attract the most able 
individuals by paying higher wages compared to their local counterparts. 
Accordingly, the share of top-performers in International Student Achievement 
Tests was used as a proxy for the share of individuals at the top of the distribution 
in the workforce. 
Finally, it was argued that, contrary to the conventional approach of measuring 
the ‘supply’ of human capital by the number of educated individuals, an additional 
appropriate measure would be one which indicates the availability of skilled 
labour in an economy as reported by the private sector itself. Accordingly, a 
country-average of the number of weeks it took firms to fill a vacancy for a skilled 
worked from survey data was calculated and used as a measure of skilled labour 
availability.  
7.3.2 Synthesising the results from the previous empirical literature 
This research has provided the first systematic review of empirical studies that 
estimate the effect of human capital on FDI inflows, in doing so it sought to 
search for any consensus that may prevail in previous research. However, an 
examination of the literature showed extremely diverse results, with no apparent 
patterns according to the particular characteristics of studies which could be used to 
summarise, classify, or explain, them. A meta-regression analysis was found to be a 
valuable tool in both identifying any average ‘authentic’ effect in the literature and 
explaining part of the heterogeneity in results that could be attributed to different 
study characteristics. Accordingly, the first meta-regression analysis of the 
empirical literature that estimates the effect of human capital on inwards FDI was 
conducted (Chapter 3).  
7.3.3 Modelling the relationship between human capital and inwards 
FDI in European transition economies 
Having identified the potential mechanisms behind the human capital-FDI 
relationship and what appear to be the most appropriate measures available, this 
research then analysed the extent to which the relationship between these measures 
and FDI are likely to apply in the specific context of (European) transition 
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economies. This research has presented some specific characteristics of the labour 
markets and education systems of these economies (Sections 1.3-1.4) and examined 
the type of ‘human capital’ developed in transition economies and its likely value in 
a market economy (Sections 4.2-4.3). It was argued that communist education 
systems, but also societies more generally, neglected or even actively discouraged 
the development of the ‘productivity-enhancing’ skills and traits identified above. 
By emphasising the memorising of factual knowledge, an authoritarian style of 
instruction and conformity to authority in general, they are likely to have inhibited 
creativity, critical thinking and self-directedness and instead fostered the 
development of the opposite traits such as docility, adherence to rules and 
dependence. Based on these considerations, two transition-specific human capital 
hypotheses were developed. First, since the differences between the level of skill-
development in developed economies and (European) transition economies were 
argued to be partially attributable to differences between general and vocational 
education, the ratio of general-to-vocational enrolments at the outset of transition 
was controlled for. Second, proxies were developed based on the age structure of 
the population as a means of controlling for the ‘vintage’ of human capital by 
discriminating between the age-groups who were educated during communism 
and those educated in the transition period. 
7.3.4 Estimating the effect of human capital on inwards FDI in 
European transition economies  
Based on the theoretical insights above, an empirical model was developed to 
estimate the effect of human capital on FDI for a sample of 12 European transition 
economies for the period 1995-2008. The empirical analysis presented in Chapters 
5 and 6 is the first to focus on the relationship between human capital and FDI in 
a sample of transition economies. Although there are studies for transition 
economies that include human capital in the model as a control variable, like most of 
previous research, they tend not to pay too much attention to the measures used. 
With the exception of one study, they use human capital measures which were 
argued in Section 5.2 to be inappropriate for transition economies, i.e. enrolment 
rates (Tondel, 2001; Gorg and Greeneway, 2002; Kinoshita and Campos, 2003; 
Carstensen and Toubal, 2004) or illiteracy rates (Fung et al., 2008). The only study 
of European transition economies that uses a similar stock measure, the 
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economically active population with tertiary education, is Serbu (2005) but this study 
covers bilateral inward FDI stocks for only 3 economies.  
This research has pointed out that human capital measures, in particular stock 
measures used here, change slowly over time and this may cause difficulties in 
identifying their effect in empirical estimations based on only within-variation of the 
variable. Accordingly, the Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD) technique 
has been used for the first time in this type of research.  
It has been argued in this research that controlling for the type and sector/industry of 
FDI is likely to be important in ‘disentangling’ the determinants of FDI, especially 
when human capital is concerned. In Chapter 6 this thesis presents the first empirical 
analysis which used sector- and industry-level data to estimate the relationship 
between human capital and FDI. The few sector- or industry-level studies that exist 
(for transition economies and beyond) do not include human capital measures at all. 
Further, they do not exploit this level of disaggregation to test for potential sectoral 
differences in the sensitivity of FDI to different determinants. Initially, FDI in the 
manufacturing sector was identified as most likely to be affected by human capital 
compared to the primary and services sector, so the effect of human capital on 
manufacturing sector FDI was estimated. In addition, it was hypothesised that, 
within manufacturing industries, the more technologically-intensive ones are 
likely to be more sensitive to human capital availability. This hypothesis was tested 
by checking for differences in the estimated human capital effects between three 
groups of industries classified according to technological intensity.  
Finally, this empirical research has considered and (tentatively) addressed potential 
problems in the estimations undertaken. Most empirical research in this area tends 
not to report any diagnostic tests or robustness checks, which makes it difficult to 
assess the reliability of their results. In this research, multiple robustness checks 
were conducted using different human capital and FDI measures and different 
estimators. Different remedies for diagnostic problems, or approaches to 
accounting for their consequences in estimation, were considered and those which 
were assessed to be most appropriate were used in the estimations. In contrast to 
previous FDI studies which do not test/address this issue, cross-sectional 
dependence was argued to be likely to be found in this type of research. This 
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suspicion was confirmed by the diagnostic test and suitable estimators were used to 
address the potential consequences of cross-sectional dependence. Finally, this 
research was the first empirical analysis to discussthe potential endogeneity of 
human capital measures in FDI models.  
7.3.5 Limitations of this research  
This research has addressed some major limitations of previous research in terms of 
the measures and empirical approach used. However, some limitations remain which 
could not be addressed, mainly due to the availability and/or quality of human capital 
measures.  
First, with the exception of one measure, all human capital measures used here 
are economy- or sector-wide measures, whereas it is not clear that foreign 
investors are interested in the characteristics of the whole workforce. Rather, they 
may be interested only in the quantity/quality of skills and other characteristics of the 
individuals at the top of the skill distribution, which these measures do not 
necessarily convey information on. 
Second, as discussed in Section 5.2, the productivity-enhancing skills and traits 
that are valued in the labour market are not only developed in formal education: 
they are also developed during early childhood (e.g. by the family) and after 
formal education (e.g. through work experience and formal or informal training). 
In this research, three innovative proxies were used which can be argued to partly 
account for these limitations. The measures of cognitive skills based upon 
International Student Achievement Test scores at primary/secondary education level 
also incorporate the skills formed during early childhood, regardless of where and 
how they were formed. However, the available data did not allow to control 
explicitly for the effects of pre-school learning which appear to be crucial for the 
development of cognitive, and especially non-cognitive, skills, partly due to the 
presence of multiplicative effects in skill formation (Heckman, 2000; Cunha et al., 
2006). Similarly,  lack of data did not allow to control for skill formation that occurs 
after formal schooling, which is likely to be a major limitation considering that this is 
estimated to account for “as much as one third to one half of all skill formation in a 
modern economy” (Heckman, 2000, p. 5). The measure of availability of skilled 
labour as reported by firms used here can be argued to include all the market-
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relevant skills and traits, including those developed after schooling, however this is 
limited in that it is determined by the number and/or characteristics of the firms 
currently in the market and does not necessarily represent foreign investors’ demand 
for skilled labour. 
 Third, the use of measures of the quantity of educational attainment implicitly 
assumes that education is homogeneous across countries and across time, whereas 
in reality there are likely to be significant differences with regard to quality and/or 
length of education. In this research, the quality of education is partially accounted 
for by the level of cognitive skills; however, this measure, too, has some limitations, 
as explained above.   
Fourth, historically the education systems in transition economies appear to have 
been inferior in developing the type of cognitive and non-cognitive skills that are 
valued in a market economy. However, the extent to which this could be accounted 
for in this research is limited. Namely, the measure of cognitive skills utilised can 
partly account for cross-country differences in endowments in one type of cognitive 
skills, problem-solving skills, but this is only measured at primary/secondary level 
education and there is no data for variation across time. Vocational education was 
argued to be more associated with the types of skills/traits fostered in communist 
(education) systems, but controlling for the relative importance of vocational 
education, again, only partly controls for these effects. Finally, an attempt was made 
to control for the communism-specific characteristics of human capital through a 
measure of the vintage of human capital, as indicated by the age structure of the 
population. However, the effect of this proxy may be argued to reflect merely the 
potential effect of age structure, and it assumes that there has been an instantaneous 
reform in European transition economies’ education systems.  
Finally, it has been argued that the (relative) wage of skilled workers, in 
particular, should be controlled for in this type of research.  Based on the 
assumption that income inequality in European transition economies is primarily 
driven by an increasing education premium during transition, the distribution of 
earnings as measured by the Gini coefficient was initially considered as a proxy for 
the level of skilled workers’ wages. However, upon careful consideration it was 
decided that the effect of this variable is, a priori, ambiguous because it is affected by 
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both the level of wages of the highly skilled and the share of the highly skilled in the 
economy.  
7.4 Implications of the findings for further research: 
challenging conventional thinking?  
As explained in Section 7.2, the hypothesis that a country’s relative quantity of 
human capital is positively related to the amount of foreign direct investment it 
attracts does not seem to be supported empirically by this empirical investigation. 
Some potential reasons for the insignificant results in the previous literature, e.g. the 
use of inappropriate measures of the level of human capital in the country or failure 
to discriminate between FDI in different sectors, have been initially advanced and 
accordingly addressed in this thesis. However, despite these and other 
methodological improvements, no significant effect of the quantity measures of 
human capital endowment on FDI could be identified in European transition 
economies. This finding and the lack of a “genuine” effect found by the MRA can 
potentially be explained on theoretical grounds and/or in terms of (the limitations of) 
empirical specification. The rest of this section explores some potential explanations 
for the insignificant effect of quantity measures of human capital on European 
transition economies’ inward FDI, and then investigates the implications of the 
significant effect found for quality measures and potential extensions of this research 
programme.  
7.4.1 Do foreign investors necessarily require/prefer highly-skilled 
labour?  
Foreign investors may not necessarily be attracted by higher-level skills if the 
activities they (intend to) carry out in the host country are not skill-intensive in 
nature. Namely, if foreign investors turn to producing in European transition 
economies only at the later stages of the product cycle, i.e. mass production of a 
product rather than product development, as maintained by the product cycle theory 
(Section 2.2), then relative human capital endowment is not a relevant factor in their 
FDI location decision. This argument is consistent with evidence presented in 
Smarzynska (2002) according to which inwards FDI in transition economies are 
concentrated in low technology production activities, whilst foreign investors with 
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relatively higher R&D intensity tend to merely open representative offices rather 
than engage in production in these economies.   
However, even in these ‘imitation’ stages of production, foreign investors may 
have choices of different technologies they can adopt, and the choice of technology 
is not necessarily exogenously determined. In Section 1.2 it was argued that foreign 
investors may choose the technology they adopt in the host country based on the 
quality and price of labour in the host country, or other characteristics such as the 
level of protection of intellectual property rights. This argument appears to be in line 
with models discussed in Section 2.3 according to which countries may choose their 
technology based on their human capital endowments. Namely, skill-complementary 
technologies developed in advanced economies may be relatively less profitable 
compared to a labour-intensive technology in a host country that is well endowed 
with (cheap) lower-skilled labour. Theoretically, the potential endogeneity of the 
choice of technology may “blur” the relationship between the level of skills in the 
host country and the level of FDI it receives: in this scenario a lower level of skills 
may be associated with a lower “quality” of FDI in terms of technological content, 
but not necessarily a smaller amount of FDI attracted. This is consistent with the 
arguments of UNCTAD (1999, pp. 205-6) that a lower level technology is 
transferred to affiliates in “host countries with low capabilities and weak learning 
systems”, and the example of affiliates of foreign electronics firms in Indonesia 
which, according to Pangestu (1997, cited in Ritchie, 2002, p. 17), limit their 
technology to a medium level due to lack of highly educated workforce (engineers, 
scientists, and technicians). The ability of foreign firms to adapt the level of 
technology to the host country’s workforce skills in turn would imply that foreign 
investors do not necessarily seek production locations with high-skill endowments 
and any relationship between human capital and FDI that may exist should be 
specified in terms of the technological level of FDI or similar measures, rather than 
merely a financial measure of FDI as is conventional practice in empirical literature.  
Finally, the availability of highly-skilled employees may only translate into higher 
profitability for foreign investors, and hence be preferred by them, to the extent 
that they do not have to be (fully) remunerated for their skills. In this case, 
controlling for the cost of highly-skilled labour would be crucial for identifying any 
292 
 
relationship between the availability of highly-skilled workers and inward FDI in an 
empirical investigation. However, finding data, or even proxies, for (relative) wages 
of skilled-labour appears to be very difficult in practice, as explained in the empirical 
investigations in Chapters 5 and 6.  
7.4.2 How much of a location-bound factor is a highly-skilled 
workforce? 
Even assuming that foreign investors do require (a portion of) their staff to be 
highly-skilled, this does not necessarily imply that the host countries’ human capital 
endowments are a (major) factor in investors’ location decisions. 
 First, the parent company has the option of transferring highly-skilled staff, 
including managerial staff, to the foreign subsidiary. Micro-level research 
economies reviewed in Section 4.3.1 suggests that this is indeed the case for many 
managerial positions in foreign subsidiaries in European transition economies. 
 Second, highly-skilled staff can be argued to be more mobile compared other 
‘conventional’ location factors such as cheap low-skilled labour or natural 
resources. Compared to low-skilled labour, in particular, high-skilled labour is 
argued to be generally more mobile because of two reasons. First, assuming that 
skill-complementary technologies are likely to require a smaller number of 
employees, the transaction cost of transferring the highly-skilled to the MNE’s 
parent country (or other foreign countries) is lower. Second, which is probably more 
relevant in the case of developing/transition economies, the immigration policies of 
developed economies tend to be selective, i.e. they aim to decrease the quantity, and 
increase the “quality”, of immigration and thus are less stringent (or least impose 
lower transaction costs) for the highly-skilled workers (Checci et al., 2007; Kugler 
and Rapoport, 2011). The potential for highly-skilled employees to migrate from the 
parent company to the host country, and the relative ease with which such employees 
can emigrate to developed economies, makes a skilled workforce less of a location-
bound factor, contrary to what appears to be the assumption in previous FDI 
research. As such, a skilled workforce is likely to be attached less weight by foreign 
investors when choosing their foreign production destination.  
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7.4.3 Do the human capital measures used accurately reflect the 
workforce skills/characteristics most relevant to foreign investors? 
In empirical research in general, and to some extent in this thesis, it is usually 
assumed that a high level of technical skills is associated with high educational 
attainment and this is what increases the productivity of the workforce. Some 
limitations of this approach have been recognised and discussed in detail in Section 
4.2. It can be further argued that in reality there are likely to be other skills and 
traits which are not necessarily related to formal schooling, but which may be even 
more important than technical skills. Examples of these may be the ability of the 
local workforce to communicate in a major business language or familiarity with, 
and ability to adapt to, the culture and work norms of the investor’s home country. 
This would be consistent with the research reviewed in Chapter 4 which suggests 
that employers value workers’ communication skills and attitudes in addition to 
technical skills.  
Further, to the extent that foreign investors evaluate different locations based on 
the availability of workers with the relevant technical skills, they would be 
interested only in the segment of the workforce with the qualifications and 
experience relevant to their line of business. For instance, a foreign company who 
will employ chemical engineers would only be interested in the economy’s quantity 
and quality of the workforce with the relevant qualification, whilst it is unlikely to be 
interested in the labour market for doctors or economists. The quality of this relevant 
segment of the workforce in turn is not necessarily related to the quality of the 
workforce overall, in which case the economy-wide measures used in empirical 
research do not convey the relevant information. Further problems with using 
economy-wide measures are discussed next.  
7.4.4 Are foreign investors interested in the characteristics of the 
whole workforce?   
Assuming that foreign investors do seek highly-skilled labour when choosing among 
potential production locations, it is not clear that this relationship can be tested using 
the conventional approach whereby FDI is related to country-level human capital 
measures. Since each foreign investor is expected to employ merely a small 
fraction of the host country’s workforce and the total share of foreign companies’ 
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employment is likely to be relatively low74, it is not clear that the average/overall 
level of skills in the host country is relevant to them. Instead, they can simply 
‘cream-skim’ the local labour markets by offering higher wages compared to their 
local competitors. Consistent with this is evidence that foreign investors do pay 
higher wages, on average, as explained in Sections 1.2 and 2.3, and the persistence of 
a foreign ownership premium even after controlling for firm- and employee- 
characteristics (Andrews et al., 2009). If foreign investors indeed cream-skim, they 
would only be interested in the top of the ‘skill distribution’; this in turn implies that 
to the extent that most able/qualified individuals are randomly distributed across 
countries, foreign investors would be indifferent to the overall level of skills in the 
workforce when choosing their production location.  
7.4.5 Are foreign investors attracted by (only) the quality of human 
capital? 
Empirical evidence presented here appears to suggest that the only measures of 
human capital that are positively associated with inward FDI in the manufacturing 
sector are those of cognitive skills: the proxy for the average level of cognitive skills 
in the workforce and that for the share of the workforce at the top of the skill 
distribution. Moreover, the higher estimated effect of these measures on (medium- 
and) high-tech groups of industries compared to the low-tech group appears to be 
consistent with the hypothesis that the quality workforce skills affects also the level 
of technology employed by foreign investors and/or the sectoral composition of 
inward FDI. The findings of this thesis appear to stress the importance of controlling 
for direct measures of cognitive skills, which (partly) reflect the quality of schooling 
(in addition to conventional measures of human capital quantity) 
7.4.6 Possible extensions of this research 
This research has empirically investigated the effect of volume and quality measures 
of human capital on FDI at the macro-, sector- and industry-level in European 
transition economies. The potentially most interesting and important finding of this 
                                                            
74
 Although in Czech Republic, where the inwards FDI relative to the economy is among the highest 
in the sample, as explained in Section 1.2, the share of employees the employment in foreign-
controlled affiliates is as high as 45.5 percent in manufacturing and 18.7 percent in services, the share 
of employment relative to total employment is likely to be lower. This indicator does not appear to be 
available for European transition economies, but globally it is estimated to be around 2.2%, as 
calculated using data from (UNCTAD, 2011, p. 24) on foreign investment-enterprise employees and 
from ILO (2011) on world employment.  
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research has been the positive effect of cognitive skill measures on inward FDI, in 
contrast to consistent findings of insignificant effects of traditional human capital 
measures, both in this research and the previous literature. The findings of this 
research point to the importance of distinguishing between the dimensions of 
volume and quality of human capital in future FDI studies and warrant further 
research on the size and robustness of the effect of cognitive skills measures on 
FDI.  
A similar approach could be used to test the same hypotheses in different samples 
of countries. Considering that the estimated effect of human capital measures on FDI 
in previous literature is found by the MRA to be smaller for samples of transition 
economies compared to other countries, it would be interesting to investigate 
whether the similar results are found for other economies. The estimation of similar 
industry- level models in developed economies would, in particular, be interesting 
for several reasons. First, such research has not been previously undertaken. Second, 
the technological level and human capital intensity of activities is likely to be 
significantly higher (on average) in developed economies, providing a reason to 
believe that a (stronger) effect of human capital on FDI would be found. Finally, the 
availability and quality of human capital (and FDI) data for developed economies is 
likely to allow for at least some of the limitations of this research to be overcome.   
This research could be further improved by controlling for the level of wages of 
skilled workers and using/developing alternative measures of human capital which 
provide information on the actual skills of the workforce rather than merely the 
average quantity of education attained. The latter would, in particular, be useful 
because it would overcome the limitations of differences in quality of formal 
education and ensure that individuals’ skills/traits are accounted for, regardless of 
whether and how they were formed. Existing studies that could be considered for this 
purpose would be the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), Adult Literacy 
and Lifeskills Survey (ALL) and OECD’s Programme for the International 
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) which provide information on the 
literacy of working-age population could be used. Or, ideally, similar but more 
inclusive surveys which would provide information on the skills and traits that are 
relevant in a market economy could be used.  
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Considering the complex relationship between human capital availability and FDI 
level/quality and difficulties in measuring human capital, complementing macro-
level research with micro-level quantitative and qualitative research could provide 
a useful means of disentangling this relationship. This type of study could be used, 
first of all, to identify the skills and traits that foreign investors value and, if they 
evaluate investment locations by availability of human capital, what indicators they 
use to inform their decision. Finally, related issues that would be interesting to 
research are whether and how the availability (and cost) of skilled labour affects 
the foreign investors’ decisions to choose the type of activity that is undertaken in 
the host country (e.g. mass production vs. product development) and the 
level/recentness of technology they employ in the host country.  
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has summarised the main findings of this research and provided 
potential explanations for the failure of both this research and previous literature to 
find empirical support in favour of a positive relationship between an investment 
location’s volume measures of human capital and its level of inward FDI. This 
chapter has also pointed out the importance of this thesis’ finding of a positive 
relationship between the cognitive skill measures and inward FDI in European 
transition economies which indicates the importance of taking into account the 
quality dimension of human capital in addition to traditional educational attainment 
measures usually used in economic research.  
However, the criticism and refinement of human capital and FDI measures in this 
research have wider implications for future economic research. First, the use of 
disaggregated measures of FDI flows/stocks at sector level or industry level (and 
classified according to technological intensity) appears to be more appropriate for 
disentangling the effect of different locational determinants of FDI. Second, the use 
of quality-adjusted measures of human capital appears to be a necessary, and 
potentially crucial, refinement to the use of traditional measures of the quantity of 
human capital when investigating the relationship between human capital 
endowments and FDI. This in turn appears to point to still wider implications for 
other economic research which empirically investigates the effects of aggregate 
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measures of human capital, for example in the study of economic growth or income 
inequality, both in European transition economies and beyond.  
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Society Institute.  (Project manager, co-author, editor) 
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Appendix 3.1 Initial sensitivity analysis 
. **Start with full model, full sample 
. regress tstat invsepcc dynamic qualdv timeseries crosssection mixed developed 
transition china fdistock fdirel h 
> cstock hcinput  secondary tertiary sectert avgyred labcost labprod endogeneity 
lnpubyr lnmedianyr lnperiod lntno 
> exp published[pweight = weight], vce(cluster study) 
(sum of wgt is   5.6000e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     341 
                                                       F( 25,    55) =    9.49 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5727 
                                                       Root MSE      =  3.8321 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 56 clusters in study) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       tstat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    invsepcc |   .5552002   .2124286     2.61   0.012     .1294836    .9809167 
     dynamic |   .0468112   .0577505     0.81   0.421    -.0689234    .1625458 
      qualdv |  -.1390898    .093568    -1.49   0.143    -.3266043    .0484247 
  timeseries |   .2394262   .2549799     0.94   0.352     -.271565    .7504174 
crosssection |  -.0133662   .0792541    -0.17   0.867     -.172195    .1454626 
       mixed |   .0678314   .0863475     0.79   0.435    -.1052128    .2408756 
   developed |   .0911523   .0660963     1.38   0.173    -.0413076    .2236122 
  transition |  -.0602446    .095401    -0.63   0.530    -.2514326    .1309433 
       china |   .0809153   .0584476     1.38   0.172    -.0362164     .198047 
    fdistock |    .019603    .053429     0.37   0.715    -.0874711    .1266771 
      fdirel |  -.0477379   .0463183    -1.03   0.307    -.1405618    .0450859 
     hcstock |   .1654176   .0582348     2.84   0.006     .0487125    .2821227 
     hcinput |  -.0632204   .0882109    -0.72   0.477    -.2399991    .1135582 
   secondary |  -.0863616   .0594305    -1.45   0.152     -.205463    .0327398 
    tertiary |  -.1013375    .050529    -2.01   0.050    -.2025999   -.0000752 
     sectert |   .0288001    .063227     0.46   0.651    -.0979096    .1555098 
     avgyred |  -.2290467   .1030877    -2.22   0.030    -.4356391   -.0224542 
     labcost |  -.1701654   .0519395    -3.28   0.002    -.2742546   -.0660762 
     labprod |   .0046908   .0445042     0.11   0.916    -.0844976    .0938791 
 endogeneity |  -.1301086    .053418    -2.44   0.018    -.2371606   -.0230566 
     lnpubyr |   .0609884   .6408281     0.10   0.925     -1.22326    1.345237 
  lnmedianyr |  -.0950141   .5062518    -0.19   0.852    -1.109565    .9195372 
    lnperiod |  -.7163985   .3932153    -1.82   0.074     -1.50442    .0716226 
    lntnoexp |  -1.805099   .9826589    -1.84   0.072    -3.774392    .1641932 
   published |  -.1570831   .0402468    -3.90   0.000    -.2377394   -.0764268 
       _cons |   8.390642   5.306001     1.58   0.120    -2.242821    19.02411 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. **Linearity test 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of tstat 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 312) =     80.55 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
. *fails linearity 
.  
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. **Investigation of outliers 
. qui regress tstat invsepcc dynamic qualdv timeseries crosssection mixed developed 
transition china fdistock fdir 
> el hcstock hcinput  secondary tertiary sectert avgyred labcost labprod endogeneity 
lnpubyr lnmedianyr lnperiod l 
> ntnoexp published 
 
. lvr2plot, ml(obs) 
 
 
 
 
*regressions from Kang and Lee (2007) with large normalised squared residuals 
.  
.  
. **Further investigation of outliers (cooksd, dfits) 
. predict cooksd, cooksd 
 
. predict dfits, dfits 
 
. *regressions from Kang and Lee (2007) have the largest values of cooksd and dfits, 
well above conventional cut-o 
> ff points 
>    
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12
3456
78910112
1356178
19
20
21223
24567
289301323343567389
401
42
345
46
4748
495512
5354
556
57
58
59
60263465
66768
69
701
7
74
5
7 77798018234 5868901
939 5689
1 0
0111 304
1 5106
90
1112
46
18
901
23245
1 678
130131323134
135
3674
143
44
568
50
5125
455670634
65
6167
70
71
72
175
176
77798
181288868
1 8
189
9
929356
9
2
20132045
206789210
2 123217
2192 0
2124
2 5
6
2
231
2 538241242
244
245
6
7248
249
50
51
2523
2545
256
2589
260
261262
263
2645
266
67
268269
27
271234
275
276
78980
2812
2838 5
286
8728
9
2
94
295296
298
9930 0130230343 5
306
307
308
3 931
311
3133
315
63 92
321232345
327
328
329
330331 332333345
3 7338
339
3403 1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
Le
ve
ra
ge
0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Normalized residual squared
337 
 
 
. **Histogram of residuals 
. predict resid, res 
 
. histogram resid 
(bin=18, start=-22.362078, width=2.9453735) 
 
 
 
. *histogram indicates normality problems, probably due to outliers 
.  
. **Multicollinearity check 
. estat vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
    invsepcc |    265.67    0.003764 
      qualdv |     66.36    0.015068 
       mixed |     64.27    0.015560 
   published |     40.76    0.024534 
    tertiary |     35.71    0.028000 
     labcost |     31.14    0.032112 
     hcstock |     17.03    0.058718 
       china |     16.07    0.062247 
     sectert |     13.32    0.075077 
     lnpubyr |      5.82    0.171899 
    lnperiod |      5.45    0.183320 
     hcinput |      5.17    0.193445 
crosssection |      4.52    0.221028 
   developed |      4.41    0.226987 
  lnmedianyr |      3.68    0.271382 
 endogeneity |      3.22    0.310360 
     labprod |      3.11    0.321297 
    lntnoexp |      2.86    0.350024 
     avgyred |      2.80    0.356914 
   secondary |      2.64    0.378648 
  transition |      2.59    0.386278 
    fdistock |      2.49    0.401864 
     dynamic |      2.21    0.452695 
      fdirel |      2.08    0.480107 
  timeseries |      1.24    0.809423 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |     24.18 
 
. *very high collinearity 
.  
. *regressions from Kang and Lee (2005) are excluded from the analysis based on the 
above.  
 
 
 
 
 
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
D
e
n
si
ty
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
Residuals
338 
 
 
Appendix 3.2: Summary statistics and correlations 
Variable* Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
tstat 335 1.194449 2.714776 -8.58 11.98 
invsepcc 335 17.53262 24.52421 2.3585 216.316 
lnpubyr 335 5.106788 0.71529 3.13813 7.67933 
lnmedianyr 335 5.222382 0.77193 2.4666 7.86165 
lntnoexp 335 4.853073 0.978714 2.04056 7.94315 
lnperiod 335 4.536439 1.159802 1.66186 8.08479 
*Note: Variables are multiplied by invsepcc 
   
Dummy 
variable   Value 
dynamic 
 
  
  Zero 268 
  Positive 67 
  Total 335 
qualdv 
 
  
  Zero 292 
  Positive 43 
  Total 335 
panel 
 
  
  Zero 179 
  Positive 156 
  Total 335 
timeseries 
 
  
  Zero 329 
  Positive 6 
  Total 335 
crosssection 
 
  
  Zero 272 
  Positive 63 
mixed 
 
  
  Zero 281 
  Positive 54 
  Total 335 
developed 
 
  
  Zero 303 
  Positive 32 
  Total 335 
developing 
 
  
  Zero 233 
  Positive 102 
  Total 335 
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transition 
 
  
  Zero 270 
  Positive 65 
  Total 335 
china 
 
  
  Zero 253 
  Positive 82 
  Total 335 
fdiflow 
 
  
  Zero 79 
  Positive 256 
  Total 335 
fdistock 
 
  
  Zero 256 
  Positive 79 
  Total 335 
fdirel 
 
  
  Zero 218 
  Positive 117 
  Total 335 
fdiabs 
 
  
  Zero 117 
  Positive 218 
  Total 335 
hcflow 
 
  
  Zero 238 
  Positive 97 
  Total 335 
hcstock 
 
  
  Zero 103 
  Positive 232 
  Total 335 
hcinput 
 
  
  Zero 319 
  Positive 16 
  Total 335 
primary 
 
  
  Zero 283 
  Positive 52 
  Total 335 
secondary 
 
  
  Zero 245 
  Positive 90 
  Total 335 
tertiary 
 
  
  Zero 230 
340 
 
  Positive 105 
  Total 335 
sectert 
 
  
  Zero 291 
  Positive 44 
  Total 335 
avgyred 
 
  
  Zero 303 
  Positive 32 
  Total 335 
labcost 
 
  
  Zero 153 
  Positive 182 
  Total 335 
labprod 
 
  
  Zero 288 
  Positive 47 
  Total 335 
endogeneity 
 
  
  Zero 279 
  Positive 56 
  Total 335 
published 
 
  
  Zero 136 
  Positive 199 
  Total 335 
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. corr  published lnperiod lnmedianyr lnpubyr lntnoexp endogeneity labprod labcost avgyred sectert tertiary second 
> ary primary hcinput hcstock hcflow fdiabs fdirel fdistock fdiflow china transition developing developed mixed cr 
> osssection timeseries panel qualdv dynamic invsepcc tstat 
(obs=335) 
 
             | publis~d lnperiod lnmedi~r  lnpubyr lntnoexp endoge~y  labprod  labcost  avgyred  sectert tertiary 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   published |   1.0000 
    lnperiod |   0.5856   1.0000 
  lnmedianyr |   0.6166   0.4664   1.0000 
     lnpubyr |   0.6653   0.6483   0.6864   1.0000 
    lntnoexp |   0.5071   0.5688   0.5473   0.6343   1.0000 
 endogeneity |   0.0021   0.2048   0.2027   0.2747   0.2301   1.0000 
     labprod |   0.0897   0.2094  -0.0366   0.1403   0.1483   0.0282   1.0000 
     labcost |   0.9544   0.5512   0.6177   0.6171   0.5349  -0.0028  -0.0247   1.0000 
     avgyred |  -0.0569  -0.1265   0.0378   0.0277   0.0218   0.3245  -0.1055  -0.0844   1.0000 
     sectert |   0.1028   0.1324   0.2941   0.2236   0.2135   0.2255   0.1892   0.0960  -0.0977   1.0000 
    tertiary |   0.9065   0.5121   0.5631   0.5528   0.4581  -0.0784  -0.1074   0.9271  -0.0960  -0.1043   1.0000 
   secondary |  -0.0689   0.0527   0.0086   0.0506  -0.1405   0.2803  -0.1360  -0.0876  -0.1596  -0.1045  -0.1332 
     primary |  -0.0406  -0.0452  -0.0543   0.1201   0.0792  -0.0425   0.0407  -0.0234  -0.1110  -0.1206  -0.1185 
     hcinput |   0.0636   0.2476   0.0371   0.0811   0.1194  -0.0812   0.5780   0.0197  -0.0624  -0.0139  -0.0448 
     hcstock |  -0.0136   0.0289   0.3039   0.2774   0.3220   0.4003  -0.0599  -0.0075   0.2109   0.3918  -0.1675 
      hcflow |   0.9209   0.5704   0.5232   0.5938   0.4265  -0.0842   0.0637   0.9047  -0.0929  -0.0532   0.9342 
      fdiabs |   0.9441   0.5906   0.6378   0.6154   0.5489   0.0007   0.0059   0.9537  -0.0395   0.1206   0.9226 
      fdirel |  -0.0826  -0.0022  -0.0212   0.1987  -0.0490   0.1449   0.1282  -0.1479   0.0380  -0.1505  -0.1185 
    fdistock |  -0.0762   0.0440   0.0843  -0.1082   0.0486   0.4548   0.0068  -0.0247   0.2186   0.2373  -0.1009 
     fdiflow |   0.9533   0.5892   0.6228   0.7040   0.5329  -0.0624   0.0397   0.9335  -0.0791   0.0275   0.9273 
       china |   0.1015   0.1802   0.2346   0.1611   0.2406   0.1385  -0.0890   0.1406  -0.1350   0.3584  -0.0086 
  transition |  -0.1564  -0.2529  -0.0171  -0.1245  -0.0013  -0.0853   0.1095  -0.1186  -0.1323   0.1847  -0.1045 
  developing |  -0.1210  -0.0767  -0.1052   0.0075  -0.1505  -0.1057  -0.1490  -0.1780   0.2297  -0.1446  -0.1487 
   developed |   0.0446   0.2867   0.0191   0.1521   0.1418   0.1706   0.5860  -0.0396   0.2553  -0.0827  -0.0750 
       mixed |   0.9203   0.5177   0.5727   0.5949   0.4550  -0.0071  -0.0482   0.9254  -0.0727  -0.0124   0.9491 
crosssection |   0.0598  -0.0626   0.0259   0.0549  -0.1151  -0.0837   0.5144  -0.0561   0.2362  -0.1088  -0.1048 
  timeseries |  -0.0477  -0.0106  -0.2571  -0.1677  -0.1534  -0.0173  -0.0158  -0.0510   0.0159  -0.0418  -0.0339 
       panel |  -0.0911   0.1510   0.1052   0.2358   0.2274   0.3010  -0.0526  -0.0613  -0.1111   0.1437  -0.0693 
      qualdv |   0.9435   0.5011   0.5849   0.5867   0.4706  -0.0959  -0.0675   0.9496  -0.0703   0.0510   0.9395 
     dynamic |  -0.1155   0.2340   0.0263  -0.0309   0.0913   0.3203   0.0319  -0.0984   0.0964   0.0545  -0.0969 
    invsepcc |   0.9725   0.6224   0.6668   0.7059   0.5651   0.0421   0.0428   0.9640  -0.0308   0.0843   0.9396 
       tstat |  -0.2192  -0.0067   0.1088   0.0581   0.1143   0.1382   0.1852  -0.2311   0.1082   0.1458  -0.2874 
 
  
 
 
 
 
            | second~y  primary  hcinput  hcstock   hcflow   fdiabs   fdirel fdistock  fdiflow    china transi~n 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   secondary |   1.0000 
     primary |  -0.1970   1.0000 
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     hcinput |  -0.1107  -0.0770   1.0000 
     hcstock |  -0.0331   0.2527  -0.2262   1.0000 
      hcflow |  -0.0544  -0.1147   0.0966  -0.3371   1.0000 
      fdiabs |  -0.1646  -0.0728   0.0211  -0.0466   0.9154   1.0000 
      fdirel |   0.3413   0.1269   0.1624   0.0622  -0.0646  -0.3232   1.0000 
    fdistock |  -0.0519  -0.1090   0.0658   0.1933  -0.1365   0.0115  -0.2228   1.0000 
     fdiflow |  -0.0618  -0.0145   0.0511  -0.0740   0.9427   0.9243  -0.0035  -0.2756   1.0000 
       china |   0.0983   0.1372   0.0116   0.5657  -0.1388   0.0663  -0.0241   0.0087   0.0587   1.0000 
  transition |  -0.1324   0.0147  -0.0918  -0.1678  -0.0563  -0.0407  -0.2818   0.0396  -0.1275  -0.2194   1.0000 
  developing |   0.1795  -0.0974  -0.0906   0.0402  -0.1270  -0.1983   0.3019  -0.1834  -0.0771  -0.3014  -0.2676 
   developed |  -0.1241  -0.1083   0.6526  -0.0623   0.0707   0.0099   0.1399   0.0247   0.0428  -0.1455  -0.1292 
       mixed |  -0.0930  -0.0385  -0.0527  -0.1771   0.9527   0.9292  -0.0981  -0.0234   0.9220  -0.1259  -0.1118 
crosssection |  -0.1256  -0.0358   0.6194  -0.1203   0.0379  -0.0804   0.2764  -0.0950   0.0157  -0.1155  -0.1777 
  timeseries |  -0.0684  -0.0475   0.0150  -0.1129  -0.0244  -0.0407  -0.0820  -0.0608  -0.0501  -0.0638  -0.0567 
       panel |   0.2918  -0.0379  -0.1655   0.3238  -0.1509  -0.1207   0.2346   0.0274  -0.0644   0.1510  -0.1894 
      qualdv |  -0.1285  -0.0169  -0.0445  -0.0839   0.9316   0.9553  -0.1567  -0.1033   0.9505   0.0275  -0.0779 
     dynamic |   0.0130  -0.0037   0.0765  -0.0455  -0.0668  -0.0229  -0.1149   0.3368  -0.1310   0.0715   0.2853 
    invsepcc |  -0.0764  -0.0407   0.0685  -0.0315   0.9473   0.9629  -0.0560  -0.0514   0.9742   0.0630  -0.1232 
       tstat |  -0.1027   0.2030   0.0803   0.2800  -0.2655  -0.1999   0.0672   0.0882  -0.2045   0.0544  -0.0258 
 
             | develo~g develo~d    mixed crosss~n timese~s    panel   qualdv  dynamic invsepcc    tstat 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  developing |   1.0000 
   developed |  -0.1774   1.0000 
       mixed |  -0.1536  -0.0741   1.0000 
crosssection |   0.0098   0.5952  -0.0781   1.0000 
  timeseries |   0.0347  -0.0376  -0.0325  -0.0517   1.0000 
       panel |   0.1952  -0.2242  -0.0670  -0.3204  -0.1022   1.0000 
      qualdv |  -0.1406  -0.0511   0.9487  -0.0988  -0.0315  -0.1954   1.0000 
     dynamic |  -0.1613   0.1404  -0.1164  -0.1849  -0.0590  -0.3655  -0.1127   1.0000 
    invsepcc |  -0.1232   0.0503   0.9524  -0.0060  -0.0664  -0.0605   0.9632  -0.0570   1.0000 
       tstat |  -0.0528   0.1610  -0.2182   0.1111  -0.0534   0.0837  -0.2598   0.1582  -0.1918   1.0000 
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Appendix 3.3: Bivariate MRA (Model 3.2) results and diagnostics 
 
. **Bivariate MRA model, sample excluding Kang and Lee (2007) 
. regress tstat invsepcc [pweight = weight], vce(cluster study) 
(sum of wgt is   5.5000e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     335 
                                                       F(  1,    54) =    2.12 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.1509 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0228 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.4799 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 55 clusters in study) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       tstat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    invsepcc |  -.0201938   .0138601    -1.46   0.151    -.0479817     .007594 
       _cons |   2.066277   .4036785     5.12   0.000     1.256951    2.875604 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of tstat 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 330) =      7.22 
                  Prob > F =      0.0001 
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Appendix 3.4: Full multivariate MRA (Model 3.3) results and 
diagnostics 
 
. **Start with full model, sample excluding Kang and Lee (2007) 
. regress tstat invsepcc dynamic qualdv timeseries crosssection mixed developed transition 
china fdistock fdirel h 
> cstock hcinput  secondary tertiary sectert avgyred labcost labprod endogeneity lnpubyr 
lnmedianyr lnperiod lntno 
> exp published [pweight = weight], vce(cluster study) 
(sum of wgt is   5.5000e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     335 
                                                       F( 25,    54) =   19.60 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3801 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0503 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 55 clusters in study) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       tstat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    invsepcc |   .1750783   .1002161     1.75   0.086    -.0258429    .3759996 
     dynamic |   .0611628   .0456958     1.34   0.186    -.0304519    .1527774 
      qualdv |  -.0470682   .0502894    -0.94   0.353    -.1478924    .0537559 
  timeseries |   .2182407   .2574841     0.85   0.400    -.2979838    .7344652 
crosssection |  -.0027922   .0634367    -0.04   0.965    -.1299752    .1243907 
       mixed |    .090753   .0879819     1.03   0.307    -.0856402    .2671462 
   developed |   .0232758   .0610291     0.38   0.704    -.0990802    .1456319 
  transition |  -.1129344   .0705296    -1.60   0.115    -.2543377    .0284688 
       china |    .069092   .0520508     1.33   0.190    -.0352637    .1734476 
    fdistock |   .0237482   .0529818     0.45   0.656    -.0824739    .1299703 
      fdirel |   -.019491   .0420386    -0.46   0.645    -.1037733    .0647912 
     hcstock |   .0453959   .0557678     0.81   0.419    -.0664118    .1572035 
     hcinput |  -.0733057   .0713894    -1.03   0.309    -.2164328    .0698214 
   secondary |  -.1215634   .0582944    -2.09   0.042    -.2384366   -.0046902 
    tertiary |  -.0550672   .0388507    -1.42   0.162    -.1329581    .0228237 
     sectert |  -.0332482   .0376136    -0.88   0.381    -.1086589    .0421626 
     avgyred |  -.1176622   .0633563    -1.86   0.069    -.2446839    .0093596 
     labcost |  -.1224047   .0457973    -2.67   0.010    -.2142227   -.0305867 
     labprod |   .0955991   .0425048     2.25   0.029     .0103821    .1808162 
 endogeneity |  -.0599005   .0562347    -1.07   0.292    -.1726442    .0528432 
     lnpubyr |   .3292858   .4486779     0.73   0.466    -.5702592    1.228831 
  lnmedianyr |   .8875675   .3427648     2.59   0.012     .2003655     1.57477 
    lnperiod |  -.3733034    .222675    -1.68   0.099      -.81974    .0731331 
    lntnoexp |  -.3661083   .4424019    -0.83   0.412    -1.253071    .5208541 
   published |  -.0730546   .0380131    -1.92   0.060    -.1492663    .0031571 
       _cons |  -1.885811   2.090304    -0.90   0.371    -6.076618    2.304996 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. **Linearity test 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of tstat 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 306) =     14.89 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
. *still fails linearity test, but F-statistic has decreased to 14.89 from over 95 in the full 
sample 
.  
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. **Investigating normality 
. predict resid, res 
 
. histogram resid 
(bin=18, start=-8.0269508, width=.81036038) 
 
 
. *The distribution of residuals is basically bell-shaped 
.  
 
. **Multicollinearity check 
. estat vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
    invsepcc |    108.43    0.009223 
       mixed |     31.85    0.031396 
      qualdv |     25.64    0.039000 
    tertiary |     14.92    0.067028 
   published |     14.72    0.067923 
     labcost |     14.12    0.070820 
     hcstock |      5.38    0.185821 
 endogeneity |      5.14    0.194506 
       china |      5.00    0.199937 
    lntnoexp |      4.93    0.202986 
     avgyred |      4.58    0.218194 
     lnpubyr |      3.95    0.253437 
   developed |      3.86    0.259167 
  lnmedianyr |      3.69    0.270828 
     sectert |      3.46    0.289170 
crosssection |      3.44    0.290412 
    lnperiod |      3.33    0.300197 
     hcinput |      3.02    0.330713 
   secondary |      2.62    0.382006 
  transition |      2.62    0.382265 
    fdistock |      2.53    0.394735 
     labprod |      2.51    0.397706 
      fdirel |      2.43    0.411623 
     dynamic |      2.10    0.475339 
  timeseries |      1.55    0.646038 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |     11.03 
 
. *very high VIF in the case of some variables 
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Appendix 3.5: Testing down procedure 
. **Testing down procedure 
. regress tstat invsepcc dynamic qualdv timeseries crosssection mixed developed transition 
china fdistock fdirel h 
> cstock hcinput  secondary tertiary sectert avgyred labcost labprod endogeneity lnpubyr 
lnmedianyr lnperiod lntno 
> exp published[pweight = weight], vce(cluster study) 
(sum of wgt is   5.5000e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     335 
                                                       F( 25,    54) =   19.60 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3801 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0503 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 55 clusters in study) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       tstat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    invsepcc |   .1750783   .1002161     1.75   0.086    -.0258429    .3759996 
     dynamic |   .0611628   .0456958     1.34   0.186    -.0304519    .1527774 
      qualdv |  -.0470682   .0502894    -0.94   0.353    -.1478924    .0537559 
  timeseries |   .2182407   .2574841     0.85   0.400    -.2979838    .7344652 
crosssection |  -.0027922   .0634367    -0.04   0.965    -.1299752    .1243907 
       mixed |    .090753   .0879819     1.03   0.307    -.0856402    .2671462 
   developed |   .0232758   .0610291     0.38   0.704    -.0990802    .1456319 
  transition |  -.1129344   .0705296    -1.60   0.115    -.2543377    .0284688 
       china |    .069092   .0520508     1.33   0.190    -.0352637    .1734476 
    fdistock |   .0237482   .0529818     0.45   0.656    -.0824739    .1299703 
      fdirel |   -.019491   .0420386    -0.46   0.645    -.1037733    .0647912 
     hcstock |   .0453959   .0557678     0.81   0.419    -.0664118    .1572035 
     hcinput |  -.0733057   .0713894    -1.03   0.309    -.2164328    .0698214 
   secondary |  -.1215634   .0582944    -2.09   0.042    -.2384366   -.0046902 
    tertiary |  -.0550672   .0388507    -1.42   0.162    -.1329581    .0228237 
     sectert |  -.0332482   .0376136    -0.88   0.381    -.1086589    .0421626 
     avgyred |  -.1176622   .0633563    -1.86   0.069    -.2446839    .0093596 
     labcost |  -.1224047   .0457973    -2.67   0.010    -.2142227   -.0305867 
     labprod |   .0955991   .0425048     2.25   0.029     .0103821    .1808162 
 endogeneity |  -.0599005   .0562347    -1.07   0.292    -.1726442    .0528432 
     lnpubyr |   .3292858   .4486779     0.73   0.466    -.5702592    1.228831 
  lnmedianyr |   .8875675   .3427648     2.59   0.012     .2003655     1.57477 
    lnperiod |  -.3733034    .222675    -1.68   0.099      -.81974    .0731331 
    lntnoexp |  -.3661083   .4424019    -0.83   0.412    -1.253071    .5208541 
   published |  -.0730546   .0380131    -1.92   0.060    -.1492663    .0031571 
       _cons |  -1.885811   2.090304    -0.90   0.371    -6.076618    2.304996 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test crosssection=fdistock=0 
 
 ( 1)  crosssection - fdistock = 0 
 ( 2)  crosssection = 0 
 
       F(  2,    54) =    0.11 
            Prob > F =    0.8956 
 
. *drop 
.  
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. regress tstat invsepcc dynamic qualdv timeseries mixed developed transition china fdirel 
hcstock hcinput  second 
> ary tertiary sectert avgyred labcost labprod endogeneity lnpubyr lnmedianyr lnperiod 
lntnoexp published[pweight  
> = weight], vce(cluster study) 
(sum of wgt is   5.5000e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     335 
                                                       F( 23,    54) =   19.31 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3788 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0459 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 55 clusters in study) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       tstat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    invsepcc |   .1578144   .0881094     1.79   0.079    -.0188343    .3344632 
     dynamic |   .0691701   .0365632     1.89   0.064    -.0041347     .142475 
      qualdv |  -.0467879   .0395976    -1.18   0.243    -.1261762    .0326005 
  timeseries |   .1973442   .2762592     0.71   0.478    -.3565221    .7512106 
       mixed |   .1012093   .0731363     1.38   0.172    -.0454201    .2478387 
   developed |   .0191505   .0489713     0.39   0.697    -.0790311     .117332 
  transition |   -.109668   .0643321    -1.70   0.094     -.238646      .01931 
       china |   .0687228   .0498103     1.38   0.173    -.0311407    .1685864 
      fdirel |  -.0194871   .0418807    -0.47   0.644    -.1034529    .0644786 
     hcstock |   .0531121   .0476449     1.11   0.270    -.0424102    .1486343 
     hcinput |  -.0593672   .0515716    -1.15   0.255    -.1627619    .0440275 
   secondary |  -.1226703   .0572398    -2.14   0.037    -.2374293   -.0079113 
    tertiary |  -.0543681   .0380699    -1.43   0.159    -.1306937    .0219575 
     sectert |  -.0293673   .0371341    -0.79   0.432    -.1038167    .0450821 
     avgyred |   -.113034   .0622294    -1.82   0.075    -.2377964    .0117284 
     labcost |   -.116887   .0413537    -2.83   0.007    -.1997962   -.0339777 
     labprod |   .0954643   .0416386     2.29   0.026      .011984    .1789447 
 endogeneity |   -.052746   .0524212    -1.01   0.319    -.1578442    .0523521 
     lnpubyr |   .2751165   .4263913     0.65   0.522    -.5797465     1.12998 
  lnmedianyr |   .8931452   .3377408     2.64   0.011     .2160157    1.570275 
    lnperiod |  -.3483453   .2322207    -1.50   0.139    -.8139198    .1172293 
    lntnoexp |  -.3838825   .4075914    -0.94   0.350    -1.201054    .4332892 
   published |  -.0728445   .0375287    -1.94   0.057     -.148085    .0023961 
       _cons |  -1.573993   2.126415    -0.74   0.462    -5.837199    2.689213 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test developed=fdirel=0 
 
 ( 1)  developed - fdirel = 0 
 ( 2)  developed = 0 
 
       F(  2,    54) =    0.18 
            Prob > F =    0.8345 
 
. *drop 
.  
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. regress tstat invsepcc dynamic qualdv timeseries mixed transition china hcstock hcinput  
secondary tertiary sect 
> ert avgyred labcost labprod endogeneity lnpubyr lnmedianyr lnperiod lntnoexp 
published[pweight = weight], vce(cl 
> uster study) 
(sum of wgt is   5.5000e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     335 
                                                       F( 21,    54) =   21.39 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3764 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0433 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 55 clusters in study) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       tstat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    invsepcc |   .1351214    .081142     1.67   0.102    -.0275586    .2978013 
     dynamic |   .0738996   .0367192     2.01   0.049      .000282    .1475172 
      qualdv |  -.0343522   .0362018    -0.95   0.347    -.1069325    .0382281 
  timeseries |   .1989821   .2709733     0.73   0.466    -.3442867    .7422509 
       mixed |   .0973706   .0582319     1.67   0.100    -.0193774    .2141186 
  transition |  -.1159383   .0468613    -2.47   0.017    -.2098895   -.0219871 
       china |   .0658125   .0386481     1.70   0.094    -.0116723    .1432972 
     hcstock |   .0476042   .0453359     1.05   0.298    -.0432888    .1384971 
     hcinput |  -.0559966   .0514875    -1.09   0.282    -.1592229    .0472296 
   secondary |   -.127655   .0557704    -2.29   0.026    -.2394679   -.0158421 
    tertiary |  -.0513456   .0375122    -1.37   0.177    -.1265531    .0238619 
     sectert |    -.02702   .0381287    -0.71   0.482    -.1034633    .0494233 
     avgyred |  -.0973897   .0541737    -1.80   0.078    -.2060014     .011222 
     labcost |  -.1119337   .0396787    -2.82   0.007    -.1914846   -.0323827 
     labprod |   .1082472   .0355361     3.05   0.004     .0370016    .1794928 
 endogeneity |  -.0469758   .0497553    -0.94   0.349    -.1467292    .0527776 
     lnpubyr |   .2365647   .4230445     0.56   0.578    -.6115885    1.084718 
  lnmedianyr |   .9839192   .3121545     3.15   0.003     .3580872    1.609751 
    lnperiod |  -.3269056    .216472    -1.51   0.137    -.7609059    .1070946 
    lntnoexp |  -.3699038   .4119247    -0.90   0.373    -1.195763    .4559555 
   published |  -.0693669    .036779    -1.89   0.065    -.1431044    .0043707 
       _cons |  -1.851455   2.139526    -0.87   0.391    -6.140945    2.438036 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test lnpubyr=timeseries=0 
 
 ( 1)  - timeseries + lnpubyr = 0 
 ( 2)  lnpubyr = 0 
 
       F(  2,    54) =    0.47 
            Prob > F =    0.6245 
 
. *drop 
.  
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. regress tstat invsepcc dynamic qualdv mixed transition china hcstock hcinput  secondary 
tertiary sectert avgyred 
>  labcost labprod endogeneity  lnmedianyr lnperiod lntnoexp published[pweight = weight], 
vce(cluster study) 
(sum of wgt is   5.5000e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     335 
                                                       F( 19,    54) =   25.63 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3687 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0493 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 55 clusters in study) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       tstat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    invsepcc |   .1364476   .0820727     1.66   0.102    -.0280983    .3009936 
     dynamic |   .0657264   .0398886     1.65   0.105    -.0142455    .1456982 
      qualdv |  -.0350106   .0338011    -1.04   0.305    -.1027778    .0327566 
       mixed |   .0997246    .060265     1.65   0.104    -.0210995    .2205487 
  transition |  -.1074779   .0453495    -2.37   0.021    -.1983982   -.0165575 
       china |   .0688293   .0379048     1.82   0.075    -.0071652    .1448238 
     hcstock |    .048911   .0453869     1.08   0.286    -.0420843    .1399063 
     hcinput |  -.0507865   .0600646    -0.85   0.402    -.1712088    .0696358 
   secondary |  -.1299933   .0553888    -2.35   0.023    -.2410411   -.0189454 
    tertiary |  -.0510921   .0376769    -1.36   0.181    -.1266297    .0244455 
     sectert |  -.0259614    .037101    -0.70   0.487    -.1003445    .0484217 
     avgyred |  -.0945595   .0548767    -1.72   0.091    -.2045806    .0154616 
     labcost |   -.116154   .0400159    -2.90   0.005    -.1963811   -.0359268 
     labprod |   .1015916   .0319196     3.18   0.002     .0375966    .1655866 
 endogeneity |  -.0421202   .0508901    -0.83   0.411    -.1441487    .0599083 
  lnmedianyr |   .9002566   .3375269     2.67   0.010     .2235558    1.576957 
    lnperiod |  -.2340325    .222707    -1.05   0.298    -.6805331    .2124681 
    lntnoexp |  -.3662773   .3993773    -0.92   0.363    -1.166981    .4344259 
   published |  -.0653665   .0372577    -1.75   0.085    -.1400638    .0093307 
       _cons |  -.6671542   1.720411    -0.39   0.700    -4.116371    2.782062 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test endogeneity=hcinput=0 
 
 ( 1)  - hcinput + endogeneity = 0 
 ( 2)  endogeneity = 0 
 
       F(  2,    54) =    0.73 
            Prob > F =    0.4853 
 
. *drop 
.  
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. regress tstat invsepcc dynamic qualdv mixed transition china hcstock  secondary tertiary 
sectert avgyred labcost 
>  labprod  lnmedianyr lnperiod lntnoexp published[pweight = weight], vce(cluster study) 
(sum of wgt is   5.5000e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     335 
                                                       F( 17,    54) =   19.88 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3575 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0609 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 55 clusters in study) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       tstat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    invsepcc |   .0950867   .0711625     1.34   0.187    -.0475855    .2377589 
     dynamic |   .0554318   .0369301     1.50   0.139    -.0186085    .1294722 
      qualdv |  -.0185974   .0239687    -0.78   0.441    -.0666517    .0294569 
       mixed |   .1038222   .0522858     1.99   0.052    -.0010045    .2086489 
  transition |   -.079651   .0414857    -1.92   0.060    -.1628247    .0035228 
       china |   .0699294   .0374916     1.87   0.068    -.0052367    .1450956 
     hcstock |   .0529456   .0359559     1.47   0.147    -.0191417    .1250329 
   secondary |  -.1390807   .0625101    -2.22   0.030    -.2644059   -.0137555 
    tertiary |  -.0467081   .0392329    -1.19   0.239    -.1253653    .0319491 
     sectert |  -.0290207   .0404334    -0.72   0.476    -.1100848    .0520434 
     avgyred |  -.1046169   .0614913    -1.70   0.095    -.2278995    .0186657 
     labcost |  -.1072095   .0358078    -2.99   0.004    -.1789998   -.0354191 
     labprod |   .0916028   .0302899     3.02   0.004     .0308753    .1523304 
  lnmedianyr |   .8759674   .3291901     2.66   0.010      .215981    1.535954 
    lnperiod |  -.1710445   .2250857    -0.76   0.451    -.6223142    .2802252 
    lntnoexp |  -.3950188   .4083242    -0.97   0.338     -1.21366    .4236218 
   published |  -.0601837   .0372814    -1.61   0.112    -.1349283    .0145609 
       _cons |  -.5025598   1.635373    -0.31   0.760    -3.781286    2.776166 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test sectert=lnperiod=0 
 
 ( 1)  sectert - lnperiod = 0 
 ( 2)  sectert = 0 
 
       F(  2,    54) =    0.65 
            Prob > F =    0.5276 
 
. *drop 
.  
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. regress tstat invsepcc dynamic qualdv mixed transition china hcstock  secondary tertiary 
avgyred labcost labprod 
>   lnmedianyr  lntnoexp published[pweight = weight], vce(cluster study) 
(sum of wgt is   5.5000e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     335 
                                                       F( 15,    54) =   19.62 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3505 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0657 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 55 clusters in study) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       tstat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    invsepcc |   .0631281   .0676104     0.93   0.355    -.0724226    .1986788 
     dynamic |   .0512156   .0346013     1.48   0.145    -.0181558    .1205871 
      qualdv |  -.0089414   .0221887    -0.40   0.689    -.0534271    .0355442 
       mixed |    .098465   .0442419     2.23   0.030     .0097653    .1871647 
  transition |  -.0917751   .0375842    -2.44   0.018    -.1671268   -.0164233 
       china |   .0573115   .0316608     1.81   0.076    -.0061645    .1207874 
     hcstock |   .0514491   .0370359     1.39   0.170    -.0228034    .1257015 
   secondary |  -.1231097   .0502565    -2.45   0.018    -.2238679   -.0223515 
    tertiary |  -.0301877   .0250203    -1.21   0.233    -.0803505    .0199751 
     avgyred |  -.0841859   .0595683    -1.41   0.163    -.2036131    .0352413 
     labcost |  -.1048476    .036155    -2.90   0.005    -.1773339   -.0323612 
     labprod |    .092567   .0311243     2.97   0.004     .0301666    .1549674 
  lnmedianyr |   .8952305   .3146477     2.85   0.006     .2643999    1.526061 
    lntnoexp |  -.3905211   .3660201    -1.07   0.291    -1.124347     .343305 
   published |  -.0574519   .0375567    -1.53   0.132    -.1327485    .0178448 
       _cons |  -1.139737   1.876688    -0.61   0.546    -4.902269    2.622796 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test qualdv=lntnoexp=0 
 
 ( 1)  qualdv - lntnoexp = 0 
 ( 2)  qualdv = 0 
 
       F(  2,    54) =    0.59 
            Prob > F =    0.5568 
 
. *drop 
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
352 
 
. regress tstat invsepcc dynamic mixed transition china hcstock  secondary tertiary avgyred 
labcost labprod  lnmed 
> ianyr  published[pweight = weight], vce(cluster study) 
(sum of wgt is   5.5000e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     335 
                                                       F( 13,    54) =   16.55 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3443 
                                                       Root MSE      =   2.069 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 55 clusters in study) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       tstat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    invsepcc |   .0158606    .045626     0.35   0.729     -.075614    .1073352 
     dynamic |   .0554106   .0342959     1.62   0.112    -.0133484    .1241697 
       mixed |   .1032192   .0461793     2.24   0.030     .0106352    .1958031 
  transition |   -.098037    .039346    -2.49   0.016    -.1769211   -.0191529 
       china |   .0619786   .0331083     1.87   0.067    -.0043995    .1283567 
     hcstock |   .0394269   .0341541     1.15   0.253     -.029048    .1079018 
   secondary |  -.1233779   .0522618    -2.36   0.022    -.2281565   -.0185993 
    tertiary |  -.0224771   .0227184    -0.99   0.327    -.0680247    .0230706 
     avgyred |  -.0706794   .0551799    -1.28   0.206    -.1813084    .0399497 
     labcost |   -.102212   .0352625    -2.90   0.005    -.1729091   -.0315149 
     labprod |   .0958277   .0307249     3.12   0.003     .0342279    .1574275 
  lnmedianyr |   .8716855   .3133429     2.78   0.007     .2434709      1.4999 
   published |  -.0442774    .037605    -1.18   0.244    -.1196709    .0311161 
       _cons |   -2.37849   1.474975    -1.61   0.113    -5.335636    .5786567 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *final parsimonious model 
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Appendix 3.6: Parsimonious multivariate MRA (Model 3.3) results and 
diagnostics 
 
. do "C:\Users\popli\Desktop\PhD final pieces\ch 3 final reported revisions 26apr12\viva 5 
final multivariate MRA  
> minus52.do" 
 
. **Final parsimonious model, sample excluding Kang and Lee (2007) 
. regress tstat invsepcc dynamic mixed transition china hcstock  secondary tertiary avgyred 
labcost labprod  lnmed 
> ianyr  published[pweight = weight], vce(cluster study) 
(sum of wgt is   5.5000e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     335 
                                                       F( 13,    54) =   16.55 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3443 
                                                       Root MSE      =   2.069 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 55 clusters in study) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       tstat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    invsepcc |   .0158606    .045626     0.35   0.729     -.075614    .1073352 
     dynamic |   .0554106   .0342959     1.62   0.112    -.0133484    .1241697 
       mixed |   .1032192   .0461793     2.24   0.030     .0106352    .1958031 
  transition |   -.098037    .039346    -2.49   0.016    -.1769211   -.0191529 
       china |   .0619786   .0331083     1.87   0.067    -.0043995    .1283567 
     hcstock |   .0394269   .0341541     1.15   0.253     -.029048    .1079018 
   secondary |  -.1233779   .0522618    -2.36   0.022    -.2281565   -.0185993 
    tertiary |  -.0224771   .0227184    -0.99   0.327    -.0680247    .0230706 
     avgyred |  -.0706794   .0551799    -1.28   0.206    -.1813084    .0399497 
     labcost |   -.102212   .0352625    -2.90   0.005    -.1729091   -.0315149 
     labprod |   .0958277   .0307249     3.12   0.003     .0342279    .1574275 
  lnmedianyr |   .8716855   .3133429     2.78   0.007     .2434709      1.4999 
   published |  -.0442774    .037605    -1.18   0.244    -.1196709    .0311161 
       _cons |   -2.37849   1.474975    -1.61   0.113    -5.335636    .5786567 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. **Linearity test 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of tstat 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 318) =      3.41 
                  Prob > F =      0.0179 
 
. *linearity can be rejected at 5% significance level but not at the 1%. 
.  
. **Investigating normality 
. qui regress tstat invsepcc dynamic mixed transition china hcstock  secondary tertiary 
avgyred labcost labprod  l 
> nmedianyr  published 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     198.58     82    0.0000 
            Skewness |      54.22     13    0.0000 
            Kurtosis |      12.32      1    0.0004 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     265.12     96    0.0000 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. *normality problem 
. predict resid2, res 
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. histogram resid2 
(bin=18, start=-7.2053146, width=.79268736) 
 
. *bell-shaped 
.  
. **Multicollinearity check 
. qui regress tstat invsepcc dynamic mixed transition china hcstock  secondary tertiary 
avgyred labcost labprod  l 
> nmedianyr  published [pweight = weight], vce(cluster study) 
 
. estat vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
    invsepcc |     24.30    0.041146 
       mixed |     12.99    0.076975 
     labcost |      9.84    0.101595 
   published |      9.42    0.106122 
    tertiary |      7.83    0.127752 
       china |      2.70    0.370059 
     hcstock |      2.41    0.414391 
  lnmedianyr |      2.25    0.444760 
     avgyred |      2.12    0.470621 
     labprod |      1.49    0.670293 
   secondary |      1.41    0.709513 
  transition |      1.32    0.759418 
     dynamic |      1.28    0.780215 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      6.11 
 
. *multicillinearity significantly reduced 
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Appendix 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
        
fdiflow overall 3217.308 7549.187 9.49 71484.99 N =     193 
  between  4040.673 238.0998 14038.79 n =      14 
  within  6451.402 -8684.083 60663.51 T-bar = 13.7857 
        
fdistock overall 18978.49 35450.15 86.58867 251951.6 N =     194 
  between  22709.32 830.7806 65544.95 n =      14 
  within  27804.99 -38126.87 205385.1 T-bar = 13.8571 
        
primedu overall 91.84012 6.694157 72.5 99.8 N =     168 
  between  6.63157 77.12 98.88714 n =      12 
  within  2.063354 87.21154 96.16012 T =      14 
        
secedu overall 45.50548 15.62276 22 80.7 N =     168 
  between  15.64613 22.68429 68.08286 n =      12 
  within  4.280841 32.22262 58.12262 T =      14 
        
tertedu overall 7.353095 3.173817 3.3 15.2 N =     168 
  between  3.130256 3.471428 13.7 n =      12 
  within  1.018513 4.553095 11.17738 T =      14 
        
genvoc~o overall 0.4394899 0.4419921 0.1466837 1.780488 N =     196 
  between  0.4575053 0.1466837 1.780488 n =      14 
  within  0 0.4394899 0.4394899 T =      14 
        
cognit~e overall 4.75875 0.3990634 3.785 5.192 N =     168 
  between  0.4155658 3.785 5.192 n =      12 
  within  0 4.75875 4.75875 T =      14 
        
top overall 0.0701667 0.0352971 0.013 0.122 N =     168 
  between  0.0367568 0.013 0.122 n =      12 
  within  0 0.0701667 0.0701667 T =      14 
        
vacancy overall 3.893044 1.362624 1.68085 7.23077 N =      56 
  between  1.277325 2.07614 5.463493 n =      14 
  within  0.5605182 2.023689 5.762399 T =       4 
        
transi~n overall 3.226143 0.4962871 1.111111 3.962222 N =     193 
  between  0.4319198 2.182619 3.816508 n =      14 
  within  0.2681852 2.154635 3.821301 T-bar = 13.7857 
        
tradef~e overall 73.04396 9.87613 46.8 87.8 N =     182 
  between  5.907103 62 82.58571 n =      14 
  within  8.02428 49.85934 94.21538 T-bar =      13 
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econfree overall 57.88642 9.169961 24.42891 77.00185 N =     182 
  between  8.099609 39.65407 72.5352 n =      14 
  within  4.924805 42.29225 71.63622 T-bar =      13 
        
ictinfra overall 77.19616 52.2034 1.34503 249.1646 N =     196 
  between  22.51218 35.22544 109.7186 n =      14 
  within  47.45717 -1.754916 216.6421 T =      14 
        
gdp overall 4.89E+10 7.23E+10 1.87E+09 5.28E+11 N =     196 
  between  6.36E+10 5.02E+09 2.44E+11 n =      14 
  within  3.82E+10 -5.65E+10 3.33E+11 T =      14 
        
primex~t overall 0.1169967 0.0682481 0.0277404 0.3343436 N =     196 
  between  0.058766 0.0464846 0.2150174 n =      14 
  within  0.037876 
-
0.0043659 0.2389431 T =      14 
        
forbank overall 0.5317708 0.2209783 0 1 N =     192 
  between  0.1485024 0.2535714 0.7792857 n =      14 
  within  0.166837 0.0303423 0.9224851 T-bar = 13.7143 
        
wage overall 489.474 353.8258 60.8529 2038.203 N =     188 
  between  247.6512 149.9469 1070.345 n =      14 
  within  256.326 -82.96173 1457.333 T-bar = 13.4286 
        
gini overall 0.3263255 0.0424144 0.243 0.406 N =     106 
  between  0.0393852 0.267 0.377 n =      10 
  within  0.0210108 0.2445398 0.3770398 T =    10.6 
        
privat~n overall 0.4081633 0.4927523 0 1 N =     196 
  between  0.1846303 0.2142857 0.7857143 n =      14 
  within  0.4593354 -0.377551 1.193878 T =      14 
        
instab~y overall 0.0255102 0.1580725 0 1 N =     196 
  between  0.0663416 0 0.2142857 n =      14 
  within   0.1444961 
-
0.1887755 0.8826531 T =      14 
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Appendix 5.2: Between-to-within ratios 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Between-to-within ratio* 
       
lnprim~u overall 4.517257 0.0760378 3.25 
  between  0.0754002   
  within  0.0232191   
       
lnsecedu overall 3.757556 0.3524169 4.42 
  between  0.3572097   
  within  0.080819   
       
lntert~u overall 1.904314 0.4283678 3.63 
  between  0.4288173   
  within  0.1180212   
       
lngenv~o overall -1.160987 0.760616 Time-invariant  
  between  0.7873124   
  within  0   
       
lncogn~e overall 1.556188 0.0892752 Time-invariant  
  between  0.092967   
  within  0   
       
lntop overall -2.83484 0.6635057 Time-invariant  
  between  0.6909435   
  within  0   
       
lnvaca~y overall 1.295273 0.3678036 2.50 
  between  0.3499025   
  within  0.1397346   
       
lntran~n overall 1.156979 0.1799261 1.47 
  between  0.1521118   
  within  0.1034439   
       
lntrad~e overall 4.281385 0.1418565 0.74 
  between  0.0848653   
  within  0.1153051   
       
lnecon~e overall 4.044214 0.1767746 1.54 
  between  0.1546549   
  within  0.1001181   
       
lnicti~a overall 4.038468 0.9081815 0.63 
  between  0.4868857   
  within  0.7768782   
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lngdp overall 23.86489 1.234269 2.37 
  between  1.170495   
  within  0.4946693   
       
lnprim~t overall -2.305377 0.5699126 1.72 
  between  0.5057387   
  within  0.2933943   
       
lnforb~k overall -0.755124 0.6050269 0.75 
  between  0.3673489   
  within  0.4867113   
       
lnwage overall 5.941384 0.7370654 1.21 
  between  0.5736379   
  within  0.4723268   
       
lngini overall -1.128338 0.1313726 1.89 
  between  0.1219636   
  within  0.0644616   
       
lnedutr1 overall -1.089152 0.1438554 Time-invariant  
  between  0.1489045   
  within  0   
       
lnedutr2 overall -1.690939 0.3105992 0.46 
  between  0.1304231   
  within  0.2838955   
       
privat~n overall 0.4081633 0.4927523 0.40 
  between  0.1846303   
  within  0.4593354   
       
instab~y overall 0.0255102 0.1580725 0.46 
  between  0.0663416   
  within  0.1444961   
          
*Ratio calculated by dividing between S.D. of the variable by its within S.D 
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Appendix 5.3: Diagnostic tests and raw correlations 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------- 
. **full model 5.1, in levels 
. xtreg fdiflow secedu tertedu wage l1wage l2wage gdp l1gdp l2gdp  transition tradefree 
econfree ictinfra primexpo 
> rt l1primexport l2primexport forbank privatisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 
d2003 d2002 d2001 d 
> 2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, fe 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1995 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       143 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        12 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4612                         Obs per group: min =        11 
       between = 0.1098                                        avg =      11.9 
       overall = 0.1302                                        max =        12 
 
                                                F(29,102)          =      3.01 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8857                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     fdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      secedu |   643.9913   366.2689     1.76   0.082    -82.50134    1370.484 
     tertedu |   111.3773   1033.206     0.11   0.914    -1937.981    2160.736 
        wage |   12.94399   21.80005     0.59   0.554    -30.29631    56.18428 
      l1wage |   -43.1405   36.72932    -1.17   0.243    -115.9929    29.71193 
      l2wage |   14.95244   24.14391     0.62   0.537    -32.93688    62.84176 
         gdp |  -3.62e-07   1.48e-07    -2.45   0.016    -6.55e-07   -6.93e-08 
       l1gdp |   7.19e-08   2.26e-07     0.32   0.751    -3.77e-07    5.20e-07 
       l2gdp |   6.93e-07   1.99e-07     3.49   0.001     2.99e-07    1.09e-06 
  transition |   -39131.9   12394.22    -3.16   0.002    -63715.78   -14548.01 
   tradefree |  -78.23926   113.6188    -0.69   0.493    -303.6016    147.1231 
    econfree |   217.0831   236.8552     0.92   0.362    -252.7181    686.8842 
    ictinfra |  -11.89955   54.00112    -0.22   0.826    -119.0105    95.21142 
  primexport |   16567.55   28082.53     0.59   0.557    -39134.01    72269.12 
l1primexport |   1058.366    31609.2     0.03   0.973    -61638.33    63755.06 
l2primexport |   14143.96   32810.09     0.43   0.667    -50934.69    79222.62 
     forbank |  -2254.634   7402.109    -0.30   0.761    -16936.68    12427.41 
privatisat~n |  -687.6849    1354.29    -0.51   0.613    -3373.914    1998.544 
 instability |  -1641.946   5963.029    -0.28   0.784    -13469.59    10185.69 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |   -1424.24   3828.139    -0.37   0.711    -9017.336    6168.857 
       d2006 |  -8120.683   4654.311    -1.74   0.084    -17352.49    1111.121 
       d2005 |  -6744.756   5811.406    -1.16   0.249    -18271.65     4782.14 
       d2004 |  -7145.187    6899.48    -1.04   0.303    -20830.27    6539.899 
       d2003 |  -12845.82   8079.754    -1.59   0.115    -28871.98     3180.33 
       d2002 |  -13701.33   8922.475    -1.54   0.128    -31399.01    3996.361 
       d2001 |  -17626.69   9641.028    -1.83   0.070    -36749.62    1496.243 
       d2000 |  -19584.02   10403.27    -1.88   0.063    -40218.85    1050.812 
       d1999 |  -20918.63   11426.23    -1.83   0.070    -43582.51    1745.252 
       d1998 |  -23700.48   11992.49    -1.98   0.051    -47487.53    86.57441 
       d1997 |  -25965.11   12637.75    -2.05   0.042    -51032.02   -898.2038 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   105144.1   47198.76     2.23   0.028     11525.63    198762.7 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  13340.737 
     sigma_e |  6324.4792 
         rho |  .81649655   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(11, 102) =     2.99             Prob > F = 0.0018 
 
. pantest2 year 
 
 
Test for serial correlation in residuals 
Null hypothesis is either that rho=0 if residuals are AR(1) 
or that lamda=0 if residuals are MA(1) 
Following tests only approximate for unbalanced panels 
LM= 26.218339 
which is asy. distributed as chisq(1) under null, so: 
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Probability of value greater than LM is 3.049e-07 
LM5= 5.1203847 
which is asy. distributed as N(0,1) under null, so: 
Probability of value greater than abs(LM5) is 1.525e-07 
 
 
Test for significance of fixed effects 
F= 2.9872844 
Probability>F= .00176597 
 
 
Test for normality of residuals 
 
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
                                                         ------- joint ------ 
    Variable |    Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    __00000B |    143      0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000 
 
 
 
. predict residlev 
(option xb assumed; fitted values) 
(53 missing values generated) 
 
. histogram residlev 
(bin=11, start=-8018.5571, width=3168.8532) 
 
 
 
. *there is a normality problem, therefore fdiflow is transformed 
.  
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. corr lnfdiflow lnfdistock lntransition lntradefree lneconfree  lnictinfra lngdp lnl1gdp lnl2gdp lnprimexport l1l 
> nprimexport l2lnprimexport lnforbank lnl1forbank lnl2forbank lnwage  l1lnwage l2lnwage lnprimedu lnsecedu lntert 
> edu lngenvocratio lnedutr1 lnedutr2 lnvacancy lncognitive lntop 
(obs=44) 
 
             | lnfdif~w lnfdis~k lntran~n lntrad~e lnecon~e lnicti~a    lngdp  lnl1gdp  lnl2gdp lnprim~t l1lnpr~t 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lnfdiflow |   1.0000 
  lnfdistock |   0.8816   1.0000 
lntransition |   0.5064   0.6909   1.0000 
 lntradefree |   0.0755   0.2607   0.6917   1.0000 
  lneconfree |  -0.1476  -0.0057   0.6054   0.6484   1.0000 
  lnictinfra |   0.3820   0.5073   0.7736   0.5031   0.5589   1.0000 
       lngdp |   0.8455   0.9326   0.4835   0.0613  -0.2342   0.3193   1.0000 
     lnl1gdp |   0.8420   0.9263   0.4848   0.0719  -0.2301   0.3196   0.9983   1.0000 
     lnl2gdp |   0.8334   0.9163   0.4776   0.0717  -0.2414   0.2985   0.9951   0.9978   1.0000 
lnprimexport |  -0.0557  -0.1626  -0.2113   0.0753  -0.0618  -0.1455  -0.1659  -0.1652  -0.1745   1.0000 
l1lnprimex~t |  -0.0320  -0.1060  -0.1615   0.0775  -0.0734  -0.1600  -0.1040  -0.1042  -0.1033   0.9496   1.0000 
l2lnprimex~t |  -0.0540  -0.1016  -0.1388   0.0825  -0.0759  -0.2233  -0.1151  -0.1183  -0.1116   0.8965   0.9485 
   lnforbank |   0.3564   0.2067  -0.1141  -0.1873  -0.1579  -0.3981   0.2332   0.2269   0.2174   0.0065   0.0189 
 lnl1forbank |   0.3171   0.1922  -0.1294  -0.2209  -0.1511  -0.4084   0.2094   0.1992   0.1877   0.0306   0.0295 
 lnl2forbank |   0.2944   0.1523  -0.1244  -0.2012  -0.1196  -0.4151   0.1559   0.1479   0.1344   0.0372   0.0260 
      lnwage |   0.3256   0.5200   0.6643   0.3730   0.3261   0.7890   0.4834   0.4893   0.4806  -0.4391  -0.4281 
    l1lnwage |   0.3249   0.5112   0.6611   0.3902   0.3270   0.7792   0.4829   0.4941   0.4863  -0.4133  -0.4073 
    l2lnwage |   0.3181   0.5019   0.6616   0.4028   0.3167   0.7556   0.4826   0.4961   0.4948  -0.4071  -0.3855 
   lnprimedu |   0.0565   0.1268   0.5307   0.5261   0.7438   0.2583  -0.0206  -0.0174  -0.0266  -0.1678  -0.1894 
    lnsecedu |  -0.0180   0.0928   0.3905   0.4686   0.5500   0.3919  -0.1762  -0.1901  -0.2092  -0.0125  -0.0155 
   lntertedu |   0.0076   0.1611   0.6562   0.6207   0.6386   0.5558  -0.1029  -0.1028  -0.1091   0.2247   0.2251 
lngenvocra~o |  -0.3367  -0.3290   0.2174   0.4523   0.7244   0.1145  -0.5435  -0.5439  -0.5503   0.3692   0.3417 
    lnedutr1 |  -0.5610  -0.6945  -0.5936  -0.2072  -0.0049  -0.6800  -0.6005  -0.5998  -0.6020   0.2150   0.1323 
    lnedutr2 |  -0.1639  -0.2750  -0.1743  -0.0144   0.1714  -0.0822  -0.2140  -0.2092  -0.2412   0.2615   0.1145 
   lnvacancy |  -0.2293  -0.0336   0.4217   0.4742   0.5291   0.4411  -0.1589  -0.1569  -0.1525  -0.1803  -0.1555 
 lncognitive |   0.4711   0.6453   0.8675   0.5852   0.4476   0.7907   0.4292   0.4286   0.4300  -0.1487  -0.0635 
       lntop |   0.6964   0.7805   0.7879   0.3730   0.2474   0.6231   0.6146   0.6144   0.6167  -0.2751  -0.1843 
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             | l2lnpr~t lnforb~k lnl1fo~k lnl2fo~k   lnwage l1lnwage l2lnwage lnprim~u lnsecedu lntert~u lngenv~o 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
l2lnprimex~t |   1.0000 
   lnforbank |   0.0367   1.0000 
 lnl1forbank |   0.0462   0.9681   1.0000 
 lnl2forbank |   0.0333   0.9276   0.9632   1.0000 
      lnwage |  -0.4682  -0.4365  -0.4846  -0.5318   1.0000 
    l1lnwage |  -0.4529  -0.4357  -0.4882  -0.5322   0.9949   1.0000 
    l2lnwage |  -0.4262  -0.4541  -0.5098  -0.5551   0.9857   0.9941   1.0000 
   lnprimedu |  -0.1973   0.3158   0.3445   0.3980   0.0569   0.0665   0.0592   1.0000 
    lnsecedu |   0.0018  -0.0163   0.0224   0.0622   0.0266   0.0010  -0.0258   0.4399   1.0000 
   lntertedu |   0.2480  -0.3196  -0.2955  -0.2551   0.2111   0.2119   0.2134   0.4066   0.4175   1.0000 
lngenvocra~o |   0.3528   0.0542   0.0683   0.1072  -0.2588  -0.2513  -0.2513   0.6008   0.4152   0.6974   1.0000 
    lnedutr1 |   0.0987   0.3448   0.3607   0.3899  -0.6075  -0.5932  -0.5964   0.1894  -0.1721  -0.2854   0.3773 
    lnedutr2 |  -0.0324   0.2450   0.2712   0.2852  -0.0843  -0.0592  -0.0937   0.3188  -0.1555  -0.1154   0.2893 
   lnvacancy |  -0.1514  -0.6337  -0.6445  -0.6403   0.5299   0.5222   0.5321   0.0876   0.3595   0.3017   0.1181 
 lncognitive |  -0.0081  -0.3248  -0.3565  -0.3816   0.6669   0.6564   0.6665   0.1577   0.3571   0.5976   0.0600 
       lntop |  -0.1205   0.0287  -0.0098  -0.0478   0.5404   0.5327   0.5397   0.1829   0.1419   0.3543  -0.1143 
 
             | lnedutr1 lnedutr2 lnvaca~y lncogn~e    lntop 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
    lnedutr1 |   1.0000 
    lnedutr2 |   0.6700   1.0000 
   lnvacancy |  -0.2257  -0.1793   1.0000 
 lncognitive |  -0.8159  -0.4836   0.5005   1.0000 
       lntop |  -0.7781  -0.4538   0.1807   0.8817   1.0000 
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. **full model 5.1, log-log 
. xtreg lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage l1lnwage l2lnwage lngdp l1lngdp l2lngdp  
lntransition lntradefree lnec 
> onfree lnictinfra lnprimexport l1lnprimexport l2lnprimexport lnforbank privatisation 
instability d2008 d2007 d20 
> 06 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, fe robust 
note: d1997 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1995 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       143 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        12 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7717                         Obs per group: min =        11 
       between = 0.5551                                        avg =      11.9 
       overall = 0.0494                                        max =        12 
 
                                                F(11,11)           =         . 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3698                        Prob > F           =         . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 12 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -.4633169   2.128209    -0.22   0.832    -5.147474     4.22084 
   lntertedu |  -.7689391   1.211899    -0.63   0.539     -3.43631    1.898432 
      lnwage |   .0142601   1.544155     0.01   0.993    -3.384401    3.412921 
    l1lnwage |   .5475273   .5299172     1.03   0.324    -.6188127    1.713867 
    l2lnwage |  -.3932786   .9403425    -0.42   0.684    -2.462958    1.676401 
       lngdp |   .3805829   1.836163     0.21   0.840    -3.660785    4.421951 
     l1lngdp |  -.5564767   1.379886    -0.40   0.694    -3.593586    2.480632 
     l2lngdp |   -.229746   1.448211    -0.16   0.877    -3.417238    2.957746 
lntransition |    1.55692   3.053853     0.51   0.620    -5.164565    8.278404 
 lntradefree |  -.4707713   .6344151    -0.74   0.474    -1.867109    .9255669 
  lneconfree |   1.155114   1.523858     0.76   0.464    -2.198876    4.509104 
  lnictinfra |  -.0536539   .3963855    -0.14   0.895    -.9260924    .8187846 
lnprimexport |   .2395144   .2997981     0.80   0.441    -.4203367    .8993655 
l1lnprimex~t |   .0042075    .318612     0.01   0.990    -.6970527    .7054677 
l2lnprimex~t |  -.1572141   .3176584    -0.49   0.630    -.8563755    .5419472 
   lnforbank |   .2231828   .2380808     0.94   0.369    -.3008294    .7471951 
privatisat~n |   .4472416   .1284495     3.48   0.005     .1645261    .7299571 
 instability |  -.6138362   .7838364    -0.78   0.450    -2.339049    1.111376 
       d2008 |   2.118311   1.824904     1.16   0.270    -1.898275    6.134898 
       d2007 |   2.124796   1.675585     1.27   0.231    -1.563142    5.812734 
       d2006 |   1.554211   1.375633     1.13   0.283    -1.473536    4.581959 
       d2005 |   1.146123   1.296192     0.88   0.395    -1.706776    3.999023 
       d2004 |   .6854929   1.064224     0.64   0.533    -1.656849    3.027835 
       d2003 |    .323199   .7889698     0.41   0.690    -1.413312     2.05971 
       d2002 |   .4044573   .7250545     0.56   0.588    -1.191377    2.000291 
       d2001 |   .2401294   .5693881     0.42   0.681    -1.013085    1.493344 
       d2000 |   .0186956   .3719085     0.05   0.961    -.7998694    .8372605 
       d1999 |  -.0507387    .302621    -0.17   0.870     -.716803    .6153256 
       d1998 |   .1567807   .2256905     0.69   0.502    -.3399609    .6535222 
       d1997 |  (omitted) 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   14.24458   36.72955     0.39   0.706    -66.59662    95.08579 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.4985071 
     sigma_e |   .4922461 
         rho |  .90260337   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. pantest2 year 
 
 
Test for serial correlation in residuals 
Null hypothesis is either that rho=0 if residuals are AR(1) 
or that lamda=0 if residuals are MA(1) 
Following tests only approximate for unbalanced panels 
LM= 12.164785 
which is asy. distributed as chisq(1) under null, so: 
Probability of value greater than LM is .000487 
LM5= 3.4878051 
which is asy. distributed as N(0,1) under null, so: 
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Probability of value greater than abs(LM5) is .0002435 
 
 
Test for significance of fixed effects 
F= 2.8622156 
Probability>F= .00228797 
 
 
Test for normality of residuals 
 
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
                                                         ------- joint ------ 
    Variable |    Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    __00000B |    143      0.0561         0.1181         5.88         0.0529 
 
 
 
. predict residln 
(option xb assumed; fitted values) 
(53 missing values generated) 
 
. histogram residln 
(bin=11, start=3.6209955, width=.6493669) 
 
.  
. **variance inflation factor (VIF) 
. qui reg fdiflow secedu tertedu wage l1wage l2wage gdp l1gdp l2gdp  transition tradefree 
econfree ictinfra primex 
> port l1primexport l2primexport forbank privatisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 
d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 
>  d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995 
 
. estat vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       l1gdp |    777.28    0.001287 
      l1wage |    477.33    0.002095 
         gdp |    288.21    0.003470 
       l2gdp |    245.43    0.004074 
        wage |    196.04    0.005101 
      l2wage |    160.30    0.006238 
    ictinfra |     16.87    0.059271 
l1primexport |     12.87    0.077707 
       d1997 |      9.50    0.105267 
       d1998 |      9.31    0.107446 
  primexport |      8.75    0.114298 
       d1999 |      8.20    0.121886 
l2primexport |      7.95    0.125832 
       d2000 |      7.63    0.130998 
       d2001 |      7.27    0.137618 
  transition |      6.91    0.144673 
       d2002 |      5.30    0.188619 
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       d2003 |      4.77    0.209444 
       d2004 |      4.14    0.241686 
       d2005 |      3.89    0.257060 
       d2006 |      3.58    0.279662 
    econfree |      3.54    0.282476 
      secedu |      3.48    0.287106 
       d2007 |      3.36    0.297843 
     forbank |      3.06    0.326492 
     tertedu |      2.95    0.338893 
   tradefree |      2.86    0.349426 
privatisat~n |      1.50    0.667569 
 instability |      1.49    0.669974 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |     78.75 
 
. *there is high multicollinearity 
.  
. **cross-sectional dependence tests 
. qui xtreg lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage l1lnwage l2lnwage lngdp l1lngdp l2lngdp  
lntransition lntradefree  
> lneconfree lnictinfra lnprimexport l1lnprimexport l2lnprimexport lnforbank privatisation 
instability d2008 d2007 
>  d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, fe 
 
. xtcsd, frees abs 
  
  Frees' test of cross sectional independence =     0.313 
|--------------------------------------------------------| 
  Critical values from Frees' Q distribution 
                      alpha = 0.10 :   0.2333 
                      alpha = 0.05 :   0.3103 
                      alpha = 0.01 :   0.4649 
  
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =     0.270 
 
. xtcsd, pesaran abs 
  
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =    -2.280, Pr = 0.0226 
  
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =     0.255 
 
. *there is a cross-sectional dependence problem 
.  
. **heteroskedasticity test 
. qui xtreg lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage l1lnwage l2lnwage lngdp l1lngdp l2lngdp  
lntransition lntradefree  
> lneconfree lnictinfra lnprimexport l1lnprimexport l2lnprimexport lnforbank privatisation 
instability d2008 d2007 
>  d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, fe 
 
. xttest3 
 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (12)  =      67.48 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
 
. *there is a heteroskedasticity problem 
.  
. **serial correlation test 
. xtserial lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage l1lnwage l2lnwage lngdp l1lngdp l2lngdp  
lntransition lntradefree l 
> neconfree lnictinfra lnprimexport l1lnprimexport l2lnprimexport lnforbank privatisation 
instability d2008 d2007  
> d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      11) =      9.463 
           Prob > F =      0.0105 
 
. *there is a serial correlation problem 
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. *therefore, Driscoll-Kraay SE's (robust to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and cross-
sectional dependence 
> ) 
.  
. **Hausman test 
. *FE estimation 
. qui xtreg lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage l1lnwage l2lnwage lngdp l1lngdp l2lngdp  
lntransition lntradefree  
> lneconfree lnictinfra lnprimexport l1lnprimexport l2lnprimexport lnforbank privatisation 
instability d2008 d2007 
>  d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, fe 
 
. est store fe1i 
 
. *RE estimation 
. qui xtreg lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage l1lnwage l2lnwage lngdp l1lngdp l2lngdp  
lntransition lntradefree  
> lneconfree lnictinfra lnprimexport l1lnprimexport l2lnprimexport lnforbank privatisation 
instability d2008 d2007 
>  d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, re 
 
. est store re1i 
 
. *Conventional Hausman test 
. hausman fe1i re1i 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      fe1i         re1i        Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |   -.4633169      .163096       -.6264129        1.826122 
   lntertedu |   -.7689391    -.1598311        -.609108        .8236482 
      lnwage |    .0142601     -1.34973         1.36399        .7247764 
    l1lnwage |    .5475273     .3128669        .2346604               . 
    l2lnwage |   -.3932786     .6015357       -.9948143        .3371823 
       lngdp |    .3805829     1.347262       -.9666789        .5975451 
     l1lngdp |   -.5564767     .4989155       -1.055392               . 
     l2lngdp |    -.229746    -1.060782        .8310358        .3292609 
lntransition |     1.55692     6.309532       -4.752613        2.601833 
 lntradefree |   -.4707713    -.7577396        .2869683        .2981251 
  lneconfree |    1.155114    -1.440415        2.595529         .788465 
  lnictinfra |   -.0536539     .2619887       -.3156426        .2171724 
lnprimexport |    .2395144      .350609       -.1110946        .0915035 
l1lnprimex~t |    .0042075    -.0571217        .0613292               . 
l2lnprimex~t |   -.1572141    -.3325908        .1753766        .1473407 
   lnforbank |    .2231828     .4476344       -.2244516        .1584315 
privatisat~n |    .4472416     .5381635       -.0909219         .012263 
 instability |   -.6138362    -.0451347       -.5687016         .215062 
       d2008 |    2.118311     .2455641        1.872747        1.083027 
       d2007 |    2.124796     .3693831        1.755413        .9869644 
       d2006 |    1.554211    -.1551574        1.709369        .8777765 
       d2005 |    1.146123    -.4729852        1.619109        .7835802 
       d2004 |    .6854929    -.6407246        1.326217        .6471892 
       d2003 |     .323199    -.6209917        .9441907        .5293624 
       d2002 |    .4044573    -.4120101        .8164674        .4321286 
       d2001 |    .2401294    -.4360164        .6761458        .3613012 
       d2000 |    .0186956    -.5976556        .6163512        .2701818 
       d1999 |   -.0507387    -.3333133        .2825747        .1402556 
       d1998 |    .1567807     .1148545        .0419262        .0430835 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(29) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        7.97 
                Prob>chi2 =      1.0000 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
. *Panel-robust Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2002) 
. hausman fe1i re1i, sigmamore 
 
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (11) does not equal the number of 
coefficients being tested 
        (29); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  
Examine the output of 
368 
 
        your estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables 
so that the 
        coefficients are on a similar scale. 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      fe1i         re1i        Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |   -.4633169      .163096       -.6264129        1.950793 
   lntertedu |   -.7689391    -.1598311        -.609108        .8829069 
      lnwage |    .0142601     -1.34973         1.36399        .8853712 
    l1lnwage |    .5475273     .3128669        .2346604        .3345801 
    l2lnwage |   -.3932786     .6015357       -.9948143        .5258773 
       lngdp |    .3805829     1.347262       -.9666789        .8204679 
     l1lngdp |   -.5564767     .4989155       -1.055392        .5518417 
     l2lngdp |    -.229746    -1.060782        .8310358         .613776 
lntransition |     1.55692     6.309532       -4.752613        2.847253 
 lntradefree |   -.4707713    -.7577396        .2869683        .3708358 
  lneconfree |    1.155114    -1.440415        2.595529        .8756891 
  lnictinfra |   -.0536539     .2619887       -.3156426        .2522345 
lnprimexport |    .2395144      .350609       -.1110946         .142992 
l1lnprimex~t |    .0042075    -.0571217        .0613292        .0626374 
l2lnprimex~t |   -.1572141    -.3325908        .1753766        .1887065 
   lnforbank |    .2231828     .4476344       -.2244516        .1834441 
privatisat~n |    .4472416     .5381635       -.0909219        .0415424 
 instability |   -.6138362    -.0451347       -.5687016        .3016885 
       d2008 |    2.118311     .2455641        1.872747        1.173015 
       d2007 |    2.124796     .3693831        1.755413         1.06905 
       d2006 |    1.554211    -.1551574        1.709369        .9516056 
       d2005 |    1.146123    -.4729852        1.619109        .8529012 
       d2004 |    .6854929    -.6407246        1.326217        .7124953 
       d2003 |     .323199    -.6209917        .9441907        .5858145 
       d2002 |    .4044573    -.4120101        .8164674         .481669 
       d2001 |    .2401294    -.4360164        .6761458        .4031172 
       d2000 |    .0186956    -.5976556        .6163512        .3061226 
       d1999 |   -.0507387    -.3333133        .2825747         .179233 
       d1998 |    .1567807     .1148545        .0419262        .1029484 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       23.49 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0151 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
. *Spatial and temporal dependence robust Hausman test (Hoechle 2007) 
. * Generate the variables for the auxiliary regression proposed by Hausman (1978). 
. scalar lambda_hat = 1 - sqrt(e(sigma_e)^2/(e(g_avg)*e(sigma_u)^2+e(sigma_e)^2)) 
 
. gen in_sample = e(sample) 
 
. sort country year 
 
. qui foreach X of varlist lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage l1lnwage l2lnwage lngdp l1lngdp 
l2lngdp  lntransiti 
> on lntradefree lneconfree lnictinfra lnprimexport l1lnprimexport l2lnprimexport lnforbank 
privatisation instabil 
> ity d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995{ 
 
. *Hoechle's (2007) auxilary regression robust to general forms of spatial and temporal 
dependence, based on Woold 
> ridge's(2002)panel-robust auxilary regression  
. qui xtscc lnfdiflow_re lnsecedu_re lntertedu_re lnwage_re l1lnwage_re l2lnwage_re lngdp_re 
l1lngdp_re l2lngdp_re 
>   lntransition_re lntradefree_re lneconfree_re lnictinfra_re lnprimexport_re 
l1lnprimexport_re l2lnprimexport_re 
>  lnforbank_re privatisation_re instability_re d2008_re d2007_re d2006_re d2005_re d2004_re 
d2003_re d2002_re d20 
> 01_re d2000_re d1999_re d1998_re lnfdiflow_fe lnsecedu_fe lntertedu_fe lnwage_fe l1lnwage_fe 
l2lnwage_fe lngdp_f 
> e l1lngdp_fe l2lngdp_fe  lntransition_fe lntradefree_fe lneconfree_fe lnictinfra_fe 
lnprimexport_fe l1lnprimexpo 
> rt_fe l2lnprimexport_fe lnforbank_fe privatisation_fe instability_fe d2008_fe d2007_fe 
d2006_fe d2005_fe d2004_f 
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> e d2003_fe d2002_fe d2001_fe d2000_fe d1999_fe d1998_fe if in_sample, lag(8)  
 
. *Perform an asymptotically equivalent version of the test as proposed by Hausman (1978) 
. test lnsecedu_fe lntertedu_fe lnwage_fe l1lnwage_fe l2lnwage_fe lngdp_fe l1lngdp_fe 
l2lngdp_fe  lntransition_fe  
> lntradefree_fe lneconfree_fe lnictinfra_fe lnprimexport_fe l1lnprimexport_fe 
l2lnprimexport_fe lnforbank_fe priv 
> atisation_fe instability_fe d2008_fe d2007_fe d2006_fe d2005_fe d2004_fe d2003_fe d2002_fe 
d2001_fe d2000_fe d19 
> 99_fe d1998_fe 
 
 ( 1)  lnsecedu_fe = 0 
 ( 2)  lntertedu_fe = 0 
 ( 3)  lnwage_fe = 0 
 ( 4)  l1lnwage_fe = 0 
 ( 5)  l2lnwage_fe = 0 
 ( 6)  lngdp_fe = 0 
 ( 7)  l1lngdp_fe = 0 
 ( 8)  l2lngdp_fe = 0 
 ( 9)  lntransition_fe = 0 
 (10)  lntradefree_fe = 0 
 (11)  lneconfree_fe = 0 
 (12)  lnictinfra_fe = 0 
 (13)  lnprimexport_fe = 0 
 (14)  l1lnprimexport_fe = 0 
 (15)  l2lnprimexport_fe = 0 
 (16)  lnforbank_fe = 0 
 (17)  privatisation_fe = 0 
 (18)  instability_fe = 0 
 (19)  d2008_fe = 0 
 (20)  d2007_fe = 0 
 (21)  d2006_fe = 0 
 (22)  d2005_fe = 0 
 (23)  d2004_fe = 0 
 (24)  d2003_fe = 0 
 (25)  d2002_fe = 0 
 (26)  d2001_fe = 0 
 (27)  d2000_fe = 0 
 (28)  d1999_fe = 0 
 (29)  d1998_fe = 0 
 
       F( 12,    11) = 3.8e+18 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. *RE estimator not consistent, therefore only FE estimators used 
.  
. **Driscoll-Kraay FE estimator  
. xtscc lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage l1lnwage l2lnwage lngdp l1lngdp l2lngdp  
lntransition lntradefree lnec 
> onfree lnictinfra lnprimexport l1lnprimexport l2lnprimexport lnforbank privatisation 
instability d2008 d2007 d20 
> 06 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       143 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        12 
Group variable (i): country                      F( 32,    11)     =     73.71 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.7717 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -.4633169   1.664913    -0.28   0.786    -4.127765    3.201132 
   lntertedu |  -.7689391   1.095653    -0.70   0.497    -3.180455    1.642577 
      lnwage |   .0142601   .7397215     0.02   0.985    -1.613856    1.642376 
    l1lnwage |   .5475273   1.018364     0.54   0.602    -1.693877    2.788931 
    l2lnwage |  -.3932786   .6477473    -0.61   0.556    -1.818961    1.032404 
       lngdp |   .3805829   .8062184     0.47   0.646    -1.393892    2.155058 
     l1lngdp |  -.5564767   1.656194    -0.34   0.743    -4.201736    3.088782 
     l2lngdp |   -.229746   .7879839    -0.29   0.776    -1.964087    1.504595 
lntransition |    1.55692   3.339307     0.47   0.650    -5.792846    8.906685 
 lntradefree |  -.4707713   .4911897    -0.96   0.358    -1.551872    .6103298 
  lneconfree |   1.155114   1.172786     0.98   0.346     -1.42617    3.736398 
  lnictinfra |  -.0536539   .2306969    -0.23   0.820    -.5614144    .4541066 
lnprimexport |   .2395144   .1526793     1.57   0.145    -.0965304    .5755592 
l1lnprimex~t |   .0042075   .2109392     0.02   0.984    -.4600665    .4684815 
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l2lnprimex~t |  -.1572141   .2949864    -0.53   0.605    -.8064748    .4920465 
   lnforbank |   .2231828   .1454572     1.53   0.153    -.0969663     .543332 
privatisat~n |   .4472416   .1291914     3.46   0.005     .1628932      .73159 
 instability |  -.6138362   .4778674    -1.28   0.225    -1.665615    .4379428 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |   .0064849    .124471     0.05   0.959    -.2674739    .2804437 
       d2006 |  -.5640997   .2129543    -2.65   0.023    -1.032809   -.0953906 
       d2005 |  -.9721877    .282827    -3.44   0.006    -1.594686   -.3496897 
       d2004 |  -1.432818   .3228847    -4.44   0.001    -2.143483   -.7221538 
       d2003 |  -1.795112   .3183692    -5.64   0.000    -2.495838   -1.094386 
       d2002 |  -1.713854   .3914926    -4.38   0.001    -2.575523   -.8521845 
       d2001 |  -1.878182   .4321582    -4.35   0.001    -2.829356   -.9270081 
       d2000 |  -2.099616   .4937456    -4.25   0.001    -3.186342   -1.012889 
       d1999 |   -2.16905    .500257    -4.34   0.001    -3.270108   -1.067992 
       d1998 |  -1.961531    .478901    -4.10   0.002    -3.015585   -.9074765 
       d1997 |  -2.118311   .5183656    -4.09   0.002    -3.259226   -.9773961 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   16.36289   13.60602     1.20   0.254    -13.58376    46.30955 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
371 
 
Appendix 5.4: Initial specifications 
**secedu only  
 
. xtfevd lnfdiflow lnsecedu  lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank privatisation 
instability d2008 d 
> 2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996, invariant (lnsecedu 
lngdp) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      128           number of obs       =      161 
mean squared error         = .1859815           F( 23, 128)         = 40.02397 
root mean squared error    = .4312557           Prob > F            = 4.00e-46 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 29.94302           R-squared           =  .915896 
Total Sum of Squares       = 356.0239           adj. R-squared      =   .89487 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 326.0809 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lntransition |   5.356397   2.838508     1.89   0.061    -.2600758    10.97287 
 lntradefree |   -.478568   .7498234    -0.64   0.524    -1.962222    1.005086 
  lneconfree |   1.015615   1.287807     0.79   0.432    -1.532531     3.56376 
   lnforbank |   .3331903   .2577847     1.29   0.199    -.1768807    .8432613 
privatisat~n |   .3967238   .1131736     3.51   0.001     .1727905    .6206572 
 instability |  -.6373658   .3515562    -1.81   0.072     -1.33298    .0582482 
       d2008 |   1.158198   .5669942     2.04   0.043     .0363029    2.280093 
       d2007 |   1.187937   .5538793     2.14   0.034     .0919922    2.283882 
       d2006 |   .6576642   .5563393     1.18   0.239    -.4431482    1.758476 
       d2005 |   .3509573   .5413783     0.65   0.518    -.7202522    1.422167 
       d2004 |   .0131117   .5339007     0.02   0.980    -1.043302    1.069525 
       d2003 |   -.367296   .5184643    -0.71   0.480    -1.393166    .6585743 
       d2002 |  -.3132066   .5018079    -0.62   0.534    -1.306119     .679706 
       d2001 |  -.4494045   .4794552    -0.94   0.350    -1.398088    .4992794 
       d2000 |  -.5379365   .4530832    -1.19   0.237    -1.434439     .358566 
       d1999 |  -.4731643   .4234959    -1.12   0.266    -1.311123    .3647946 
       d1998 |   -.178981   .3987864    -0.45   0.654     -.968048     .610086 
       d1997 |   -.240217   .3886696    -0.62   0.538    -1.009266    .5288321 
       d1996 |  -.2047121    .354228    -0.58   0.564    -.9056127    .4961885 
    lnsecedu |  -.6129995   .5792951    -1.06   0.292    -1.759234    .5332349 
       lngdp |   .5260324   .2071689     2.54   0.012     .1161134    .9359514 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |  -11.71173   6.559518    -1.79   0.077    -24.69085      1.2674 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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**tertedu only  
 
. xtfevd lnfdiflow lntertedu  lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
privatisation instability d2008  
> d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996, invariant 
(lntertedu lngdp) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      128           number of obs       =      161 
mean squared error         = .1841164           F( 23, 128)         =  41.8006 
root mean squared error    = .4290879           Prob > F            = 3.75e-47 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 29.64274           R-squared           = .9167395 
Total Sum of Squares       = 356.0239           adj. R-squared      = .8959243 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 326.3812 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lntransition |   5.065456   3.595322     1.41   0.161    -2.048502    12.17941 
 lntradefree |  -.5005262    .806716    -0.62   0.536    -2.096752    1.095699 
  lneconfree |    1.13442   1.347584     0.84   0.401    -1.532005    3.800845 
   lnforbank |   .3355226   .2758931     1.22   0.226     -.210379    .8814243 
privatisat~n |   .4033676   .1111797     3.63   0.000     .1833795    .6233557 
 instability |  -.6161357   .3552252    -1.73   0.085     -1.31901    .0867382 
       d2008 |   1.335864   .6992319     1.91   0.058    -.0476862    2.719413 
       d2007 |   1.345936   .6947224     1.94   0.055    -.0286913    2.720562 
       d2006 |   .7925446   .7005531     1.13   0.260    -.5936194    2.178709 
       d2005 |   .4660706   .6830944     0.68   0.496    -.8855484     1.81769 
       d2004 |   .1092848   .6674859     0.16   0.870     -1.21145     1.43002 
       d2003 |   -.281251   .6482182    -0.43   0.665    -1.563862    1.001359 
       d2002 |  -.2395973   .6532853    -0.37   0.714    -1.532234    1.053039 
       d2001 |  -.3929505   .6302668    -0.62   0.534    -1.640041    .8541401 
       d2000 |  -.5001761   .5962179    -0.84   0.403    -1.679895    .6795429 
       d1999 |  -.4459966   .5414495    -0.82   0.412    -1.517347    .6253537 
       d1998 |  -.1587937   .4921586    -0.32   0.747    -1.132614    .8150261 
       d1997 |  -.2307012   .4491689    -0.51   0.608    -1.119459    .6580561 
       d1996 |  -.2021054    .378378    -0.53   0.594    -.9507909    .5465801 
   lntertedu |  -.6255987   .6939644    -0.90   0.369    -1.998726    .7475284 
       lngdp |   .5463153   .2313063     2.36   0.020     .0886363    1.003994 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |  -13.42047   7.102442    -1.89   0.061    -27.47386    .6329281 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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*cognitive only 
. xtfevd lnfdiflow lncognitive lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
privatisation instability d2008 
>  d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996, invariant 
(lncognitive lngdp) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      122           number of obs       =      155 
mean squared error         = .1880317           F( 23, 122)         =  30.6598 
root mean squared error    = .4336263           Prob > F            = 7.50e-39 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 29.14492           R-squared           = .9214037 
Total Sum of Squares       = 370.8179           adj. R-squared      = .9007883 
Estimation Sum of Squares  =  341.673 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lntransition |   4.420685    2.77026     1.60   0.113    -1.063323    9.904692 
 lntradefree |  -.5043205   .7520113    -0.67   0.504    -1.993002    .9843609 
  lneconfree |   1.210238   .9384561     1.29   0.200    -.6475295    3.068006 
   lnforbank |   .5441142   .2715376     2.00   0.047     .0065785     1.08165 
privatisat~n |   .3975968   .1168695     3.40   0.001      .166242    .6289515 
 instability |  -.6800063   .3900897    -1.74   0.084    -1.452228    .0922151 
       d2008 |   1.014567   .7590072     1.34   0.184    -.4879638    2.517097 
       d2007 |    1.09521   .7335244     1.49   0.138    -.3568747    2.547295 
       d2006 |   .5016368   .6599598     0.76   0.449    -.8048195    1.808093 
       d2005 |   .1811519   .6345775     0.29   0.776    -1.075058    1.437361 
       d2004 |  -.0460169   .5843823    -0.08   0.937     -1.20286    1.110826 
       d2003 |  -.4827314   .5740631    -0.84   0.402    -1.619147    .6536838 
       d2002 |  -.3936693   .5508646    -0.71   0.476    -1.484161    .6968222 
       d2001 |  -.5339357   .5359303    -1.00   0.321    -1.594863    .5269919 
       d2000 |  -.6044857    .479996    -1.26   0.210    -1.554686    .3457143 
       d1999 |  -.5693758   .4374754    -1.30   0.196    -1.435402    .2966504 
       d1998 |  -.2373199   .3972763    -0.60   0.551    -1.023768    .5491283 
       d1997 |  -.2181913   .3901967    -0.56   0.577    -.9906246     .554242 
       d1996 |   -.268626   .3159214    -0.85   0.397     -.894024     .356772 
 lncognitive |  -.3461962   3.173119    -0.11   0.913    -6.627702    5.935309 
       lngdp |   .6299125   .1497804     4.21   0.000     .3334073    .9264177 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |  -15.36924   5.660174    -2.72   0.008    -26.57411   -4.164356 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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*top only 
. xtfevd lnfdiflow lntop  lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank privatisation 
instability d2008 d200 
> 7 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996, invariant (lntop lngdp) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      122           number of obs       =      155 
mean squared error         = .1880317           F( 23, 122)         = 29.82651 
root mean squared error    = .4336263           Prob > F            = 2.95e-38 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 29.14492           R-squared           = .9214037 
Total Sum of Squares       = 370.8179           adj. R-squared      = .9007883 
Estimation Sum of Squares  =  341.673 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lntransition |   4.420685   2.627052     1.68   0.095    -.7798279    9.621197 
 lntradefree |  -.5043205    .743656    -0.68   0.499    -1.976462    .9678207 
  lneconfree |   1.210238   .9346493     1.29   0.198    -.6399935     3.06047 
   lnforbank |   .5441142      .2667     2.04   0.043      .016155    1.072073 
privatisat~n |   .3975968   .1209224     3.29   0.001     .1582188    .6369747 
 instability |  -.6800063   .3885983    -1.75   0.083    -1.449275    .0892628 
       d2008 |   1.014567   .8032543     1.26   0.209    -.5755553    2.604689 
       d2007 |    1.09521    .771542     1.42   0.158    -.4321344    2.622555 
       d2006 |   .5016368   .6960984     0.72   0.473    -.8763594    1.879633 
       d2005 |   .1811519   .6699516     0.27   0.787    -1.145084    1.507388 
       d2004 |  -.0460169   .6159515    -0.07   0.941    -1.265354    1.173321 
       d2003 |  -.4827314    .609894    -0.79   0.430    -1.690077    .7246147 
       d2002 |  -.3936693    .577182    -0.68   0.496    -1.536259    .7489201 
       d2001 |  -.5339357     .57071    -0.94   0.351    -1.663713    .5958418 
       d2000 |  -.6044857   .5117058    -1.18   0.240    -1.617458    .4084871 
       d1999 |  -.5693759   .4676003    -1.22   0.226    -1.495037    .3562856 
       d1998 |  -.2373199   .4249205    -0.56   0.578    -1.078492    .6038526 
       d1997 |  -.2181913   .4195069    -0.52   0.604    -1.048647    .6122645 
       d1996 |   -.268626    .342299    -0.78   0.434    -.9462411     .408989 
       lntop |   .1959804   .4066572     0.48   0.631     -.609038    1.000999 
       lngdp |   .5558178   .1617803     3.44   0.001     .2355575    .8760781 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |  -13.57802   6.843076    -1.98   0.049    -27.12458   -.0314733 
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**secede + tertedu + cognitive + top, no controls apart from GDP 
. xtfevd lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive lntop lngdp d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 
d2003 d2002 d2001 d200 
> 0 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996, invariant (lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive lntop lngdp) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      125           number of obs       =      154 
mean squared error         = .2881555           F( 20, 125)         = 32.53735 
root mean squared error    = .5368012           Prob > F            = 1.47e-38 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 44.37595           R-squared           = .8786716 
Total Sum of Squares       = 365.7506           adj. R-squared      =  .851494 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 321.3747 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       d2008 |   2.097962   .4695057     4.47   0.000     1.168752    3.027172 
       d2007 |   2.294056   .4358057     5.26   0.000     1.431542    3.156569 
       d2006 |   1.967035   .3941124     4.99   0.000     1.187038    2.747032 
       d2005 |   1.633203    .367383     4.45   0.000     .9061068      2.3603 
       d2004 |   1.477392   .3425538     4.31   0.000     .7994361    2.155349 
       d2003 |   .7670785   .3126302     2.45   0.016     .1483447    1.385812 
       d2002 |   1.045132   .2850849     3.67   0.000     .4809134     1.60935 
       d2001 |   .8366917   .2698381     3.10   0.002     .3026487    1.370735 
       d2000 |   .7885345   .2610243     3.02   0.003      .271935    1.305134 
       d1999 |    .458696   .2590832     1.77   0.079    -.0540619    .9714538 
       d1998 |   .6375934   .2568383     2.48   0.014     .1292784    1.145908 
       d1997 |   .3328475    .253222     1.31   0.191    -.1683102    .8340053 
       d1996 |  -.1188265   .2525382    -0.47   0.639     -.618631     .380978 
    lnsecedu |   .5007416   .4755116     1.05   0.294    -.4403549    1.441838 
   lntertedu |   .1693764   .4980866     0.34   0.734    -.8163988    1.155152 
 lncognitive |  -7.964224   4.635011    -1.72   0.088    -17.13749    1.209037 
       lntop |   1.509943   .5486668     2.75   0.007     .4240628    2.595822 
       lngdp |   .6325433   .1871594     3.38   0.001     .2621317    1.002955 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   5.314719   9.243507     0.57   0.566    -12.97933    23.60877 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 5.5: Testing down procedure 
*Start from the baseline regression 
 
. xtscc lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage l1lnwage l2lnwage lngdp l1lngdp l2lngdp  
lntransition lntradefree lnec 
> onfree lnictinfra lnprimexport l1lnprimexport l2lnprimexport lnforbank privatisation 
instability d2008 d2007 d20 
> 06 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       143 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        12 
Group variable (i): country                      F( 32,    11)     =     73.71 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.7717 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -.4633169   1.664913    -0.28   0.786    -4.127765    3.201132 
   lntertedu |  -.7689391   1.095653    -0.70   0.497    -3.180455    1.642577 
      lnwage |   .0142601   .7397215     0.02   0.985    -1.613856    1.642376 
    l1lnwage |   .5475273   1.018364     0.54   0.602    -1.693877    2.788931 
    l2lnwage |  -.3932786   .6477473    -0.61   0.556    -1.818961    1.032404 
       lngdp |   .3805829   .8062184     0.47   0.646    -1.393892    2.155058 
     l1lngdp |  -.5564767   1.656194    -0.34   0.743    -4.201736    3.088782 
     l2lngdp |   -.229746   .7879839    -0.29   0.776    -1.964087    1.504595 
lntransition |    1.55692   3.339307     0.47   0.650    -5.792846    8.906685 
 lntradefree |  -.4707713   .4911897    -0.96   0.358    -1.551872    .6103298 
  lneconfree |   1.155114   1.172786     0.98   0.346     -1.42617    3.736398 
  lnictinfra |  -.0536539   .2306969    -0.23   0.820    -.5614144    .4541066 
lnprimexport |   .2395144   .1526793     1.57   0.145    -.0965304    .5755592 
l1lnprimex~t |   .0042075   .2109392     0.02   0.984    -.4600665    .4684815 
l2lnprimex~t |  -.1572141   .2949864    -0.53   0.605    -.8064748    .4920465 
   lnforbank |   .2231828   .1454572     1.53   0.153    -.0969663     .543332 
privatisat~n |   .4472416   .1291914     3.46   0.005     .1628932      .73159 
 instability |  -.6138362   .4778674    -1.28   0.225    -1.665615    .4379428 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |   .0064849    .124471     0.05   0.959    -.2674739    .2804437 
       d2006 |  -.5640997   .2129543    -2.65   0.023    -1.032809   -.0953906 
       d2005 |  -.9721877    .282827    -3.44   0.006    -1.594686   -.3496897 
       d2004 |  -1.432818   .3228847    -4.44   0.001    -2.143483   -.7221538 
       d2003 |  -1.795112   .3183692    -5.64   0.000    -2.495838   -1.094386 
       d2002 |  -1.713854   .3914926    -4.38   0.001    -2.575523   -.8521845 
       d2001 |  -1.878182   .4321582    -4.35   0.001    -2.829356   -.9270081 
       d2000 |  -2.099616   .4937456    -4.25   0.001    -3.186342   -1.012889 
       d1999 |   -2.16905    .500257    -4.34   0.001    -3.270108   -1.067992 
       d1998 |  -1.961531    .478901    -4.10   0.002    -3.015585   -.9074765 
       d1997 |  -2.118311   .5183656    -4.09   0.002    -3.259226   -.9773961 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   16.36289   13.60602     1.20   0.254    -13.58376    46.30955 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. **testing down 
. test lnprimexport=l1lnprimexport=l2lnprimexport=0 
 
 ( 1)  lnprimexport - l1lnprimexport = 0 
 ( 2)  lnprimexport - l2lnprimexport = 0 
 ( 3)  lnprimexport = 0 
 
       F(  3,    11) =    1.04 
            Prob > F =    0.4111 
 
. *lnprimexport l1lnprimexport l2lnprimexport dropped 
.  
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. xtscc lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lnwage l1lnwage l2lnwage l1lngdp l2lngdp  
lntransition lntradefree lnec 
> onfree lnictinfra lnforbank privatisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 
d2002 d2001 d2000 d199 
> 9 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       143 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        12 
Group variable (i): country                      F( 29,    11)     =     76.03 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.7696 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -.3771131   1.637528    -0.23   0.822    -3.981289    3.227062 
   lntertedu |  -1.048645   .9799451    -1.07   0.307    -3.205489      1.1082 
       lngdp |    .324391   .7648338     0.42   0.680    -1.358997    2.007779 
      lnwage |  -.0485696    .652992    -0.07   0.942    -1.485795    1.388656 
    l1lnwage |    .563708   .9827377     0.57   0.578    -1.599283    2.726699 
    l2lnwage |  -.3653256    .618266    -0.59   0.567     -1.72612    .9954687 
     l1lngdp |  -.5844466   1.591709    -0.37   0.720    -4.087776    2.918882 
     l2lngdp |   -.059768   .7691966    -0.08   0.939    -1.752758    1.633222 
lntransition |   .9692884   2.555835     0.38   0.712    -4.656065    6.594642 
 lntradefree |  -.4802472   .4999409    -0.96   0.357     -1.58061    .6201154 
  lneconfree |   1.151382   1.028574     1.12   0.287    -1.112495    3.415258 
  lnictinfra |   .0653135   .2123113     0.31   0.764    -.4019807    .5326076 
   lnforbank |   .2539841   .1431212     1.77   0.104    -.0610236    .5689917 
privatisat~n |   .4368253   .1161576     3.76   0.003     .1811642    .6924865 
 instability |  -.4896169   .3608577    -1.36   0.202    -1.283859    .3046255 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |   .0103053   .1117826     0.09   0.928    -.2357265    .2563371 
       d2006 |  -.5091337   .1957218    -2.60   0.025    -.9399144   -.0783529 
       d2005 |  -.8947227   .2546995    -3.51   0.005    -1.455312   -.3341329 
       d2004 |  -1.369949   .3159297    -4.34   0.001    -2.065306   -.6745928 
       d2003 |  -1.783363   .3296874    -5.41   0.000       -2.509   -1.057726 
       d2002 |  -1.708304   .3904971    -4.37   0.001    -2.567782   -.8488258 
       d2001 |  -1.851164    .433241    -4.27   0.001    -2.804721   -.8976067 
       d2000 |  -2.028246   .4816067    -4.21   0.001    -3.088255   -.9682363 
       d1999 |  -2.129266   .4927161    -4.32   0.001    -3.213726   -1.044805 
       d1998 |  -1.920149    .491798    -3.90   0.002    -3.002589   -.8377086 
       d1997 |  -2.043494   .5399295    -3.78   0.003    -3.231871   -.8551171 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   14.70304   15.14035     0.97   0.352    -18.62064    48.02672 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. test lnwage=l1lnwage=l2lnwage=0 
 
 ( 1)  lnwage - l1lnwage = 0 
 ( 2)  lnwage - l2lnwage = 0 
 ( 3)  lnwage = 0 
 
       F(  3,    11) =    0.17 
            Prob > F =    0.9134 
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. *lnwage l1lnwage l2lnwage dropped 
.  
. xtscc lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp l1lngdp l2lngdp  lntransition lntradefree 
lneconfree lnictinfra lnforba 
> nk privatisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 
d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995 
> , fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       143 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        12 
Group variable (i): country                      F( 26,    11)     =    209.98 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.7692 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -.3309616   1.603159    -0.21   0.840     -3.85949    3.197567 
   lntertedu |  -1.132672   .7874712    -1.44   0.178    -2.865884    .6005404 
       lngdp |   .2472936   .5176596     0.48   0.642    -.8920675    1.386655 
     l1lngdp |   .0214622     .80546     0.03   0.979    -1.751343    1.794268 
     l2lngdp |  -.4380341    .286701    -1.53   0.155    -1.069059    .1929905 
lntransition |   .8194406   3.112823     0.26   0.797    -6.031836    7.670717 
 lntradefree |  -.4831496   .4762856    -1.01   0.332    -1.531447    .5651481 
  lneconfree |   1.134157   1.016109     1.12   0.288    -1.102284    3.370598 
  lnictinfra |   .0944659   .1985089     0.48   0.643    -.3424493    .5313811 
   lnforbank |   .2623754   .1253009     2.09   0.060      -.01341    .5381609 
privatisat~n |   .4433493   .1075314     4.12   0.002     .2066742    .6800244 
 instability |  -.4674504   .3148991    -1.48   0.166    -1.160539    .2256378 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |   .0054516   .1086993     0.05   0.961    -.2337938    .2446971 
       d2006 |  -.5159944   .1759227    -2.93   0.014    -.9031976   -.1287912 
       d2005 |  -.9051766    .235617    -3.84   0.003    -1.423766   -.3865871 
       d2004 |  -1.366422   .3247421    -4.21   0.001    -2.081174   -.6516693 
       d2003 |  -1.769301   .3536955    -5.00   0.000     -2.54778   -.9908225 
       d2002 |   -1.69836   .3974846    -4.27   0.001    -2.573218   -.8235022 
       d2001 |  -1.845141   .4109433    -4.49   0.001    -2.749621   -.9406605 
       d2000 |  -1.998279   .4504739    -4.44   0.001    -2.989766   -1.006793 
       d1999 |  -2.113392   .4201567    -5.03   0.000    -3.038151   -1.188634 
       d1998 |  -1.903464   .3977942    -4.79   0.001    -2.779003   -1.027924 
       d1997 |  -2.022921   .4160453    -4.86   0.001    -2.938631   -1.107212 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   12.08992    12.2683     0.99   0.346    -14.91242    39.09226 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test l1lngdp=l2lngdp=0 
 
 ( 1)  l1lngdp - l2lngdp = 0 
 ( 2)  l1lngdp = 0 
 
       F(  2,    11) =    1.47 
            Prob > F =    0.2708 
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. *l1lngdp l2lngdp dropped 
.  
. xtscc lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnictinfra 
lnforbank privatisation  
> instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
d1995, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       161 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        12 
Group variable (i): country                      F( 24,    11)     =   2221.09 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.7972 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -.2985031   1.361085    -0.22   0.830    -3.294231    2.697225 
   lntertedu |  -.7683703   .6483295    -1.19   0.261    -2.195334    .6585934 
       lngdp |  -.2121493   .4060959    -0.52   0.612     -1.10596    .6816617 
lntransition |   5.033338   1.938876     2.60   0.025     .7659012    9.300775 
 lntradefree |   -.489566   .3964931    -1.23   0.243    -1.362241    .3831093 
  lneconfree |   1.118148   .7603085     1.47   0.169      -.55528    2.791576 
  lnictinfra |  -.0551046   .1183415    -0.47   0.651    -.3155725    .2053633 
   lnforbank |    .329932   .1262097     2.61   0.024     .0521463    .6077177 
privatisat~n |   .4057775   .1073731     3.78   0.003      .169451     .642104 
 instability |   -.649036   .1269566    -5.11   0.000    -.9284655   -.3696064 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |   .0074095   .0499144     0.15   0.885    -.1024514    .1172704 
       d2006 |   -.546573   .1235574    -4.42   0.001     -.818521    -.274625 
       d2005 |  -.8787819   .1528978    -5.75   0.000    -1.215308   -.5422562 
       d2004 |  -1.244921    .204825    -6.08   0.000    -1.695738   -.7941043 
       d2003 |   -1.64187   .2096546    -7.83   0.000    -2.103316   -1.180423 
       d2002 |  -1.607321    .267084    -6.02   0.000    -2.195169   -1.019473 
       d2001 |  -1.774218   .2976082    -5.96   0.000    -2.429249   -1.119187 
       d2000 |  -1.902729   .3384812    -5.62   0.000    -2.647721   -1.157737 
       d1999 |   -1.86489   .3498803    -5.33   0.000    -2.634971   -1.094808 
       d1998 |  -1.593711    .375671    -4.24   0.001    -2.420557   -.7668642 
       d1997 |  -1.674576   .3944981    -4.24   0.001    -2.542861   -.8062918 
       d1996 |   -1.66505   .4245808    -3.92   0.002    -2.599546   -.7305538 
       d1995 |   -1.48374   .4937553    -3.01   0.012    -2.570489   -.3969923 
       _cons |   7.931019   6.957071     1.14   0.279    -7.381392    23.24343 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
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 *ictinfra dropped 
**BASELINE REGRESSION: 
. xtscc lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
privatisation instability 
>  d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       161 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        12 
Group variable (i): country                      F( 23,    11)     =  13218.83 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.7971 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -.1197061   1.188927    -0.10   0.922    -2.736518    2.497106 
   lntertedu |  -.7697577    .648464    -1.19   0.260    -2.197017     .657502 
       lngdp |  -.2470292   .3654323    -0.68   0.513     -1.05134    .5572819 
lntransition |   5.076224    1.94496     2.61   0.024     .7953961    9.357051 
 lntradefree |  -.4964094   .3841643    -1.29   0.223    -1.341949    .3491304 
  lneconfree |    1.12866   .7650754     1.48   0.168    -.5552597     2.81258 
   lnforbank |   .3345589   .1307638     2.56   0.027     .0467497    .6223682 
privatisat~n |   .4026688   .1105342     3.64   0.004     .1593847    .6459529 
 instability |  -.6108348      .1382    -4.42   0.001     -.915011   -.3066586 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |   .0092618   .0514554     0.18   0.860    -.1039908    .1225144 
       d2006 |  -.5447139   .1258323    -4.33   0.001    -.8216689   -.2677589 
       d2005 |  -.8722318   .1590181    -5.49   0.000    -1.222228   -.5222354 
       d2004 |  -1.230521   .2175621    -5.66   0.000    -1.709372   -.7516701 
       d2003 |  -1.623655   .2215913    -7.33   0.000    -2.111374   -1.135935 
       d2002 |  -1.584403   .2808361    -5.64   0.000    -2.202519   -.9662868 
       d2001 |  -1.739983   .3126275    -5.57   0.000    -2.428072   -1.051895 
       d2000 |  -1.849178   .3538286    -5.23   0.000     -2.62795   -1.070407 
       d1999 |  -1.797017   .3549371    -5.06   0.000    -2.578228   -1.015806 
       d1998 |  -1.511477   .3687633    -4.10   0.002    -2.323119   -.6998343 
       d1997 |  -1.584419   .3918259    -4.04   0.002    -2.446822   -.7220159 
       d1996 |  -1.557279   .3980971    -3.91   0.002    -2.433484   -.6810728 
       d1995 |  -1.355782   .4460091    -3.04   0.011    -2.337441   -.3741225 
       _cons |    7.77193   7.102661     1.09   0.297    -7.860922    23.40478 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. **variance inflation factor (VIF) 
. qui reg lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
privatisation instabili 
> ty d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995 
 
. estat vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
lntransition |      6.40    0.156161 
  lneconfree |      3.44    0.291059 
       lngdp |      3.28    0.304814 
       d1996 |      2.86    0.349518 
       d1997 |      2.46    0.405694 
       d1998 |      2.34    0.426554 
       d1999 |      2.28    0.438047 
       d2000 |      2.27    0.440350 
 lntradefree |      2.23    0.449385 
       d2004 |      2.21    0.452997 
   lntertedu |      2.14    0.468111 
       d2003 |      2.12    0.471924 
       d2001 |      2.11    0.474180 
       d2002 |      2.09    0.478514 
       d1995 |      2.05    0.487948 
    lnsecedu |      2.00    0.500857 
       d2005 |      1.99    0.501346 
       d2006 |      1.95    0.512766 
       d2007 |      1.87    0.534935 
   lnforbank |      1.79    0.558450 
 instability |      1.35    0.743016 
privatisat~n |      1.28    0.779558 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.39 
 
. *multicollinearity significantly reduced after testing down 
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 Appendix 5.6: Model 5.1 results 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
. **parsimonious 5.1 model, baseline model  
. **Driscoll-Kraay FE 
. xtscc lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
privatisation instability 
>  d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       161 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        12 
Group variable (i): country                      F( 23,    11)     =  13218.83 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.7971 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -.1197061   1.188927    -0.10   0.922    -2.736518    2.497106 
   lntertedu |  -.7697577    .648464    -1.19   0.260    -2.197017     .657502 
       lngdp |  -.2470292   .3654323    -0.68   0.513     -1.05134    .5572819 
lntransition |   5.076224    1.94496     2.61   0.024     .7953961    9.357051 
 lntradefree |  -.4964094   .3841643    -1.29   0.223    -1.341949    .3491304 
  lneconfree |    1.12866   .7650754     1.48   0.168    -.5552597     2.81258 
   lnforbank |   .3345589   .1307638     2.56   0.027     .0467497    .6223682 
privatisat~n |   .4026688   .1105342     3.64   0.004     .1593847    .6459529 
 instability |  -.6108348      .1382    -4.42   0.001     -.915011   -.3066586 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |   .0092618   .0514554     0.18   0.860    -.1039908    .1225144 
       d2006 |  -.5447139   .1258323    -4.33   0.001    -.8216689   -.2677589 
       d2005 |  -.8722318   .1590181    -5.49   0.000    -1.222228   -.5222354 
       d2004 |  -1.230521   .2175621    -5.66   0.000    -1.709372   -.7516701 
       d2003 |  -1.623655   .2215913    -7.33   0.000    -2.111374   -1.135935 
       d2002 |  -1.584403   .2808361    -5.64   0.000    -2.202519   -.9662868 
       d2001 |  -1.739983   .3126275    -5.57   0.000    -2.428072   -1.051895 
       d2000 |  -1.849178   .3538286    -5.23   0.000     -2.62795   -1.070407 
       d1999 |  -1.797017   .3549371    -5.06   0.000    -2.578228   -1.015806 
       d1998 |  -1.511477   .3687633    -4.10   0.002    -2.323119   -.6998343 
       d1997 |  -1.584419   .3918259    -4.04   0.002    -2.446822   -.7220159 
       d1996 |  -1.557279   .3980971    -3.91   0.002    -2.433484   -.6810728 
       d1995 |  -1.355782   .4460091    -3.04   0.011    -2.337441   -.3741225 
       _cons |    7.77193   7.102661     1.09   0.297    -7.860922    23.40478 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. **FEVD 
. xtfevd lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
privatisation instabilit 
> y d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996, invariant 
(lnsecedu lntertedu l 
> ngdp) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      127           number of obs       =      161 
mean squared error         = .1841029           F( 24, 127)         = 39.97923 
root mean squared error    = .4290721           Prob > F            = 1.45e-46 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 29.64056           R-squared           = .9167456 
Total Sum of Squares       = 356.0239           adj. R-squared      = .8951125 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 326.3834 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lntransition |   5.076224   3.278408     1.55   0.124    -1.411155     11.5636 
 lntradefree |  -.4964095   .7327268    -0.68   0.499    -1.946344    .9535247 
  lneconfree |    1.12866   1.314091     0.86   0.392     -1.47169     3.72901 
   lnforbank |   .3345589   .2738955     1.22   0.224    -.2074309    .8765488 
privatisat~n |   .4026688    .112055     3.59   0.000     .1809321    .6244055 
 instability |  -.6108348    .354684    -1.72   0.087     -1.31269    .0910208 
       d2008 |   1.355782   .5825829     2.33   0.022     .2029554    2.508608 
       d2007 |   1.365044   .5740508     2.38   0.019     .2291008    2.500987 
       d2006 |    .811068   .5842918     1.39   0.168      -.34514    1.967276 
       d2005 |   .4835501   .5761841     0.84   0.403    -.6566143    1.623714 
       d2004 |   .1252609   .5700484     0.22   0.826    -1.002762    1.253284 
       d2003 |  -.2678727   .5585404    -0.48   0.632    -1.373123     .837378 
       d2002 |  -.2286209   .5498479    -0.42   0.678    -1.316671    .8594289 
       d2001 |  -.3842013   .5272514    -0.73   0.468    -1.427537    .6591341 
       d2000 |  -.4933962   .5003166    -0.99   0.326    -1.483432      .49664 
       d1999 |  -.4412351   .4712571    -0.94   0.351    -1.373768    .4912976 
       d1998 |  -.1556949    .437597    -0.36   0.723     -1.02162    .7102306 
       d1997 |   -.228637   .4228525    -0.54   0.590    -1.065386    .6081117 
       d1996 |  -.2014967   .3751049    -0.54   0.592    -.9437616    .5407683 
    lnsecedu |  -.3287548   .5359311    -0.61   0.541    -1.389266     .731756 
   lntertedu |  -.4923385   .5830922    -0.84   0.400    -1.646173    .6614959 
       lngdp |   .5307859   .2260036     2.35   0.020     .0835655    .9780063 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |  -12.08435   6.509716    -1.86   0.066    -24.96591    .7971988 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
.  
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. **baseline model robustness checks 
. **panel-robust FE 
. xtreg lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
privatisation instability 
>  d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, fe 
robust 
note: d1995 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       161 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        12 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7971                         Obs per group: min =        11 
       between = 0.0969                                        avg =      13.4 
       overall = 0.3720                                        max =        14 
 
                                                F(11,11)           =         . 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0025                        Prob > F           =         . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 12 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -.1197061   1.370948    -0.09   0.932    -3.137142     2.89773 
   lntertedu |  -.7697577   1.069552    -0.72   0.487    -3.123826     1.58431 
       lngdp |  -.2470292   .5498437    -0.45   0.662    -1.457227    .9631686 
lntransition |   5.076224   1.960386     2.59   0.025     .7614422    9.391005 
 lntradefree |  -.4964094    .433271    -1.15   0.276    -1.450032    .4572136 
  lneconfree |    1.12866   .9192933     1.23   0.245    -.8946909    3.152011 
   lnforbank |   .3345589   .1684206     1.99   0.072    -.0361322    .7052501 
privatisat~n |   .4026688   .0885954     4.55   0.001     .2076716    .5976661 
 instability |  -.6108348   .2186769    -2.79   0.017    -1.092139   -.1295301 
       d2008 |   1.355782   1.270149     1.07   0.309    -1.439798    4.151362 
       d2007 |   1.365044   1.177778     1.16   0.271    -1.227228    3.957316 
       d2006 |    .811068   .9095068     0.89   0.392    -1.190743    2.812879 
       d2005 |   .4835501   .8271486     0.58   0.571    -1.336992    2.304092 
       d2004 |   .1252609   .6568525     0.19   0.852    -1.320462    1.570984 
       d2003 |  -.2678727   .5357853    -0.50   0.627    -1.447128    .9113829 
       d2002 |  -.2286209    .540008    -0.42   0.680     -1.41717    .9599287 
       d2001 |  -.3842012   .4602437    -0.83   0.422    -1.397191    .6287883 
       d2000 |  -.4933962   .3408151    -1.45   0.176    -1.243525    .2567328 
       d1999 |  -.4412351   .3876759    -1.14   0.279    -1.294504    .4120338 
       d1998 |  -.1556949   .3731024    -0.42   0.684    -.9768877     .665498 
       d1997 |   -.228637   .3768698    -0.61   0.556    -1.058122    .6008479 
       d1996 |  -.2014967   .2855653    -0.71   0.495    -.8300217    .4270284 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   6.416148   12.59179     0.51   0.620     -21.2982     34.1305 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.1338305 
     sigma_e |  .48310483 
         rho |  .84634882   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. **two-way cluster-robust FE (clusters: country & year), small-sample adjustment 
 
. xtivreg2 lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
privatisation instability d20 
> 08 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996, fe 
cluster(country year) small 
Warning: estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions not of full rank. 
         standard errors and model tests should be interpreted with caution. 
Possible causes: 
         number of clusters insufficient to calculate robust covariance matrix 
         singleton dummy variable (dummy with one 1 and N-1 0s or vice versa) 
partial option may address problem. 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        12                    Obs per group: min =        11 
                                                               avg =      13.4 
                                                               max =        14 
 
OLS estimation 
-------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on country and year 
 
Number of clusters (country) =      12                Number of obs =      161 
Number of clusters (year) =         14                F( 22,    11) =    11.17 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0001 
Total (centered) SS     =  146.0739744                Centered R2   =   0.7971 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  146.0739744                Uncentered R2 =   0.7971 
Residual SS             =  29.64056556                Root MSE      =    .4831 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -.1197061   1.541854    -0.08   0.940    -3.513305    3.273892 
   lntertedu |  -.7697577   1.100132    -0.70   0.499    -3.191132    1.651617 
       lngdp |  -.2470292    .500921    -0.49   0.632    -1.349549    .8554904 
lntransition |   5.076224   2.060217     2.46   0.031     .5417168     9.61073 
 lntradefree |  -.4964094   .4291283    -1.16   0.272    -1.440914    .4480955 
  lneconfree |    1.12866    .879382     1.28   0.226    -.8068468    3.064167 
   lnforbank |   .3345589   .2012192     1.66   0.125    -.1083216    .7774394 
privatisat~n |   .4026688   .1096154     3.67   0.004      .161407    .6439307 
 instability |  -.6108348   .2247348    -2.72   0.020    -1.105473   -.1161968 
       d2008 |   1.355782   .9164258     1.48   0.167    -.6612576    3.372821 
       d2007 |   1.365044    .868219     1.57   0.144    -.5458934    3.275981 
       d2006 |    .811068   .6489852     1.25   0.237    -.6173387    2.239475 
       d2005 |   .4835501   .5869892     0.82   0.428    -.8084045    1.775505 
       d2004 |   .1252609   .3957253     0.32   0.758    -.7457247    .9962465 
       d2003 |  -.2678727   .3002555    -0.89   0.391    -.9287305    .3929852 
       d2002 |  -.2286209   .3365222    -0.68   0.511    -.9693012    .5120595 
       d2001 |  -.3842012   .3030284    -1.27   0.231    -1.051162    .2827599 
       d2000 |  -.4933962   .0291878   -16.90   0.000    -.5576382   -.4291542 
       d1999 |  -.4412351   .2043401    -2.16   0.054    -.8909846    .0085144 
       d1998 |  -.1556949    .195433    -0.80   0.443    -.5858401    .2744503 
       d1997 |   -.228637   .2546274    -0.90   0.388    -.7890681    .3317942 
       d1996 |  -.2014967   .1402195    -1.44   0.179    -.5101178    .1071244 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Warning: estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions not of full rank. 
         standard errors and model tests should be interpreted with caution. 
Possible causes: 
         number of clusters insufficient to calculate robust covariance matrix 
         singleton dummy variable (dummy with one 1 and N-1 0s or vice versa) 
partial option may address problem. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Included instruments: lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
                      lneconfree lnforbank privatisation instability d2008 d2007 
                      d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 
                      d1997 d1996 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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Appendix 5.7: Models 5.2-5.4 results 
**model 5.2 
. **FEVD 
. xtfevd lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lngenvocratio lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnforbank privatisat 
> ion instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 
d1996, invariant (lnsece 
> du lntertedu lngdp lngenvocratio) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      126           number of obs       =      161 
mean squared error         = .1841029           F( 25, 126)         = 41.14599 
root mean squared error    = .4290721           Prob > F            = 1.16e-47 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 29.64056           R-squared           = .9167456 
Total Sum of Squares       = 356.0239           adj. R-squared      = .8942801 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 326.3834 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lntransition |   5.076224   3.254858     1.56   0.121    -1.365045    11.51749 
 lntradefree |  -.4964094   .7266036    -0.68   0.496    -1.934337    .9415178 
  lneconfree |    1.12866   1.320899     0.85   0.394    -1.485359    3.742679 
   lnforbank |   .3345589    .267463     1.25   0.213    -.1947424    .8638603 
privatisat~n |   .4026688   .1113381     3.62   0.000     .1823341    .6230036 
 instability |  -.6108347   .3584418    -1.70   0.091    -1.320181    .0985111 
       d2008 |   1.355782   .5810615     2.33   0.021     .2058784    2.505685 
       d2007 |   1.365044   .5719967     2.39   0.018     .2330791    2.497008 
       d2006 |    .811068    .580221     1.40   0.165    -.3371724    1.959308 
       d2005 |   .4835501   .5705436     0.85   0.398    -.6455389    1.612639 
       d2004 |   .1252609   .5636853     0.22   0.825    -.9902557    1.240777 
       d2003 |  -.2678727   .5498498    -0.49   0.627    -1.356009    .8202638 
       d2002 |  -.2286209   .5404437    -0.42   0.673    -1.298143    .8409013 
       d2001 |  -.3842013   .5179701    -0.74   0.460    -1.409249    .6408463 
       d2000 |  -.4933962   .4940989    -1.00   0.320    -1.471203     .484411 
       d1999 |  -.4412351   .4598204    -0.96   0.339    -1.351206     .468736 
       d1998 |  -.1556949   .4270309    -0.36   0.716    -1.000776    .6893867 
       d1997 |   -.228637   .4073868    -0.56   0.576    -1.034843    .5775695 
       d1996 |  -.2014967   .3542701    -0.57   0.571    -.9025869    .4995935 
    lnsecedu |  -.3189886   .5298442    -0.60   0.548    -1.367535    .7295575 
   lntertedu |   -.428064   .7707516    -0.56   0.580    -1.953359    1.097231 
       lngdp |   .5137274   .2291567     2.24   0.027     .0602329    .9672218 
lngenvocra~o |  -.0552107   .3658122    -0.15   0.880    -.7791422    .6687208 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |  -11.88948   6.365258    -1.87   0.064    -24.48614    .7071753 
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. **model 5.3   
. **FEVD 
. xtfevd lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr1 lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnforbank privatisation i 
> nstability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996, 
invariant (lnsecedu ln 
> tertedu lngdp lnedutr1) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      126           number of obs       =      161 
mean squared error         = .1841029           F( 25, 126)         = 36.47658 
root mean squared error    = .4290721           Prob > F            = 7.65e-45 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 29.64057           R-squared           = .9167456 
Total Sum of Squares       = 356.0239           adj. R-squared      = .8942801 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 326.3834 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lntransition |   5.076224   2.985388     1.70   0.092    -.8317714    10.98422 
 lntradefree |  -.4964095   .7162338    -0.69   0.490    -1.913815    .9209962 
  lneconfree |    1.12866   1.301289     0.87   0.387    -1.446553    3.703873 
   lnforbank |   .3345589   .2408748     1.39   0.167    -.1421252     .811243 
privatisat~n |   .4026688   .1101926     3.65   0.000     .1846009    .6207368 
 instability |  -.6108348   .3530232    -1.73   0.086    -1.309457    .0877877 
       d2008 |   1.355782    .598041     2.27   0.025     .1722763    2.539288 
       d2007 |   1.365044   .5817162     2.35   0.021     .2138446    2.516243 
       d2006 |    .811068   .5789397     1.40   0.164    -.3346366    1.956773 
       d2005 |   .4835501    .565222     0.86   0.394    -.6350076    1.602108 
       d2004 |   .1252609   .5524884     0.23   0.821    -.9680974    1.218619 
       d2003 |  -.2678727    .533324    -0.50   0.616    -1.323305    .7875599 
       d2002 |  -.2286209   .5159143    -0.44   0.658      -1.2496    .7923584 
       d2001 |  -.3842012   .4908528    -0.78   0.435    -1.355584     .587182 
       d2000 |  -.4933962   .4693119    -1.05   0.295    -1.422151    .4353583 
       d1999 |  -.4412351     .43338    -1.02   0.311    -1.298881    .4164112 
       d1998 |  -.1556949   .3953311    -0.39   0.694    -.9380436    .6266538 
       d1997 |   -.228637   .3784126    -0.60   0.547    -.9775044    .5202304 
       d1996 |  -.2014967    .329943    -0.61   0.542    -.8544442    .4514508 
    lnsecedu |  -.3645756   .5312595    -0.69   0.494    -1.415922    .6867713 
   lntertedu |  -.5740212   .5265747    -1.09   0.278    -1.616097    .4680547 
       lngdp |   .4251323   .2143216     1.98   0.049     .0009962    .8492684 
    lnedutr1 |  -1.414284   1.508223    -0.94   0.350    -4.399012    1.570444 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   -10.7882   6.206171    -1.74   0.085    -23.07003    1.493633 
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**model 5.4   
. **Driscoll-Kraay FE 
. xtscc lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnforbank privatisation in 
> stability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       107 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        12 
Group variable (i): country                      F( 23,    11)     =    346.66 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.7825 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -.7990205   1.651207    -0.48   0.638    -4.433302    2.835261 
   lntertedu |   -1.02028   .3865625    -2.64   0.023    -1.871098   -.1694617 
    lnedutr2 |   11.35946   2.786995     4.08   0.002     5.225326    17.49359 
       lngdp |  -1.086931   .4286627    -2.54   0.028    -2.030411   -.1434509 
lntransition |  -.9312099   3.983058    -0.23   0.819    -9.697862    7.835442 
 lntradefree |  -.4775107   .3679055    -1.30   0.221    -1.287265    .3322438 
  lneconfree |  -.3184353   1.085194    -0.29   0.775    -2.706931     2.07006 
   lnforbank |   .3335295   .1223288     2.73   0.020     .0642857    .6027734 
privatisat~n |   .3794268   .1232884     3.08   0.011     .1080709    .6507826 
 instability |  (omitted) 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |   .5667871   .1631372     3.47   0.005     .2077245    .9258498 
       d2006 |   .5958942    .327618     1.82   0.096    -.1251881    1.316977 
       d2005 |   .9514534    .511122     1.86   0.090    -.1735185    2.076425 
       d2004 |   1.564274   .7947424     1.97   0.075    -.1849424     3.31349 
       d2003 |   2.133989   1.025065     2.08   0.062    -.1221634    4.390141 
       d2002 |   3.366952   1.346115     2.50   0.029     .4041736    6.329731 
       d2001 |   4.699161   1.731943     2.71   0.020     .8871803    8.511142 
       d2000 |   6.312527   2.198298     2.87   0.015     1.474106    11.15095 
       d1999 |  (omitted) 
       d1998 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |  (omitted) 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   60.62371   9.606906     6.31   0.000     39.47905    81.76837 
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**Model 5.4  
**panel-robust FE 
. xtreg lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnforbank privatisation in 
> stability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996, fe 
robust 
note: instability omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1998 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1997 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       107 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        12 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7825                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.5271                                        avg =       8.9 
       overall = 0.1742                                        max =         9 
 
                                                F(11,11)           =         . 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9336                        Prob > F           =         . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 12 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -.7990205   1.609193    -0.50   0.629     -4.34083    2.742789 
   lntertedu |   -1.02028     1.5139    -0.67   0.514    -4.352351    2.311791 
    lnedutr2 |   11.35946   4.629214     2.45   0.032     1.170628    21.54829 
       lngdp |  -1.086931   1.267435    -0.86   0.409    -3.876536    1.702674 
lntransition |  -.9312099   4.302016    -0.22   0.833    -10.39988    8.537465 
 lntradefree |  -.4775107   1.103373    -0.43   0.674    -2.906018    1.950997 
  lneconfree |  -.3184353   1.183674    -0.27   0.793    -2.923683    2.286813 
   lnforbank |   .3335295   .3455008     0.97   0.355    -.4269127    1.093972 
privatisat~n |   .3794268   .1293191     2.93   0.014     .0947972    .6640563 
 instability |  (omitted) 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |   .5667871   .2382675     2.38   0.037      .042364     1.09121 
       d2006 |   .5958942    .443151     1.34   0.206    -.3794745    1.571263 
       d2005 |   .9514534   .5600551     1.70   0.117    -.2812196    2.184126 
       d2004 |   1.564274   .8104142     1.93   0.080    -.2194358    3.347983 
       d2003 |   2.133989   1.054008     2.02   0.068    -.1858661    4.453844 
       d2002 |   3.366952   1.318436     2.55   0.027     .4650934    6.268812 
       d2001 |   4.699161   1.803052     2.61   0.024     .7306713    8.667651 
       d2000 |   6.312527   2.489947     2.54   0.028     .8321905    11.79286 
       d1999 |  (omitted) 
       d1998 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |  (omitted) 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   60.62371   38.50919     1.57   0.144    -24.13446    145.3819 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  3.4335813 
     sigma_e |  .43663278 
         rho |   .9840863   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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. **two-way cluster-robust FE (clusters: country & year), small-sample adjustment 
. xtivreg2 lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnforbank privatisation instab 
> ility d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996, fe 
cluster(country year) small 
Warning: estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions not of full rank. 
         standard errors and model tests should be interpreted with caution. 
Possible causes: 
         number of clusters insufficient to calculate robust covariance matrix 
         singleton dummy variable (dummy with one 1 and N-1 0s or vice versa) 
partial option may address problem. 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:  instability d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        12                    Obs per group: min =         8 
                                                               avg =       8.9 
                                                               max =         9 
 
OLS estimation 
-------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on country and year 
 
Number of clusters (country) =      12                Number of obs =      107 
Number of clusters (year) =          9                F( 17,     8) =     0.86 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.6285 
Total (centered) SS     =  68.36354012                Centered R2   =   0.7825 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  68.36354012                Uncentered R2 =   0.7825 
Residual SS             =  14.87055865                Root MSE      =    .4366 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -.7990205   1.489491    -0.54   0.606    -4.233794    2.635753 
   lntertedu |   -1.02028   1.412756    -0.72   0.491    -4.278102    2.237542 
    lnedutr2 |   11.35946   4.349243     2.61   0.031     1.330087    21.38883 
       lngdp |  -1.086931   1.168591    -0.93   0.380    -3.781706    1.607844 
lntransition |  -.9312099   5.569214    -0.17   0.871    -13.77384    11.91142 
 lntradefree |  -.4775107   1.043737    -0.46   0.659    -2.884373    1.929352 
  lneconfree |  -.3184353   1.477547    -0.22   0.835    -3.725665    3.088795 
   lnforbank |   .3335295   .2418876     1.38   0.205    -.2242642    .8913232 
privatisat~n |   .3794268   .1597211     2.38   0.045     .0111093    .7477442 
       d2008 |  -6.312527   2.552748    -2.47   0.039    -12.19917   -.4258798 
       d2007 |   -5.74574   2.343857    -2.45   0.040    -11.15068   -.3407959 
       d2006 |  -5.716633   2.256395    -2.53   0.035    -10.91989   -.5133758 
       d2005 |  -5.361074   2.081727    -2.58   0.033    -10.16155   -.5606015 
       d2004 |  -4.748253   1.778748    -2.67   0.028    -8.850053   -.6464539 
       d2003 |  -4.178538   1.508894    -2.77   0.024    -7.658054   -.6990219 
       d2002 |  -2.945575   1.149142    -2.56   0.033      -5.5955   -.2956494 
       d2001 |  -1.613366   .6404581    -2.52   0.036    -3.090265   -.1364671 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Warning: estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions not of full rank. 
         standard errors and model tests should be interpreted with caution. 
Possible causes: 
         number of clusters insufficient to calculate robust covariance matrix 
         singleton dummy variable (dummy with one 1 and N-1 0s or vice versa) 
partial option may address problem. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Included instruments: lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
                      lneconfree lnforbank privatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 
                      d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 
Dropped collinear:    instability d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
390 
 
Appendix 5.8: Models 5.5-5.7 results 
**Model 5.5  
**FEVD 
. xtfevd lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnvacancy lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnforbank privatisation  
> d2005 d2004 d2003, invariant (lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lnvacancy) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =       24           number of obs       =       48 
mean squared error         = .0883556           F( 14, 24)          =  9.82583 
root mean squared error    = .2972467           Prob > F            = 1.45e-06 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 4.241069           R-squared           = .9375918 
Total Sum of Squares       = 67.95695           adj. R-squared      =  .877784 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 63.71588 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lntransition |   5.192804   70.00127     0.07   0.941    -139.2827    149.6683 
 lntradefree |  -1.025658   10.17839    -0.10   0.921    -22.03282     19.9815 
  lneconfree |  -4.195524   4.598553    -0.91   0.371    -13.68647    5.295424 
   lnforbank |   .2211436   3.320147     0.07   0.947    -6.631302    7.073589 
privatisat~n |   .5754189   .5556053     1.04   0.311    -.5712941    1.722132 
       d2005 |   .4173607   1.081872     0.39   0.703    -1.815513    2.650234 
       d2004 |   .0397049   1.245805     0.03   0.975     -2.53151     2.61092 
       d2003 |   -.166552    .397613    -0.42   0.679    -.9871849    .6540808 
    lnsecedu |   .4925184   1.715465     0.29   0.776    -3.048027    4.033064 
   lntertedu |   .3462602   6.931933     0.05   0.961    -13.96055    14.65307 
       lngdp |   .6376342    3.15114     0.20   0.841       -5.866    7.141268 
   lnvacancy |  -.2549383   6.466808    -0.04   0.969    -13.60177     13.0919 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   4.578285   58.70432     0.08   0.938    -116.5815    125.7381 
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. **model 5.5 
. **Driscoll-Kraay FE 
. xtscc lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnvacancy lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnforbank privatisation i 
> nstability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
d1995, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        48 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        12 
Group variable (i): country                      F( 24,    11)     =     25.53 
maximum lag: 1                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.7150 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -7.362814   3.866754    -1.90   0.083    -15.87348    1.147853 
   lntertedu |  -1.617557   .4828556    -3.35   0.006    -2.680315   -.5547994 
   lnvacancy |   .2964394   .1332782     2.22   0.048      .003096    .5897827 
       lngdp |   1.532452   .6216916     2.46   0.031     .1641177    2.900786 
lntransition |   5.192804   3.472798     1.50   0.163    -2.450774    12.83638 
 lntradefree |  -1.025658    .623642    -1.64   0.128    -2.398284    .3469691 
  lneconfree |  -4.195524   1.518957    -2.76   0.018    -7.538726   -.8523229 
   lnforbank |   .2211437   .4908849     0.45   0.661    -.8592866    1.301574 
privatisat~n |   .5754189   .1023149     5.62   0.000     .3502254    .8006124 
 instability |  (omitted) 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |  (omitted) 
       d2006 |  (omitted) 
       d2005 |   16.20471   16.51479     0.98   0.348    -20.14411    52.55353 
       d2004 |   15.82706   16.36398     0.97   0.354    -20.18983    51.84394 
       d2003 |    15.6208   16.28146     0.96   0.358    -20.21446    51.45606 
       d2002 |   15.78735   16.10244     0.98   0.348    -19.65387    51.22857 
       d2001 |  (omitted) 
       d2000 |  (omitted) 
       d1999 |  (omitted) 
       d1998 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |  (omitted) 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |  (omitted) 
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**model 5.5 robustness checks 
. **panel-robust FE 
. xtreg lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnvacancy lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnforbank privatisation i 
> nstability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
d1995, fe robust 
note: instability omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2007 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2006 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2004 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2001 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2000 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1998 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1997 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1995 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        48 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        12 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7150                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.2125                                        avg =       4.0 
       overall = 0.2040                                        max =         4 
 
                                                F(11,11)           =         . 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9582                        Prob > F           =         . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 12 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -7.362814   5.021575    -1.47   0.171    -18.41523    3.689597 
   lntertedu |  -1.617557   2.440575    -0.66   0.521    -6.989227    3.754112 
   lnvacancy |   .2964394   .6519483     0.45   0.658    -1.138489    1.731368 
       lngdp |   1.532452   1.809276     0.85   0.415    -2.449737     5.51464 
lntransition |   5.192804   5.057197     1.03   0.327    -5.938013    16.32362 
 lntradefree |  -1.025658   1.464621    -0.70   0.498    -4.249266    2.197951 
  lneconfree |  -4.195524    3.08922    -1.36   0.202    -10.99485    2.603803 
   lnforbank |   .2211437    .997418     0.22   0.829    -1.974158    2.416446 
privatisat~n |   .5754189   .1729685     3.33   0.007     .1947179    .9561199 
 instability |  (omitted) 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |  (omitted) 
       d2006 |  (omitted) 
       d2005 |   .3776558   .4360385     0.87   0.405    -.5820586     1.33737 
       d2004 |  (omitted) 
       d2003 |  -.2062569   .2882827    -0.72   0.489    -.8407628     .428249 
       d2002 |  -.0397049   .6914996    -0.06   0.955    -1.561685    1.482275 
       d2001 |  (omitted) 
       d2000 |  (omitted) 
       d1999 |  (omitted) 
       d1998 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |  (omitted) 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   15.82706   43.87987     0.36   0.725    -80.75188     112.406 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  3.7215238 
     sigma_e |  .42037028 
         rho |  .98740158   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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. **two-way cluster-robust FE (clusters: country & year), small-sample adjustment 
. xtivreg2 lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lnvacancy lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnforbank privatisation insta 
> bility d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996, fe 
cluster(country year) small 
Warning: estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions not of full rank. 
         standard errors and model tests should be interpreted with caution. 
Possible causes: 
         number of clusters insufficient to calculate robust covariance matrix 
         singleton dummy variable (dummy with one 1 and N-1 0s or vice versa) 
partial option may address problem. 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:  instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 
               d1996 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        12                    Obs per group: min =         4 
                                                               avg =       4.0 
                                                               max =         4 
 
OLS estimation 
-------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on country and year 
 
Number of clusters (country) =      12                Number of obs =       48 
Number of clusters (year) =          4                F( 12,     3) =     2.87 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.2089 
Total (centered) SS     =  14.87872551                Centered R2   =   0.7150 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  14.87872551                Uncentered R2 =   0.7150 
Residual SS             =  4.241068124                Root MSE      =    .4204 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnsecedu |  -7.362814   6.694397    -1.10   0.352    -28.66737    13.94174 
   lntertedu |  -1.617557   1.346714    -1.20   0.316    -5.903404    2.668289 
   lnvacancy |   .2964394    .332908     0.89   0.439    -.7630224    1.355901 
       lngdp |   1.532452   1.333552     1.15   0.334    -2.711505    5.776409 
lntransition |   5.192804   4.263002     1.22   0.310    -8.373972    18.75958 
 lntradefree |  -1.025658   1.226393    -0.84   0.464    -4.928588    2.877273 
  lneconfree |  -4.195524   2.948984    -1.42   0.250    -13.58051    5.189459 
   lnforbank |   .2211437   .8049584     0.27   0.801    -2.340593    2.782881 
privatisat~n |   .5754189   .1604665     3.59   0.037     .0647429    1.086095 
       d2005 |   .4173607   .7489441     0.56   0.616    -1.966114    2.800835 
       d2004 |   .0397049   .3812042     0.10   0.924    -1.173457    1.252867 
       d2003 |   -.166552   .3178929    -0.52   0.637    -1.178229    .8451252 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Warning: estimated covariance matrix of moment conditions not of full rank. 
         standard errors and model tests should be interpreted with caution. 
Possible causes: 
         number of clusters insufficient to calculate robust covariance matrix 
         singleton dummy variable (dummy with one 1 and N-1 0s or vice versa) 
partial option may address problem. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Included instruments: lnsecedu lntertedu lnvacancy lngdp lntransition 
                      lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank privatisation d2005 d2004 
                      d2003 
Dropped collinear:    instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 
                      d1998 d1997 d1996 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. **model 5.6 
. **FEVD 
. xtfevd lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnforbank privatisatio 
> n instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996, 
invariant (lnsecedu 
>  lntertedu lngdp lncognitive) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      114           number of obs       =      148 
mean squared error         = .1895275           F( 25, 114)         = 34.79964 
root mean squared error    = .4353476           Prob > F            = 4.54e-41 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 28.05007           R-squared           = .9195435 
Total Sum of Squares       = 348.6367           adj. R-squared      = .8962535 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 320.5866 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lntransition |   4.164404   3.421488     1.22   0.226    -2.613537    10.94234 
 lntradefree |  -.6065213   .7645734    -0.79   0.429    -2.121135    .9080927 
  lneconfree |   1.308299   1.209804     1.08   0.282    -1.088314    3.704913 
   lnforbank |   .5379091   .3507974     1.53   0.128    -.1570178    1.232836 
privatisat~n |   .3951362   .1248085     3.17   0.002     .1478916    .6423809 
 instability |  -.6689404   .3633525    -1.84   0.068    -1.388739    .0508582 
       d2008 |   1.314611    .759752     1.73   0.086    -.1904513    2.819674 
       d2007 |   1.344188    .724338     1.86   0.066    -.0907199    2.779096 
       d2006 |   .7289289   .6940138     1.05   0.296    -.6459071    2.103765 
       d2005 |   .4422089   .6641826     0.67   0.507    -.8735317     1.75795 
       d2004 |   .0912998   .6263405     0.15   0.884    -1.149476    1.332076 
       d2003 |  -.3671024   .5992905    -0.61   0.541    -1.554292    .8200875 
       d2002 |  -.2956889    .563415    -0.52   0.601     -1.41181    .8204319 
       d2001 |  -.4453612   .5398705    -0.82   0.411    -1.514841    .6241181 
       d2000 |  -.5392883   .4782913    -1.13   0.262     -1.48678     .408203 
       d1999 |   -.521057   .4488259    -1.16   0.248    -1.410178    .3680637 
       d1998 |  -.1993567   .4152317    -0.48   0.632    -1.021927    .6232141 
       d1997 |  -.2079851   .3850522    -0.54   0.590    -.9707705    .5548003 
       d1996 |  -.2765067   .3255859    -0.85   0.398      -.92149    .3684765 
    lnsecedu |  -.4124725   .5226991    -0.79   0.432    -1.447935    .6229904 
   lntertedu |  -.5501259   .6640389    -0.83   0.409    -1.865582      .76533 
       lngdp |   .5012058   .2175962     2.30   0.023     .0701493    .9322622 
 lncognitive |    2.41587   3.884817     0.62   0.535    -5.279923    10.11166 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |  -13.71058   6.707268    -2.04   0.043    -26.99763   -.4235353 
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. **model 5.7 
. **FEVD 
. xtfevd lnfdiflow lnsecedu lntertedu lntop lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnforbank privatisation inst 
> ability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996, 
invariant (lnsecedu lnter 
> tedu lngdp lntop) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      114           number of obs       =      148 
mean squared error         = .1895275           F( 25, 114)         = 32.67579 
root mean squared error    = .4353476           Prob > F            = 9.56e-40 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 28.05007           R-squared           = .9195435 
Total Sum of Squares       = 348.6367           adj. R-squared      = .8962535 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 320.5866 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
   lnfdiflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lntransition |   4.164404   3.194222     1.30   0.195    -2.163326    10.49213 
 lntradefree |  -.6065213   .7390153    -0.82   0.414    -2.070505    .8574624 
  lneconfree |   1.308299   1.196722     1.09   0.277    -1.062398    3.678997 
   lnforbank |   .5379091    .331839     1.62   0.108    -.1194615     1.19528 
privatisat~n |   .3951362   .1241694     3.18   0.002     .1491576    .6411149 
 instability |  -.6689404    .361589    -1.85   0.067    -1.385245    .0473645 
       d2008 |   1.314612     .73272     1.79   0.075    -.1369011    2.766124 
       d2007 |   1.344188   .6996647     1.92   0.057    -.0418424    2.730218 
       d2006 |   .7289289   .6713526     1.09   0.280    -.6010154    2.058873 
       d2005 |   .4422089   .6428006     0.69   0.493    -.8311741    1.715592 
       d2004 |   .0912998   .6093314     0.15   0.881    -1.115781     1.29838 
       d2003 |  -.3671023   .5897418    -0.62   0.535    -1.535376    .8011715 
       d2002 |  -.2956889   .5581891    -0.53   0.597    -1.401457    .8100794 
       d2001 |  -.4453612    .540905    -0.82   0.412     -1.51689    .6261674 
       d2000 |  -.5392883   .4801443    -1.12   0.264     -1.49045    .4118738 
       d1999 |   -.521057   .4532775    -1.15   0.253    -1.418996    .3768823 
       d1998 |  -.1993567   .4229686    -0.47   0.638    -1.037254    .6385408 
       d1997 |  -.2079851   .3961099    -0.53   0.601    -.9926757    .5767055 
       d1996 |  -.2765067    .336526    -0.82   0.413    -.9431621    .3901487 
    lnsecedu |  -.3370755   .4856186    -0.69   0.489    -1.299082    .6249313 
   lntertedu |  -.5978336   .6339079    -0.94   0.348      -1.8536    .6579331 
       lngdp |   .4168696   .2310097     1.80   0.074    -.0407588     .874498 
       lntop |   .5065795   .3949159     1.28   0.202    -.2757458    1.288905 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |  -6.678992    8.26356    -0.81   0.421    -23.04904    9.691058 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
396 
 
Appendix 5.9: Stock-adjustment Models 5.15-5.17 results 
 
. **Model 5.15 
. **LSDVC 
. xtlsdvc lnfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
privatisation instabil 
> ity d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, 
initial(bb) vcov(100) f 
> irst 
Note: Bias correction initialized by Blundell and Bond estimator 
 
Note: Blundell and Bond estimator is implemented through 
      the user-written Stata command -xtabond2- by David Roodman, 
      Center for Global Development, Washington, DC droodman@cgdev.org 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       154 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        12 
Number of instruments = 110                     Obs per group: min =        11 
Wald chi2(23) = 740064.52                                      avg =     12.83 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  lnfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lnfdistock | 
         L1. |   .9050609   .0472958    19.14   0.000     .8123628    .9977589 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   .1048215   .0475025     2.21   0.027     .0117184    .1979247 
   lntertedu |   .0560304   .0385592     1.45   0.146    -.0195442    .1316051 
       lngdp |   .0867569   .0497128     1.75   0.081    -.0106784    .1841922 
lntransition |   .4294225   .3159713     1.36   0.174    -.1898699    1.048715 
 lntradefree |   .1467702   .1159331     1.27   0.206    -.0804544    .3739948 
  lneconfree |  -.6146536   .1528279    -4.02   0.000    -.9141908   -.3151164 
   lnforbank |   .0618411   .0282625     2.19   0.029     .0064475    .1172346 
privatisat~n |   .0796853   .0250226     3.18   0.001      .030642    .1287287 
 instability |   .0636878   .1054409     0.60   0.546    -.1429725    .2703481 
       d2008 |  -.3435988   1.127405    -0.30   0.761    -2.553272    1.866074 
       d2007 |  -.0124753   1.132472    -0.01   0.991     -2.23208     2.20713 
       d2006 |  -.0218381   1.134666    -0.02   0.985    -2.245743    2.202066 
       d2005 |  -.2408557   1.131223    -0.21   0.831    -2.458012    1.976301 
       d2004 |  -.0828847   1.136584    -0.07   0.942    -2.310548    2.144778 
       d2003 |  -.0387322   1.137437    -0.03   0.973    -2.268068    2.190604 
       d2002 |  -.1009702   1.138244    -0.09   0.929    -2.331888    2.129947 
       d2001 |  -.2690082    1.13591    -0.24   0.813    -2.495351    1.957334 
       d2000 |   -.346811   1.132726    -0.31   0.759    -2.566914    1.873292 
       d1999 |  -.2618724    1.13926    -0.23   0.818    -2.494782    1.971037 
       d1998 |  -.1511151   1.147168    -0.13   0.895    -2.399523    2.097293 
       d1997 |  -.0799517   1.149525    -0.07   0.945    -2.332978    2.173075 
       d1996 |  -.0083581   1.154677    -0.01   0.994    -2.271484    2.254768 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
    privatisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 
    d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/.).L.lnfdistock 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
    privatisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 
    d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnfdistock 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.29  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.82  Pr > z =  0.413 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(87)   = 114.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.026 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Sargan tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
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  GMM instruments for levels 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(75)   =  84.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.214 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =  30.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank privatisation 
instability d2008 d2007  
> d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(65)   =  87.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.033 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(22)   =  26.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.215 
  
 
note: d2008 dropped because of collinearity 
      in the LSDV regression 
note: Bias correction up to order O(1/T) 
 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
    privatisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 
    d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
    L(1/.).L.lnfdistock 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
    privatisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 
    d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
    D.L.lnfdistock 
  GMM instruments for levels 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank privatisation 
instability d2008 d2007  
> d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
LSDVC dynamic regression 
(bootstrapped SE) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  lnfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lnfdistock | 
         L1. |   .7828173   .0610114    12.83   0.000     .6632372    .9023974 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.0284297   .5658546    -0.05   0.960    -1.137484    1.080625 
   lntertedu |  -.4000683   .2779822    -1.44   0.150    -.9449034    .1447668 
       lngdp |  -.0491923   .1960674    -0.25   0.802    -.4334772    .3350927 
lntransition |   .3480042   .6129296     0.57   0.570    -.8533156    1.549324 
 lntradefree |   .1583884    .170685     0.93   0.353     -.176148    .4929248 
  lneconfree |   .0330567    .318517     0.10   0.917    -.5912251    .6573385 
   lnforbank |   .0205479   .0550637     0.37   0.709    -.0873749    .1284708 
privatisat~n |   .0829518   .0283772     2.92   0.003     .0273334    .1385701 
 instability |   .1478013   .1451835     1.02   0.309     -.136753    .4323557 
       d2007 |   .2539941    .078786     3.22   0.001     .0995765    .4084118 
       d2006 |   .1464951   .1107009     1.32   0.186    -.0704747    .3634648 
       d2005 |   -.109588    .136392    -0.80   0.422    -.3769113    .1577353 
       d2004 |  -.0309901   .1578472    -0.20   0.844    -.3403648    .2783847 
       d2003 |  -.0609853   .1931142    -0.32   0.752    -.4394821    .3175114 
       d2002 |  -.2027927   .2384648    -0.85   0.395     -.670175    .2645897 
       d2001 |  -.4262735   .2663993    -1.60   0.110    -.9484065    .0958596 
       d2000 |  -.5228783   .2745711    -1.90   0.057    -1.061028    .0152711 
       d1999 |  -.4823994   .2937901    -1.64   0.101    -1.058217    .0934187 
       d1998 |  -.4199612    .293462    -1.43   0.152    -.9951362    .1552137 
       d1997 |  -.3960572    .325822    -1.22   0.224    -1.034657    .2425422 
       d1996 |  -.3659851   .3395602    -1.08   0.281    -1.031511    .2995406 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. . **FE 
. xtreg lnfdistock l1lnfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnforbank privatisati 
> on instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
d1995, fe 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1995 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       154 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        12 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.9822                         Obs per group: min =        11 
       between = 0.9599                                        avg =      12.8 
       overall = 0.9384                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(22,120)          =    301.66 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5456                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  lnfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
l1lnfdistock |   .6674096   .0544314    12.26   0.000     .5596393    .7751799 
    lnsecedu |  -.1045754    .418508    -0.25   0.803    -.9331921    .7240413 
   lntertedu |  -.4363795   .2103971    -2.07   0.040    -.8529512   -.0198078 
       lngdp |  -.0212873   .1515265    -0.14   0.889    -.3212993    .2787246 
lntransition |   .8798334   .5872634     1.50   0.137    -.2829072    2.042574 
 lntradefree |   .1420477   .1558496     0.91   0.364    -.1665237     .450619 
  lneconfree |   .0999724   .2685426     0.37   0.710    -.4317232    .6316681 
   lnforbank |   .0352891   .0460527     0.77   0.445    -.0558921    .1264703 
privatisat~n |   .0743428   .0290266     2.56   0.012      .016872    .1318135 
 instability |   .2261211   .1232095     1.84   0.069    -.0178251    .4700674 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |   .2176431   .0675212     3.22   0.002     .0839557    .3513305 
       d2006 |   .0734303   .0974285     0.75   0.453    -.1194714     .266332 
       d2005 |  -.1919698   .1144406    -1.68   0.096    -.4185542    .0346146 
       d2004 |  -.1423731   .1415373    -1.01   0.316    -.4226072    .1378609 
       d2003 |  -.2037683   .1708699    -1.19   0.235    -.5420788    .1345423 
       d2002 |  -.3702204   .2030861    -1.82   0.071    -.7723167     .031876 
       d2001 |   -.600323   .2244245    -2.67   0.009    -1.044668   -.1559782 
       d2000 |  -.6947769   .2359514    -2.94   0.004    -1.161944   -.2276096 
       d1999 |  -.6658584   .2430238    -2.74   0.007    -1.147029   -.1846882 
       d1998 |   -.623954   .2531636    -2.46   0.015      -1.1252   -.1227077 
       d1997 |  -.6248347   .2764059    -2.26   0.026    -1.172099   -.0775702 
       d1996 |  -.6070858   .2891836    -2.10   0.038    -1.179649   -.0345224 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   3.143199   3.993757     0.79   0.433    -4.764161    11.05056 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .45336375 
     sigma_e |  .14498628 
         rho |  .90721641   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(11, 120) =     2.71             Prob > F = 0.0038 
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. **OLS 
. reg lnfdistock l1lnfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnforbank privatisation 
>  instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
d1995 
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1995 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     154 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 22,   131) =  700.55 
       Model |  370.363824    22  16.8347193           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  3.14802702   131  .024030741           R-squared     =  0.9916 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.9902 
       Total |  373.511851   153  2.44125393           Root MSE      =  .15502 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  lnfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
l1lnfdistock |   .8441584   .0410207    20.58   0.000     .7630097    .9253071 
    lnsecedu |   .1280657   .0530201     2.42   0.017     .0231793    .2329521 
   lntertedu |    .064451   .0442231     1.46   0.147    -.0230328    .1519348 
       lngdp |   .1523334    .045465     3.35   0.001     .0623929    .2422739 
lntransition |   .5047635   .3281414     1.54   0.126    -.1443784    1.153905 
 lntradefree |   .1635247   .1321116     1.24   0.218    -.0978235    .4248729 
  lneconfree |  -.5271588   .1713888    -3.08   0.003    -.8662068   -.1881108 
   lnforbank |   .0507018   .0307065     1.65   0.101     -.010043    .1114466 
privatisat~n |   .0828858   .0285046     2.91   0.004     .0264969    .1392748 
 instability |   .0527444   .1132203     0.47   0.642    -.1712324    .2767212 
       d2008 |  -.2588742   .0929773    -2.78   0.006    -.4428055   -.0749428 
       d2007 |   .0621191   .0900157     0.69   0.491    -.1159534    .2401915 
       d2006 |   .0467715   .0862475     0.54   0.589    -.1238466    .2173895 
       d2005 |  -.1689089   .0846073    -2.00   0.048    -.3362824   -.0015354 
       d2004 |  -.0217619   .0831464    -0.26   0.794    -.1862453    .1427215 
       d2003 |   .0198915   .0788035     0.25   0.801    -.1360007    .1757837 
       d2002 |  -.0455109   .0812658    -0.56   0.576    -.2062741    .1152523 
       d2001 |  -.2117026   .0811458    -2.61   0.010    -.3722283   -.0511769 
       d2000 |  -.2855473   .0826721    -3.45   0.001    -.4490925   -.1220021 
       d1999 |  -.2088546   .0760986    -2.74   0.007    -.3593959   -.0583134 
       d1998 |  -.1134067   .0726287    -1.56   0.121    -.2570837    .0302702 
       d1997 |  -.0517242   .0698502    -0.74   0.460    -.1899046    .0864563 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |  -1.738992   1.138829    -1.53   0.129    -3.991867    .5138824 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. **Model 5.16 
. **LSDVC 
. xtlsdvc lnfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnforbank privatisation 
>  instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
d1995, initial(bb) vc 
> ov(100) first 
Note: Bias correction initialized by Blundell and Bond estimator 
 
Note: Blundell and Bond estimator is implemented through 
      the user-written Stata command -xtabond2- by David Roodman, 
      Center for Global Development, Washington, DC droodman@cgdev.org 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =       107 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        12 
Number of instruments = 94                      Obs per group: min =         8 
Wald chi2(19) = 704780.79                                      avg =      8.92 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         9 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  lnfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lnfdistock | 
         L1. |   .8806979    .055748    15.80   0.000     .7714338    .9899621 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   .0299378   .0544312     0.55   0.582    -.0767455    .1366211 
   lntertedu |   .0304191   .0437684     0.70   0.487    -.0553653    .1162035 
    lnedutr2 |  -.2582851     .17619    -1.47   0.143    -.6036113     .087041 
       lngdp |   .0820024   .0526182     1.56   0.119    -.0211274    .1851323 
lntransition |    .746077   .4455357     1.67   0.094     -.127157    1.619311 
 lntradefree |   .0594042   .1628641     0.36   0.715    -.2598035    .3786119 
  lneconfree |   -.417111   .1937858    -2.15   0.031    -.7969242   -.0372978 
   lnforbank |   .0998654   .0542925     1.84   0.066    -.0065459    .2062767 
privatisat~n |   .0793495   .0252475     3.14   0.002     .0298654    .1288336 
       d2008 |   -.789825   1.422272    -0.56   0.579    -3.577426    1.997776 
       d2007 |  -.4853085    1.43622    -0.34   0.735    -3.300249    2.329632 
       d2006 |  -.5319362   1.445626    -0.37   0.713    -3.365312    2.301439 
       d2005 |  -.7687698   1.448503    -0.53   0.596    -3.607784    2.070245 
       d2004 |  -.6503797   1.464501    -0.44   0.657    -3.520749     2.21999 
       d2003 |   -.639123   1.480486    -0.43   0.666    -3.540822    2.262576 
       d2002 |  -.7364389   1.500407    -0.49   0.624    -3.677183    2.204305 
       d2001 |  -.9431126   1.515681    -0.62   0.534    -3.913792    2.027567 
       d2000 |  -1.063012   1.530216    -0.69   0.487     -4.06218    1.936157 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnforbank privatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 
    d2000) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/.).L.lnfdistock 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnforbank privatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 
    d2000 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnfdistock 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.30  Pr > z =  0.195 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.91  Pr > z =  0.361 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(75)   = 120.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.001 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Sargan tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(66)   =  87.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.043 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =  33.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
privatisation d2008 d2007 d20 
> 06 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000) 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(57)   =  81.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.019 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =  39.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
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note: d2000 dropped because of collinearity 
      in the LSDV regression 
note: Bias correction up to order O(1/T) 
 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnforbank privatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 
    d2000) 
    L(1/.).L.lnfdistock 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnforbank privatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 
    d2000 
    D.L.lnfdistock 
  GMM instruments for levels 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
privatisation d2008 d2007 d20 
> 06 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000) 
LSDVC dynamic regression 
(bootstrapped SE) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  lnfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lnfdistock | 
         L1. |   .8118696   .0992795     8.18   0.000     .6172853    1.006454 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.9165034   .8664793    -1.06   0.290    -2.614772    .7817648 
   lntertedu |   -.359973    .391451    -0.92   0.358    -1.127203    .4072568 
    lnedutr2 |    1.31286   .9460754     1.39   0.165    -.5414138    3.167134 
       lngdp |   .0501852   .2840239     0.18   0.860    -.5064915    .6068618 
lntransition |  -1.606036   1.260893    -1.27   0.203     -4.07734    .8652683 
 lntradefree |   .3245785   .2781746     1.17   0.243    -.2206337    .8697908 
  lneconfree |  -.0315855   .4044924    -0.08   0.938     -.824376    .7612049 
   lnforbank |  -.1534018   .1383517    -1.11   0.268    -.4245662    .1177626 
privatisat~n |   .0774709   .0338998     2.29   0.022     .0110285    .1439134 
       d2008 |  -.5413411     .72054    -0.75   0.452    -1.953574    .8708913 
       d2007 |  -.1851626    .667905    -0.28   0.782    -1.494232    1.123907 
       d2006 |  -.1685373    .609181    -0.28   0.782     -1.36251    1.025435 
       d2005 |   -.337425   .5533745    -0.61   0.542    -1.422019    .7471691 
       d2004 |   -.133752   .4538721    -0.29   0.768    -1.023325    .7558209 
       d2003 |  -.0393706   .3827414    -0.10   0.918      -.78953    .7107888 
       d2002 |  -.0199234   .2749607    -0.07   0.942    -.5588365    .5189896 
       d2001 |  -.0838206   .1537376    -0.55   0.586    -.3851408    .2174997 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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. **FE 
. xtreg lnfdistock l1lnfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
lneconfree lnforbank pr 
> ivatisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 
d1997 d1996 d1995, fe 
note: instability omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1998 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1997 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1995 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       107 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        12 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.9759                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.6048                                        avg =       8.9 
       overall = 0.6770                                        max =         9 
 
                                                F(18,77)           =    173.34 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.2384                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  lnfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
l1lnfdistock |   .5900802   .0878604     6.72   0.000     .4151278    .7650326 
    lnsecedu |  -.5770833   .6965158    -0.83   0.410    -1.964024    .8098569 
   lntertedu |  -.5116411   .2926712    -1.75   0.084    -1.094424    .0711417 
    lnedutr2 |   1.338536   .8693599     1.54   0.128    -.3925811    3.069652 
       lngdp |   .0187818   .2458746     0.08   0.939    -.4708172    .5083807 
lntransition |  -1.447564   1.194645    -1.21   0.229    -3.826407    .9312782 
 lntradefree |   .3735807   .2330567     1.60   0.113    -.0904945    .8376559 
  lneconfree |   .2529951   .3686371     0.69   0.495    -.4810552    .9870454 
   lnforbank |  -.1783467   .1113174    -1.60   0.113    -.4000078    .0433145 
privatisat~n |   .0632226    .031922     1.98   0.051    -.0003422    .1267875 
 instability |  (omitted) 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |   .2752057   .0808232     3.41   0.001      .114266    .4361453 
       d2006 |   .2065971   .1410076     1.47   0.147    -.0741848     .487379 
       d2005 |   .0091293   .1879512     0.05   0.961    -.3651294     .383388 
       d2004 |    .148199   .2657344     0.56   0.579    -.3809458    .6773438 
       d2003 |   .1648078   .3424179     0.48   0.632    -.5170334     .846649 
       d2002 |   .1188257   .4349789     0.27   0.785    -.7473279    .9849793 
       d2001 |   .0273457    .540983     0.05   0.960    -1.049889    1.104581 
       d2000 |   .1187729    .661319     0.18   0.858    -1.198081    1.435627 
       d1999 |  (omitted) 
       d1998 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |  (omitted) 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   7.940602   7.217681     1.10   0.275    -6.431636    22.31284 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .88236582 
     sigma_e |  .13591617 
         rho |  .97682281   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(11, 77) =     3.17              Prob > F = 0.0014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
403 
 
. **OLS 
 
. reg lnfdistock l1lnfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
lneconfree lnforbank priv 
> atisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 
d1997 d1996 d1995 
note: instability omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     107 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 18,    88) =  537.32 
       Model |  227.229012    18   12.623834           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2.06746257    88  .023493893           R-squared     =  0.9910 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.9891 
       Total |  229.296474   106  2.16317429           Root MSE      =  .15328 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  lnfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
l1lnfdistock |   .8640939   .0683807    12.64   0.000     .7282017    .9999861 
    lnsecedu |   .0159029   .0702704     0.23   0.821    -.1237446    .1555505 
   lntertedu |   .0232967   .0567916     0.41   0.683    -.0895646     .136158 
    lnedutr2 |  -.3325469   .2255358    -1.47   0.144    -.7807519    .1156581 
       lngdp |   .0946493   .0657928     1.44   0.154       -.0361    .2253987 
lntransition |   .7744966   .5514502     1.40   0.164    -.3213948    1.870388 
 lntradefree |   .0908684   .2098557     0.43   0.666    -.3261757    .5079125 
  lneconfree |  -.3398062   .2467012    -1.38   0.172     -.830073    .1504606 
   lnforbank |   .1158861   .0687244     1.69   0.095    -.0206892    .2524614 
privatisat~n |   .0744099   .0322801     2.31   0.024       .01026    .1385598 
 instability |  (omitted) 
       d2008 |   .3420262    .237467     1.44   0.153    -.1298895     .813942 
       d2007 |   .6392588   .2126119     3.01   0.003     .2167374     1.06178 
       d2006 |   .5860322   .1900586     3.08   0.003     .2083306    .9637337 
       d2005 |   .3462564   .1776614     1.95   0.054    -.0068084    .6993212 
       d2004 |   .4566108   .1508898     3.03   0.003     .1567491    .7564726 
       d2003 |   .4544518   .1245066     3.65   0.000     .2070211    .7018825 
       d2002 |   .3456252   .0934968     3.70   0.000     .1598199    .5314305 
       d2001 |   .1281347   .0733051     1.75   0.084    -.0175438    .2738133 
       d2000 |  (omitted) 
       d1999 |  (omitted) 
       d1998 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |  (omitted) 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |  -1.792921   1.944592    -0.92   0.359    -5.657388    2.071546 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
.  
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. **Model 5.17 
. **LSDVC 
. xtlsdvc lnfdistock l1lnfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnvacancy lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
lneconfree lnforbank 
>  privatisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 
d1997 d1996 d1995,  
> initial(bb) vcov(100) first 
 
note: d2001 dropped because of collinearity 
note: l1lnfdistock dropped because of collinearity 
Note: Bias correction initialized by Blundell and Bond estimator 
 
Note: Blundell and Bond estimator is implemented through 
      the user-written Stata command -xtabond2- by David Roodman, 
      Center for Global Development, Washington, DC droodman@cgdev.org 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: country                         Number of obs      =        48 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        12 
Number of instruments = 41                      Obs per group: min =         4 
Wald chi2(14) = 488290.14                                      avg =      4.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  lnfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lnfdistock | 
         L1. |   .8977995   .0854526    10.51   0.000     .7303155    1.065283 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   .0485539   .0715418     0.68   0.497    -.0916654    .1887732 
   lntertedu |   .1910826   .0729563     2.62   0.009      .048091    .3340743 
   lnvacancy |   .2246185   .0910351     2.47   0.014      .046193    .4030441 
       lngdp |   .0778563   .0931203     0.84   0.403    -.1046561    .2603687 
lntransition |   .1558071   .6244971     0.25   0.803    -1.068185    1.379799 
 lntradefree |   -.062606    .207485    -0.30   0.763    -.4692691    .3440571 
  lneconfree |   -.967274   .2399055    -4.03   0.000     -1.43748   -.4970679 
   lnforbank |   .2217583   .0771907     2.87   0.004     .0704672    .3730493 
privatisat~n |   .1045229   .0328716     3.18   0.001     .0400957    .1689501 
       d2005 |   2.468708    2.02655     1.22   0.223    -1.503257    6.440673 
       d2004 |   2.591857   2.029857     1.28   0.202    -1.386591    6.570304 
       d2003 |   2.627675   2.037782     1.29   0.197    -1.366303    6.621653 
       d2002 |   2.552531   2.036454     1.25   0.210    -1.438845    6.543907 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnvacancy lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnforbank privatisation d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/.).L.lnfdistock 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnvacancy lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnforbank privatisation d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnfdistock 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.61  Pr > z =  0.009 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.10  Pr > z =  0.270 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(27)   =  46.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.010 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Sargan tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(23)   =  34.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.056 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =  12.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.015 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lnvacancy lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
privatisation d2005 d2004 d2 
> 003 d2002) 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(14)   =  19.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.132 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =  27.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.012 
  
 
note: d2003 dropped because of collinearity 
      in the LSDV regression 
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note: Bias correction up to order O(1/T) 
 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnvacancy lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnforbank privatisation d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002) 
    L(1/.).L.lnfdistock 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnvacancy lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnforbank privatisation d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 
    D.L.lnfdistock 
  GMM instruments for levels 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lnvacancy lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnforbank 
privatisation d2005 d2004 d2 
> 003 d2002) 
LSDVC dynamic regression 
(bootstrapped SE) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  lnfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lnfdistock | 
         L1. |   .8002723   .1714412     4.67   0.000     .4642537    1.136291 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.9372391   1.790581    -0.52   0.601    -4.446713    2.572235 
   lntertedu |     .15019   .9760434     0.15   0.878     -1.76282      2.0632 
   lnvacancy |   .2876396   .2296195     1.25   0.210    -.1624064    .7376855 
       lngdp |   .9855574   .4763982     2.07   0.039      .051834    1.919281 
lntransition |  -.3605443   1.831897    -0.20   0.844    -3.950996    3.229908 
 lntradefree |    .401198   .3918783     1.02   0.306    -.3668693    1.169265 
  lneconfree |  -1.471083    .902214    -1.63   0.103     -3.23939     .297224 
   lnforbank |  -.4011407    .249009    -1.61   0.107    -.8891894    .0869081 
privatisat~n |   .0438374   .0550406     0.80   0.426    -.0640402     .151715 
       d2005 |  -.3316825   .2389914    -1.39   0.165    -.8000971     .136732 
       d2004 |  -.1113344   .1293712    -0.86   0.389    -.3648974    .1422286 
       d2002 |   .0632003   .1561237     0.40   0.686    -.2427965    .3691971 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
.  
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. **FE 
. xtreg lnfdistock l1lnfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnvacancy lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
lneconfree lnforbank p 
> rivatisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 
d1997 d1996 d1995,fe 
note: instability omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        48 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        12 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.9791                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.5147                                        avg =       4.0 
       overall = 0.5259                                        max =         4 
 
                                                F(13,23)           =     83.08 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7828                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  lnfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
l1lnfdistock |   .3099765   .1602137     1.93   0.065    -.0214509    .6414038 
    lnsecedu |  -2.475255   1.116257    -2.22   0.037    -4.784408   -.1661017 
   lntertedu |  -.5593412   .5969751    -0.94   0.359    -1.794278    .6755959 
   lnvacancy |   .1357895   .1068955     1.27   0.217    -.0853407    .3569197 
       lngdp |   1.287851   .3239115     3.98   0.001     .6177894    1.957913 
lntransition |   .0026686   1.358066     0.00   0.998    -2.806704    2.812042 
 lntradefree |    .448129   .2018111     2.22   0.037     .0306508    .8656071 
  lneconfree |  -.3238841   .6438529    -0.50   0.620    -1.655795    1.008027 
   lnforbank |  -.5604368   .1708097    -3.28   0.003    -.9137835     -.20709 
privatisat~n |   .0074137   .0285687     0.26   0.798    -.0516852    .0665125 
 instability |  (omitted) 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |  (omitted) 
       d2006 |  (omitted) 
       d2005 |  -.0643408   .0895869    -0.72   0.480    -.2496654    .1209838 
       d2004 |  (omitted) 
       d2003 |  -.0388948    .098381    -0.40   0.696    -.2424115    .1646219 
       d2002 |  -.0847756   .1911969    -0.44   0.662    -.4802966    .3107454 
       d2001 |  (omitted) 
       d2000 |  (omitted) 
       d1999 |  (omitted) 
       d1998 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |  (omitted) 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |  -15.25231   8.820247    -1.73   0.097    -33.49838    2.993767 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.5068576 
     sigma_e |  .07056648 
         rho |  .99781173   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(11, 23) =     7.40              Prob > F = 0.0000 
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. **OLS 
. reg lnfdistock l1lnfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnvacancy lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
lneconfree lnforbank pri 
> vatisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 
d1997 d1996 d1995 d1996 
note: instability omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      48 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 13,    34) =  409.13 
       Model |  81.3319117    13   6.2563009           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .519917216    34  .015291683           R-squared     =  0.9936 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.9912 
       Total |  81.8518289    47  1.74152827           Root MSE      =  .12366 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  lnfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
l1lnfdistock |   .9729042   .0896259    10.86   0.000     .7907624    1.155046 
    lnsecedu |  -.0063703   .0862696    -0.07   0.942    -.1816913    .1689506 
   lntertedu |   .1696389   .0943231     1.80   0.081    -.0220487    .3613266 
   lnvacancy |   .2367733   .1197646     1.98   0.056    -.0066176    .4801641 
       lngdp |   -.000332   .1002784    -0.00   0.997    -.2041221    .2034582 
lntransition |  -.1898742   .7579255    -0.25   0.804    -1.730164    1.350416 
 lntradefree |  -.0013784   .2669808    -0.01   0.996    -.5439487    .5411919 
  lneconfree |  -.8789366   .3044616    -2.89   0.007    -1.497677   -.2601962 
   lnforbank |   .2295101   .0990511     2.32   0.027      .028214    .4308061 
privatisat~n |   .1138667     .04285     2.66   0.012     .0267851    .2009484 
 instability |  (omitted) 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |  (omitted) 
       d2006 |  (omitted) 
       d2005 |  -.1763234   .0591216    -2.98   0.005    -.2964729    -.056174 
       d2004 |  -.0444551   .0571931    -0.78   0.442    -.1606854    .0717752 
       d2003 |  (omitted) 
       d2002 |  -.0784778   .0547007    -1.43   0.161     -.189643    .0326873 
       d2001 |  (omitted) 
       d2000 |  (omitted) 
       d1999 |  (omitted) 
       d1998 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |  (omitted) 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1995 |  (omitted) 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   3.893939   2.342262     1.66   0.106    -.8661106    8.653989 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.1: Descriptive statistics and raw correlations  
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
  
     
  
manfdi~k overall 6814.486 10475.6 39.1255 55474.5 N =     153 
  between 
 
7983.675 183.9826 23616.39 n = 14 
  within 
 
6830.655 -11600.8 38672.6 
T-bar = 
10.9286 
  
     
  
manvac~y overall 4.155934 1.907717 1.51351 9.94 N =     52 
  between 
 
1.863207 2.125 8.77 n = 13 
  within 
 
0.609959 2.398837 5.913027   
  
     
  
manpri~n overall 0.163399 0.370943 0 1 N =     153 
  between 
 
0.12112 0 0.5 n = 14 
  within 
 
0.35567 -0.3366 1.086476 
T-bar = 
10.9286 
  
     
  
indfdi~k overall 557.6086 1160.246 1.00E-06 10575.5 N =    1609 
 
between 
 
887.619 0.065769 4306.717 n =     154 
 
within 
 
718.8372 -2795.94 6973.497 
T-bar = 
10.4481 
      
  
indpri~n overall 0.010597 0.102413 0 1 N =    2548 
 
between 
 
0.031407 0 0.214286 n =     182 
 
within 
 
0.097504 -0.20369 0.939168 T =      14 
      
  
primedu overall 91.84012 6.694157 72.5 99.8 N =     168 
  between 
 
6.63157 77.12 98.88714 n =      12 
  within 
 
2.063354 87.21154 96.16012 T =      14 
  
     
  
secedu overall 45.50548 15.62276 22 80.7 N =     168 
  between 
 
15.64613 22.68429 68.08286 n =      12 
  within 
 
4.280841 32.22262 58.12262 T =      14 
  
     
  
tertedu overall 7.353095 3.173817 3.3 15.2 N =     168 
  between 
 
3.130256 3.471428 13.7 n =      12 
  within 
 
1.018513 4.553095 11.17738 T =      14 
  
     
  
genvoc~o overall 0.43949 0.441992 0.146684 1.780488 N =     196 
  between 
 
0.457505 0.146684 1.780488 n =      14 
  within 
 
0 0.43949 0.43949 T =      14 
  
     
  
cognit~e overall 4.75875 0.399063 3.785 5.192 N =     168 
  between 
 
0.415566 3.785 5.192 n =      12 
  within 
 
0 4.75875 4.75875 T =      14 
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top overall 0.070167 0.035297 0.013 0.122 N =     168 
  between 
 
0.036757 0.013 0.122 n =      12 
  within 
 
0 0.070167 0.070167 T =      14 
  
     
  
vacancy overall 3.893044 1.362624 1.68085 7.23077 N =      56 
  between 
 
1.277325 2.07614 5.463493 n =      14 
  within 
 
0.560518 2.023689 5.762399 T =       4 
  
     
  
transi~n overall 3.226143 0.496287 1.111111 3.962222 N =     193 
  between 
 
0.43192 2.182619 3.816508 n =      14 
  within 
 
0.268185 2.154635 3.821301 
T-bar = 
13.7857 
  
     
  
tradef~e overall 73.04396 9.87613 46.8 87.8 N =     182 
  between 
 
5.907103 62 82.58571 n =      14 
  within 
 
8.02428 49.85934 94.21538 T-bar =      13 
  
     
  
econfree overall 57.88642 9.169961 24.42891 77.00185 N =     182 
  between 
 
8.099609 39.65407 72.5352 n =      14 
  within 
 
4.924805 42.29225 71.63622 T-bar =      13 
  
     
  
ictinfra overall 77.19616 52.2034 1.34503 249.1646 N =     196 
  between 
 
22.51218 35.22544 109.7186 n =      14 
  within 
 
47.45717 -1.75492 216.6421 T =      14 
  
     
  
gdp overall 4.89E+10 7.23E+10 1.87E+09 5.28E+11 N =     196 
  between 
 
6.36E+10 5.02E+09 2.44E+11 n =      14 
  within 
 
3.82E+10 
-
5.65E+10 3.33E+11 T =      14 
  
     
  
primex~t overall 0.116997 0.068248 0.02774 0.334344 N =     196 
  between 
 
0.058766 0.046485 0.215017 n =      14 
  within 
 
0.037876 -0.00437 0.238943 T =      14 
  
     
  
forbank overall 0.531771 0.220978 0 1 N =     192 
  between 
 
0.148502 0.253571 0.779286 n =      14 
  within 
 
0.166837 0.030342 0.922485 
T-bar = 
13.7143 
  
     
  
wage overall 489.474 353.8258 60.8529 2038.203 N =     188 
  between 
 
247.6512 149.9469 1070.345 n =      14 
  within 
 
256.326 -82.9617 1457.333 
T-bar = 
13.4286 
  
     
  
gini overall 0.326326 0.042414 0.243 0.406 N =     106 
  between 
 
0.039385 0.267 0.377 n =      10 
  within 
 
0.021011 0.24454 0.37704 T =    10.6 
411 
 
  
     
  
privat~n overall 0.408163 0.492752 0 1 N =     196 
  between 
 
0.18463 0.214286 0.785714 n =      14 
  within 
 
0.459335 -0.37755 1.193878 T =      14 
  
     
  
instab~y overall 0.02551 0.158073 0 1 N =     196 
  between 
 
0.066342 0 0.214286 n =      14 
  within   0.144496 -0.18878 0.882653 T =      14 
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. corr lnindfdistock lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnictinfra   lnprimedu lnsecedu lntertedu lngenvocratio l 
> nedutr1 lnedutr2 lncognitive lnmanvacancy lngdp lntop 
(obs=436) 
 
             | lnindf~k lntran~n lntrad~e lnecon~e lnicti~a lnprim~u lnsecedu lntert~u lngenv~o lnedutr1 lnedutr2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k |   1.0000 
lntransition |   0.3693   1.0000 
 lntradefree |  -0.0418   0.6437   1.0000 
  lneconfree |  -0.1511   0.5474   0.7167   1.0000 
  lnictinfra |   0.3230   0.7060   0.4098   0.4431   1.0000 
   lnprimedu |  -0.0189   0.5754   0.6081   0.6955   0.1595   1.0000 
    lnsecedu |  -0.0245   0.3915   0.4837   0.6169   0.3762   0.5440   1.0000 
   lntertedu |  -0.1009   0.6185   0.7156   0.7028   0.4638   0.4673   0.4482   1.0000 
lngenvocra~o |  -0.3512   0.2582   0.6389   0.8035   0.0538   0.6088   0.4993   0.7515   1.0000 
    lnedutr1 |  -0.5068  -0.5051  -0.0341   0.1011  -0.6986   0.1982  -0.0995  -0.0148   0.5272   1.0000 
    lnedutr2 |  -0.1463  -0.0758   0.0954   0.1471  -0.0767   0.2283  -0.0964   0.0817   0.3371   0.6002   1.0000 
 lncognitive |   0.3708   0.8365   0.5338   0.4504   0.8027   0.1890   0.3264   0.4648   0.0600  -0.7290  -0.3532 
lnmanvacancy |  -0.1573   0.3224   0.4105   0.4147   0.3332   0.1578   0.3788   0.3426   0.1859  -0.1725  -0.0932 
       lngdp |   0.6756   0.4253  -0.1317  -0.3357   0.3035  -0.0045  -0.2089  -0.2398  -0.5694  -0.6277  -0.1597 
       lntop |   0.5018   0.7626   0.2740   0.2002   0.5798   0.2367   0.1043   0.1008  -0.2087  -0.6785  -0.3285 
 
             | lncogn~e lnmanv~y    lngdp    lntop 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
 lncognitive |   1.0000 
lnmanvacancy |   0.4106   1.0000 
       lngdp |   0.3514  -0.3275   1.0000 
       lntop |   0.8427   0.1152   0.6088   1.0000 
Appendix 6.2: Models 6.1-6.3 results  
 
. **Model (6.1) (LSDVC) 
. xtlsdvc manfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
lneconfree lnictinfra manprivatisat 
> ion instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 
d1997 d1996 d1995, initial(bb) 
>  vcov(100) first 
note: variable instability is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: d1995 dropped because of collinearity 
Note: Bias correction initialized by Blundell and Bond estimator 
 
Note: Blundell and Bond estimator is implemented through 
      the user-written Stata command -xtabond2- by David Roodman, 
      Center for Global Development, Washington, DC droodman@cgdev.org 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: countryid                       Number of obs      =       123 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        12 
Number of instruments = 111                     Obs per group: min =         5 
Wald chi2(23) =   9866.80                                      avg =     10.25 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 manfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 manfdistock | 
         L1. |     1.0726   .0261763    40.98   0.000     1.021295    1.123904 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -340.3054   618.3513    -0.55   0.582    -1552.252    871.6408 
   lntertedu |  -1300.381   656.8293    -1.98   0.048    -2587.742   -13.01892 
      lnwage |  -1283.133   516.4708    -2.48   0.013    -2295.397   -270.8687 
       lngdp |   691.7068    312.126     2.22   0.027     79.95112    1303.463 
lntransition |    5686.72    5120.33     1.11   0.267    -4348.943    15722.38 
 lntradefree |   1352.337   1732.993     0.78   0.435    -2044.267    4748.941 
  lneconfree |  -191.0656   2032.056    -0.09   0.925    -4173.822    3791.691 
  lnictinfra |    1392.16    971.352     1.43   0.152    -511.6546    3295.975 
manprivati~n |   1051.042   401.2772     2.62   0.009     264.5531    1837.531 
       d2008 |  -25047.28   11848.44    -2.11   0.035    -48269.79   -1824.756 
       d2007 |  -21641.46   11831.68    -1.83   0.067    -44831.13    1548.209 
       d2006 |  -23297.53   11745.48    -1.98   0.047    -46318.26    -276.811 
       d2005 |  -22839.36   11679.05    -1.96   0.051    -45729.87    51.16094 
       d2004 |  -22013.19   11629.25    -1.89   0.058    -44806.11    779.7247 
       d2003 |  -22247.25   11619.41    -1.91   0.056    -45020.89    526.3767 
       d2002 |  -23202.36   11608.43    -2.00   0.046    -45954.46   -450.2528 
       d2001 |   -22943.6    11616.4    -1.98   0.048    -45711.32   -175.8761 
       d2000 |  -23001.52   11540.42    -1.99   0.046    -45620.34   -382.7105 
       d1999 |  -22333.99   11590.56    -1.93   0.054    -45051.07     383.102 
       d1998 |  -21692.46   11644.12    -1.86   0.062    -44514.52    1129.605 
       d1997 |     -21647    11475.3    -1.89   0.059    -44138.17    844.1746 
       d1996 |  -20877.25   11221.91    -1.86   0.063    -42871.78    1117.284 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 
    d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/.).L.manfdistock 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 
    d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.manfdistock 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.46  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.72  Pr > z =  0.085 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(88)   = 113.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.034 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
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Difference-in-Sargan tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(76)   = 110.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.006 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =   3.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.995 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnictinfra 
manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d 
> 2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(66)   =  99.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.005 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(22)   =  13.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.904 
  
 
note: d2008 dropped because of collinearity 
      in the LSDV regression 
note: Bias correction up to order O(1/T) 
 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 
    d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
    L(1/.).L.manfdistock 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 
    d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
    D.L.manfdistock 
  GMM instruments for levels 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnictinfra 
manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d 
> 2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
LSDVC dynamic regression 
(bootstrapped SE) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 manfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 manfdistock | 
         L1. |   1.109882   .0323443    34.31   0.000     1.046488    1.173275 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -1594.429   7601.586    -0.21   0.834    -16493.26    13304.41 
   lntertedu |  -3574.935   2455.596    -1.46   0.145    -8387.814    1237.944 
      lnwage |  -1429.649   3519.215    -0.41   0.685    -8327.184    5467.885 
       lngdp |   813.2126   3416.311     0.24   0.812    -5882.635     7509.06 
lntransition |   7920.074   12549.35     0.63   0.528    -16676.21    32516.36 
 lntradefree |  -86.76408   2289.004    -0.04   0.970    -4573.129    4399.601 
  lneconfree |  -2989.151   4433.338    -0.67   0.500    -11678.33    5700.032 
  lnictinfra |   2322.138   1712.925     1.36   0.175    -1035.132    5679.409 
manprivati~n |   1063.526   508.2505     2.09   0.036     67.37326    2059.679 
       d2007 |   3547.624   770.1055     4.61   0.000     2038.245    5057.003 
       d2006 |   1887.352   1230.582     1.53   0.125    -524.5442    4299.248 
       d2005 |   2321.564    1450.08     1.60   0.109    -520.5407    5163.669 
       d2004 |   3224.769   1892.483     1.70   0.088    -484.4285    6933.967 
       d2003 |   3149.485   2072.877     1.52   0.129    -913.2784    7212.248 
       d2002 |   2278.702   2674.508     0.85   0.394    -2963.237    7520.642 
       d2001 |   2616.286   3040.977     0.86   0.390     -3343.92    8576.491 
       d2000 |    2479.81   3416.885     0.73   0.468    -4217.161    9176.781 
       d1999 |   3371.186   3599.064     0.94   0.349    -3682.851    10425.22 
       d1998 |   4194.479   3867.205     1.08   0.278    -3385.103    11774.06 
       d1997 |   4049.657   4263.892     0.95   0.342    -4307.418    12406.73 
       d1996 |   4040.653   4500.675     0.90   0.369    -4780.509    12861.81 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.2(LSDVC) 
. xtlsdvc manfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp lntransition 
lntradefree lneconfree lnictinfra manp 
> rivatisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 
d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, in 
> itial(bb) vcov(100) first 
note: variable instability is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: variable d1998 is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: variable d1997 is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: variable d1996 is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: variable d1995 is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: d1999 dropped because of collinearity 
Note: Bias correction initialized by Blundell and Bond estimator 
 
Note: Blundell and Bond estimator is implemented through 
      the user-written Stata command -xtabond2- by David Roodman, 
      Center for Global Development, Washington, DC droodman@cgdev.org 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: countryid                       Number of obs      =       100 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        12 
Number of instruments = 95                      Obs per group: min =         5 
Wald chi2(20) =   8136.06                                      avg =      8.33 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         9 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 manfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 manfdistock | 
         L1. |   1.052522   .0322886    32.60   0.000     .9892371    1.115806 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -23.11787   860.4007    -0.03   0.979    -1709.472    1663.236 
   lntertedu |  -1397.665   775.3874    -1.80   0.071    -2917.396    122.0667 
    lnedutr2 |   874.9979    2694.53     0.32   0.745    -4406.184     6156.18 
      lnwage |  -1280.672   607.6725    -2.11   0.035    -2471.689   -89.65622 
       lngdp |   958.7519   403.8551     2.37   0.018     167.2105    1750.293 
lntransition |   6663.675   6441.502     1.03   0.301    -5961.437    19288.79 
 lntradefree |   1005.576   2548.743     0.39   0.693    -3989.868     6001.02 
  lneconfree |  -531.4659   3004.468    -0.18   0.860    -6420.115    5357.183 
  lnictinfra |   1209.865    1394.95     0.87   0.386    -1524.187    3943.917 
manprivati~n |   1023.948   466.8776     2.19   0.028     108.8851    1939.012 
       d2008 |  -28684.51   14891.79    -1.93   0.054    -57871.88    502.8663 
       d2007 |  -25253.97    14961.8    -1.69   0.091    -54578.55    4070.611 
       d2006 |  -26859.49   14948.99    -1.80   0.072    -56158.97    2439.996 
       d2005 |  -26369.34   14957.59    -1.76   0.078    -55685.68     2947.01 
       d2004 |   -25486.8   15046.67    -1.69   0.090    -54977.74    4004.134 
       d2003 |  -25597.07   15180.02    -1.69   0.092    -55349.36    4155.215 
       d2002 |  -26391.33   15369.09    -1.72   0.086    -56514.19     3731.53 
       d2001 |  -26007.33   15611.36    -1.67   0.096    -56605.03    4590.375 
       d2000 |  -25942.48      15787    -1.64   0.100    -56884.43    4999.473 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
    lneconfree lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 
    d2002 d2001 d2000) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/.).L.manfdistock 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
    lneconfree lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 
    d2002 d2001 d2000 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.manfdistock 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.91  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.74  Pr > z =  0.082 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(75)   =  92.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.084 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Sargan tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(66)   =  90.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.026 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =   2.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.987 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnictinfra manprivatisation d200 
> 8 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000) 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(56)   =  79.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.021 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =  12.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.847 
  
 
note: d2008 dropped because of collinearity 
      in the LSDV regression 
note: Bias correction up to order O(1/T) 
 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
    lneconfree lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 
    d2002 d2001 d2000) 
    L(1/.).L.manfdistock 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
    lneconfree lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 
    d2002 d2001 d2000 
    D.L.manfdistock 
  GMM instruments for levels 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnictinfra manprivatisation d200 
> 8 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000) 
LSDVC dynamic regression 
(bootstrapped SE) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 manfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 manfdistock | 
         L1. |   1.088028   .0412909    26.35   0.000     1.007099    1.168957 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -3265.546   11491.29    -0.28   0.776    -25788.06    19256.97 
   lntertedu |  -1711.834   4335.963    -0.39   0.693    -10210.16    6786.497 
    lnedutr2 |  -13602.46   12138.54    -1.12   0.262    -37393.55    10188.64 
      lnwage |   1134.347   4976.724     0.23   0.820    -8619.853    10888.55 
       lngdp |  -1190.473   6112.637    -0.19   0.846    -13171.02    10790.08 
lntransition |   7844.214    20536.8     0.38   0.702    -32407.17    48095.59 
 lntradefree |   211.0329   3910.167     0.05   0.957    -7452.753    7874.819 
  lneconfree |  -4061.495   4946.871    -0.82   0.412    -13757.18    5634.193 
  lnictinfra |   2575.773   2358.717     1.09   0.275    -2047.227    7198.774 
manprivati~n |   1090.971   615.0621     1.77   0.076    -114.5289     2296.47 
       d2007 |    2751.99   1173.893     2.34   0.019     451.2012    5052.779 
       d2006 |   332.2169   1758.272     0.19   0.850    -3113.932    3778.366 
       d2005 |  -255.6132   2634.327    -0.10   0.923    -5418.799    4907.572 
       d2004 |  -696.7297   3582.555    -0.19   0.846    -7718.409    6324.949 
       d2003 |  -2260.891   4651.731    -0.49   0.627    -11378.12    6856.334 
       d2002 |  -4729.846   5917.202    -0.80   0.424    -16327.35    6867.656 
       d2001 |  -6308.386   7546.808    -0.84   0.403    -21099.86    8483.086 
       d2000 |  -8755.319   9273.901    -0.94   0.345    -26931.83    9421.192 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.3(LSDVC) 
. xtlsdvc manfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnmanvacancy lnwage lngdp lntransition 
lntradefree lneconfree lnictinfra  
> manprivatisation instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 
d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995 
> , initial(bb) vcov(100) first 
note: variable instability is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: variable d2008 is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: variable d2007 is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: variable d2006 is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: variable d2000 is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: variable d1999 is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: variable d1998 is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: variable d1997 is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: variable d1996 is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: variable d1995 is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: d2001 dropped because of collinearity 
Note: Bias correction initialized by Blundell and Bond estimator 
 
Note: Blundell and Bond estimator is implemented through 
      the user-written Stata command -xtabond2- by David Roodman, 
      Center for Global Development, Washington, DC droodman@cgdev.org 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: countryid                       Number of obs      =        42 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        11 
Number of instruments = 42                      Obs per group: min =         2 
Wald chi2(15) =   4799.88                                      avg =      3.82 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 manfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 manfdistock | 
         L1. |   1.123667   .0622207    18.06   0.000     1.001716    1.245617 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -1041.55   823.2802    -1.27   0.206     -2655.15    572.0491 
   lntertedu |  -1349.383   1051.208    -1.28   0.199    -3409.712    710.9461 
lnmanvacancy |   710.7931   764.0726     0.93   0.352    -786.7618    2208.348 
      lnwage |  -1244.385   711.7049    -1.75   0.080    -2639.301    150.5304 
       lngdp |   608.5713    546.446     1.11   0.265    -462.4432    1679.586 
lntransition |   4894.127   8667.262     0.56   0.572    -12093.39    21881.65 
 lntradefree |     1969.3   2982.297     0.66   0.509    -3875.894    7814.495 
  lneconfree |  -1334.806   3648.063    -0.37   0.714    -8484.878    5815.267 
  lnictinfra |   1516.244   1533.711     0.99   0.323    -1489.774    4522.262 
manprivati~n |   815.1173   490.8693     1.66   0.097     -146.969    1777.204 
       d2005 |  -17218.18   17684.34    -0.97   0.330    -51878.84    17442.48 
       d2004 |  -16132.48   17762.84    -0.91   0.364       -50947    18682.04 
       d2003 |  -16342.54   17754.02    -0.92   0.357    -51139.77     18454.7 
       d2002 |  -17378.44   17721.23    -0.98   0.327    -52111.43    17354.54 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnmanvacancy lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
    lneconfree lnictinfra manprivatisation d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/.).L.manfdistock 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnmanvacancy lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
    lneconfree lnictinfra manprivatisation d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.manfdistock 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.63  Pr > z =  0.103 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.62  Pr > z =  0.105 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(27)   =  42.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.027 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Sargan tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(23)   =  41.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.011 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.70  Prob > chi2 =  0.790 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lnmanvacancy lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnictinfra manprivatisation  
> d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002) 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =  14.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.309 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  27.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.015 
  
 
note: d2002 dropped because of collinearity 
      in the LSDV regression 
note: Bias correction up to order O(1/T) 
 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnmanvacancy lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
    lneconfree lnictinfra manprivatisation d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002) 
    L(1/.).L.manfdistock 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnmanvacancy lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
    lneconfree lnictinfra manprivatisation d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 
    D.L.manfdistock 
  GMM instruments for levels 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lnmanvacancy lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
lnictinfra manprivatisation  
> d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002) 
LSDVC dynamic regression 
(bootstrapped SE) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 manfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 manfdistock | 
         L1. |    1.20136   .1448339     8.29   0.000     .9174913     1.48523 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   32802.57   32123.64     1.02   0.307    -30158.61    95763.74 
   lntertedu |  -6925.728   16240.79    -0.43   0.670     -38757.1    24905.64 
lnmanvacancy |   5870.575   3191.668     1.84   0.066    -384.9786    12126.13 
      lnwage |  -1879.595   21845.65    -0.09   0.931    -44696.28     40937.1 
       lngdp |  -5682.114   20281.17    -0.28   0.779    -45432.47    34068.24 
lntransition |  -67394.92   40335.44    -1.67   0.095    -146450.9    11661.08 
 lntradefree |   3942.533   4907.706     0.80   0.422    -5676.394    13561.46 
  lneconfree |  -11957.93   12904.55    -0.93   0.354    -37250.37    13334.52 
  lnictinfra |   6223.325   6382.685     0.98   0.330    -6286.507    18733.16 
manprivati~n |   423.7125   872.1456     0.49   0.627    -1285.661    2133.086 
       d2005 |   2715.529   5036.157     0.54   0.590    -7155.158    12586.22 
       d2004 |   3492.799   3906.217     0.89   0.371    -4163.246    11148.84 
       d2003 |   1981.686   2441.031     0.81   0.417    -2802.646    6766.018 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
.  
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. **Testing down Model (6.1)to reduce the instrument count 
. **Initial full Model  
. xtlsdvc manfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree 
lneconfree lnictinfra manprivatisat 
> ion instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 
d1997 d1996 d1995, initial(bb) 
>  vcov(100) first 
note: variable instability is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: d1995 dropped because of collinearity 
Note: Bias correction initialized by Blundell and Bond estimator 
 
Note: Blundell and Bond estimator is implemented through 
      the user-written Stata command -xtabond2- by David Roodman, 
      Center for Global Development, Washington, DC droodman@cgdev.org 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: countryid                       Number of obs      =       123 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        12 
Number of instruments = 111                     Obs per group: min =         5 
Wald chi2(23) =   9866.80                                      avg =     10.25 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 manfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 manfdistock | 
         L1. |     1.0726   .0261763    40.98   0.000     1.021295    1.123904 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -340.3054   618.3513    -0.55   0.582    -1552.252    871.6408 
   lntertedu |  -1300.381   656.8293    -1.98   0.048    -2587.742   -13.01892 
      lnwage |  -1283.133   516.4708    -2.48   0.013    -2295.397   -270.8687 
       lngdp |   691.7068    312.126     2.22   0.027     79.95112    1303.463 
lntransition |    5686.72    5120.33     1.11   0.267    -4348.943    15722.38 
 lntradefree |   1352.337   1732.993     0.78   0.435    -2044.267    4748.941 
  lneconfree |  -191.0656   2032.056    -0.09   0.925    -4173.822    3791.691 
  lnictinfra |    1392.16    971.352     1.43   0.152    -511.6546    3295.975 
manprivati~n |   1051.042   401.2772     2.62   0.009     264.5531    1837.531 
       d2008 |  -25047.28   11848.44    -2.11   0.035    -48269.79   -1824.756 
       d2007 |  -21641.46   11831.68    -1.83   0.067    -44831.13    1548.209 
       d2006 |  -23297.53   11745.48    -1.98   0.047    -46318.26    -276.811 
       d2005 |  -22839.36   11679.05    -1.96   0.051    -45729.87    51.16094 
       d2004 |  -22013.19   11629.25    -1.89   0.058    -44806.11    779.7247 
       d2003 |  -22247.25   11619.41    -1.91   0.056    -45020.89    526.3767 
       d2002 |  -23202.36   11608.43    -2.00   0.046    -45954.46   -450.2528 
       d2001 |   -22943.6    11616.4    -1.98   0.048    -45711.32   -175.8761 
       d2000 |  -23001.52   11540.42    -1.99   0.046    -45620.34   -382.7105 
       d1999 |  -22333.99   11590.56    -1.93   0.054    -45051.07     383.102 
       d1998 |  -21692.46   11644.12    -1.86   0.062    -44514.52    1129.605 
       d1997 |     -21647    11475.3    -1.89   0.059    -44138.17    844.1746 
       d1996 |  -20877.25   11221.91    -1.86   0.063    -42871.78    1117.284 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 
    d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/.).L.manfdistock 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 
    d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.manfdistock 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.46  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.72  Pr > z =  0.085 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(88)   = 113.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.034 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Sargan tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
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  GMM instruments for levels 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(76)   = 110.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.006 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =   3.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.995 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnictinfra 
manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d 
> 2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(66)   =  99.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.005 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(22)   =  13.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.904 
  
 
note: d2008 dropped because of collinearity 
      in the LSDV regression 
note: Bias correction up to order O(1/T) 
 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 
    d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
    L(1/.).L.manfdistock 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree 
    lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 
    d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
    D.L.manfdistock 
  GMM instruments for levels 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntransition lntradefree lneconfree lnictinfra 
manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d 
> 2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
LSDVC dynamic regression 
(bootstrapped SE) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 manfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 manfdistock | 
         L1. |   1.109882   .0323443    34.31   0.000     1.046488    1.173275 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -1594.429   7601.586    -0.21   0.834    -16493.26    13304.41 
   lntertedu |  -3574.935   2455.596    -1.46   0.145    -8387.814    1237.944 
      lnwage |  -1429.649   3519.215    -0.41   0.685    -8327.184    5467.885 
       lngdp |   813.2126   3416.311     0.24   0.812    -5882.635     7509.06 
lntransition |   7920.074   12549.35     0.63   0.528    -16676.21    32516.36 
 lntradefree |  -86.76408   2289.004    -0.04   0.970    -4573.129    4399.601 
  lneconfree |  -2989.151   4433.338    -0.67   0.500    -11678.33    5700.032 
  lnictinfra |   2322.138   1712.925     1.36   0.175    -1035.132    5679.409 
manprivati~n |   1063.526   508.2505     2.09   0.036     67.37326    2059.679 
       d2007 |   3547.624   770.1055     4.61   0.000     2038.245    5057.003 
       d2006 |   1887.352   1230.582     1.53   0.125    -524.5442    4299.248 
       d2005 |   2321.564    1450.08     1.60   0.109    -520.5407    5163.669 
       d2004 |   3224.769   1892.483     1.70   0.088    -484.4285    6933.967 
       d2003 |   3149.485   2072.877     1.52   0.129    -913.2784    7212.248 
       d2002 |   2278.702   2674.508     0.85   0.394    -2963.237    7520.642 
       d2001 |   2616.286   3040.977     0.86   0.390     -3343.92    8576.491 
       d2000 |    2479.81   3416.885     0.73   0.468    -4217.161    9176.781 
       d1999 |   3371.186   3599.064     0.94   0.349    -3682.851    10425.22 
       d1998 |   4194.479   3867.205     1.08   0.278    -3385.103    11774.06 
       d1997 |   4049.657   4263.892     0.95   0.342    -4307.418    12406.73 
       d1996 |   4040.653   4500.675     0.90   0.369    -4780.509    12861.81 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test lntradefree=lnwage 
 
 ( 1)  - lnwage + lntradefree = 0 
 
           chi2(  1) =    0.14 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.7080 
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. **lntradefree & lnwage dropped 
. xtlsdvc manfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lneconfree lnictinfra 
manprivatisation instability d20 
> 08 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, 
initial(bb) vcov(100) first 
note: variable instability is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: d1995 dropped because of collinearity 
Note: Bias correction initialized by Blundell and Bond estimator 
 
Note: Blundell and Bond estimator is implemented through 
      the user-written Stata command -xtabond2- by David Roodman, 
      Center for Global Development, Washington, DC droodman@cgdev.org 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: countryid                       Number of obs      =       123 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        12 
Number of instruments = 109                     Obs per group: min =         5 
Wald chi2(21) =   9683.23                                      avg =     10.25 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 manfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 manfdistock | 
         L1. |   1.078477   .0262135    41.14   0.000       1.0271    1.129855 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   453.8763   527.1814     0.86   0.389    -579.3803    1487.133 
   lntertedu |  -463.7821    568.805    -0.82   0.415    -1578.619    651.0553 
       lngdp |   730.4102    311.379     2.35   0.019     120.1187    1340.702 
lntransition |   1033.303   4642.291     0.22   0.824    -8065.419    10132.03 
  lneconfree |   89.87123   2043.452     0.04   0.965     -3915.22    4094.963 
  lnictinfra |  -252.3672   715.9008    -0.35   0.724    -1655.507    1150.773 
manprivati~n |   1055.678   400.6972     2.63   0.008     270.3263     1841.03 
       d2008 |  -20450.76   10261.33    -1.99   0.046    -40562.59   -338.9233 
       d2007 |  -17002.97   10242.76    -1.66   0.097    -37078.41    3072.461 
       d2006 |  -18623.74   10214.39    -1.82   0.068    -38643.57    1396.099 
       d2005 |  -18233.52   10151.93    -1.80   0.072    -38130.94    1663.904 
       d2004 |  -17585.72   10172.57    -1.73   0.084    -37523.59    2352.152 
       d2003 |  -17841.27   10139.17    -1.76   0.078    -37713.67    2031.137 
       d2002 |  -18655.09   10081.78    -1.85   0.064    -38415.02    1104.844 
       d2001 |  -18501.87    10083.4    -1.83   0.067    -38264.96    1261.225 
       d2000 |  -18845.12   10021.38    -1.88   0.060    -38486.67    796.4189 
       d1999 |  -18708.81   10103.63    -1.85   0.064    -38511.57    1093.947 
       d1998 |  -18387.52   10135.48    -1.81   0.070     -38252.7    1477.651 
       d1997 |  -18778.31   10061.98    -1.87   0.062    -38499.43    942.8156 
       d1996 |  -18193.15   9831.386    -1.85   0.064    -37462.32     1076.01 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lneconfree lnictinfra 
    manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 
    d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/.).L.manfdistock 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lneconfree lnictinfra 
    manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 
    d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.manfdistock 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.65  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.74  Pr > z =  0.082 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(88)   = 117.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.019 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Sargan tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(76)   = 113.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.004 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =   4.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.977 
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  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lneconfree lnictinfra manprivatisation 
d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2 
> 003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(68)   = 106.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(20)   =  11.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.946 
  
 
note: d2008 dropped because of collinearity 
      in the LSDV regression 
note: Bias correction up to order O(1/T) 
 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lneconfree lnictinfra 
    manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 
    d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
    L(1/.).L.manfdistock 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lneconfree lnictinfra 
    manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 
    d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
    D.L.manfdistock 
  GMM instruments for levels 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lntransition lneconfree lnictinfra manprivatisation 
d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d2004 d2 
> 003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
LSDVC dynamic regression 
(bootstrapped SE) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 manfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 manfdistock | 
         L1. |   1.109596   .0319144    34.77   0.000     1.047045    1.172147 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -1664.669   7488.975    -0.22   0.824    -16342.79    13013.45 
   lntertedu |   -3377.63   2364.661    -1.43   0.153    -8012.281    1257.021 
       lngdp |  -152.6028    2072.84    -0.07   0.941    -4215.294    3910.088 
lntransition |   9594.075   10908.45     0.88   0.379     -11786.1    30974.25 
  lneconfree |  -3203.673   4433.677    -0.72   0.470    -11893.52    5486.173 
  lnictinfra |   2078.302    1624.33     1.28   0.201    -1105.326    5261.929 
manprivati~n |    1074.64   503.5038     2.13   0.033     87.79097     2061.49 
       d2007 |   3653.279   745.3131     4.90   0.000     2192.492    5114.066 
       d2006 |   2102.954    1171.01     1.80   0.073    -192.1826    4398.091 
       d2005 |    2569.91   1376.149     1.87   0.062    -127.2934    5267.113 
       d2004 |   3502.326   1807.185     1.94   0.053    -39.69133    7044.343 
       d2003 |   3454.557   2000.264     1.73   0.084    -465.8889    7375.003 
       d2002 |   2663.975   2601.781     1.02   0.306    -2435.422    7763.373 
       d2001 |   3057.517   2970.441     1.03   0.303    -2764.441    8879.474 
       d2000 |   2939.487   3355.627     0.88   0.381    -3637.421    9516.396 
       d1999 |   3762.966    3601.28     1.04   0.296    -3295.414    10821.35 
       d1998 |   4652.535   3790.458     1.23   0.220    -2776.626     12081.7 
       d1997 |   4585.972   4092.148     1.12   0.262    -3434.491    12606.44 
       d1996 |   4682.647   4207.508     1.11   0.266    -3563.917    12929.21 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. test lntransition=lneconfree=0 
 
 ( 1)  lntransition - lneconfree = 0 
 ( 2)  lntransition = 0 
 
           chi2(  2) =    0.86 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.6490 
 
.  
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. **lntransition & lneconfree dropped 
. xtlsdvc manfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lnictinfra manprivatisation 
instability d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 d20 
> 04 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 d1995, initial(bb) vcov(100) 
first 
note: variable instability is time-invariant over the 
      estimation sample and has been discarded 
note: d1995 dropped because of collinearity 
Note: Bias correction initialized by Blundell and Bond estimator 
 
Note: Blundell and Bond estimator is implemented through 
      the user-written Stata command -xtabond2- by David Roodman, 
      Center for Global Development, Washington, DC droodman@cgdev.org 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: countryid                       Number of obs      =       123 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        12 
Number of instruments = 107                     Obs per group: min =         5 
Wald chi2(19) =   9688.47                                      avg =     10.25 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 manfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 manfdistock | 
         L1. |   1.078748   .0261542    41.25   0.000     1.027487     1.13001 
             | 
    lnsecedu |    510.602   471.3558     1.08   0.279    -413.2383    1434.442 
   lntertedu |  -361.7917   429.7157    -0.84   0.400    -1204.019    480.4356 
       lngdp |   775.4905   238.9738     3.25   0.001     307.1105     1243.87 
  lnictinfra |    -197.26   641.9894    -0.31   0.759    -1455.536    1061.016 
manprivati~n |   1070.962   401.8862     2.66   0.008     283.2792    1858.644 
       d2008 |  -20595.35   6223.301    -3.31   0.001    -32792.79   -8397.902 
       d2007 |   -17141.4   6247.456    -2.74   0.006    -29386.19   -4896.615 
       d2006 |  -18745.82   6216.559    -3.02   0.003    -30930.06   -6561.593 
       d2005 |  -18346.49   6204.613    -2.96   0.003    -30507.31   -6185.669 
       d2004 |  -17699.98   6211.021    -2.85   0.004    -29873.36     -5526.6 
       d2003 |  -17941.32   6174.393    -2.91   0.004    -30042.91   -5839.734 
       d2002 |  -18743.82   6124.903    -3.06   0.002    -30748.41   -6739.231 
       d2001 |  -18587.01    6135.62    -3.03   0.002     -30612.6   -6561.415 
       d2000 |  -18933.28   6121.088    -3.09   0.002    -30930.39   -6936.166 
       d1999 |  -18793.62    6145.96    -3.06   0.002    -30839.48   -6747.759 
       d1998 |  -18479.31   6134.312    -3.01   0.003    -30502.34   -6456.275 
       d1997 |  -18874.02   6120.981    -3.08   0.002    -30870.92   -6877.114 
       d1996 |  -18325.85     6019.1    -3.04   0.002    -30123.07   -6528.625 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 
    d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/.).L.manfdistock 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 
    d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.manfdistock 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -5.02  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.64  Pr > z =  0.101 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(88)   = 117.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.020 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Sargan tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(76)   = 112.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.004 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =   4.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.968 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 
d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1 
> 999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
    Sargan test excluding group:     chi2(70)   = 108.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =   9.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.959 
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note: d2008 dropped because of collinearity 
      in the LSDV regression 
note: Bias correction up to order O(1/T) 
 
    D.(lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 
    d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
    L(1/.).L.manfdistock 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 
    d2005 d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1999 d1998 d1997 d1996 
    D.L.manfdistock 
  GMM instruments for levels 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lngdp lnictinfra manprivatisation d2008 d2007 d2006 d2005 
d2004 d2003 d2002 d2001 d2000 d1 
> 999 d1998 d1997 d1996) 
LSDVC dynamic regression 
(bootstrapped SE) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 manfdistock |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 manfdistock | 
         L1. |   1.115415   .0286414    38.94   0.000     1.059279    1.171551 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   497.0232   6624.399     0.08   0.940    -12486.56    13480.61 
   lntertedu |  -3585.485   2385.215    -1.50   0.133    -8260.422    1089.451 
       lngdp |   168.8159   1777.261     0.09   0.924    -3314.552    3652.184 
  lnictinfra |   2243.391   1582.473     1.42   0.156    -858.1999    5344.982 
manprivati~n |   1103.146   495.3471     2.23   0.026      132.284    2074.009 
       d2007 |   3744.107   754.0481     4.97   0.000       2266.2    5222.015 
       d2006 |   2235.989   1105.156     2.02   0.043     69.92333    4402.055 
       d2005 |   2811.592   1314.114     2.14   0.032     235.9761    5387.207 
       d2004 |   3706.883   1730.324     2.14   0.032     315.5104    7098.256 
       d2003 |   3678.514   1852.524     1.99   0.047      47.6335    7309.394 
       d2002 |    2971.32   2430.712     1.22   0.222    -1792.787    7735.427 
       d2001 |   3334.252   2751.173     1.21   0.226    -2057.949    8726.452 
       d2000 |   3331.485   3172.755     1.05   0.294    -2886.999     9549.97 
       d1999 |   3999.806   3373.288     1.19   0.236    -2611.717    10611.33 
       d1998 |   4767.836   3561.059     1.34   0.181    -2211.711    11747.38 
       d1997 |       4675   3876.807     1.21   0.228    -2923.403     12273.4 
       d1996 |   5106.965    4090.08     1.25   0.212    -2909.444    13123.37 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.3: Technological intensity classification  
 
NACE Rev 1.1 code and economic activity 
Original 
OECD 
classification 
Technology 
dummy 
variables 
DA Food products, beverages and tobacco L Low 
DB/DC Textiles/leather and textile/leather products L Low 
DD/DE 
Wood and wood products; pulp, paper and paper 
products; publishing and printing 
L Low 
DF Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel M-L Medium 
DG* 
Chemicals, chemical products and man-made 
fibers M-H High 
DH Rubber and plastic products M-L Medium 
DI (Other) non-metallic mineral products M-L Medium 
DJ Basic metals and fabricated metal products M-L Medium 
DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. M-H High 
DL** Electrical and optical equipment H High 
DM Transport equipment M-H High 
D* Furniture; n.e.c.; recycling L Low 
Source: OECD (2011) 
 *All sub-groups except for one are classified as 'medium-high' in the original classification 
**Three out of four sub-groups are classified as 'high' in the original classification 
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Appendix 6.4: Unit root tests and initial specification tests  
***Fisher unit root tests, using demean option to account for cross-sectional 
dependence 
 
. xtunitroot fisher lnindfdistock, pp lag(1) demean 
could not compute test for panel 16 
could not compute test for panel 80 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for lnindfdistock 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
-------------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =    154 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  10.45 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(304)  P       469.2289       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z        -2.9576       0.0016 
 Inverse logit t(709)      L*       -4.0156       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        6.7009       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher  lntransition, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for lntransition 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
------------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =    182 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  13.79 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(364)  P      1280.3454       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z       -20.7716       0.0000 
 Inverse logit t(914)      L*      -24.6875       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       33.9620       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher  lntradefree, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for lntradefree 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
------------------------------------------ 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =    182 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  13.00 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(364)  P       662.7768       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z        -9.7649       0.0000 
 Inverse logit t(914)      L*       -9.8332       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       11.0734       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
427 
 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher  lneconfree, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for lneconfree 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
----------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =    182 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  13.00 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(364)  P      1231.2940       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z       -12.8428       0.0000 
 Inverse logit t(914)      L*      -20.5767       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       32.1441       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher  lnictinfra, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for lnictinfra 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
----------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels  =    182 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Number of periods =     14 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(364)  P       232.2167       1.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z         8.3788       1.0000 
 Inverse logit t(914)      L*        8.6198       1.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       -4.8842       1.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher  lnsecedu, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for lnsecedu 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
--------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels  =     12 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Number of periods =     14 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(24)   P        54.0188       0.0004 
 Inverse normal            Z        -2.6761       0.0037 
 Inverse logit t(54)       L*       -3.4712       0.0005 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        4.3328       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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. xtunitroot fisher  lngdp, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for lngdp 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
------------------------------------ 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels  =     14 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Number of periods =     14 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(28)   P       106.7239       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z        -2.1162       0.0172 
 Inverse logit t(74)       L*       -5.5884       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       10.5199       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
. xtunitroot fisher  lntertedu, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for lntertedu 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
---------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels  =    156 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Number of periods =     14 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(312)  P       257.3760       0.9893 
 Inverse normal            Z         6.6218       1.0000 
 Inverse logit t(654)      L*        7.5725       1.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       -2.1867       0.9856 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher  lnedutransition2, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for lnedutransition2 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
----------------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =    156 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =   8.92 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(312)  P      2298.1686       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z       -18.8831       0.0000 
 Inverse logit t(784)      L*      -42.5685       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       79.5104       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. xtunitroot fisher  lnwage, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for lnwage 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =    182 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  13.43 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(364)  P       727.1602       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z        -2.4153       0.0079 
 Inverse logit t(914)      L*       -5.9800       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       13.4596       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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**initial specification 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock) 
iv(lnsecedu lntertedu  lnwage lngdp   
>    lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-
c14 s2-s13) two robust small o 
> rthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 134                     Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     67.62                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2978747   .1451054     2.05   0.042     .0107801    .5849692 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.7572554   1.126232    -0.67   0.503    -2.985534    1.471023 
   lntertedu |  -.3391896   1.069308    -0.32   0.752    -2.454842    1.776462 
      lnwage |  -.5601606   .5341135    -1.05   0.296    -1.616917    .4965961 
       lngdp |   .5910103   .6396796     0.92   0.357    -.6746115    1.856632 
 lntradefree |  -.1064939   .2762006    -0.39   0.700    -.6529637    .4399758 
  lneconfree |   1.182877   .7703745     1.54   0.127    -.3413275    2.707082 
lntransition |    2.08377   1.370431     1.52   0.131    -.6276612    4.795202 
  lnictinfra |   .3746656   .3347958     1.12   0.265    -.2877362    1.037067 
indprivati~n |   1.470644   .8406541     1.75   0.083    -.1926106    3.133899 
       d1996 |  -.8238078   .9906252    -0.83   0.407    -2.783784    1.136168 
       d1997 |  -.7123139   .9452012    -0.75   0.452    -2.582418     1.15779 
       d1998 |  -.6416653   .8744837    -0.73   0.464    -2.371853    1.088522 
       d1999 |  -.5669629   .7863053    -0.72   0.472    -2.122687    .9887614 
       d2000 |  -.9257001   .5840057    -1.59   0.115     -2.08117    .2297696 
       d2001 |   -.681652   .5886138    -1.16   0.249    -1.846239    .4829349 
       d2002 |   -.549423   .5465017    -1.01   0.317     -1.63069     .531844 
       d2003 |  -.4686766   .5202426    -0.90   0.369    -1.497989     .560636 
       d2004 |  -.2185787   .3180992    -0.69   0.493    -.8479458    .4107884 
       d2005 |  -.1601537   .2349323    -0.68   0.497     -.624973    .3046657 
       d2006 |  -.2169285   .1548289    -1.40   0.164    -.5232613    .0894042 
       d2007 |  -.1622286   .2340824    -0.69   0.490    -.6253663    .3009091 
          c4 |   1.857914   1.019322     1.82   0.071    -.1588397    3.874668 
          c5 |   2.510407    1.97487     1.27   0.206    -1.396921    6.417735 
          c6 |   1.836361     1.6223     1.13   0.260    -1.373399    5.046121 
          c7 |   2.515459   2.237896     1.12   0.263    -1.912274    6.943192 
          c8 |   1.084082   1.116441     0.97   0.333    -1.124823    3.292987 
          c9 |   1.744383   1.618597     1.08   0.283    -1.458051    4.946816 
         c11 |    1.53665   2.702688     0.57   0.571    -3.810684    6.883984 
         c12 |   2.138795   1.991041     1.07   0.285    -1.800529    6.078118 
         c13 |   1.864911   1.382707     1.35   0.180    -.8708092     4.60063 
         c14 |   1.979948   1.218421     1.63   0.107    -.4307289    4.390624 
          s2 |  -.9736692   .3596255    -2.71   0.008    -1.685197   -.2621414 
          s3 |  -2.878196   .7822486    -3.68   0.000    -4.425894   -1.330498 
          s4 |  -.3385739   .3330705    -1.02   0.311     -.997562    .3204141 
          s5 |  -2.140208   .6554023    -3.27   0.001    -3.436937   -.8434781 
          s6 |  -.2407095   .2534548    -0.95   0.344     -.742176    .2607571 
          s7 |  -.8328143   .3243414    -2.57   0.011    -1.474532   -.1910969 
          s8 |  -.2402478   .2611621    -0.92   0.359    -.7569636    .2764679 
          s9 |  -.3602723   .2929357    -1.23   0.221    -.9398527    .2193082 
         s10 |  -.9522802   .3378148    -2.82   0.006    -1.620655   -.2839054 
         s11 |  -.3553612   .2779339    -1.28   0.203    -.9052602    .1945378 
         s12 |  -.3956231   .3578738    -1.11   0.271    -1.103685    .3124389 
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         s13 |  -1.660634   .4666511    -3.56   0.001    -2.583915   -.7373533 
       _cons |  -13.17014   12.66758    -1.04   0.300    -38.23326    11.89298 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/.).L.lnindfdistock 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.72  Pr > z =  0.085 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.06  Pr > z =  0.287 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(89)   = 235.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(89)   = 106.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.100 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(77)   =  98.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.052 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =   8.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.765 
  iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d 
> 1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 
c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2  
> s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(46)   =  79.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(43)   =  26.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.973 
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. *fails instrument validity tests  
. **collapsing instruments 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
collapse) iv(lnsecedu lntertedu  lnwa 
> ge lngdp     lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-
d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13) two robu 
> st small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 57                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =    107.63                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2500422    .188926     1.32   0.188    -.1237525    .6238369 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.5773644   1.066541    -0.54   0.589    -2.687542    1.532813 
   lntertedu |  -1.112778   .7320694    -1.52   0.131    -2.561195    .3356388 
      lnwage |  -.2794698   .5274014    -0.53   0.597    -1.322946    .7640068 
       lngdp |   .3561638    .711584     0.50   0.618    -1.051723     1.76405 
 lntradefree |   .0154571   .2243494     0.07   0.945    -.4284237    .4593379 
  lneconfree |   1.158458   .5886368     1.97   0.051    -.0061743     2.32309 
lntransition |   1.869017   1.266205     1.48   0.142    -.6362018    4.374235 
  lnictinfra |   .2367734   .2054149     1.15   0.251     -.169645    .6431918 
indprivati~n |   .8135382   .6201818     1.31   0.192    -.4135067    2.040583 
       d1996 |  -1.372023   .8596409    -1.60   0.113    -3.072844    .3287973 
       d1997 |  -1.225842   .8639593    -1.42   0.158    -2.935207    .4835226 
       d1998 |   -1.13865    .791561    -1.44   0.153    -2.704773    .4274724 
       d1999 |  -.9051986   .7522497    -1.20   0.231    -2.393543    .5831459 
       d2000 |  -.9981159   .7077054    -1.41   0.161    -2.398328    .4020966 
       d2001 |  -.8451333   .6221579    -1.36   0.177    -2.076088    .3858213 
       d2002 |   -.782863   .5661996    -1.38   0.169    -1.903103    .3373768 
       d2003 |  -.5407693    .522688    -1.03   0.303     -1.57492    .4933817 
       d2004 |  -.3207463   .3707723    -0.87   0.389    -1.054328    .4128358 
       d2005 |  -.2370668   .2601797    -0.91   0.364    -.7518387    .2777052 
       d2006 |  -.2179109   .2085666    -1.04   0.298    -.6305651    .1947432 
       d2007 |  -.0771359   .1433772    -0.54   0.592    -.3608111    .2065393 
          c4 |   2.140484   1.154837     1.85   0.066    -.1443907    4.425358 
          c5 |   3.435726   2.099101     1.64   0.104    -.7173964    7.588849 
          c6 |   2.848118   1.168679     2.44   0.016     .5358583    5.160378 
          c7 |   3.902396   2.309029     1.69   0.093    -.6660739    8.470866 
          c8 |   1.937948   .9760687     1.99   0.049     .0067716    3.869123 
          c9 |   2.677491    1.40508     1.91   0.059    -.1024942    5.457477 
         c11 |   3.091655   3.101057     1.00   0.321    -3.043861    9.227172 
         c12 |   3.184441   2.330199     1.37   0.174    -1.425915    7.794798 
         c13 |   2.747404    1.56396     1.76   0.081    -.3469301    5.841738 
         c14 |   2.714441   1.423317     1.91   0.059    -.1016261    5.530508 
          s2 |  -1.236095   .4680308    -2.64   0.009    -2.162106   -.3100852 
          s3 |  -3.151883   1.072035    -2.94   0.004    -5.272931   -1.030835 
          s4 |  -.3412179   .3007158    -1.13   0.259    -.9361916    .2537558 
          s5 |  -2.656843   .9330251    -2.85   0.005    -4.502856   -.8108297 
          s6 |  -.3073535   .2946886    -1.04   0.299    -.8904021    .2756951 
          s7 |  -.9873224   .3897406    -2.53   0.012    -1.758434    -.216211 
          s8 |  -.3394888   .2716105    -1.25   0.214    -.8768769    .1978993 
          s9 |  -.5655168   .3051004    -1.85   0.066    -1.169165    .0381318 
         s10 |  -1.089904   .4213304    -2.59   0.011    -1.923516   -.2562911 
         s11 |  -.6444302   .3331455    -1.93   0.055    -1.303567    .0147064 
         s12 |  -.5115812   .3096923    -1.65   0.101    -1.124315    .1011525 
         s13 |   -1.76802   .6385367    -2.77   0.006    -3.031381   -.5046598 
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       _cons |  -8.303172   13.52679    -0.61   0.540    -35.06625    18.45991 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/.).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.65  Pr > z =  0.099 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.10  Pr > z =  0.270 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =  12.50  Prob > chi2 =  0.407 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(12)   =  17.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.149 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(11)   =  16.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.122 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.501 
 
. *fails instrument validity tests  
.  
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. **limiting lags 
. **laglimit 1 7 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 7) collapse) iv(lnsecedu l 
> ntertedu  lnwage lngdp     lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2 
> -s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 52                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     89.92                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2309852   .1807398     1.28   0.204    -.1266129    .5885833 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -1.088259   .9304486    -1.17   0.244    -2.929175    .7526559 
   lntertedu |    -1.3572   .7063731    -1.92   0.057    -2.754776    .0403768 
      lnwage |  -.2652029   .5010582    -0.53   0.598    -1.256559     .726153 
       lngdp |   .2367891   .6401898     0.37   0.712    -1.029842     1.50342 
 lntradefree |   .0171587    .240038     0.07   0.943    -.4577623    .4920797 
  lneconfree |   1.470017    .551895     2.66   0.009     .3780795    2.561955 
lntransition |   2.229198    1.36254     1.64   0.104    -.4666202    4.925016 
  lnictinfra |   .2205244    .201947     1.09   0.277    -.1790328    .6200815 
indprivati~n |   .8209957   .6493979     1.26   0.208     -.463854    2.105845 
       d1996 |  -1.525234   .7887951    -1.93   0.055    -3.085884    .0354165 
       d1997 |  -1.414453   .7846816    -1.80   0.074    -2.966965    .1380588 
       d1998 |  -1.362243   .7296521    -1.87   0.064    -2.805878    .0813911 
       d1999 |  -1.144813   .6926467    -1.65   0.101    -2.515231    .2256056 
       d2000 |  -1.245283   .6243748    -1.99   0.048    -2.480624   -.0099424 
       d2001 |  -1.069569   .5800807    -1.84   0.068    -2.217273    .0781346 
       d2002 |  -.9566041   .5219732    -1.83   0.069    -1.989341    .0761327 
       d2003 |  -.6644162   .4650337    -1.43   0.155    -1.584497    .2556644 
       d2004 |  -.4450536   .3278205    -1.36   0.177    -1.093655    .2035474 
       d2005 |  -.3181526   .2339901    -1.36   0.176    -.7811078    .1448025 
       d2006 |  -.2931066   .1851431    -1.58   0.116    -.6594168    .0732035 
       d2007 |  -.1164891   .1567937    -0.74   0.459    -.4267092     .193731 
          c4 |   2.408179   1.015014     2.37   0.019     .3999493    4.416409 
          c5 |   4.201327   2.006357     2.09   0.038     .2316993    8.170954 
          c6 |   3.494356   1.231289     2.84   0.005     1.058221    5.930492 
          c7 |   4.745473    2.13597     2.22   0.028     .5194036    8.971543 
          c8 |    2.38102   .9930784     2.40   0.018     .4161906     4.34585 
          c9 |    3.33119   1.401998     2.38   0.019     .5573017    6.105078 
         c11 |   3.417969   2.582476     1.32   0.188    -1.691523    8.527461 
         c12 |   3.817644   2.124046     1.80   0.075    -.3848331    8.020122 
         c13 |   3.181473   1.384366     2.30   0.023     .4424711    5.920475 
         c14 |    2.92619   1.224713     2.39   0.018     .5030659    5.349314 
          s2 |   -1.15711   .4619907    -2.50   0.014     -2.07117   -.2430505 
          s3 |  -3.202046   .9767917    -3.28   0.001    -5.134652    -1.26944 
          s4 |  -.3004116   .2995535    -1.00   0.318    -.8930856    .2922623 
          s5 |  -2.459125   .9146748    -2.69   0.008    -4.268832   -.6494185 
          s6 |  -.2507455   .2849278    -0.88   0.380    -.8144821     .312991 
          s7 |  -.9653842    .383586    -2.52   0.013    -1.724318   -.2064499 
          s8 |  -.3150256   .2849359    -1.11   0.271    -.8787782     .248727 
          s9 |  -.4884267   .3296375    -1.48   0.141    -1.140623    .1637693 
         s10 |  -1.044445   .4042178    -2.58   0.011    -1.844199   -.2446897 
         s11 |  -.5560698   .3374256    -1.65   0.102    -1.223675    .1115349 
         s12 |  -.4151755   .3513518    -1.18   0.240    -1.110334    .2799827 
         s13 |  -1.840366   .6237273    -2.95   0.004    -3.074425    -.606306 
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       _cons |  -5.030602   12.56883    -0.40   0.690    -29.89835    19.83714 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/7).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.66  Pr > z =  0.096 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.14  Pr > z =  0.254 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(7)    =  11.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.120 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(7)    =  10.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.187 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   9.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.165 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.351 
 
. **fails instrument validity tests  
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. *laglimit 1 6 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 6) collapse) iv(lnsecedu l 
> ntertedu  lnwage lngdp     lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2 
> -s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 51                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     86.18                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2390337   .1966717     1.22   0.226    -.1500861    .6281536 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -1.28277   .9623953    -1.33   0.185    -3.186893    .6213528 
   lntertedu |  -1.434477   .6839355    -2.10   0.038    -2.787661   -.0812943 
      lnwage |  -.4273924   .4874329    -0.88   0.382     -1.39179    .5370055 
       lngdp |   .4154806   .6051685     0.69   0.494    -.7818601    1.612821 
 lntradefree |   .0239786   .2398197     0.10   0.921    -.4505105    .4984676 
  lneconfree |    1.60263    .542653     2.95   0.004     .5289778    2.676282 
lntransition |   1.993196   1.355238     1.47   0.144    -.6881763    4.674569 
  lnictinfra |   .1798124   .1999585     0.90   0.370    -.2158105    .5754353 
indprivati~n |   .6724807   .5845294     1.15   0.252     -.484025    1.828986 
       d1996 |  -1.615774   .7630455    -2.12   0.036    -3.125478   -.1060701 
       d1997 |  -1.529522   .7617723    -2.01   0.047    -3.036707   -.0223372 
       d1998 |  -1.461658   .7117659    -2.05   0.042    -2.869904   -.0534115 
       d1999 |   -1.23225     .67475    -1.83   0.070    -2.567259    .1027593 
       d2000 |  -1.258025    .609739    -2.06   0.041    -2.464408   -.0516413 
       d2001 |  -1.146693   .5631636    -2.04   0.044    -2.260926   -.0324604 
       d2002 |   -1.01776   .5023007    -2.03   0.045    -2.011574   -.0239457 
       d2003 |  -.6866092   .4475565    -1.53   0.127    -1.572111    .1988922 
       d2004 |  -.4824349   .3122022    -1.55   0.125    -1.100135    .1352648 
       d2005 |  -.3558089   .2203166    -1.61   0.109    -.7917106    .0800929 
       d2006 |   -.325524   .1754884    -1.85   0.066    -.6727321    .0216841 
       d2007 |    -.15096   .1604419    -0.94   0.349    -.4683984    .1664783 
          c4 |   2.403135   .9931236     2.42   0.017      .438216    4.368055 
          c5 |   4.147065   1.941143     2.14   0.035      .306465    7.987665 
          c6 |   3.869094   1.280763     3.02   0.003     1.335074    6.403114 
          c7 |   4.741191   2.058617     2.30   0.023     .6681665    8.814216 
          c8 |   2.568419   .9942508     2.58   0.011     .6012692    4.535568 
          c9 |   3.515857   1.388282     2.53   0.013     .7691064    6.262608 
         c11 |   2.996037    2.42457     1.24   0.219    -1.801035    7.793108 
         c12 |   3.551355   2.029156     1.75   0.082    -.4633796    7.566089 
         c13 |    3.14826   1.338325     2.35   0.020     .5003513    5.796168 
         c14 |    2.95814   1.210151     2.44   0.016     .5638259    5.352455 
          s2 |   -1.09723   .4760994    -2.30   0.023    -2.039204   -.1552555 
          s3 |  -3.117078   1.038017    -3.00   0.003    -5.170821   -1.063335 
          s4 |  -.2436169   .2961099    -0.82   0.412    -.8294777    .3422438 
          s5 |  -2.273454    .919797    -2.47   0.015    -4.093295   -.4536135 
          s6 |  -.2071005   .2722683    -0.76   0.448      -.74579    .3315889 
          s7 |  -.9320774   .3943994    -2.36   0.020    -1.712406   -.1517484 
          s8 |  -.2770551   .2805851    -0.99   0.325    -.8321996    .2780895 
          s9 |  -.4562269   .3209339    -1.42   0.158    -1.091202    .1787486 
         s10 |  -.9985429    .407937    -2.45   0.016    -1.805656   -.1914295 
         s11 |  -.5147579   .3379247    -1.52   0.130     -1.18335    .1538343 
         s12 |  -.3899694   .3425042    -1.14   0.257    -1.067622    .2876835 
         s13 |  -1.783003   .6610878    -2.70   0.008    -3.090982   -.4750251 
       _cons |  -7.619425   11.77162    -0.65   0.519    -30.90986    15.67101 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/6).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.65  Pr > z =  0.098 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.11  Pr > z =  0.268 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =  11.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.084 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   7.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.251 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   6.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.247 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   1.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.281 
 
. *fails instrument validity tests  
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. **laglimit 1 5 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 5) collapse) iv(lnsecedu l 
> ntertedu  lnwage lngdp     lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2 
> -s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 50                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     84.74                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2542499   .1990111     1.28   0.204    -.1394984    .6479981 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -1.224096   .9772412    -1.25   0.213    -3.157592    .7093992 
   lntertedu |  -1.425792    .686128    -2.08   0.040    -2.783313   -.0682713 
      lnwage |  -.3988685   .4689869    -0.85   0.397    -1.326771    .5290335 
       lngdp |   .3683495   .5856158     0.63   0.530    -.7903056    1.527005 
 lntradefree |   .0351866   .2349989     0.15   0.881    -.4297645    .5001377 
  lneconfree |   1.597474   .5598505     2.85   0.005     .4897965    2.705152 
lntransition |    2.07022   1.223761     1.69   0.093    -.3510202     4.49146 
  lnictinfra |   .2044371   .2071102     0.99   0.325    -.2053355    .6142097 
indprivati~n |   .6938887   .5687006     1.22   0.225    -.4312993    1.819077 
       d1996 |  -1.536009   .7969854    -1.93   0.056    -3.112864    .0408466 
       d1997 |   -1.45585   .7928259    -1.84   0.069    -3.024475    .1127757 
       d1998 |  -1.401749   .7304588    -1.92   0.057    -2.846979    .0434818 
       d1999 |  -1.175589   .6930778    -1.70   0.092    -2.546861    .1956818 
       d2000 |  -1.222003    .608644    -2.01   0.047     -2.42622   -.0177859 
       d2001 |  -1.107799    .574056    -1.93   0.056    -2.243583    .0279844 
       d2002 |  -.9805031   .5109816    -1.92   0.057    -1.991493    .0304864 
       d2003 |  -.6511412   .4490512    -1.45   0.149      -1.5396    .2373177 
       d2004 |  -.4666768   .3111568    -1.50   0.136    -1.082308    .1489546 
       d2005 |  -.3401881   .2242148    -1.52   0.132    -.7838026    .1034263 
       d2006 |  -.3164963   .1764648    -1.79   0.075    -.6656362    .0326436 
       d2007 |  -.1298889   .1685222    -0.77   0.442    -.4633142    .2035363 
          c4 |   2.373513   .9933206     2.39   0.018     .4082035    4.338822 
          c5 |   4.060385   1.925736     2.11   0.037      .250268    7.870501 
          c6 |   3.697852   1.416051     2.61   0.010     .8961615    6.499543 
          c7 |   4.671209   2.040897     2.29   0.024     .6332451    8.709173 
          c8 |   2.502176   1.031693     2.43   0.017     .4609469    4.543405 
          c9 |    3.42926   1.418802     2.42   0.017      .622126    6.236395 
         c11 |    3.03133   2.297106     1.32   0.189     -1.51355     7.57621 
         c12 |   3.541673   1.934167     1.83   0.069    -.2851231     7.36847 
         c13 |   3.105287   1.321468     2.35   0.020     .4907299    5.719845 
         c14 |   2.930575   1.210965     2.42   0.017     .5346504      5.3265 
          s2 |  -1.119763   .4419428    -2.53   0.012    -1.994158   -.2453687 
          s3 |  -3.075185   1.009204    -3.05   0.003    -5.071919   -1.078451 
          s4 |  -.2718567    .283656    -0.96   0.340     -.833077    .2893636 
          s5 |  -2.277129   .8693215    -2.62   0.010    -3.997103   -.5571551 
          s6 |  -.2405538   .2586972    -0.93   0.354    -.7523926     .271285 
          s7 |  -.9362682    .378114    -2.48   0.015    -1.684376   -.1881605 
          s8 |  -.2984532   .2669193    -1.12   0.266    -.8265595    .2296532 
          s9 |  -.4724958    .308181    -1.53   0.128    -1.082239    .1372478 
         s10 |  -.9984026   .3927583    -2.54   0.012    -1.775485   -.2213206 
         s11 |  -.5345241   .3133501    -1.71   0.090    -1.154495    .0854467 
         s12 |  -.4036736   .3377785    -1.20   0.234    -1.071977    .2646294 
         s13 |  -1.749802   .6447251    -2.71   0.008    -3.025406   -.4741972 
       _cons |  -7.160907   11.48477    -0.62   0.534     -29.8838    15.56199 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/5).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.71  Pr > z =  0.088 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.08  Pr > z =  0.281 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(5)    =  10.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.054 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(5)    =   7.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.199 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   6.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.158 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.70  Prob > chi2 =  0.403 
 
. *fails instrument validity tests  
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. **laglimit 1 4 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 4) collapse) iv(lnsecedu l 
> ntertedu  lnwage lngdp     lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2 
> -s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 49                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     85.01                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .3024129   .2134972     1.42   0.159    -.1199965    .7248224 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -1.13002   .9657758    -1.17   0.244    -3.040831     .780791 
   lntertedu |  -1.364065   .6788464    -2.01   0.047     -2.70718   -.0209512 
      lnwage |  -.4352596      .4539    -0.96   0.339    -1.333312    .4627927 
       lngdp |   .3572461   .5662922     0.63   0.529    -.7631768    1.477669 
 lntradefree |   .0554154   .2450246     0.23   0.821    -.4293716    .5402025 
  lneconfree |   1.492667    .629089     2.37   0.019     .2479986    2.737334 
lntransition |   2.100232    1.17817     1.78   0.077    -.2308065    4.431271 
  lnictinfra |   .2998424   .2121628     1.41   0.160    -.1199268    .7196116 
indprivati~n |   .5361775   .4518528     1.19   0.238    -.3578243    1.430179 
       d1996 |  -1.258261      .8135    -1.55   0.124    -2.867791    .3512681 
       d1997 |  -1.196462   .7961502    -1.50   0.135    -2.771664    .3787409 
       d1998 |  -1.159283   .7448122    -1.56   0.122    -2.632912    .3143466 
       d1999 |   -.969594   .6898461    -1.41   0.162    -2.334471    .3952834 
       d2000 |  -1.058315   .6062626    -1.75   0.083     -2.25782    .1411906 
       d2001 |  -.9888058   .5718586    -1.73   0.086    -2.120242    .1426304 
       d2002 |  -.8691837   .5063631    -1.72   0.088    -1.871036    .1326682 
       d2003 |   -.483949    .464646    -1.04   0.300    -1.403262    .4353644 
       d2004 |  -.4023017   .3006777    -1.34   0.183    -.9971999    .1925965 
       d2005 |  -.2999952   .2191383    -1.37   0.173    -.7335657    .1335753 
       d2006 |  -.2915678   .1745373    -1.67   0.097    -.6368942    .0537586 
       d2007 |  -.0714007   .1703547    -0.42   0.676    -.4084515    .2656502 
          c4 |    2.21009   .9923683     2.23   0.028     .2466646    4.173514 
          c5 |   3.716253   1.872689     1.98   0.049      .011091    7.421414 
          c6 |   3.434372   1.473184     2.33   0.021      .519641    6.349103 
          c7 |   4.311798   2.003286     2.15   0.033     .3482482    8.275348 
          c8 |   2.272973   1.068335     2.13   0.035     .1592464      4.3867 
          c9 |   3.170378   1.419903     2.23   0.027     .3610646    5.979692 
         c11 |   2.788759   2.110697     1.32   0.189    -1.387307    6.964825 
         c12 |   3.280979   1.821392     1.80   0.074     -.322689    6.884646 
         c13 |   2.864216   1.296045     2.21   0.029     .2999593    5.428472 
         c14 |   2.737283   1.211082     2.26   0.025     .3411268    5.133439 
          s2 |  -1.057156   .4405108    -2.40   0.018    -1.928717   -.1855948 
          s3 |  -2.806622   1.075658    -2.61   0.010    -4.934839   -.6784059 
          s4 |  -.2824133   .2723672    -1.04   0.302    -.8212985    .2564718 
          s5 |  -1.961092   .9740995    -2.01   0.046    -3.888372   -.0338121 
          s6 |  -.2432247   .2440066    -1.00   0.321    -.7259978    .2395484 
          s7 |  -.8800836   .3818854    -2.30   0.023    -1.635653    -.124514 
          s8 |  -.3033228   .2530693    -1.20   0.233    -.8040266     .197381 
          s9 |   -.455816   .3028899    -1.50   0.135    -1.055091     .143459 
         s10 |  -.9437514   .3921954    -2.41   0.018     -1.71972   -.1677831 
         s11 |  -.5157395   .3035331    -1.70   0.092    -1.116287    .0848081 
         s12 |   -.402448   .3219004    -1.25   0.213    -1.039336    .2344397 
         s13 |  -1.632811   .6461697    -2.53   0.013    -2.911274   -.3543489 
       _cons |  -7.394954   11.19707    -0.66   0.510    -29.54863    14.75872 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/4).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.79  Pr > z =  0.073 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.02  Pr > z =  0.309 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  10.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.028 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   5.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.209 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   4.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.211 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   1.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.243 
 
. **fails instrument validity tests  
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. **laglimit 1 3 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 3) collapse) iv(lnsecedu l 
> ntertedu  lnwage lngdp     lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2 
> -s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 48                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     84.91                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2593845   .1906996     1.36   0.176    -.1179193    .6366884 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.3620891   1.036617    -0.35   0.727    -2.413061    1.688883 
   lntertedu |  -1.686296   .7269682    -2.32   0.022     -3.12462   -.2479715 
      lnwage |  -.4010693   .4452837    -0.90   0.369    -1.282074    .4799355 
       lngdp |    .417495   .5622288     0.74   0.459    -.6948884    1.529878 
 lntradefree |   .2101625   .2784523     0.75   0.452    -.3407623    .7610873 
  lneconfree |    1.27007   .6037023     2.10   0.037     .0756301     2.46451 
lntransition |   2.736017   1.265637     2.16   0.032     .2319237     5.24011 
  lnictinfra |   .4430819   .2421966     1.83   0.070    -.0361101    .9222739 
indprivati~n |   .4308111   .4015231     1.07   0.285    -.3636121    1.225234 
       d1996 |  -.8004353   .8632162    -0.93   0.356     -2.50833     .907459 
       d1997 |  -.8115697   .8355483    -0.97   0.333    -2.464722    .8415831 
       d1998 |  -.7888399   .7799654    -1.01   0.314    -2.332021    .7543407 
       d1999 |  -.6451104   .7211483    -0.89   0.373     -2.07192    .7816992 
       d2000 |  -.9674841    .599788    -1.61   0.109    -2.154179    .2192111 
       d2001 |  -.7118747   .5946116    -1.20   0.233    -1.888328    .4645789 
       d2002 |  -.6735877   .5111185    -1.32   0.190    -1.684848    .3376728 
       d2003 |  -.3534356   .4695859    -0.75   0.453    -1.282523    .5756517 
       d2004 |  -.2873285   .2961489    -0.97   0.334    -.8732664    .2986094 
       d2005 |  -.2273898    .219403    -1.04   0.302    -.6614841    .2067044 
       d2006 |  -.2411724    .170931    -1.41   0.161    -.5793636    .0970189 
       d2007 |  -.0749129   .1555642    -0.48   0.631    -.3827005    .2328748 
          c4 |     2.0306   .9581471     2.12   0.036      .134882    3.926317 
          c5 |   2.809916    1.85624     1.51   0.133    -.8626996    6.482532 
          c6 |   3.090519   1.429701     2.16   0.032     .2618198    5.919218 
          c7 |   3.918665   1.931981     2.03   0.045     .0961931    7.741138 
          c8 |    1.99882   1.030794     1.94   0.055    -.0406307     4.03827 
          c9 |   2.764141   1.378253     2.01   0.047     .0372332     5.49105 
         c11 |    2.97823   2.084734     1.43   0.156    -1.146466    7.102927 
         c12 |   2.996321   1.771809     1.69   0.093    -.5092456    6.501888 
         c13 |   2.554047   1.252832     2.04   0.044     .0752894    5.032805 
         c14 |   2.711128   1.156834     2.34   0.021     .4223027    4.999953 
          s2 |  -1.122459   .4087667    -2.75   0.007    -1.931214   -.3137038 
          s3 |  -3.279457   1.055774    -3.11   0.002    -5.368331   -1.190583 
          s4 |  -.3142022   .2616926    -1.20   0.232    -.8319673     .203563 
          s5 |  -2.026182   .8800052    -2.30   0.023    -3.767294   -.2850704 
          s6 |    -.26457   .2325229    -1.14   0.257    -.7246222    .1954821 
          s7 |  -.9578787   .3548387    -2.70   0.008    -1.659936   -.2558217 
          s8 |  -.3378485   .2414495    -1.40   0.164    -.8155622    .1398652 
          s9 |  -.4954958   .2787938    -1.78   0.078    -1.047096    .0561046 
         s10 |  -1.012274   .3580359    -2.83   0.005    -1.720657   -.3038914 
         s11 |   -.558062   .2804309    -1.99   0.049    -1.112901   -.0032226 
         s12 |  -.4783171   .3140441    -1.52   0.130    -1.099661    .1430269 
         s13 |  -1.772305   .5887121    -3.01   0.003    -2.937087   -.6075242 
       _cons |  -12.17042   11.48296    -1.06   0.291    -34.88974    10.54889 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/3).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.86  Pr > z =  0.062 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.08  Pr > z =  0.279 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(3)    =  10.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.012 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(3)    =   3.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.282 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.233 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.341 
 
. *fails instrument validity tests  
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. *laglimit 1 2 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv(lnsecedu l 
> ntertedu  lnwage lngdp     lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2 
> -s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 47                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     89.93                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .3208334   .1117719     2.87   0.005       .09969    .5419769 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -.533791   1.040238    -0.51   0.609    -2.591928    1.524346 
   lntertedu |  -1.014866    .828662    -1.22   0.223    -2.654394    .6246623 
      lnwage |  -.4811796   .4289389    -1.12   0.264    -1.329846    .3674865 
       lngdp |   .3232995    .538482     0.60   0.549    -.7421003    1.388699 
 lntradefree |  -.0156689   .2795488    -0.06   0.955     -.568763    .5374253 
  lneconfree |   1.555186    .646416     2.41   0.018     .2762365    2.834136 
lntransition |   2.226154   1.108879     2.01   0.047     .0322095    4.420099 
  lnictinfra |   .3942821   .2317451     1.70   0.091    -.0642313    .8527956 
indprivati~n |    1.30017    .692433     1.88   0.063    -.0698252    2.670166 
       d1996 |  -.9040535    .744114    -1.21   0.227    -2.376301    .5681942 
       d1997 |  -.9096219   .7171691    -1.27   0.207    -2.328558    .5093148 
       d1998 |  -.8653015   .6743822    -1.28   0.202    -2.199583    .4689801 
       d1999 |  -.7769027   .6236156    -1.25   0.215    -2.010741     .456936 
       d2000 |  -1.120688    .526311    -2.13   0.035    -2.162007   -.0793687 
       d2001 |  -.8396037   .5206383    -1.61   0.109    -1.869699     .190492 
       d2002 |  -.7322052   .4465472    -1.64   0.104     -1.61571    .1512994 
       d2003 |  -.6432739   .4242456    -1.52   0.132    -1.482654    .1961064 
       d2004 |  -.2990308   .2750488    -1.09   0.279    -.8432216    .2451601 
       d2005 |  -.2410968   .2048553    -1.18   0.241     -.646408    .1642143 
       d2006 |  -.2709131   .1581928    -1.71   0.089    -.5839014    .0420752 
       d2007 |  -.0226139   .1101029    -0.21   0.838    -.2404553    .1952274 
          c4 |   2.143116   .8504812     2.52   0.013     .4604184    3.825814 
          c5 |   2.861377   1.588306     1.80   0.074    -.2811263    6.003879 
          c6 |   2.344773   1.332944     1.76   0.081    -.2924895    4.982035 
          c7 |   3.373176   1.664154     2.03   0.045     .0806068    6.665745 
          c8 |   1.515622   .9709776     1.56   0.121    -.4054807    3.436725 
          c9 |   2.255235   1.217279     1.85   0.066    -.1531816    4.663652 
         c11 |    2.69387    1.93081     1.40   0.165    -1.126285    6.514024 
         c12 |   2.795191   1.518817     1.84   0.068    -.2098246    5.800207 
         c13 |   2.459607   1.092451     2.25   0.026     .2981662    4.621048 
         c14 |    2.40213   1.059094     2.27   0.025     .3066859    4.497574 
          s2 |  -1.003029   .3208703    -3.13   0.002    -1.637879   -.3681792 
          s3 |  -2.843619   .7675946    -3.70   0.000    -4.362324   -1.324914 
          s4 |  -.2663226   .2382375    -1.12   0.266    -.7376813    .2050362 
          s5 |  -2.080592   .5994255    -3.47   0.001     -3.26657   -.8946138 
          s6 |  -.2634231   .2085931    -1.26   0.209    -.6761297    .1492835 
          s7 |  -.8562062   .2694939    -3.18   0.002    -1.389407   -.3230059 
          s8 |  -.2892621   .2128607    -1.36   0.177    -.7104123     .131888 
          s9 |  -.4886417   .2366244    -2.07   0.041    -.9568088   -.0204746 
         s10 |  -.9078983   .2684454    -3.38   0.001    -1.439024   -.3767725 
         s11 |   -.486165   .2320611    -2.09   0.038    -.9453037   -.0270264 
         s12 |  -.4438315   .2777173    -1.60   0.112     -.993302    .1056389 
         s13 |  -1.586333   .3809908    -4.16   0.000    -2.340133   -.8325336 
       _cons |   -9.37977    11.0529    -0.85   0.398    -31.24821    12.48867 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.13  Pr > z =  0.033 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.06  Pr > z =  0.289 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   4.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.087 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.609 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.612 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.392 
 
*instrument validity OK 
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. *laglimit 1 1 
 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 1) collapse) iv(lnsecedu l 
> ntertedu  lnwage lngdp     lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2 
> -s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 46                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     96.31                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .3941117   .1103209     3.57   0.000      .175839    .6123844 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.6819076   1.074021    -0.63   0.527    -2.806885     1.44307 
   lntertedu |  -.2879896    1.09214    -0.26   0.792    -2.448815    1.872836 
      lnwage |  -.6691042   .4641303    -1.44   0.152    -1.587397     .249189 
       lngdp |   .5540893   .5870941     0.94   0.347    -.6074907    1.715669 
 lntradefree |  -.0415594   .2653751    -0.16   0.876    -.5666106    .4834918 
  lneconfree |   1.079604   .8117343     1.33   0.186    -.5264321     2.68564 
lntransition |   2.453441   1.129033     2.17   0.032     .2196205    4.687261 
  lnictinfra |   .4411933   .2333615     1.89   0.061    -.0205181    .9029047 
indprivati~n |   1.664574   .7451581     2.23   0.027     .1902605    3.138888 
       d1996 |  -.5198179   .7594564    -0.68   0.495    -2.022421    .9827853 
       d1997 |   -.461927   .7654574    -0.60   0.547    -1.976403    1.052549 
       d1998 |  -.4359923   .7275555    -0.60   0.550    -1.875479    1.003494 
       d1999 |   -.397477   .6635862    -0.60   0.550    -1.710399    .9154445 
       d2000 |  -.8909695   .4955192    -1.80   0.075    -1.871366    .0894273 
       d2001 |  -.5670213   .5325987    -1.06   0.289    -1.620781    .4867383 
       d2002 |  -.4241713   .4971045    -0.85   0.395    -1.407705     .559362 
       d2003 |  -.3869563   .4648622    -0.83   0.407    -1.306697    .5327849 
       d2004 |  -.1443547   .2734652    -0.53   0.598    -.6854123    .3967029 
       d2005 |  -.1351844   .1998528    -0.68   0.500    -.5305981    .2602293 
       d2006 |  -.2179156    .140639    -1.55   0.124    -.4961732     .060342 
       d2007 |  -.0885259   .1376497    -0.64   0.521    -.3608693    .1838175 
          c4 |   1.572689   .9349458     1.68   0.095     -.277124    3.422502 
          c5 |   1.905097   1.781897     1.07   0.287     -1.62043    5.430623 
          c6 |   1.387911   1.501631     0.92   0.357    -1.583102    4.358925 
          c7 |   1.910462    2.11309     0.90   0.368    -2.270338    6.091263 
          c8 |   .8080908   1.115498     0.72   0.470    -1.398949     3.01513 
          c9 |   1.259658   1.493367     0.84   0.401    -1.695004     4.21432 
         c11 |   1.078344    2.48017     0.43   0.664    -3.828732     5.98542 
         c12 |   1.686599   1.821377     0.93   0.356     -1.91704    5.290239 
         c13 |   1.597011   1.313623     1.22   0.226    -1.002024    4.196047 
         c14 |   1.634928   1.160712     1.41   0.161    -.6615697    3.931425 
          s2 |  -.8893628   .3148124    -2.83   0.005    -1.512227   -.2664987 
          s3 |  -2.529691    .726899    -3.48   0.001    -3.967878   -1.091503 
          s4 |  -.2256783    .234869    -0.96   0.338    -.6903722    .2390157 
          s5 |  -1.876678   .5745456    -3.27   0.001    -3.013431   -.7399258 
          s6 |  -.2406225   .2060244    -1.17   0.245    -.6482468    .1670019 
          s7 |  -.7453531   .2679377    -2.78   0.006    -1.275474   -.2152317 
          s8 |  -.2437034   .2103172    -1.16   0.249    -.6598212    .1724143 
          s9 |  -.4496206   .2326964    -1.93   0.056     -.910016    .0107749 
         s10 |  -.7965863   .2663393    -2.99   0.003    -1.323545   -.2696274 
         s11 |  -.4180931   .2291747    -1.82   0.070    -.8715209    .0353347 
         s12 |  -.3760593   .2780088    -1.35   0.179    -.9261066    .1739879 
         s13 |  -1.449896   .3484933    -4.16   0.000    -2.139399   -.7603933 
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       _cons |  -12.79457   11.48754    -1.11   0.267    -35.52295    9.933811 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.13  Pr > z =  0.033 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.05  Pr > z =  0.296 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   0.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.407 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   0.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.615 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.615 
 
*instrument validity OK 
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Appendix 6.5: Testing instrument validity 
 
. **Model 5.4  
. **FDI stock predetermined; all variables exogenous 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv(lnsecedu l 
> ntertedu  lnwage lngdp     lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2 
> -s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 47                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     89.93                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .3208334   .1117719     2.87   0.005       .09969    .5419769 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -.533791   1.040238    -0.51   0.609    -2.591928    1.524346 
   lntertedu |  -1.014866    .828662    -1.22   0.223    -2.654394    .6246623 
      lnwage |  -.4811796   .4289389    -1.12   0.264    -1.329846    .3674865 
       lngdp |   .3232995    .538482     0.60   0.549    -.7421003    1.388699 
 lntradefree |  -.0156689   .2795488    -0.06   0.955     -.568763    .5374253 
  lneconfree |   1.555186    .646416     2.41   0.018     .2762365    2.834136 
lntransition |   2.226154   1.108879     2.01   0.047     .0322095    4.420099 
  lnictinfra |   .3942821   .2317451     1.70   0.091    -.0642313    .8527956 
indprivati~n |    1.30017    .692433     1.88   0.063    -.0698252    2.670166 
       d1996 |  -.9040535    .744114    -1.21   0.227    -2.376301    .5681942 
       d1997 |  -.9096219   .7171691    -1.27   0.207    -2.328558    .5093148 
       d1998 |  -.8653015   .6743822    -1.28   0.202    -2.199583    .4689801 
       d1999 |  -.7769027   .6236156    -1.25   0.215    -2.010741     .456936 
       d2000 |  -1.120688    .526311    -2.13   0.035    -2.162007   -.0793687 
       d2001 |  -.8396037   .5206383    -1.61   0.109    -1.869699     .190492 
       d2002 |  -.7322052   .4465472    -1.64   0.104     -1.61571    .1512994 
       d2003 |  -.6432739   .4242456    -1.52   0.132    -1.482654    .1961064 
       d2004 |  -.2990308   .2750488    -1.09   0.279    -.8432216    .2451601 
       d2005 |  -.2410968   .2048553    -1.18   0.241     -.646408    .1642143 
       d2006 |  -.2709131   .1581928    -1.71   0.089    -.5839014    .0420752 
       d2007 |  -.0226139   .1101029    -0.21   0.838    -.2404553    .1952274 
          c4 |   2.143116   .8504812     2.52   0.013     .4604184    3.825814 
          c5 |   2.861377   1.588306     1.80   0.074    -.2811263    6.003879 
          c6 |   2.344773   1.332944     1.76   0.081    -.2924895    4.982035 
          c7 |   3.373176   1.664154     2.03   0.045     .0806068    6.665745 
          c8 |   1.515622   .9709776     1.56   0.121    -.4054807    3.436725 
          c9 |   2.255235   1.217279     1.85   0.066    -.1531816    4.663652 
         c11 |    2.69387    1.93081     1.40   0.165    -1.126285    6.514024 
         c12 |   2.795191   1.518817     1.84   0.068    -.2098246    5.800207 
         c13 |   2.459607   1.092451     2.25   0.026     .2981662    4.621048 
         c14 |    2.40213   1.059094     2.27   0.025     .3066859    4.497574 
          s2 |  -1.003029   .3208703    -3.13   0.002    -1.637879   -.3681792 
          s3 |  -2.843619   .7675946    -3.70   0.000    -4.362324   -1.324914 
          s4 |  -.2663226   .2382375    -1.12   0.266    -.7376813    .2050362 
          s5 |  -2.080592   .5994255    -3.47   0.001     -3.26657   -.8946138 
          s6 |  -.2634231   .2085931    -1.26   0.209    -.6761297    .1492835 
          s7 |  -.8562062   .2694939    -3.18   0.002    -1.389407   -.3230059 
          s8 |  -.2892621   .2128607    -1.36   0.177    -.7104123     .131888 
          s9 |  -.4886417   .2366244    -2.07   0.041    -.9568088   -.0204746 
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         s10 |  -.9078983   .2684454    -3.38   0.001    -1.439024   -.3767725 
         s11 |   -.486165   .2320611    -2.09   0.038    -.9453037   -.0270264 
         s12 |  -.4438315   .2777173    -1.60   0.112     -.993302    .1056389 
         s13 |  -1.586333   .3809908    -4.16   0.000    -2.340133   -.8325336 
       _cons |   -9.37977    11.0529    -0.85   0.398    -31.24821    12.48867 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.13  Pr > z =  0.033 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.06  Pr > z =  0.289 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   4.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.087 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.609 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.612 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.392 
 
. *acceptable specification tests 
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. **FDI stock predetermined; gdp, wage, secedu & tertedu endogenous 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock 
l.lnsecedu l.lntertedu  l.lnwage l.lng 
> dp , laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv(  lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2 
> -c14 s2-s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 55                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     69.49                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |    .408263    .099017     4.12   0.000     .2123556    .6041705 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   1.391176   1.455805     0.96   0.341    -1.489171    4.271523 
   lntertedu |  -.9098347   .5904922    -1.54   0.126    -2.078138    .2584686 
      lnwage |  -.7016354   .5911914    -1.19   0.237    -1.871322    .4680513 
       lngdp |   .4484304   .7376339     0.61   0.544    -1.010996    1.907857 
 lntradefree |  -.0754216   .2598619    -0.29   0.772    -.5895646    .4387215 
  lneconfree |   1.924799   .6668083     2.89   0.005     .6055021    3.244095 
lntransition |   .3330241   1.309251     0.25   0.800    -2.257362     2.92341 
  lnictinfra |   .5235513   .2693383     1.94   0.054    -.0093412    1.056444 
indprivati~n |   1.456308   .6978269     2.09   0.039       .07564    2.836975 
       d1996 |  -.4155657   .7724507    -0.54   0.592    -1.943878    1.112747 
       d1997 |  -.4798783   .7415386    -0.65   0.519    -1.947031     .987274 
       d1998 |  -.4126425   .6999137    -0.59   0.557    -1.797439    .9721538 
       d1999 |  -.3497589   .6474538    -0.54   0.590    -1.630762    .9312443 
       d2000 |   -.729744   .5819704    -1.25   0.212    -1.881187    .4216986 
       d2001 |  -.5758382   .5708923    -1.01   0.315    -1.705363    .5536862 
       d2002 |  -.4667194   .4845283    -0.96   0.337    -1.425371    .4919318 
       d2003 |   -.339949   .4204956    -0.81   0.420     -1.17191    .4920118 
       d2004 |  -.1875772   .3169292    -0.59   0.555    -.8146294    .4394749 
       d2005 |  -.1505887   .2507848    -0.60   0.549    -.6467727    .3455953 
       d2006 |   -.235003   .2023019    -1.16   0.248    -.6352622    .1652562 
       d2007 |    .087015   .1384975     0.63   0.531    -.1870056    .3610356 
          c4 |   2.239232   .9565589     2.34   0.021     .3466572    4.131808 
          c5 |   1.176978   1.744089     0.67   0.501    -2.273744      4.6277 
          c6 |   1.083336   1.348176     0.80   0.423    -1.584062    3.750735 
          c7 |   2.165043   1.483499     1.46   0.147    -.7700956    5.100181 
          c8 |   .8184628   .8638721     0.95   0.345    -.8907293    2.527655 
          c9 |   .8667398   1.172609     0.74   0.461    -1.453295    3.186775 
         c11 |   3.127626   2.179196     1.44   0.154    -1.183966    7.439218 
         c12 |   1.813378   1.639201     1.11   0.271    -1.429822    5.056577 
         c13 |   1.953547   1.078749     1.81   0.072    -.1807855    4.087879 
         c14 |   2.793428   1.103635     2.53   0.013     .6098604    4.976996 
          s2 |  -1.095121   .3688136    -2.97   0.004    -1.824828   -.3654143 
          s3 |  -2.307993   .7494576    -3.08   0.003    -3.790813   -.8251729 
          s4 |  -.3334904   .2908471    -1.15   0.254    -.9089386    .2419577 
          s5 |  -1.831449   .7346032    -2.49   0.014    -3.284879   -.3780183 
          s6 |  -.2826747   .2590987    -1.09   0.277    -.7953079    .2299584 
          s7 |  -.8368899   .3115268    -2.69   0.008    -1.453253   -.2205266 
          s8 |  -.3709348   .2583141    -1.44   0.153    -.8820156     .140146 
          s9 |  -.4899429    .312255    -1.57   0.119    -1.107747    .1278613 
         s10 |  -.9148551   .3242862    -2.82   0.006    -1.556463    -.273247 
         s11 |  -.4983276   .2686603    -1.85   0.066    -1.029879    .0332234 
         s12 |  -.3849729   .3322302    -1.16   0.249    -1.042299    .2723527 
         s13 |  -1.547021   .4202643    -3.68   0.000    -2.378524   -.7155173 
       _cons |  -18.06218   14.37927    -1.26   0.211    -46.51192    10.38755 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 
    d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 
    c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 
    s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(L.lnindfdistock L.lnsecedu L.lntertedu L.lnwage L.lngdp) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 
    d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 
    c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 
    s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.(L.lnindfdistock L.lnsecedu L.lntertedu L.lnwage L.lngdp) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.98  Pr > z =  0.048 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.90  Pr > z =  0.368 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  12.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.251 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  21.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.017 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   3.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.604 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =  18.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.003 
 
. *fails specification tests 
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**FDI stock predetermined; gdp & wage endogenous; secedu & tertedu predetermined 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu 
lntertedu  l.lnwage l.lngdp , 
>  laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv(lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s 
> 2-s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 55                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     77.93                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |    .445465    .078242     5.69   0.000     .2906612    .6002688 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -1.674779   .9373675    -1.79   0.076    -3.529383    .1798257 
   lntertedu |  -.6521125   .5724687    -1.14   0.257    -1.784756    .4805308 
      lnwage |  -.3868201   .6211391    -0.62   0.535    -1.615759    .8421188 
       lngdp |   .4128716   .7227899     0.57   0.569    -1.017186    1.842929 
 lntradefree |  -.1489961   .2277433    -0.65   0.514    -.5995918    .3015996 
  lneconfree |    1.73191    .719143     2.41   0.017     .3090678    3.154752 
lntransition |   1.464705   1.439699     1.02   0.311    -1.383775    4.313186 
  lnictinfra |   .2396872    .251919     0.95   0.343    -.2587408    .7381151 
indprivati~n |   1.743844   .6002286     2.91   0.004     .5562774    2.931411 
       d1996 |  -.8341754   .6926759    -1.20   0.231    -2.204652    .5363008 
       d1997 |  -.8080644   .6394208    -1.26   0.209    -2.073174    .4570453 
       d1998 |  -.7733217   .5906585    -1.31   0.193    -1.941954    .3953107 
       d1999 |  -.6903175    .555995    -1.24   0.217    -1.790367    .4097323 
       d2000 |  -.8799858   .5177431    -1.70   0.092    -1.904353    .1443816 
       d2001 |  -.7507007   .5071957    -1.48   0.141      -1.7542    .2527983 
       d2002 |  -.5389089   .4370601    -1.23   0.220    -1.403643    .3258252 
       d2003 |  -.4701205   .3685595    -1.28   0.204    -1.199324    .2590834 
       d2004 |  -.1929811   .2829314    -0.68   0.496    -.7527677    .3668055 
       d2005 |  -.1248883   .2267789    -0.55   0.583    -.5735758    .3237993 
       d2006 |  -.2026314   .1854423    -1.09   0.277    -.5695336    .1642707 
       d2007 |   .1044894   .1363047     0.77   0.445    -.1651929    .3741717 
          c4 |   1.418176   .9234833     1.54   0.127    -.4089579    3.245311 
          c5 |   2.950014   1.443044     2.04   0.043     .0949162    5.805111 
          c6 |   2.380815    1.24303     1.92   0.058      -.07855     4.84018 
          c7 |   2.914898   1.298369     2.25   0.026     .3460429    5.483752 
          c8 |   1.453313   .8599233     1.69   0.093    -.2480668    3.154692 
          c9 |   2.374727   .9216011     2.58   0.011     .5513161    4.198137 
         c11 |   1.112987   1.912361     0.58   0.562    -2.670665    4.896639 
         c12 |   2.263891   1.523748     1.49   0.140     -.750881    5.278663 
         c13 |   1.941542   1.004701     1.93   0.055     -.046283    3.929366 
         c14 |   1.545725   1.108712     1.39   0.166    -.6478892    3.739339 
          s2 |  -.9635405   .3507542    -2.75   0.007    -1.657516   -.2695648 
          s3 |  -1.988975   .5691869    -3.49   0.001    -3.115125   -.8628244 
          s4 |  -.2581532   .2723978    -0.95   0.345     -.797099    .2807925 
          s5 |  -1.820311   .6662035    -2.73   0.007    -3.138411   -.5022109 
          s6 |  -.2415306   .2443805    -0.99   0.325    -.7250435    .2419823 
          s7 |  -.7157294   .2852805    -2.51   0.013    -1.280164    -.151295 
          s8 |  -.2948168   .2422679    -1.22   0.226    -.7741498    .1845163 
          s9 |  -.4491089   .2857342    -1.57   0.118    -1.014441    .1162231 
         s10 |  -.7782399   .2942783    -2.64   0.009    -1.360477   -.1960031 
         s11 |  -.4041342    .252663    -1.60   0.112    -.9040342    .0957657 
         s12 |  -.3639674    .304326    -1.20   0.234    -.9660839     .238149 
         s13 |   -1.43978   .3672628    -3.92   0.000    -2.166419   -.7131416 
       _cons |  -7.405741   14.05436    -0.53   0.599    -35.21263    20.40115 
453 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 
    d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 
    c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 
    s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(L.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu L.lnwage L.lngdp) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 
    d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 
    c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 
    s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.(L.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu L.lnwage L.lngdp) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.00  Pr > z =  0.045 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.83  Pr > z =  0.404 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  12.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.228 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  20.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.027 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   9.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.100 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =  10.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.052 
 
. *fails specification tests 
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. **FDI stock predetermined; gdp & wage endogenous, secedu & tertedu exogenous 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock   
l.lnwage l.lngdp , laglimit(1 2) col 
> lapse) iv( lnsecedu lntertedu   lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c 
> 14 s2-s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 51                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     81.79                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2841363   .1911339     1.49   0.140    -.0940267    .6622994 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.7661954   1.064209    -0.72   0.473    -2.871758    1.339367 
   lntertedu |  -1.347418   .8917796    -1.51   0.133    -3.111826      .41699 
      lnwage |  -.3312103   .6182998    -0.54   0.593    -1.554532    .8921109 
       lngdp |   1.106128   .7529693     1.47   0.144    -.3836399    2.595896 
 lntradefree |   .1611391   .3235816     0.50   0.619     -.479075    .8013532 
  lneconfree |   1.191983   .6132272     1.94   0.054    -.0213022    2.405268 
lntransition |   .9380517   1.273605     0.74   0.463    -1.581807     3.45791 
  lnictinfra |   .3782772   .2386835     1.58   0.115    -.0939639    .8505184 
indprivati~n |   .5990027   .7004031     0.86   0.394    -.7867621    1.984767 
       d1996 |  -.0209897   .8247931    -0.03   0.980    -1.652863    1.610884 
       d1997 |  -.0698833    .765072    -0.09   0.927    -1.583597     1.44383 
       d1998 |  -.0658882   .7196098    -0.09   0.927    -1.489654    1.357877 
       d1999 |   .1007959    .651045     0.15   0.877    -1.187313    1.388904 
       d2000 |  -.1101001     .56721    -0.19   0.846    -1.232339    1.012139 
       d2001 |   .0544375    .563866     0.10   0.923    -1.061185     1.17006 
       d2002 |   .0312545   .4770982     0.07   0.948     -.912696    .9752049 
       d2003 |   .1637921   .3953344     0.41   0.679    -.6183868    .9459709 
       d2004 |   .1707005   .3023254     0.56   0.573    -.4274577    .7688588 
       d2005 |   .1718424   .2334289     0.74   0.463    -.2900024    .6336872 
       d2006 |   .0646152   .1893835     0.34   0.734    -.3100847    .4393151 
       d2007 |   .0893266   .1534702     0.58   0.562     -.214318    .3929711 
          c4 |   .9119244    .915345     1.00   0.321    -.8991081    2.722957 
          c5 |   1.412575   1.532635     0.92   0.358    -1.619781    4.444931 
          c6 |    2.98403   1.981309     1.51   0.134    -.9360388    6.904098 
          c7 |   2.371756   1.644184     1.44   0.152    -.8813019    5.624813 
          c8 |   1.578503   1.242833     1.27   0.206    -.8804718    4.037477 
          c9 |   2.201603   1.425407     1.54   0.125    -.6186004    5.021806 
         c11 |   .2772691    1.75267     0.16   0.875    -3.190432     3.74497 
         c12 |   1.274501   1.388395     0.92   0.360    -1.472473    4.021475 
         c13 |   1.307213   1.052586     1.24   0.217    -.7753541    3.389779 
         c14 |   1.448684   1.307089     1.11   0.270    -1.137425    4.034792 
          s2 |  -1.113089   .4057135    -2.74   0.007    -1.915803   -.3103746 
          s3 |  -2.982445   1.039063    -2.87   0.005    -5.038257   -.9266329 
          s4 |  -.3356607   .2594467    -1.29   0.198    -.8489823    .1776609 
          s5 |  -2.084864   .7971638    -2.62   0.010    -3.662072    -.507656 
          s6 |  -.2831985   .2161462    -1.31   0.192     -.710849     .144452 
          s7 |  -.9476069   .3555574    -2.67   0.009    -1.651086   -.2441279 
          s8 |  -.3594599   .2351822    -1.53   0.129    -.8247736    .1058538 
          s9 |  -.5008216       .263    -1.90   0.059    -1.021174    .0195304 
         s10 |   -1.00287    .356879    -2.81   0.006    -1.708963   -.2967756 
         s11 |  -.5634075   .2741238    -2.06   0.042    -1.105768   -.0210468 
         s12 |  -.5353741   .3020537    -1.77   0.079    -1.132995    .0622466 
         s13 |  -1.767849   .5809793    -3.04   0.003    -2.917331   -.6183676 
       _cons |  -24.92467   14.65162    -1.70   0.091    -53.91325    4.063914 
455 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(L.lnindfdistock L.lnwage L.lngdp) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.(L.lnindfdistock L.lnwage L.lngdp) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.73  Pr > z =  0.084 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.08  Pr > z =  0.279 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   6.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.329 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   4.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.625 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.500 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.569 
 
. *fails specification tests 
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. **FDI stock predetermined; gdp & wage predetermined, secedu & tertedu exogenous 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock   lnwage 
lngdp , laglimit(1 2) collaps 
> e) iv(lnsecedu lntertedu  lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2- 
> s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 51                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     72.76                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .4712474    .171904     2.74   0.007     .1311311    .8113636 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -2.00676   1.104611    -1.82   0.072    -4.192259    .1787397 
   lntertedu |  -.3838467   .7492899    -0.51   0.609    -1.866335    1.098642 
      lnwage |  -.3846961   .9296048    -0.41   0.680    -2.223942     1.45455 
       lngdp |     .67429   .9120129     0.74   0.461     -1.13015     2.47873 
 lntradefree |  -.1405122   .3051392    -0.46   0.646    -.7442377    .4632132 
  lneconfree |   1.515544   .8499819     1.78   0.077    -.1661658    3.197254 
lntransition |   .5712668   1.414866     0.40   0.687     -2.22808    3.370613 
  lnictinfra |   .1949185    .371384     0.52   0.601    -.5398738    .9297108 
indprivati~n |   .9309465   .6486252     1.44   0.154    -.3523743    2.214267 
       d1996 |  -.5562535   .8022728    -0.69   0.489     -2.14357    1.031063 
       d1997 |  -.5221947   .7339918    -0.71   0.478    -1.974415    .9300259 
       d1998 |  -.4912198    .689091    -0.71   0.477    -1.854603    .8721636 
       d1999 |  -.3733414   .6222197    -0.60   0.550    -1.604418    .8577355 
       d2000 |  -.2982926   .5295831    -0.56   0.574    -1.346086    .7495006 
       d2001 |  -.4627244   .5466023    -0.85   0.399    -1.544191    .6187416 
       d2002 |  -.3176024   .4704905    -0.68   0.501    -1.248479    .6132745 
       d2003 |  -.0723652   .3671941    -0.20   0.844    -.7988677    .6541374 
       d2004 |   -.027247   .3024487    -0.09   0.928    -.6256492    .5711552 
       d2005 |   .0069123   .2345572     0.03   0.977    -.4571648    .4709894 
       d2006 |  -.0647597   .1899046    -0.34   0.734    -.4404907    .3109712 
       d2007 |   .1497612   .1640396     0.91   0.363    -.1747952    .4743176 
          c4 |   1.209968   1.025457     1.18   0.240    -.8189242    3.238859 
          c5 |   2.787894    1.70419     1.64   0.104    -.5838879    6.159676 
          c6 |    2.58387   1.815044     1.42   0.157     -1.00724    6.174979 
          c7 |   2.504487   1.591612     1.57   0.118    -.6445556     5.65353 
          c8 |   1.449839   1.164428     1.25   0.215    -.8540093    3.753688 
          c9 |   2.266754   1.265084     1.79   0.076    -.2362447    4.769754 
         c11 |   .0477607   1.716252     0.03   0.978    -3.347886    3.443407 
         c12 |   1.726206   1.636259     1.05   0.293    -1.511172    4.963584 
         c13 |   1.559868   1.060106     1.47   0.144     -.537578    3.657314 
         c14 |   1.051631   1.448468     0.73   0.469    -1.814198     3.91746 
          s2 |   -.806122   .3769922    -2.14   0.034     -1.55201   -.0602338 
          s3 |  -1.644304   .9298844    -1.77   0.079    -3.484103    .1954949 
          s4 |  -.2164456   .2464394    -0.88   0.381     -.704032    .2711409 
          s5 |  -1.395617   .7602147    -1.84   0.069     -2.89972    .1084865 
          s6 |   -.201355   .2211817    -0.91   0.364    -.6389684    .2362585 
          s7 |  -.6621646    .337679    -1.96   0.052    -1.330271    .0059416 
          s8 |  -.2246446   .2263118    -0.99   0.323     -.672408    .2231188 
          s9 |  -.3874048   .2716206    -1.43   0.156    -.9248129    .1500033 
         s10 |  -.7100495   .3360196    -2.11   0.037    -1.374873   -.0452266 
         s11 |  -.3387108   .2567434    -1.32   0.189    -.8466838    .1692622 
         s12 |  -.3250991   .3048219    -1.07   0.288    -.9281967    .2779985 
         s13 |  -1.192582   .5067341    -2.35   0.020    -2.195168   -.1899961 
       _cons |  -10.99121   18.35569    -0.60   0.550    -47.30839    25.32597 
457 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(L.lnindfdistock lnwage lngdp) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.(L.lnindfdistock lnwage lngdp) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.93  Pr > z =  0.054 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.80  Pr > z =  0.426 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =  13.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.039 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =  12.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.056 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   9.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.025 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.401 
 
. *fails specification tests 
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. **FDI stock predetermined; gdp, wage, secedu & tertedu predetermined 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu 
lntertedu  lnwage lngdp , lag 
> limit(1 2) collapse) iv(  lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2- 
> s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 55                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     66.13                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .4758102   .0876206     5.43   0.000     .3024506    .6491698 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -2.337161   1.137156    -2.06   0.042    -4.587052   -.0872693 
   lntertedu |  -.4947653   .6804912    -0.73   0.469    -1.841134    .8516033 
      lnwage |   .2666401   .6037543     0.44   0.659    -.9279025    1.461183 
       lngdp |   -.115622   .6671488    -0.17   0.863    -1.435592    1.204348 
 lntradefree |  -.0342546   .2579519    -0.13   0.895    -.5446187    .4761095 
  lneconfree |   1.345314   .9738663     1.38   0.170    -.5815044    3.272132 
lntransition |   2.465132   1.614752     1.53   0.129    -.7296951     5.65996 
  lnictinfra |   .2875196    .286082     1.01   0.317    -.2785005    .8535398 
indprivati~n |   1.452164    .577344     2.52   0.013     .3098746    2.594453 
       d1996 |  -.3373079   .7353046    -0.46   0.647    -1.792126     1.11751 
       d1997 |  -.3367697   .6956491    -0.48   0.629    -1.713128    1.039589 
       d1998 |   -.374551   .6563238    -0.57   0.569    -1.673104    .9240017 
       d1999 |  -.3439375   .6123779    -0.56   0.575    -1.555542    .8676672 
       d2000 |  -.5348873   .5559036    -0.96   0.338    -1.634756    .5649816 
       d2001 |  -.4607081   .5635188    -0.82   0.415    -1.575644    .6542277 
       d2002 |  -.3056298   .4803922    -0.64   0.526    -1.256098     .644838 
       d2003 |  -.1775218   .4042304    -0.44   0.661    -.9773016     .622258 
       d2004 |  -.0187427   .3114867    -0.06   0.952    -.6350268    .5975414 
       d2005 |    .006661   .2449473     0.03   0.978    -.4779733    .4912952 
       d2006 |  -.0662447   .1998288    -0.33   0.741    -.4616108    .3291214 
       d2007 |   .1871005     .14235     1.31   0.191    -.0945424    .4687434 
          c4 |   .8383526   1.048722     0.80   0.426     -1.23657    2.913275 
          c5 |   3.540452   1.792886     1.97   0.050    -.0068171    7.087722 
          c6 |   1.846354    1.19116     1.55   0.124    -.5103845    4.203092 
          c7 |    3.17022   1.718218     1.85   0.067    -.2293164    6.569756 
          c8 |   1.182949   .9118339     1.30   0.197    -.6211366    2.987035 
          c9 |   2.476949   1.135334     2.18   0.031     .2306638    4.723234 
         c11 |   1.376694   2.051697     0.67   0.503    -2.682639    5.436028 
         c12 |   3.088859   1.724903     1.79   0.076    -.3239049    6.501622 
         c13 |   1.759105      1.223     1.44   0.153    -.6606298    4.178839 
         c14 |   .6084658    1.25654     0.48   0.629     -1.87763    3.094562 
          s2 |  -.8231432   .3452433    -2.38   0.019    -1.506216   -.1400709 
          s3 |  -1.800518   .6572028    -2.74   0.007     -3.10081    -.500226 
          s4 |  -.2172284   .2654757    -0.82   0.415    -.7424786    .3080219 
          s5 |  -1.688912   .8601355    -1.96   0.052    -3.390711    .0128875 
          s6 |  -.2278511    .261971    -0.87   0.386    -.7461671    .2904649 
          s7 |  -.6985578   .2976832    -2.35   0.020    -1.287531   -.1095842 
          s8 |  -.2535879    .239895    -1.06   0.292     -.728226    .2210501 
          s9 |  -.4408976   .2817381    -1.56   0.120    -.9983233    .1165281 
         s10 |  -.7242171   .3053514    -2.37   0.019    -1.328362   -.1200718 
         s11 |  -.2952998   .2603379    -1.13   0.259    -.8103847    .2197851 
         s12 |  -.3727299   .3418804    -1.09   0.278    -1.049149    .3036887 
         s13 |   -1.28473   .3724003    -3.45   0.001    -2.021534   -.5479274 
       _cons |   2.866771   14.20672     0.20   0.840    -25.24158    30.97512 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 
    d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 
    c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 
    s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(L.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 
    d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 
    c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 
    s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.(L.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.03  Pr > z =  0.043 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.79  Pr > z =  0.427 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  19.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.038 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  30.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.001 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =  11.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.037 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =  18.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
 
. *fails specification tests 
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Appendix 6.6: Model 6.4 results 
 
. **Model 6.4 System GMM 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv(lnsecedu l 
> ntertedu  lnwage lngdp     lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2 
> -s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 47                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     89.93                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .3208334   .1117719     2.87   0.005       .09969    .5419769 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -.533791   1.040238    -0.51   0.609    -2.591928    1.524346 
   lntertedu |  -1.014866    .828662    -1.22   0.223    -2.654394    .6246623 
      lnwage |  -.4811796   .4289389    -1.12   0.264    -1.329846    .3674865 
       lngdp |   .3232995    .538482     0.60   0.549    -.7421003    1.388699 
 lntradefree |  -.0156689   .2795488    -0.06   0.955     -.568763    .5374253 
  lneconfree |   1.555186    .646416     2.41   0.018     .2762365    2.834136 
lntransition |   2.226154   1.108879     2.01   0.047     .0322095    4.420099 
  lnictinfra |   .3942821   .2317451     1.70   0.091    -.0642313    .8527956 
indprivati~n |    1.30017    .692433     1.88   0.063    -.0698252    2.670166 
       d1996 |  -.9040535    .744114    -1.21   0.227    -2.376301    .5681942 
       d1997 |  -.9096219   .7171691    -1.27   0.207    -2.328558    .5093148 
       d1998 |  -.8653015   .6743822    -1.28   0.202    -2.199583    .4689801 
       d1999 |  -.7769027   .6236156    -1.25   0.215    -2.010741     .456936 
       d2000 |  -1.120688    .526311    -2.13   0.035    -2.162007   -.0793687 
       d2001 |  -.8396037   .5206383    -1.61   0.109    -1.869699     .190492 
       d2002 |  -.7322052   .4465472    -1.64   0.104     -1.61571    .1512994 
       d2003 |  -.6432739   .4242456    -1.52   0.132    -1.482654    .1961064 
       d2004 |  -.2990308   .2750488    -1.09   0.279    -.8432216    .2451601 
       d2005 |  -.2410968   .2048553    -1.18   0.241     -.646408    .1642143 
       d2006 |  -.2709131   .1581928    -1.71   0.089    -.5839014    .0420752 
       d2007 |  -.0226139   .1101029    -0.21   0.838    -.2404553    .1952274 
          c4 |   2.143116   .8504812     2.52   0.013     .4604184    3.825814 
          c5 |   2.861377   1.588306     1.80   0.074    -.2811263    6.003879 
          c6 |   2.344773   1.332944     1.76   0.081    -.2924895    4.982035 
          c7 |   3.373176   1.664154     2.03   0.045     .0806068    6.665745 
          c8 |   1.515622   .9709776     1.56   0.121    -.4054807    3.436725 
          c9 |   2.255235   1.217279     1.85   0.066    -.1531816    4.663652 
         c11 |    2.69387    1.93081     1.40   0.165    -1.126285    6.514024 
         c12 |   2.795191   1.518817     1.84   0.068    -.2098246    5.800207 
         c13 |   2.459607   1.092451     2.25   0.026     .2981662    4.621048 
         c14 |    2.40213   1.059094     2.27   0.025     .3066859    4.497574 
          s2 |  -1.003029   .3208703    -3.13   0.002    -1.637879   -.3681792 
          s3 |  -2.843619   .7675946    -3.70   0.000    -4.362324   -1.324914 
          s4 |  -.2663226   .2382375    -1.12   0.266    -.7376813    .2050362 
          s5 |  -2.080592   .5994255    -3.47   0.001     -3.26657   -.8946138 
          s6 |  -.2634231   .2085931    -1.26   0.209    -.6761297    .1492835 
          s7 |  -.8562062   .2694939    -3.18   0.002    -1.389407   -.3230059 
          s8 |  -.2892621   .2128607    -1.36   0.177    -.7104123     .131888 
          s9 |  -.4886417   .2366244    -2.07   0.041    -.9568088   -.0204746 
         s10 |  -.9078983   .2684454    -3.38   0.001    -1.439024   -.3767725 
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         s11 |   -.486165   .2320611    -2.09   0.038    -.9453037   -.0270264 
         s12 |  -.4438315   .2777173    -1.60   0.112     -.993302    .1056389 
         s13 |  -1.586333   .3809908    -4.16   0.000    -2.340133   -.8325336 
       _cons |   -9.37977    11.0529    -0.85   0.398    -31.24821    12.48867 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.13  Pr > z =  0.033 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.06  Pr > z =  0.289 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   4.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.087 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.609 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.612 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.392 
 
.  
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. **Calculating long-run coefficients 
. nlcom _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |    -.78595   1.577803    -0.50   0.619    -3.907673    2.335773 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.494281   1.063527    -1.41   0.162    -3.598495    .6099328 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.7084854   .6471814    -1.09   0.276     -1.98895     .571979 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .4760239   .8021236     0.59   0.554    -1.110997    2.063045 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. nlcom _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0230707   .4135921    -0.06   0.956    -.8413729    .7952315 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   2.289845   .8949541     2.56   0.012     .5191567    4.060534 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   3.277774   1.581633     2.07   0.040     .1484745    6.407073 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .5805382    .359881     1.61   0.109    -.1314952    1.292572 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   1.914362   1.189135     1.61   0.110    -.4383716    4.267095 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.4 FE 
. xtreg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree 
lneconfree lntransition lnic 
> tinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, fe  
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c13 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c14 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s13 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1283 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       130 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2952                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.8341                                        avg =       9.9 
       overall = 0.5743                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(22,1131)         =     21.54 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5226                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .1934758   .0294962     6.56   0.000     .1356024    .2513491 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.6698671   1.501536    -0.45   0.656    -3.615976    2.276242 
   lntertedu |  -.3828825   .7326196    -0.52   0.601    -1.820329    1.054564 
      lnwage |  -.5342059   .7749431    -0.69   0.491    -2.054694    .9862818 
       lngdp |   .4507245   .7466757     0.60   0.546    -1.014301     1.91575 
 lntradefree |   .0347742   .6023787     0.06   0.954    -1.147131     1.21668 
  lneconfree |    1.37947   .9375811     1.47   0.141    -.4601241    3.219064 
lntransition |   2.662767   2.919594     0.91   0.362    -3.065661    8.391196 
  lnictinfra |   .4709106   .4009703     1.17   0.240    -.3158187     1.25764 
indprivati~n |   1.268965   .2994998     4.24   0.000     .6813273    1.856603 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |   .0130319    .337859     0.04   0.969     -.649869    .6759329 
       d1998 |   .0687798   .3872561     0.18   0.859    -.6910413    .8286008 
       d1999 |   .1486281   .4313123     0.34   0.730     -.697634    .9948903 
       d2000 |  -.2516717   .4872503    -0.52   0.606    -1.207688    .7043445 
       d2001 |  -.0294384   .5631599    -0.05   0.958    -1.134394    1.075517 
       d2002 |   .1530985   .6228805     0.25   0.806    -1.069033     1.37523 
       d2003 |   .2521734   .6808485     0.37   0.711    -1.083695    1.588042 
       d2004 |   .5290596   .7427938     0.71   0.476    -.9283491    1.986468 
       d2005 |   .6040135   .8152234     0.74   0.459    -.9955066    2.203534 
       d2006 |   .5468484   .8829063     0.62   0.536     -1.18547    2.279167 
       d2007 |   .6100633   .9782966     0.62   0.533    -1.309417    2.529544 
       d2008 |   .8098976   1.059337     0.76   0.445    -1.268589    2.888384 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |  (omitted) 
          c5 |  (omitted) 
          c6 |  (omitted) 
          c7 |  (omitted) 
          c8 |  (omitted) 
          c9 |  (omitted) 
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         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |  (omitted) 
         c12 |  (omitted) 
         c13 |  (omitted) 
         c14 |  (omitted) 
          s2 |  (omitted) 
          s3 |  (omitted) 
          s4 |  (omitted) 
          s5 |  (omitted) 
          s6 |  (omitted) 
          s7 |  (omitted) 
          s8 |  (omitted) 
          s9 |  (omitted) 
         s10 |  (omitted) 
         s11 |  (omitted) 
         s12 |  (omitted) 
         s13 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |  -11.95249   15.26013    -0.78   0.434    -41.89383    17.98885 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.4583088 
     sigma_e |  1.2182688 
         rho |  .58896614   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(129, 1131) =     2.12           Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.4 OLS 
. reg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree 
lneconfree lntransition lnicti 
> nfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1283 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 44,  1238) =   75.16 
       Model |  5566.62764    44  126.514265           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2083.96973  1238  1.68333581           R-squared     =  0.7276 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7179 
       Total |  7650.59737  1282  5.96770466           Root MSE      =  1.2974 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .4778515   .0250706    19.06   0.000      .428666     .527037 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -.996562   1.596739    -0.62   0.533    -4.129175    2.136051 
   lntertedu |  -.2239122   .7790083    -0.29   0.774    -1.752235     1.30441 
      lnwage |  -.5886715   .8231173    -0.72   0.475    -2.203531    1.026188 
       lngdp |   .5549401    .790297     0.70   0.483    -.9955293     2.10541 
 lntradefree |  -.1448079   .6402688    -0.23   0.821     -1.40094    1.111324 
  lneconfree |   .5732394   .9968057     0.58   0.565    -1.382376    2.528855 
lntransition |   2.432461   3.107627     0.78   0.434    -3.664335    8.529258 
  lnictinfra |   .2218436   .4265315     0.52   0.603    -.6149608    1.058648 
indprivati~n |   1.655353   .3044638     5.44   0.000     1.058031    2.252675 
       d1996 |  -.8193515   1.127264    -0.73   0.467     -3.03091    1.392207 
       d1997 |  -.6819054   1.012083    -0.67   0.501    -2.667494    1.303683 
       d1998 |  -.6334704   .9104454    -0.70   0.487    -2.419657    1.152716 
       d1999 |  -.5643722   .8483348    -0.67   0.506    -2.228705    1.099961 
       d2000 |  -.9730768   .8039344    -1.21   0.226    -2.550301    .6041477 
       d2001 |  -.5908311   .7311608    -0.81   0.419    -2.025282    .8436201 
       d2002 |  -.4850339   .6386994    -0.76   0.448    -1.738087     .768019 
       d2003 |  -.4556584   .5259541    -0.87   0.386    -1.487518    .5762016 
       d2004 |  -.1850777   .4443288    -0.42   0.677    -1.056799     .686643 
       d2005 |  -.1870454   .3706179    -0.50   0.614    -.9141539    .5400631 
       d2006 |  -.2483097   .3014798    -0.82   0.410    -.8397775    .3431581 
       d2007 |  -.1869985   .2092488    -0.89   0.372      -.59752    .2235229 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |   1.244041   1.145955     1.09   0.278    -1.004188    3.492269 
          c5 |   1.870444   1.793353     1.04   0.297    -1.647903     5.38879 
          c6 |    1.58697   1.591961     1.00   0.319     -1.53627     4.71021 
          c7 |     1.7172   1.581333     1.09   0.278    -1.385188    4.819588 
          c8 |   .8826534   1.029984     0.86   0.392    -1.138054    2.903361 
          c9 |   1.386442   1.298826     1.07   0.286    -1.161701    3.934585 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |   .4861865   2.229463     0.22   0.827    -3.887756    4.860129 
         c12 |   1.377434   1.707043     0.81   0.420    -1.971583    4.726451 
         c13 |   1.339142   1.120368     1.20   0.232     -.858889    3.537172 
         c14 |   1.343043   1.368146     0.98   0.326    -1.341097    4.027184 
          s2 |  -.7603264   .1834158    -4.15   0.000    -1.120167   -.4004862 
          s3 |  -2.140034   .2165296    -9.88   0.000     -2.56484   -1.715229 
          s4 |  -.1852932    .183226    -1.01   0.312     -.544761    .1741746 
          s5 |  -1.609111   .2165958    -7.43   0.000    -2.034047   -1.184176 
          s6 |  -.2057085    .179393    -1.15   0.252    -.5576564    .1462395 
          s7 |   -.626032    .182978    -3.42   0.001    -.9850133   -.2670507 
          s8 |   -.198082   .1833286    -1.08   0.280    -.5577512    .1615871 
          s9 |  -.3850523   .1817988    -2.12   0.034    -.7417201   -.0283845 
         s10 |  -.6752637   .1815645    -3.72   0.000    -1.031472   -.3190555 
         s11 |  -.3444126   .1782365    -1.93   0.054    -.6940915    .0052663 
         s12 |   -.313625   .1779358    -1.76   0.078    -.6627141    .0354641 
         s13 |  -1.287006   .1946514    -6.61   0.000    -1.668889   -.9051231 
       _cons |  -8.980017   15.97736    -0.56   0.574    -40.32571    22.36568 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.7: Different GMM estimators and options 
 
. **Robustess checks: different GMM estimators/options 
. **Baseline Model 6.4 
. **Two-step System GMM with orthogonal deviations 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock   
l.lnwage  , laglimit(1 2) collapse)  
> iv(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu   lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 
>  s2-s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 49                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     81.64                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .3118026   .1164769     2.68   0.008     .0813502    .5422551 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   .0468517   1.163361     0.04   0.968    -2.254886    2.348589 
   lntertedu |  -1.199081   .8440154    -1.42   0.158    -2.868986    .4708243 
      lnwage |  -1.589346   1.563896    -1.02   0.311    -4.683552     1.50486 
       lngdp |   1.086779    1.19042     0.91   0.363    -1.268496    3.442054 
 lntradefree |  -.0564319   .2832339    -0.20   0.842     -.616817    .5039533 
  lneconfree |   1.684713   .6495537     2.59   0.011     .3995553    2.969871 
lntransition |   .0625179   2.601038     0.02   0.981      -5.0837    5.208736 
  lnictinfra |   .5968877   .2842984     2.10   0.038     .0343965    1.159379 
indprivati~n |   1.238553   .5804432     2.13   0.035     .0901318    2.386974 
       d1996 |  -1.418608   1.168044    -1.21   0.227    -3.729611     .892395 
       d1997 |   -1.34834   1.025403    -1.31   0.191    -3.377125    .6804442 
       d1998 |  -1.196141   .9190589    -1.30   0.195    -3.014521    .6222398 
       d1999 |  -1.091693     .82118    -1.33   0.186    -2.716417    .5330319 
       d2000 |  -1.493446   .7842617    -1.90   0.059    -3.045127    .0582345 
       d2001 |  -1.183898    .745564    -1.59   0.115    -2.659015    .2912184 
       d2002 |  -1.026956   .6415318    -1.60   0.112    -2.296242    .2423301 
       d2003 |  -.8394947   .5380433    -1.56   0.121    -1.904027    .2250371 
       d2004 |  -.5001698   .4166954    -1.20   0.232    -1.324612    .3242723 
       d2005 |  -.4229228   .3409997    -1.24   0.217    -1.097599    .2517534 
       d2006 |  -.4305971   .2790515    -1.54   0.125    -.9827074    .1215131 
       d2007 |  -.1126247   .1930198    -0.58   0.561    -.4945192    .2692698 
          c4 |   2.926609   1.394602     2.10   0.038     .1673548    5.685863 
          c5 |   2.246218   1.651374     1.36   0.176    -1.021066    5.513503 
          c6 |   3.638409   2.260917     1.61   0.110    -.8348701    8.111688 
          c7 |   3.286725   1.585354     2.07   0.040     .1500628    6.423386 
          c8 |    2.17646   1.392373     1.56   0.120    -.5783836    4.931305 
          c9 |   2.467177   1.256693     1.96   0.052    -.0192217    4.953575 
         c11 |   2.223938   1.934521     1.15   0.252     -1.60356    6.051435 
         c12 |   1.638658   2.062934     0.79   0.428    -2.442908    5.720224 
         c13 |   2.638554   1.075905     2.45   0.016     .5098484    4.767259 
         c14 |   3.818521   2.165148     1.76   0.080    -.4652773    8.102318 
          s2 |  -1.057647   .3289273    -3.22   0.002    -1.708438   -.4068561 
          s3 |  -2.916411   .7930776    -3.68   0.000    -4.485535   -1.347288 
          s4 |  -.3186784   .2456693    -1.30   0.197    -.8047412    .1673844 
          s5 |  -2.022297   .6883361    -2.94   0.004    -3.384187   -.6604071 
          s6 |  -.3068299   .2108101    -1.46   0.148    -.7239228     .110263 
          s7 |  -.9126659   .2808676    -3.25   0.001    -1.468369   -.3569625 
          s8 |  -.3390712   .2175703    -1.56   0.122    -.7695393    .0913969 
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          s9 |  -.5226335   .2428629    -2.15   0.033    -1.003144   -.0421234 
         s10 |  -.9676882   .2799486    -3.46   0.001    -1.521573   -.4138031 
         s11 |  -.5433867   .2376025    -2.29   0.024    -1.013489   -.0732842 
         s12 |  -.5113618   .2790045    -1.83   0.069    -1.063379    .0406554 
         s13 |  -1.671998   .3938622    -4.25   0.000    -2.451264    -.892732 
       _cons |  -21.39492   19.97551    -1.07   0.286    -60.91695    18.12711 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(L.lnindfdistock L.lnwage) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.(L.lnindfdistock L.lnwage) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.02  Pr > z =  0.043 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.10  Pr > z =  0.271 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   5.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.219 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.488 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.334 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.538 
 
.  
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. **Two-step System GMM with first-differences 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock   
l.lnwage  , laglimit(1 2) collapse)  
> iv(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu   lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 
>  s2-s13) two robust small  
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 49                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     66.09                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2691585   .1777997     1.51   0.133    -.0826225    .6209394 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -1.396712   1.205301    -1.16   0.249    -3.781429    .9880044 
   lntertedu |  -1.096964   .8487584    -1.29   0.199    -2.776254    .5823249 
      lnwage |    1.60485   1.972234     0.81   0.417    -2.297263    5.506963 
       lngdp |  -.9075936   1.557426    -0.58   0.561    -3.988999    2.173811 
 lntradefree |   .1248105   .3399202     0.37   0.714    -.5477299    .7973509 
  lneconfree |   .7273438   .7069848     1.03   0.306    -.6714429    2.126131 
lntransition |   5.468454   3.124856     1.75   0.082    -.7141509    11.65106 
  lnictinfra |   .0848902   .3270981     0.26   0.796    -.5622815    .7320618 
indprivati~n |   .7286264   .5094052     1.43   0.155    -.2792442    1.736497 
       d1996 |  -.1085934   1.900689    -0.06   0.955    -3.869153    3.651967 
       d1997 |  -.1178784   1.654935    -0.07   0.943    -3.392208    3.156451 
       d1998 |  -.1693992   1.464851    -0.12   0.908    -3.067642    2.728844 
       d1999 |   -.125655    1.28858    -0.10   0.922    -2.675143    2.423833 
       d2000 |  -.2669579   1.103164    -0.24   0.809    -2.449594    1.915678 
       d2001 |  -.1212092   1.100814    -0.11   0.912    -2.299196    2.056778 
       d2002 |  -.1464257   .9470683    -0.15   0.877    -2.020223    1.727372 
       d2003 |  -.0178252   .8249837    -0.02   0.983    -1.650076    1.614425 
       d2004 |   .0976067   .6008169     0.16   0.871    -1.091124    1.286338 
       d2005 |   .1140221   .4611591     0.25   0.805    -.7983925    1.026437 
       d2006 |   .0716629   .3654403     0.20   0.845    -.6513697    .7946954 
       d2007 |   .1728076   .2417095     0.71   0.476    -.3054207    .6510359 
          c4 |   .5889191   1.916041     0.31   0.759    -3.202015    4.379853 
          c5 |   4.097405   1.976788     2.07   0.040     .1862808    8.008528 
          c6 |   1.015598    3.39254     0.30   0.765    -5.696627    7.727822 
          c7 |   4.071791   1.811661     2.25   0.026     .4873758    7.656207 
          c8 |   .7695969   2.050836     0.38   0.708    -3.288033    4.827227 
          c9 |   2.394537   1.831614     1.31   0.193    -1.229357    6.018431 
         c11 |   3.804126   1.834229     2.07   0.040     .1750592    7.433193 
         c12 |   5.014132   2.174466     2.31   0.023     .7118978    9.316367 
         c13 |    2.32699      1.371     1.70   0.092    -.3855662    5.039547 
         c14 |   .2438983   2.927808     0.08   0.934    -5.548841    6.036637 
          s2 |  -1.119406   .4049832    -2.76   0.007    -1.920675   -.3181364 
          s3 |  -3.014431   .8684904    -3.47   0.001     -4.73276   -1.296101 
          s4 |  -.3218211   .2654138    -1.21   0.228    -.8469488    .2033067 
          s5 |  -1.971264   .6775162    -2.91   0.004    -3.311747   -.6307821 
          s6 |  -.2893152   .2361387    -1.23   0.223    -.7565214     .177891 
          s7 |  -.9519478   .3473225    -2.74   0.007    -1.639134   -.2647619 
          s8 |  -.3492682   .2486752    -1.40   0.163    -.8412782    .1427419 
          s9 |  -.5305611   .2834785    -1.87   0.064     -1.09143    .0303081 
         s10 |  -1.016318   .3635181    -2.80   0.006    -1.735547   -.2970883 
         s11 |  -.5508828   .2827024    -1.95   0.054    -1.110216    .0084508 
         s12 |  -.5117693   .3254677    -1.57   0.118    -1.155715    .1321766 
         s13 |   -1.69675   .5696414    -2.98   0.003      -2.8238   -.5697009 
       _cons |   11.10659   24.57156     0.45   0.652    -37.50885    59.72203 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(L.lnindfdistock L.lnwage) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.(L.lnindfdistock L.lnwage) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.91  Pr > z =  0.056 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.05  Pr > z =  0.295 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  16.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.433 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   3.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.192 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.775 
 
.  
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. **One-step System GMM with orthogonal deviations 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock   
l.lnwage  , laglimit(1 2) collapse)  
> iv(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu   lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 
>  s2-s13) robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 49                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     82.74                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .3153918   .1697328     1.86   0.065    -.0204287    .6512124 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.5194027   1.166665    -0.45   0.657    -2.827678    1.788873 
   lntertedu |   -.460752   1.127382    -0.41   0.683    -2.691305    1.769801 
      lnwage |  -1.501007   1.458438    -1.03   0.305    -4.386562    1.384548 
       lngdp |   1.214024   1.159024     1.05   0.297    -1.079133    3.507181 
 lntradefree |  -.0916138   .2741554    -0.33   0.739    -.6340371    .4508094 
  lneconfree |   1.063004   .7801689     1.36   0.175    -.4805796    2.606587 
lntransition |   1.126705   2.572192     0.44   0.662    -3.962439     6.21585 
  lnictinfra |    .485981   .3065339     1.59   0.115    -.1205038    1.092466 
indprivati~n |   1.435112   .8615085     1.67   0.098    -.2694037    3.139628 
       d1996 |  -1.259476    1.44291    -0.87   0.384     -4.11431    1.595358 
       d1997 |  -1.091732   1.309633    -0.83   0.406    -3.682873    1.499409 
       d1998 |  -.9788583   1.178588    -0.83   0.408    -3.310724    1.353008 
       d1999 |  -.8563159   1.043498    -0.82   0.413    -2.920901     1.20827 
       d2000 |  -1.292668    .859674    -1.50   0.135    -2.993555    .4082177 
       d2001 |  -.9785031   .8629711    -1.13   0.259    -2.685913    .7289063 
       d2002 |  -.7894262   .7944173    -0.99   0.322      -2.3612    .7823479 
       d2003 |  -.6845515   .6950258    -0.98   0.327    -2.059677    .6905742 
       d2004 |    -.39108    .485758    -0.81   0.422    -1.352164    .5700042 
       d2005 |  -.3275378   .3778065    -0.87   0.388    -1.075037    .4199616 
       d2006 |  -.3684809   .2865428    -1.29   0.201    -.9354129    .1984511 
       d2007 |  -.2616755   .3099199    -0.84   0.400    -.8748596    .3515087 
          c4 |   2.396354   1.546258     1.55   0.124    -.6629542    5.455663 
          c5 |   1.934287   2.065667     0.94   0.351    -2.152686    6.021261 
          c6 |   2.772375   2.644683     1.05   0.296    -2.460194    8.004944 
          c7 |   2.242077    2.30939     0.97   0.333    -2.327108    6.811263 
          c8 |   1.607855   1.681609     0.96   0.341     -1.71925    4.934961 
          c9 |   1.840741   1.828238     1.01   0.316    -1.776474    5.457955 
         c11 |    .760061   2.514112     0.30   0.763     -4.21417    5.734292 
         c12 |   1.087094   2.261959     0.48   0.632    -3.388248    5.562435 
         c13 |   1.970324   1.464224     1.35   0.181    -.9266786    4.867327 
         c14 |   2.880969    2.27329     1.27   0.207    -1.616791    7.378729 
          s2 |  -1.018544   .3847798    -2.65   0.009     -1.77984   -.2572477 
          s3 |  -2.840602   .8704427    -3.26   0.001    -4.562794   -1.118409 
          s4 |   -.276817   .2555616    -1.08   0.281    -.7824519    .2288178 
          s5 |  -2.104155   .6835643    -3.08   0.003    -3.456603   -.7517059 
          s6 |  -.2764831   .2183767    -1.27   0.208    -.7085468    .1555805 
          s7 |  -.8701231   .3437864    -2.53   0.013    -1.550313   -.1899332 
          s8 |  -.2987674   .2328451    -1.28   0.202    -.7594572    .1619224 
          s9 |  -.5076782   .2556348    -1.99   0.049    -1.013458   -.0018986 
         s10 |  -.9210151   .3412125    -2.70   0.008    -1.596112   -.2459179 
         s11 |  -.4967885   .2688938    -1.85   0.067    -1.028801    .0352244 
         s12 |  -.4557158   .3145668    -1.45   0.150    -1.078094    .1666623 
         s13 |  -1.721573   .6000386    -2.87   0.005    -2.908764   -.5343816 
       _cons |  -21.91064   18.88653    -1.16   0.248    -59.27811    15.45683 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(L.lnindfdistock L.lnwage) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.(L.lnindfdistock L.lnwage) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.27  Pr > z =  0.023 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.31  Pr > z =  0.189 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   5.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.219 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.488 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.334 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.538 
 
.  
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. **One-step System GMM with with first-differences 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock   
l.lnwage  , laglimit(1 2) collapse)  
> iv(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu   lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 
>  s2-s13) robust small 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 49                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     64.86                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2678748    .168859     1.59   0.115    -.0662169    .6019666 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -1.848736    1.35692    -1.36   0.175    -4.533435    .8359626 
   lntertedu |    .287518   1.412482     0.20   0.839    -2.507112    3.082148 
      lnwage |   .9234055   2.172794     0.42   0.672    -3.375521    5.222332 
       lngdp |  -.2254943    1.77012    -0.13   0.899    -3.727721    3.276732 
 lntradefree |   .2589226   .3950202     0.66   0.513    -.5226344     1.04048 
  lneconfree |   .4624361   .7272329     0.64   0.526    -.9764121    1.901284 
lntransition |   5.467928   3.469547     1.58   0.117    -1.396655    12.33251 
  lnictinfra |  -.2183336   .4481527    -0.49   0.627    -1.105015    .6683474 
indprivati~n |   1.925279   1.128235     1.71   0.090    -.3069619     4.15752 
       d1996 |  -.3457928   2.186929    -0.16   0.875    -4.672685    3.981099 
       d1997 |  -.3054397   1.925077    -0.16   0.874    -4.114252    3.503372 
       d1998 |  -.3181826   1.711057    -0.19   0.853    -3.703552    3.067187 
       d1999 |   -.239548   1.456781    -0.16   0.870    -3.121824    2.642728 
       d2000 |  -.5104973   1.232078    -0.41   0.679    -2.948194      1.9272 
       d2001 |  -.2108453   1.170733    -0.18   0.857     -2.52717     2.10548 
       d2002 |  -.1156179   1.052906    -0.11   0.913    -2.198818    1.967583 
       d2003 |  -.1267762    .919817    -0.14   0.891    -1.946657    1.693104 
       d2004 |   .1124369   .6714873     0.17   0.867    -1.216117    1.440991 
       d2005 |   .1378212   .5247565     0.26   0.793    -.9004224    1.176065 
       d2006 |   .0308767   .3867978     0.08   0.936    -.7344121    .7961656 
       d2007 |  -.0464679   .3485884    -0.13   0.894    -.7361585    .6432227 
          c4 |   .5490344   2.036861     0.27   0.788    -3.480946    4.579015 
          c5 |   3.249188   1.964979     1.65   0.101    -.6385713    7.136947 
          c6 |   .2181413   4.020064     0.05   0.957    -7.735655    8.171937 
          c7 |    2.21533   2.128302     1.04   0.300    -1.995568    6.426228 
          c8 |   .0116391    2.40668     0.00   0.996    -4.750037    4.773315 
          c9 |   1.245183   2.205259     0.56   0.573    -3.117975    5.608341 
         c11 |   1.260367   2.384455     0.53   0.598    -3.457335     5.97807 
         c12 |   3.409485   2.467439     1.38   0.169    -1.472403    8.291373 
         c13 |   1.460009   1.423811     1.03   0.307    -1.357035    4.277054 
         c14 |  -.1215297   3.308274    -0.04   0.971    -6.667031    6.423972 
          s2 |  -1.083154   .3984149    -2.72   0.007    -1.871428   -.2948804 
          s3 |  -3.028555   .8636083    -3.51   0.001    -4.737225   -1.319884 
          s4 |  -.2940349   .2702652    -1.09   0.279    -.8287613    .2406914 
          s5 |  -2.283995   .6907057    -3.31   0.001    -3.650573   -.9174165 
          s6 |  -.3089412   .2298707    -1.34   0.181    -.7637461    .1458637 
          s7 |  -.9315304   .3549884    -2.62   0.010    -1.633884   -.2291773 
          s8 |  -.3174601   .2463212    -1.29   0.200    -.8048126    .1698925 
          s9 |  -.5668607   .2689586    -2.11   0.037    -1.099002   -.0347195 
         s10 |  -.9827704   .3515568    -2.80   0.006    -1.678334   -.2872066 
         s11 |  -.5331315   .2824298    -1.89   0.061    -1.091926    .0256628 
         s12 |   -.492113   .3328506    -1.48   0.142    -1.150666    .1664401 
         s13 |  -1.839995    .619471    -2.97   0.004    -3.065633   -.6143561 
       _cons |   .7169213   26.58306     0.03   0.979    -51.87831    53.31215 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(L.lnindfdistock L.lnwage) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.(L.lnindfdistock L.lnwage) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.26  Pr > z =  0.024 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.42  Pr > z =  0.155 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =  16.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.433 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   3.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.192 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.775 
 
.  
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. **Two-step Difference GMM with orthogonal deviations 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock   
l.lnwage  , laglimit(1 2) collapse)  
> iv(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu   lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 
>  s2-s13) nolevel two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c4 dropped due to collinearity 
c5 dropped due to collinearity 
c6 dropped due to collinearity 
c7 dropped due to collinearity 
c8 dropped due to collinearity 
c9 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
c11 dropped due to collinearity 
c12 dropped due to collinearity 
c13 dropped due to collinearity 
c14 dropped due to collinearity 
s2 dropped due to collinearity 
s3 dropped due to collinearity 
s4 dropped due to collinearity 
s5 dropped due to collinearity 
s6 dropped due to collinearity 
s7 dropped due to collinearity 
s8 dropped due to collinearity 
s9 dropped due to collinearity 
s10 dropped due to collinearity 
s11 dropped due to collinearity 
s12 dropped due to collinearity 
s13 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step difference GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1153 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       129 
Number of instruments = 24                      Obs per group: min =         0 
F(22, 129)    =     57.37                                      avg =      8.94 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2930003   .1060283     2.76   0.007     .0832207    .5027798 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.4927605   1.051485    -0.47   0.640    -2.573149    1.587628 
   lntertedu |  -.7563393   .7825626    -0.97   0.336    -2.304659      .79198 
      lnwage |   -.988525   1.080394    -0.91   0.362    -3.126111    1.149061 
       lngdp |   .7411505   .9557393     0.78   0.439    -1.149803    2.632104 
 lntradefree |  -.0973139   .2387109    -0.41   0.684    -.5696091    .3749814 
  lneconfree |   1.143403   .6992432     1.64   0.104    -.2400664    2.526873 
lntransition |   1.264554   1.719025     0.74   0.463    -2.136579    4.665687 
  lnictinfra |   .2994335   .3249365     0.92   0.359    -.3434613    .9423284 
indprivati~n |   1.117634   .7609688     1.47   0.144    -.3879616    2.623229 
       d1996 |  -1.520294   .9680214    -1.57   0.119    -3.435548    .3949604 
       d1997 |  -1.438709   .8300253    -1.73   0.085    -3.080934    .2035167 
       d1998 |  -1.305631    .761333    -1.71   0.089    -2.811947    .2006853 
       d1999 |  -1.149328   .6681515    -1.72   0.088    -2.471282    .1726262 
       d2000 |  -1.424333    .560782    -2.54   0.012    -2.533854   -.3148123 
       d2001 |  -1.124522    .550354    -2.04   0.043    -2.213411   -.0356332 
       d2002 |  -.9878034   .4750811    -2.08   0.040    -1.927763   -.0478438 
       d2003 |  -.8303105    .395666    -2.10   0.038    -1.613145   -.0474755 
       d2004 |  -.4831601   .3236007    -1.49   0.138    -1.123412    .1570918 
       d2005 |  -.4042647   .2561911    -1.58   0.117    -.9111452    .1026158 
       d2006 |  -.4005121   .2036581    -1.97   0.051    -.8034547    .0024305 
       d2007 |  -.2775821   .2883635    -0.96   0.338    -.8481164    .2929522 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(L.lnindfdistock L.lnwage) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.07  Pr > z =  0.038 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.15  Pr > z =  0.248 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.602 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
.  
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. **Two-step Difference GMM with first-differences 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock   
l.lnwage  , laglimit(1 2) collapse)  
> iv(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu   lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 
>  s2-s13) nolevel two robust small 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c4 dropped due to collinearity 
c5 dropped due to collinearity 
c6 dropped due to collinearity 
c7 dropped due to collinearity 
c8 dropped due to collinearity 
c9 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
c11 dropped due to collinearity 
c12 dropped due to collinearity 
c13 dropped due to collinearity 
c14 dropped due to collinearity 
s2 dropped due to collinearity 
s3 dropped due to collinearity 
s4 dropped due to collinearity 
s5 dropped due to collinearity 
s6 dropped due to collinearity 
s7 dropped due to collinearity 
s8 dropped due to collinearity 
s9 dropped due to collinearity 
s10 dropped due to collinearity 
s11 dropped due to collinearity 
s12 dropped due to collinearity 
s13 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step difference GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1153 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       129 
Number of instruments = 24                      Obs per group: min =         0 
F(22, 129)    =     29.40                                      avg =      8.94 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .1903081   .1639547     1.16   0.248    -.1340803    .5146965 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   1.225137   2.172029     0.56   0.574    -3.072276    5.522551 
   lntertedu |  -.8779878    1.76518    -0.50   0.620     -4.37044    2.614464 
      lnwage |  -.9167376   2.992441    -0.31   0.760    -6.837355    5.003879 
       lngdp |   2.439099   2.683389     0.91   0.365    -2.870051     7.74825 
 lntradefree |   .2860834   .5209066     0.55   0.584    -.7445431     1.31671 
  lneconfree |  -.6376986   .6840691    -0.93   0.353    -1.991146     .715749 
lntransition |   2.929559   3.017635     0.97   0.333    -3.040906    8.900025 
  lnictinfra |  -.9664639   1.183973    -0.82   0.416    -3.308983    1.376055 
indprivati~n |   1.005035   1.037093     0.97   0.334    -1.046878    3.056949 
       d1996 |  -1.454939   2.399953    -0.61   0.545    -6.203306    3.293427 
       d1997 |  -.9139625   2.062629    -0.44   0.658    -4.994924    3.166999 
       d1998 |   -.743905   1.796452    -0.41   0.679     -4.29823     2.81042 
       d1999 |   -.315584   1.491995    -0.21   0.833    -3.267533    2.636365 
       d2000 |  -.2982558   1.164866    -0.26   0.798    -2.602971     2.00646 
       d2001 |   .1604224   1.060155     0.15   0.880    -1.937119    2.257964 
       d2002 |   .1331592   .8496524     0.16   0.876    -1.547899    1.814217 
       d2003 |   .0904483   .6867668     0.13   0.895    -1.268337    1.449233 
       d2004 |   .2488974   .5866864     0.42   0.672     -.911876    1.409671 
       d2005 |   .2169736   .4670309     0.46   0.643    -.7070584    1.141006 
       d2006 |   .1509676    .382725     0.39   0.694    -.6062632    .9081984 
       d2007 |  -.0494124   .3880439    -0.13   0.899    -.8171667    .7183419 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(L.lnindfdistock L.lnwage) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.79  Pr > z =  0.073 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.38  Pr > z =  0.166 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   4.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.099 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   2.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.294 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
.  
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. **One-step Difference GMM with orthogonal deviations 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock   
l.lnwage  , laglimit(1 2) collapse)  
> iv(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu   lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 
>  s2-s13) nolevel robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c4 dropped due to collinearity 
c5 dropped due to collinearity 
c6 dropped due to collinearity 
c7 dropped due to collinearity 
c8 dropped due to collinearity 
c9 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
c11 dropped due to collinearity 
c12 dropped due to collinearity 
c13 dropped due to collinearity 
c14 dropped due to collinearity 
s2 dropped due to collinearity 
s3 dropped due to collinearity 
s4 dropped due to collinearity 
s5 dropped due to collinearity 
s6 dropped due to collinearity 
s7 dropped due to collinearity 
s8 dropped due to collinearity 
s9 dropped due to collinearity 
s10 dropped due to collinearity 
s11 dropped due to collinearity 
s12 dropped due to collinearity 
s13 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step difference GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1153 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       129 
Number of instruments = 24                      Obs per group: min =         0 
F(22, 129)    =     59.44                                      avg =      8.94 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .3742096   .1615508     2.32   0.022     .0545774    .6938418 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.5324873   1.068499    -0.50   0.619    -2.646539    1.581565 
   lntertedu |  -.2691231   1.091236    -0.25   0.806    -2.428161    1.889914 
      lnwage |  -1.109091   1.140859    -0.97   0.333    -3.366308    1.148127 
       lngdp |   .8638822   1.005014     0.86   0.392    -1.124562    2.852326 
 lntradefree |  -.0909696   .2419678    -0.38   0.708    -.5697088    .3877697 
  lneconfree |   .9428296    .844571     1.12   0.266    -.7281748    2.613834 
lntransition |   1.572588   1.781331     0.88   0.379    -1.951819    5.096995 
  lnictinfra |   .3687599   .3374664     1.09   0.277    -.2989257    1.036445 
indprivati~n |   1.539059   .9305875     1.65   0.101    -.3021316    3.380249 
       d1996 |  -1.063788    1.14551    -0.93   0.355    -3.330208    1.202631 
       d1997 |  -.9621468   1.056675    -0.91   0.364    -3.052804     1.12851 
       d1998 |  -.8656549   .9763563    -0.89   0.377      -2.7974     1.06609 
       d1999 |  -.7645111   .8507447    -0.90   0.371     -2.44773    .9187081 
       d2000 |  -1.188517   .6271413    -1.90   0.060    -2.429332    .0522972 
       d2001 |   -.845211   .6683859    -1.26   0.208    -2.167629    .4772069 
       d2002 |  -.6832481   .6377413    -1.07   0.286    -1.945035    .5785387 
       d2003 |   -.596077   .5219533    -1.14   0.256    -1.628774    .4366203 
       d2004 |  -.3198882   .3898462    -0.82   0.413    -1.091208    .4514319 
       d2005 |  -.2882423     .29969    -0.96   0.338    -.8811864    .3047018 
       d2006 |   -.334738   .2202185    -1.52   0.131    -.7704457    .1009698 
       d2007 |  -.2380554   .2992249    -0.80   0.428    -.8300792    .3539685 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
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  Standard 
    FOD.(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(L.lnindfdistock L.lnwage) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.14  Pr > z =  0.033 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.21  Pr > z =  0.225 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.602 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
.  
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. **Two-step Difference GMM with first-differences 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock   
l.lnwage  , laglimit(1 2) collapse)  
> iv(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu   lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 
>  s2-s13) nolevel robust small 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c4 dropped due to collinearity 
c5 dropped due to collinearity 
c6 dropped due to collinearity 
c7 dropped due to collinearity 
c8 dropped due to collinearity 
c9 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
c11 dropped due to collinearity 
c12 dropped due to collinearity 
c13 dropped due to collinearity 
c14 dropped due to collinearity 
s2 dropped due to collinearity 
s3 dropped due to collinearity 
s4 dropped due to collinearity 
s5 dropped due to collinearity 
s6 dropped due to collinearity 
s7 dropped due to collinearity 
s8 dropped due to collinearity 
s9 dropped due to collinearity 
s10 dropped due to collinearity 
s11 dropped due to collinearity 
s12 dropped due to collinearity 
s13 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step difference GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1153 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       129 
Number of instruments = 24                      Obs per group: min =         0 
F(22, 129)    =     32.51                                      avg =      8.94 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .4097621   .1917979     2.14   0.035     .0302852    .7892389 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.9777922   2.663254    -0.37   0.714    -6.247106    4.291522 
   lntertedu |   2.635979   3.047204     0.87   0.389     -3.39299    8.664947 
      lnwage |   2.896084   4.266317     0.68   0.498    -5.544928     11.3371 
       lngdp |  -1.068887   3.945235    -0.27   0.787     -8.87463    6.736857 
 lntradefree |   .6865883   .7136727     0.96   0.338    -.7254306    2.098607 
  lneconfree |  -1.587547   1.063717    -1.49   0.138    -3.692138    .5170441 
lntransition |   5.715283   3.859109     1.48   0.141    -1.920058    13.35062 
  lnictinfra |  -1.163273   1.136022    -1.02   0.308    -3.410921    1.084374 
indprivati~n |   2.427789    1.42494     1.70   0.091    -.3914891    5.247067 
       d1996 |   .5316167   2.875291     0.18   0.854    -5.157217    6.220451 
       d1997 |   .7442441   2.443995     0.30   0.761     -4.09126    5.579748 
       d1998 |   .7484036   2.136189     0.35   0.727    -3.478099    4.974906 
       d1999 |   .8319356   1.718803     0.48   0.629    -2.568758     4.23263 
       d2000 |   .7298896   1.394292     0.52   0.602    -2.028751     3.48853 
       d2001 |   1.189035   1.331886     0.89   0.374    -1.446134    3.824204 
       d2002 |   1.114755   1.144752     0.97   0.332    -1.150164    3.379674 
       d2003 |   .8622895   .8974387     0.96   0.338     -.913315    2.637894 
       d2004 |   .9765492    .827137     1.18   0.240    -.6599617     2.61306 
       d2005 |   .8222447   .6738815     1.22   0.225    -.5110463    2.155536 
       d2006 |    .577263   .5079175     1.14   0.258    -.4276642     1.58219 
       d2007 |   .2024043   .4380825     0.46   0.645    -.6643527    1.069161 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
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  Standard 
    D.(lngdp lnsecedu lntertedu lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(L.lnindfdistock L.lnwage) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.09  Pr > z =  0.036 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.20  Pr > z =  0.231 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   4.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.099 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   2.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.294 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
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Appendix 6.8: Reducing the instrument count 
. **Checking robustness by reducing the number of instruments  
. **start with Baseline Model 6.4 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv(lnsecedu l 
> ntertedu  lnwage lngdp     lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2 
> -s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 47                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     89.93                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .3208334   .1117719     2.87   0.005       .09969    .5419769 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -.533791   1.040238    -0.51   0.609    -2.591928    1.524346 
   lntertedu |  -1.014866    .828662    -1.22   0.223    -2.654394    .6246623 
      lnwage |  -.4811796   .4289389    -1.12   0.264    -1.329846    .3674865 
       lngdp |   .3232995    .538482     0.60   0.549    -.7421003    1.388699 
 lntradefree |  -.0156689   .2795488    -0.06   0.955     -.568763    .5374253 
  lneconfree |   1.555186    .646416     2.41   0.018     .2762365    2.834136 
lntransition |   2.226154   1.108879     2.01   0.047     .0322095    4.420099 
  lnictinfra |   .3942821   .2317451     1.70   0.091    -.0642313    .8527956 
indprivati~n |    1.30017    .692433     1.88   0.063    -.0698252    2.670166 
       d1996 |  -.9040535    .744114    -1.21   0.227    -2.376301    .5681942 
       d1997 |  -.9096219   .7171691    -1.27   0.207    -2.328558    .5093148 
       d1998 |  -.8653015   .6743822    -1.28   0.202    -2.199583    .4689801 
       d1999 |  -.7769027   .6236156    -1.25   0.215    -2.010741     .456936 
       d2000 |  -1.120688    .526311    -2.13   0.035    -2.162007   -.0793687 
       d2001 |  -.8396037   .5206383    -1.61   0.109    -1.869699     .190492 
       d2002 |  -.7322052   .4465472    -1.64   0.104     -1.61571    .1512994 
       d2003 |  -.6432739   .4242456    -1.52   0.132    -1.482654    .1961064 
       d2004 |  -.2990308   .2750488    -1.09   0.279    -.8432216    .2451601 
       d2005 |  -.2410968   .2048553    -1.18   0.241     -.646408    .1642143 
       d2006 |  -.2709131   .1581928    -1.71   0.089    -.5839014    .0420752 
       d2007 |  -.0226139   .1101029    -0.21   0.838    -.2404553    .1952274 
          c4 |   2.143116   .8504812     2.52   0.013     .4604184    3.825814 
          c5 |   2.861377   1.588306     1.80   0.074    -.2811263    6.003879 
          c6 |   2.344773   1.332944     1.76   0.081    -.2924895    4.982035 
          c7 |   3.373176   1.664154     2.03   0.045     .0806068    6.665745 
          c8 |   1.515622   .9709776     1.56   0.121    -.4054807    3.436725 
          c9 |   2.255235   1.217279     1.85   0.066    -.1531816    4.663652 
         c11 |    2.69387    1.93081     1.40   0.165    -1.126285    6.514024 
         c12 |   2.795191   1.518817     1.84   0.068    -.2098246    5.800207 
         c13 |   2.459607   1.092451     2.25   0.026     .2981662    4.621048 
         c14 |    2.40213   1.059094     2.27   0.025     .3066859    4.497574 
          s2 |  -1.003029   .3208703    -3.13   0.002    -1.637879   -.3681792 
          s3 |  -2.843619   .7675946    -3.70   0.000    -4.362324   -1.324914 
          s4 |  -.2663226   .2382375    -1.12   0.266    -.7376813    .2050362 
          s5 |  -2.080592   .5994255    -3.47   0.001     -3.26657   -.8946138 
          s6 |  -.2634231   .2085931    -1.26   0.209    -.6761297    .1492835 
          s7 |  -.8562062   .2694939    -3.18   0.002    -1.389407   -.3230059 
          s8 |  -.2892621   .2128607    -1.36   0.177    -.7104123     .131888 
          s9 |  -.4886417   .2366244    -2.07   0.041    -.9568088   -.0204746 
         s10 |  -.9078983   .2684454    -3.38   0.001    -1.439024   -.3767725 
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         s11 |   -.486165   .2320611    -2.09   0.038    -.9453037   -.0270264 
         s12 |  -.4438315   .2777173    -1.60   0.112     -.993302    .1056389 
         s13 |  -1.586333   .3809908    -4.16   0.000    -2.340133   -.8325336 
       _cons |   -9.37977    11.0529    -0.85   0.398    -31.24821    12.48867 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.13  Pr > z =  0.033 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.06  Pr > z =  0.289 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   4.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.087 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.609 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.612 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.392 
 
.  
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. **testing joint significance of dummies 
. test c4=c5=c6=c7=c8=c9=c11=c12=c13=0 
 
 ( 1)  c4 - c5 = 0 
 ( 2)  c4 - c6 = 0 
 ( 3)  c4 - c7 = 0 
 ( 4)  c4 - c8 = 0 
 ( 5)  c4 - c9 = 0 
 ( 6)  c4 - c11 = 0 
 ( 7)  c4 - c12 = 0 
 ( 8)  c4 - c13 = 0 
 ( 9)  c4 = 0 
 
       F(  9,   129) =    1.98 
            Prob > F =    0.0463 
 
. test d1996=d1997=d1998=d1999=d2000=d2001=d2002=d2003=d2004=d2005=d2006=d2007=0 
 
 ( 1)  d1996 - d1997 = 0 
 ( 2)  d1996 - d1998 = 0 
 ( 3)  d1996 - d1999 = 0 
 ( 4)  d1996 - d2000 = 0 
 ( 5)  d1996 - d2001 = 0 
 ( 6)  d1996 - d2002 = 0 
 ( 7)  d1996 - d2003 = 0 
 ( 8)  d1996 - d2004 = 0 
 ( 9)  d1996 - d2005 = 0 
 (10)  d1996 - d2006 = 0 
 (11)  d1996 - d2007 = 0 
 (12)  d1996 = 0 
 
       F( 12,   129) =    3.15 
            Prob > F =    0.0006 
 
. test s2=s3=s4=s5=s6=s7=s8=s9=s10=s11=s12=s13=0 
 
 ( 1)  s2 - s3 = 0 
 ( 2)  s2 - s4 = 0 
 ( 3)  s2 - s5 = 0 
 ( 4)  s2 - s6 = 0 
 ( 5)  s2 - s7 = 0 
 ( 6)  s2 - s8 = 0 
 ( 7)  s2 - s9 = 0 
 ( 8)  s2 - s10 = 0 
 ( 9)  s2 - s11 = 0 
 (10)  s2 - s12 = 0 
 (11)  s2 - s13 = 0 
 (12)  s2 = 0 
 
       F( 12,   129) =    2.10 
            Prob > F =    0.0209 
 
.  
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. **limit lag length to lag 1 only 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 1) collapse) iv(lnsecedu l 
> ntertedu  lnwage lngdp     lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2 
> -s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 46                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     96.31                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .3941117   .1103209     3.57   0.000      .175839    .6123844 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.6819076   1.074021    -0.63   0.527    -2.806885     1.44307 
   lntertedu |  -.2879896    1.09214    -0.26   0.792    -2.448815    1.872836 
      lnwage |  -.6691042   .4641303    -1.44   0.152    -1.587397     .249189 
       lngdp |   .5540893   .5870941     0.94   0.347    -.6074907    1.715669 
 lntradefree |  -.0415594   .2653751    -0.16   0.876    -.5666106    .4834918 
  lneconfree |   1.079604   .8117343     1.33   0.186    -.5264321     2.68564 
lntransition |   2.453441   1.129033     2.17   0.032     .2196205    4.687261 
  lnictinfra |   .4411933   .2333615     1.89   0.061    -.0205181    .9029047 
indprivati~n |   1.664574   .7451581     2.23   0.027     .1902605    3.138888 
       d1996 |  -.5198179   .7594564    -0.68   0.495    -2.022421    .9827853 
       d1997 |   -.461927   .7654574    -0.60   0.547    -1.976403    1.052549 
       d1998 |  -.4359923   .7275555    -0.60   0.550    -1.875479    1.003494 
       d1999 |   -.397477   .6635862    -0.60   0.550    -1.710399    .9154445 
       d2000 |  -.8909695   .4955192    -1.80   0.075    -1.871366    .0894273 
       d2001 |  -.5670213   .5325987    -1.06   0.289    -1.620781    .4867383 
       d2002 |  -.4241713   .4971045    -0.85   0.395    -1.407705     .559362 
       d2003 |  -.3869563   .4648622    -0.83   0.407    -1.306697    .5327849 
       d2004 |  -.1443547   .2734652    -0.53   0.598    -.6854123    .3967029 
       d2005 |  -.1351844   .1998528    -0.68   0.500    -.5305981    .2602293 
       d2006 |  -.2179156    .140639    -1.55   0.124    -.4961732     .060342 
       d2007 |  -.0885259   .1376497    -0.64   0.521    -.3608693    .1838175 
          c4 |   1.572689   .9349458     1.68   0.095     -.277124    3.422502 
          c5 |   1.905097   1.781897     1.07   0.287     -1.62043    5.430623 
          c6 |   1.387911   1.501631     0.92   0.357    -1.583102    4.358925 
          c7 |   1.910462    2.11309     0.90   0.368    -2.270338    6.091263 
          c8 |   .8080908   1.115498     0.72   0.470    -1.398949     3.01513 
          c9 |   1.259658   1.493367     0.84   0.401    -1.695004     4.21432 
         c11 |   1.078344    2.48017     0.43   0.664    -3.828732     5.98542 
         c12 |   1.686599   1.821377     0.93   0.356     -1.91704    5.290239 
         c13 |   1.597011   1.313623     1.22   0.226    -1.002024    4.196047 
         c14 |   1.634928   1.160712     1.41   0.161    -.6615697    3.931425 
          s2 |  -.8893628   .3148124    -2.83   0.005    -1.512227   -.2664987 
          s3 |  -2.529691    .726899    -3.48   0.001    -3.967878   -1.091503 
          s4 |  -.2256783    .234869    -0.96   0.338    -.6903722    .2390157 
          s5 |  -1.876678   .5745456    -3.27   0.001    -3.013431   -.7399258 
          s6 |  -.2406225   .2060244    -1.17   0.245    -.6482468    .1670019 
          s7 |  -.7453531   .2679377    -2.78   0.006    -1.275474   -.2152317 
          s8 |  -.2437034   .2103172    -1.16   0.249    -.6598212    .1724143 
          s9 |  -.4496206   .2326964    -1.93   0.056     -.910016    .0107749 
         s10 |  -.7965863   .2663393    -2.99   0.003    -1.323545   -.2696274 
         s11 |  -.4180931   .2291747    -1.82   0.070    -.8715209    .0353347 
         s12 |  -.3760593   .2780088    -1.35   0.179    -.9261066    .1739879 
         s13 |  -1.449896   .3484933    -4.16   0.000    -2.139399   -.7603933 
       _cons |  -12.79457   11.48754    -1.11   0.267    -35.52295    9.933811 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.13  Pr > z =  0.033 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.05  Pr > z =  0.296 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   0.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.407 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   0.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.615 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.615 
 
.  
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. **lag 1 only + drop time dummies 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, laglimit(1 1) 
collapse) iv(lnsecedu lntertedu  ln 
> wage lngdp     lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation c2-
c14 s2-s13) two robust small o 
> rthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 34                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(32, 129)    =    112.29                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .3764636   .1934389     1.95   0.054      -.00626    .7591871 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -.171759   .9792483    -0.18   0.861    -2.109226    1.765708 
   lntertedu |  -.1231369   1.318128    -0.09   0.926    -2.731086    2.484812 
      lnwage |   -.250018   .4850901    -0.52   0.607    -1.209781    .7097448 
       lngdp |   .7288795   .4080439     1.79   0.076    -.0784453    1.536204 
 lntradefree |  -.3952729   .4040027    -0.98   0.330    -1.194602    .4040564 
  lneconfree |   1.279448   .5539172     2.31   0.022     .1835093    2.375387 
lntransition |    1.58898   1.014233     1.57   0.120    -.4177053    3.595664 
  lnictinfra |   .3102064   .1615489     1.92   0.057     -.009422    .6298348 
indprivati~n |   1.654461   .8647889     1.91   0.058    -.0565454    3.365467 
          c4 |   .9965928   .5264762     1.89   0.061    -.0450533    2.038239 
          c5 |   .9069865   1.088311     0.83   0.406    -1.246263    3.060236 
          c6 |   .7000743   1.508338     0.46   0.643    -2.284209    3.684357 
          c7 |   .9778697   1.695634     0.58   0.565    -2.376983    4.332723 
          c8 |   .2989524   1.030428     0.29   0.772    -1.739774    2.337679 
          c9 |   .5430532   1.322144     0.41   0.682    -2.072841    3.158948 
         c11 |   .4071503   1.937629     0.21   0.834    -3.426497    4.240797 
         c12 |   1.119358   1.428807     0.78   0.435    -1.707572    3.946287 
         c13 |   .9620363   .8610701     1.12   0.266    -.7416119    2.665685 
         c14 |   .8514235   .9148714     0.93   0.354    -.9586719    2.661519 
          s2 |  -.9130881   .4007695    -2.28   0.024     -1.70602   -.1201557 
          s3 |  -2.613937   1.036353    -2.52   0.013    -4.664387   -.5634869 
          s4 |  -.2364176   .2567487    -0.92   0.359    -.7444012     .271566 
          s5 |   -1.93409   .7408903    -2.61   0.010    -3.399959   -.4682199 
          s6 |  -.2513339    .219791    -1.14   0.255    -.6861958     .183528 
          s7 |   -.773169   .3655342    -2.12   0.036    -1.496387   -.0499507 
          s8 |  -.2555357   .2377598    -1.07   0.284    -.7259493    .2148779 
          s9 |  -.4606759   .2554996    -1.80   0.074    -.9661881    .0448362 
         s10 |  -.8243677   .3645652    -2.26   0.025    -1.545669   -.1030666 
         s11 |  -.4344565   .2787699    -1.56   0.122    -.9860096    .1170966 
         s12 |  -.3894063   .3086802    -1.26   0.209    -1.000138     .221325 
         s13 |  -1.495252   .5716175    -2.62   0.010    -2.626211   -.3642927 
       _cons |  -19.10277   8.826993    -2.16   0.032    -36.56719   -1.638349 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 
    s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
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    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 
    s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.11  Pr > z =  0.035 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.09  Pr > z =  0.274 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   0.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.638 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   0.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.576 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.576 
 
.  
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. **lag 1 only + drop time & sector dummies 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation c2-c14, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, laglimit(1 1) collapse) 
iv(lnsecedu lntertedu  lnwage ln 
> gdp     lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation c2-c14 ) 
two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 22                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(20, 129)    =     79.94                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .4028806    .195752     2.06   0.042     .0155806    .7901806 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.1311129   .9917576    -0.13   0.895     -2.09333    1.831104 
   lntertedu |  -.1114431   1.305805    -0.09   0.932    -2.695011    2.472125 
      lnwage |  -.3644721    .493494    -0.74   0.462    -1.340862    .6119179 
       lngdp |   .8274061   .4127889     2.00   0.047     .0106932    1.644119 
 lntradefree |  -.4164439   .3852922    -1.08   0.282    -1.178754    .3458662 
  lneconfree |   1.282053   .5785274     2.22   0.028     .1374224    2.426684 
lntransition |   1.360653   1.108516     1.23   0.222    -.8325722    3.553879 
  lnictinfra |    .310408   .1509293     2.06   0.042     .0117906    .6090254 
indprivati~n |   1.643025   .7464403     2.20   0.030     .1661742    3.119875 
          c4 |   .8671793    .516155     1.68   0.095    -.1540461    1.888405 
          c5 |   .5387926   1.114507     0.48   0.630    -1.666286    2.743871 
          c6 |   .6339256   1.454935     0.44   0.664    -2.244698     3.51255 
          c7 |   .6544548   1.638001     0.40   0.690    -2.586369    3.895279 
          c8 |   .3308169   1.029282     0.32   0.748    -1.705643    2.367277 
          c9 |   .2905566   1.340887     0.22   0.829     -2.36242    2.943534 
         c11 |   .1763581   1.983485     0.09   0.929    -3.748016    4.100732 
         c12 |    .990764   1.481791     0.67   0.505    -1.940995    3.922523 
         c13 |   .7701365   .8206513     0.94   0.350    -.8535422    2.393815 
         c14 |   .8637202   .9336956     0.93   0.357    -.9836194     2.71106 
       _cons |  -21.31364   9.249435    -2.30   0.023    -39.61388    -3.01341 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.13  Pr > z =  0.033 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.02  Pr > z =  0.310 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   0.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.512 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   0.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.424 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
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Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.424 
 
.  
. **lag 1 only + drop time, sector & year dummies  
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock     lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, laglimit(1 1) collapse) 
iv(lnsecedu lntertedu  lnwage lngdp     
>  lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation) two robust small 
orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 12                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(10, 129)    =     98.43                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .5061902   .1590555     3.18   0.002      .191495    .8208854 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.0957877   .2990294    -0.32   0.749    -.6874248    .4958494 
   lntertedu |   -.371845   .3050338    -1.22   0.225    -.9753618    .2316719 
      lnwage |  -.0998372   .1459941    -0.68   0.495    -.3886901    .1890157 
       lngdp |    .566149   .1876215     3.02   0.003     .1949353    .9373627 
 lntradefree |  -.6655098   .4103886    -1.62   0.107    -1.477474     .146454 
  lneconfree |   .7466977   .7935578     0.94   0.348    -.8233758    2.316771 
lntransition |   2.755338   1.923395     1.43   0.154    -1.050146    6.560821 
  lnictinfra |    .212107   .1414691     1.50   0.136     -.067793     .492007 
indprivati~n |   1.948911   .5954608     3.27   0.001     .7707773    3.127045 
       _cons |  -14.18927    5.62458    -2.52   0.013    -25.31764   -3.060906 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.36  Pr > z =  0.018 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.83  Pr > z =  0.407 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   3.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.053 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   2.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.140 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   2.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.140 
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Appendix 6.9: Model 6.5 results 
. **Model 6.5 System GMM 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu medium high  lnsecmed 
lnsechigh lntertmed lnterthigh l 
> nwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-
d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lni 
> ndfdistock, laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv(lnsecedu lntertedu medium high  lnsecmed 
lnsechigh lntertmed lnterthigh l 
> nwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-
d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13) two robus 
> t small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
s9 dropped due to collinearity 
s12 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 51                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(48, 129)    =     95.50                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .3186341   .1155068     2.76   0.007      .090101    .5471672 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.7075837   .9959982    -0.71   0.479    -2.678191    1.263023 
   lntertedu |  -.6692939   .7609879    -0.88   0.381    -2.174927    .8363393 
      medium |  -.2675938   1.223482    -0.22   0.827    -2.688282    2.153095 
        high |  -.0316611   1.116168    -0.03   0.977    -2.240027    2.176704 
    lnsecmed |   .3302604   .3722931     0.89   0.377    -.4063306    1.066851 
   lnsechigh |   .0870308   .3449474     0.25   0.801    -.5954561    .7695177 
   lntertmed |   -.738955   .4530264    -1.63   0.105    -1.635279    .1573689 
  lnterthigh |  -.3753829    .341706    -1.10   0.274    -1.051457    .3006907 
      lnwage |  -.4806463   .4288579    -1.12   0.264    -1.329152    .3678596 
       lngdp |   .3234916   .5414496     0.60   0.551    -.7477797    1.394763 
 lntradefree |  -.0110028   .2828068    -0.04   0.969    -.5705429    .5485373 
  lneconfree |    1.53208   .6561581     2.33   0.021      .233855    2.830305 
lntransition |   2.217576   1.113234     1.99   0.048     .0150159    4.420136 
  lnictinfra |   .3917369   .2374591     1.65   0.101    -.0780818    .8615556 
indprivati~n |   1.300261   .7022273     1.85   0.066    -.0891128    2.689635 
       d1996 |  -.9259038   .7763041    -1.19   0.235     -2.46184    .6100328 
       d1997 |  -.9292165   .7489195    -1.24   0.217    -2.410972    .5525391 
       d1998 |  -.8836442   .7041417    -1.25   0.212    -2.276806    .5095174 
       d1999 |  -.7931488   .6494056    -1.22   0.224    -2.078014     .491716 
       d2000 |  -1.132953    .546507    -2.07   0.040     -2.21423   -.0516754 
       d2001 |  -.8502346   .5406804    -1.57   0.118    -1.919984    .2195147 
       d2002 |  -.7419855   .4658944    -1.59   0.114    -1.663769    .1797981 
       d2003 |  -.6509138   .4347867    -1.50   0.137     -1.51115    .2093223 
       d2004 |  -.3050955   .2868833    -1.06   0.290    -.8727011    .2625102 
       d2005 |  -.2456584   .2135151    -1.15   0.252    -.6681033    .1767865 
       d2006 |  -.2744388   .1635764    -1.68   0.096    -.5980787    .0492012 
       d2007 |  -.0315988   .1160358    -0.27   0.786    -.2611784    .1979809 
          c4 |   2.145751    .889404     2.41   0.017     .3860436    3.905459 
          c5 |   2.890242   1.639949     1.76   0.080    -.3544381    6.134922 
          c6 |    2.35833   1.385946     1.70   0.091     -.383799    5.100459 
          c7 |    3.38911   1.736309     1.95   0.053      -.04622    6.824439 
          c8 |   1.515109   1.010399     1.50   0.136    -.4839892    3.514208 
          c9 |   2.269701    1.26919     1.79   0.076    -.2414224    4.780825 
         c11 |   2.674857   1.984967     1.35   0.180    -1.252449    6.602163 
         c12 |   2.801168   1.559792     1.80   0.075    -.2849174    5.887254 
         c13 |   2.447954   1.128848     2.17   0.032     .2145014    4.681407 
         c14 |   2.379993    1.09593     2.17   0.032     .2116693    4.548318 
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          s2 |   -1.01171   .3109367    -3.25   0.001    -1.626906    -.396514 
          s3 |  -2.841134   .7682494    -3.70   0.000    -4.361134   -1.321134 
          s4 |  -.2582483   .2152177    -1.20   0.232    -.6840618    .1675652 
          s5 |  -1.612347   .5246853    -3.07   0.003     -2.65045   -.5742447 
          s6 |   .1820921   .2407576     0.76   0.451    -.2942527     .658437 
          s7 |  -.3765197   .2185681    -1.72   0.087     -.808962    .0559226 
          s8 |   .1724847   .1789014     0.96   0.337    -.1814761    .5264456 
         s10 |  -.4640475   .2668551    -1.74   0.084    -.9920269    .0639319 
         s11 |  -.0420604   .2473929    -0.17   0.865    -.5315334    .4474126 
         s13 |  -1.596439   .3735762    -4.27   0.000    -2.335569   -.8573095 
       _cons |   -9.29383   11.22656    -0.83   0.409    -31.50585    12.91819 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu medium high lnsecmed lnsechigh lntertmed 
    lnterthigh lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu medium high lnsecmed lnsechigh lntertmed lnterthigh 
    lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.11  Pr > z =  0.035 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.07  Pr > z =  0.286 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   4.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.096 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.624 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.606 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.411 
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. **testing the joint significance of technological dummies and their interactions 
. test  lntertmed=lnterthigh=lnsecmed=lnsechigh=0 
 
 ( 1)  lntertmed - lnterthigh = 0 
 ( 2)  - lnsecmed + lntertmed = 0 
 ( 3)  - lnsechigh + lntertmed = 0 
 ( 4)  lntertmed = 0 
 
       F(  4,   129) =    0.79 
            Prob > F =    0.5367 
 
. test  lntertmed=lnterthigh=0 
 
 ( 1)  lntertmed - lnterthigh = 0 
 ( 2)  lntertmed = 0 
 
       F(  2,   129) =    1.34 
            Prob > F =    0.2666 
 
. test  lnsecmed=lnsechigh=0 
 
 ( 1)  lnsecmed - lnsechigh = 0 
 ( 2)  lnsecmed = 0 
 
       F(  2,   129) =    0.48 
            Prob > F =    0.6230 
 
. test  lntertmed=lnterthigh=lnsecmed=lnsechigh=high=medium=0 
 
 ( 1)  lntertmed - lnterthigh = 0 
 ( 2)  - lnsecmed + lntertmed = 0 
 ( 3)  - lnsechigh + lntertmed = 0 
 ( 4)  - high + lntertmed = 0 
 ( 5)  - medium + lntertmed = 0 
 ( 6)  lntertmed = 0 
 
       F(  6,   129) =    1.32 
            Prob > F =    0.2550 
 
. test high=medium=0 
 
 ( 1)  - medium + high = 0 
 ( 2)  high = 0 
 
       F(  2,   129) =    0.03 
            Prob > F =    0.9712 
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. **Calculating long-run coefficients 
. nlcom _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.038478   1.511925    -0.69   0.493     -4.02986    1.952903 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.9822826   1.024879    -0.96   0.340     -3.01003    1.045465 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[medium]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[medium]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.3927314   1.793787    -0.22   0.827    -3.941782     3.15632 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[high]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[high]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0464671   1.637247    -0.03   0.977    -3.285801    3.192866 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnsecmed]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnsecmed]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .4847034   .5203027     0.93   0.353    -.5447283    1.514135 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnsechigh]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnsechigh]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .1277299   .5007642     0.26   0.799    -.8630443    1.118504 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntertmed]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntertmed]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   -1.08452   .5716462    -1.90   0.060    -2.215536     .046496 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. nlcom _b[lnterthigh]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnterthigh]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.5509271   .4697511    -1.17   0.243    -1.480341    .3784871 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.7054158   .6465677    -1.09   0.277    -1.984666    .5738342 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .4747693   .8051704     0.59   0.556     -1.11828    2.067819 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0161482   .4164811    -0.04   0.969    -.8401662    .8078698 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   2.248542   .9122624     2.46   0.015     .4436086    4.053475 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   3.254603   1.588275     2.05   0.042     .1121617    6.397045 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .5749288   .3707886     1.55   0.123    -.1586856    1.308543 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   1.908315   1.210645     1.58   0.117     -.486975    4.303606 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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.  
 
. **Model 6.4 FE 
. xtreg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu medium high  lnsecmed 
lnsechigh lntertmed lnterthigh lnwa 
> ge lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-
d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s12 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1283 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       130 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2588                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.9543                                        avg =       9.9 
       overall = 0.7295                                        max =        13 
 
                                                Wald chi2(48)      =   3327.56 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |    .466158   .0253451    18.39   0.000     .4164825    .5158334 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -1.138928   1.601715    -0.71   0.477    -4.278231    2.000375 
   lntertedu |   .1274414   .7898702     0.16   0.872    -1.420676    1.675559 
      medium |   .0142298   .9590468     0.01   0.988    -1.865467    1.893927 
        high |    .083502   .9127848     0.09   0.927    -1.705523    1.872527 
    lnsecmed |   .2907087   .2883759     1.01   0.313    -.2744976    .8559151 
   lnsechigh |    .094277   .2770552     0.34   0.734    -.4487412    .6372953 
   lntertmed |  -.7559742   .2673351    -2.83   0.005    -1.279941   -.2320071 
  lnterthigh |  -.3856889   .2572142    -1.50   0.134    -.8898194    .1184416 
      lnwage |  -.5912116   .8216276    -0.72   0.472    -2.201572    1.019149 
       lngdp |   .5555586   .7888705     0.70   0.481    -.9905992    2.101716 
 lntradefree |  -.1319482   .6391154    -0.21   0.836    -1.384591    1.120695 
  lneconfree |   .5943793   .9950677     0.60   0.550    -1.355918    2.544676 
lntransition |   2.433742   3.101951     0.78   0.433    -3.645969    8.513454 
  lnictinfra |   .2369778   .4257908     0.56   0.578    -.5975568    1.071512 
indprivati~n |   1.660414   .3039669     5.46   0.000      1.06465    2.256179 
       d1996 |  -.8174703   1.125214    -0.73   0.468    -3.022849    1.387909 
       d1997 |  -.6837736   1.010238    -0.68   0.499    -2.663803    1.296256 
       d1998 |  -.6354915   .9087861    -0.70   0.484    -2.416679    1.145696 
       d1999 |  -.5663146   .8467888    -0.67   0.504     -2.22599    1.093361 
       d2000 |  -.9754321   .8024712    -1.22   0.224    -2.548247    .5973826 
       d2001 |  -.5980579   .7298341    -0.82   0.413    -2.028506    .8323906 
       d2002 |  -.4895536   .6375395    -0.77   0.443    -1.739108    .7600008 
       d2003 |  -.4571827   .5249981    -0.87   0.384     -1.48616    .5717947 
       d2004 |  -.1875785   .4435201    -0.42   0.672    -1.056862    .6817048 
       d2005 |  -.1862975   .3699418    -0.50   0.615    -.9113702    .5387751 
       d2006 |   -.248378   .3009296    -0.83   0.409    -.8381891    .3414331 
       d2007 |  -.1880241   .2088674    -0.90   0.368    -.5973967    .2213485 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |   1.275398   1.144025     1.11   0.265     -.966851    3.517646 
          c5 |   1.908944   1.790133     1.07   0.286    -1.599651     5.41754 
          c6 |   1.582748   1.589092     1.00   0.319    -1.531815     4.69731 
          c7 |   1.752315   1.578505     1.11   0.267    -1.341497    4.846127 
          c8 |   .8736985    1.02812     0.85   0.395     -1.14138    2.888777 
          c9 |   1.394419   1.296467     1.08   0.282     -1.14661    3.935448 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |   .5184136    2.22575     0.23   0.816    -3.843977    4.880804 
         c12 |   1.416609   1.704074     0.83   0.406    -1.923314    4.756532 
         c13 |   1.357486   1.118367     1.21   0.225    -.8344733    3.549444 
         c14 |   1.344155   1.365675     0.98   0.325    -1.332519    4.020829 
          s2 |  -.7833108   .1832545    -4.27   0.000    -1.142483   -.4241386 
          s3 |  -2.181337    .217236   -10.04   0.000    -2.607112   -1.755562 
          s4 |  -.1827652   .1835897    -1.00   0.319    -.5425945    .1770641 
          s5 |  -1.267003   .2130915    -5.95   0.000    -1.684655   -.8493517 
          s6 |     .11292   .1791926     0.63   0.529    -.2382911    .4641311 
          s7 |  -.2579533   .1844614    -1.40   0.162    -.6194909    .1035844 
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          s8 |    .163459   .1874511     0.87   0.383    -.2039385    .5308564 
          s9 |  (omitted) 
         s10 |  -.3678584   .1779073    -2.07   0.039    -.7165504   -.0191664 
         s11 |  -.0314497   .1762677    -0.18   0.858    -.3769279    .3140286 
         s12 |  (omitted) 
         s13 |  -1.309218   .1951552    -6.71   0.000    -1.691715   -.9267209 
       _cons |  -9.290704   15.95644    -0.58   0.560    -40.56475    21.98335 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |    1.20442 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.4 OLS 
. reg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu medium high  lnsecmed 
lnsechigh lntertmed lnterthigh lnwage 
>  lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 
c2-c14 s2-s13 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s10 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1283 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 48,  1234) =   69.32 
       Model |  5580.94495    48  116.269686           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2069.65242  1234  1.67718997           R-squared     =  0.7295 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7190 
       Total |  7650.59737  1282  5.96770466           Root MSE      =  1.2951 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |    .466158   .0253451    18.39   0.000     .4164338    .5158822 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -1.138928   1.601715    -0.71   0.477    -4.281313    2.003457 
   lntertedu |   .1274414   .7898702     0.16   0.872    -1.422196    1.677078 
      medium |   .1776888   .9648926     0.18   0.854    -1.715323      2.0707 
        high |  -.2843563   .9136999    -0.31   0.756    -2.076933    1.508221 
    lnsecmed |   .2907087   .2883759     1.01   0.314    -.2750525      .85647 
   lnsechigh |    .094277   .2770552     0.34   0.734    -.4492744    .6378284 
   lntertmed |  -.7559742   .2673351    -2.83   0.005    -1.280456   -.2314926 
  lnterthigh |  -.3856889   .2572142    -1.50   0.134    -.8903143    .1189365 
      lnwage |  -.5912116   .8216276    -0.72   0.472    -2.203153     1.02073 
       lngdp |   .5555586   .7888705     0.70   0.481    -.9921172    2.103234 
 lntradefree |  -.1319482   .6391154    -0.21   0.836    -1.385821    1.121925 
  lneconfree |   .5943793   .9950677     0.60   0.550    -1.357832    2.546591 
lntransition |   2.433742   3.101951     0.78   0.433    -3.651938    8.519423 
  lnictinfra |   .2369778   .4257908     0.56   0.578    -.5983761    1.072332 
indprivati~n |   1.660414   .3039669     5.46   0.000     1.064065    2.256763 
       d1996 |  -.8174703   1.125214    -0.73   0.468    -3.025014    1.390074 
       d1997 |  -.6837736   1.010238    -0.68   0.499    -2.665747      1.2982 
       d1998 |  -.6354915   .9087861    -0.70   0.485    -2.418428    1.147445 
       d1999 |  -.5663146   .8467888    -0.67   0.504     -2.22762     1.09499 
       d2000 |  -.9754321   .8024712    -1.22   0.224    -2.549791    .5989267 
       d2001 |  -.5980579   .7298341    -0.82   0.413    -2.029911     .833795 
       d2002 |  -.4895536   .6375395    -0.77   0.443    -1.740335    .7612276 
       d2003 |  -.4571827   .5249981    -0.87   0.384     -1.48717    .5728049 
       d2004 |  -.1875785   .4435201    -0.42   0.672    -1.057715    .6825583 
       d2005 |  -.1862975   .3699418    -0.50   0.615    -.9120821     .539487 
       d2006 |   -.248378   .3009296    -0.83   0.409    -.8387682    .3420122 
       d2007 |  -.1880241   .2088674    -0.90   0.368    -.5977987    .2217504 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |   1.275398   1.144025     1.11   0.265    -.9690524    3.519848 
          c5 |   1.908944   1.790133     1.07   0.286    -1.603096    5.420985 
          c6 |   1.582748   1.589092     1.00   0.319    -1.534873    4.700368 
          c7 |   1.752315   1.578505     1.11   0.267    -1.344535    4.849165 
          c8 |   .8736985    1.02812     0.85   0.396    -1.143358    2.890755 
          c9 |   1.394419   1.296467     1.08   0.282    -1.149104    3.937943 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |   .5184136    2.22575     0.23   0.816     -3.84826    4.885087 
         c12 |   1.416609   1.704074     0.83   0.406    -1.926593    4.759811 
         c13 |   1.357486   1.118367     1.21   0.225    -.8366254    3.551596 
         c14 |   1.344155   1.365675     0.98   0.325    -1.335147    4.023457 
          s2 |  -.7833108   .1832545    -4.27   0.000    -1.142836    -.423786 
          s3 |  -2.181337    .217236   -10.04   0.000     -2.60753   -1.755144 
          s4 |  -.1827652   .1835897    -1.00   0.320    -.5429477    .1774174 
          s5 |  -1.430462   .2179047    -6.56   0.000    -1.857967   -1.002958 
          s6 |   .4807784   .1819445     2.64   0.008     .1238236    .8377332 
          s7 |  -.4214122   .1865537    -2.26   0.024    -.7874097   -.0554148 
          s8 |  (omitted) 
          s9 |   -.163459   .1874511    -0.87   0.383    -.5312171    .2042992 
         s10 |  (omitted) 
         s11 |   .3364087   .1777271     1.89   0.059    -.0122721    .6850895 
         s12 |   .3678584   .1779073     2.07   0.039      .018824    .7168927 
500 
 
         s13 |  -1.309218   .1951552    -6.71   0.000    -1.692091   -.9263453 
       _cons |  -9.290704   15.95644    -0.58   0.561    -40.59546    22.01405 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.10: Model 6.6 results 
 
. **Model 6.6 System GMM 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lngenvocratio lnwage 
lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntr 
> ansition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, 
gmm(l.lnindfdistock, laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv( 
> lnsecedu lntertedu lngenvocratio lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
lnictinfra indprivatisation d1 
> 996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
c14 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1283 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       130 
Number of instruments = 47                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 129)    =     89.93                                      avg =      9.87 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .3208332   .1117717     2.87   0.005     .0996901    .5419763 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.5337772   1.040243    -0.51   0.609    -2.591922    1.524368 
   lntertedu |  -1.014868   .8286618    -1.22   0.223    -2.654396    .6246594 
lngenvocra~o |  -2.355396   1.038488    -2.27   0.025     -4.41007   -.3007219 
      lnwage |  -.4811834   .4289406    -1.12   0.264    -1.329853     .367486 
       lngdp |   .3233058   .5384849     0.60   0.549    -.7420997    1.388711 
 lntradefree |  -.0156682   .2795487    -0.06   0.955    -.5687621    .5374258 
  lneconfree |   1.555184   .6464159     2.41   0.018     .2762342    2.834134 
lntransition |   2.226154   1.108879     2.01   0.047     .0322095    4.420099 
  lnictinfra |   .3942835   .2317452     1.70   0.091    -.0642301    .8527971 
indprivati~n |   1.300169   .6924332     1.88   0.063    -.0698275    2.670165 
       d1996 |  -.9040468   .7441145    -1.21   0.227    -2.376296     .568202 
       d1997 |  -.9096157   .7171694    -1.27   0.207    -2.328553    .5093216 
       d1998 |  -.8652952   .6743827    -1.28   0.202    -2.199578    .4689876 
       d1999 |  -.7768966   .6236162    -1.25   0.215    -2.010736    .4569434 
       d2000 |  -1.120684   .5263108    -2.13   0.035    -2.162002   -.0793647 
       d2001 |  -.8395985    .520639    -1.61   0.109    -1.869695    .1904984 
       d2002 |  -.7322011   .4465474    -1.64   0.104    -1.615706    .1513038 
       d2003 |  -.6432703   .4242457    -1.52   0.132    -1.482651    .1961103 
       d2004 |  -.2990284   .2750489    -1.09   0.279    -.8432193    .2451625 
       d2005 |  -.2410952   .2048553    -1.18   0.241    -.6464063     .164216 
       d2006 |  -.2709119   .1581927    -1.71   0.089    -.5839001    .0420762 
       d2007 |  -.0226137   .1101028    -0.21   0.838    -.2404549    .1952275 
          c4 |  -.2590173    .498923    -0.52   0.605    -1.246149    .7281141 
          c5 |   1.498331   1.364212     1.10   0.274    -1.200795    4.197457 
          c6 |   5.769905   2.633327     2.19   0.030     .5598019    10.98001 
          c7 |   2.725895   1.452534     1.88   0.063    -.1479795    5.599769 
          c8 |   1.739472    1.04999     1.66   0.100    -.3379593    3.816903 
          c9 |   4.388865   1.995284     2.20   0.030     .4411473    8.336582 
         c11 |   1.967594   1.695636     1.16   0.248    -1.387264    5.322452 
         c12 |   .3403784   1.177823     0.29   0.773    -1.989974    2.670731 
         c13 |   1.138289   .6992816     1.63   0.106    -.2452572    2.521834 
          s2 |  -1.003029     .32087    -3.13   0.002    -1.637878     -.36818 
          s3 |  -2.843622   .7675935    -3.70   0.000    -4.362324   -1.324919 
          s4 |  -.2663222   .2382374    -1.12   0.266    -.7376806    .2050363 
          s5 |  -2.080591   .5994253    -3.47   0.001    -3.266569   -.8946133 
          s6 |  -.2634229    .208593    -1.26   0.209    -.6761292    .1492835 
          s7 |  -.8562063   .2694936    -3.18   0.002    -1.389406   -.3230066 
          s8 |  -.2892617   .2128605    -1.36   0.177    -.7104115    .1318881 
          s9 |  -.4886414   .2366243    -2.07   0.041    -.9568083   -.0204745 
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         s10 |   -.907898    .268445    -3.38   0.001    -1.439023   -.3767731 
         s11 |  -.4861648   .2320609    -2.09   0.038    -.9453029   -.0270267 
         s12 |  -.4438317    .277717    -1.60   0.112    -.9933017    .1056382 
         s13 |  -1.586334   .3809904    -4.16   0.000    -2.340133    -.832535 
       _cons |  -11.44628   10.99704    -1.04   0.300    -33.20419    10.31163 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lngenvocratio lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree 
    lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 
    d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
    c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lngenvocratio lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree 
    lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 
    d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
    c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.13  Pr > z =  0.033 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.06  Pr > z =  0.289 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   4.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.087 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.609 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.612 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.392 
 
.  
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. **Calculating long-run coefficients 
. nlcom _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.7859294   1.577807    -0.50   0.619     -3.90766    2.335801 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.494284   1.063526    -1.41   0.162    -3.598497    .6099284 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lngenvocratio]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lngenvocratio]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -3.468067   1.185637    -2.93   0.004    -5.813879   -1.122255 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.7084907   .6471833    -1.09   0.276    -1.988959    .5719773 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |    .476033   .8021273     0.59   0.554    -1.110995    2.063061 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0230697   .4135917    -0.06   0.956    -.8413711    .7952317 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   2.289841   .8949544     2.56   0.012     .5191516     4.06053 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   3.277772   1.581632     2.07   0.040     .1484735    6.407071 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |     .58054   .3598811     1.61   0.109    -.1314936    1.292573 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   1.914358   1.189135     1.61   0.110    -.4383736     4.26709 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.6 FE 
. xtreg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lngenvocratio lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntrans 
> ition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, fe  
note: lngenvocratio omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c13 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c14 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s13 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1283 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       130 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2952                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.8341                                        avg =       9.9 
       overall = 0.5743                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(22,1131)         =     21.54 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5226                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .1934758   .0294962     6.56   0.000     .1356024    .2513491 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.6698671   1.501536    -0.45   0.656    -3.615976    2.276242 
   lntertedu |  -.3828825   .7326196    -0.52   0.601    -1.820329    1.054564 
lngenvocra~o |  (omitted) 
      lnwage |  -.5342059   .7749431    -0.69   0.491    -2.054694    .9862818 
       lngdp |   .4507245   .7466757     0.60   0.546    -1.014301     1.91575 
 lntradefree |   .0347742   .6023787     0.06   0.954    -1.147131     1.21668 
  lneconfree |    1.37947   .9375811     1.47   0.141    -.4601241    3.219064 
lntransition |   2.662767   2.919594     0.91   0.362    -3.065661    8.391196 
  lnictinfra |   .4709106   .4009703     1.17   0.240    -.3158187     1.25764 
indprivati~n |   1.268965   .2994998     4.24   0.000     .6813273    1.856603 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |   .0130319    .337859     0.04   0.969     -.649869    .6759329 
       d1998 |   .0687798   .3872561     0.18   0.859    -.6910413    .8286008 
       d1999 |   .1486281   .4313123     0.34   0.730     -.697634    .9948903 
       d2000 |  -.2516717   .4872503    -0.52   0.606    -1.207688    .7043445 
       d2001 |  -.0294384   .5631599    -0.05   0.958    -1.134394    1.075517 
       d2002 |   .1530985   .6228805     0.25   0.806    -1.069033     1.37523 
       d2003 |   .2521734   .6808485     0.37   0.711    -1.083695    1.588042 
       d2004 |   .5290596   .7427938     0.71   0.476    -.9283491    1.986468 
       d2005 |   .6040135   .8152234     0.74   0.459    -.9955066    2.203534 
       d2006 |   .5468484   .8829063     0.62   0.536     -1.18547    2.279167 
       d2007 |   .6100633   .9782966     0.62   0.533    -1.309417    2.529544 
       d2008 |   .8098976   1.059337     0.76   0.445    -1.268589    2.888384 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |  (omitted) 
          c5 |  (omitted) 
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          c6 |  (omitted) 
          c7 |  (omitted) 
          c8 |  (omitted) 
          c9 |  (omitted) 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |  (omitted) 
         c12 |  (omitted) 
         c13 |  (omitted) 
         c14 |  (omitted) 
          s2 |  (omitted) 
          s3 |  (omitted) 
          s4 |  (omitted) 
          s5 |  (omitted) 
          s6 |  (omitted) 
          s7 |  (omitted) 
          s8 |  (omitted) 
          s9 |  (omitted) 
         s10 |  (omitted) 
         s11 |  (omitted) 
         s12 |  (omitted) 
         s13 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |  -11.95249   15.26013    -0.78   0.434    -41.89383    17.98885 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.4583088 
     sigma_e |  1.2182688 
         rho |  .58896614   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(129, 1131) =     2.12           Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.6 OLS 
. reg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lngenvocratio lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransit 
> ion lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1283 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 44,  1238) =   75.16 
       Model |  5566.62764    44  126.514265           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2083.96973  1238  1.68333581           R-squared     =  0.7276 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7179 
       Total |  7650.59737  1282  5.96770466           Root MSE      =  1.2974 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .4778515   .0250706    19.06   0.000      .428666     .527037 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -.996562   1.596739    -0.62   0.533    -4.129175    2.136051 
   lntertedu |  -.2239122   .7790083    -0.29   0.774    -1.752235     1.30441 
lngenvocra~o |   1.091326   1.094759     1.00   0.319    -1.056462    3.239114 
      lnwage |  -.5886715   .8231173    -0.72   0.475    -2.203531    1.026188 
       lngdp |   .5549401    .790297     0.70   0.483    -.9955293     2.10541 
 lntradefree |  -.1448079   .6402688    -0.23   0.821     -1.40094    1.111324 
  lneconfree |   .5732394   .9968057     0.58   0.565    -1.382376    2.528855 
lntransition |   2.432461   3.107627     0.78   0.434    -3.664335    8.529258 
  lnictinfra |   .2218436   .4265315     0.52   0.603    -.6149608    1.058648 
indprivati~n |   1.655353   .3044638     5.44   0.000     1.058031    2.252675 
       d1996 |  -.8193515   1.127264    -0.73   0.467     -3.03091    1.392207 
       d1997 |  -.6819054   1.012083    -0.67   0.501    -2.667494    1.303683 
       d1998 |  -.6334704   .9104454    -0.70   0.487    -2.419657    1.152716 
       d1999 |  -.5643722   .8483348    -0.67   0.506    -2.228705    1.099961 
       d2000 |  -.9730768   .8039344    -1.21   0.226    -2.550301    .6041477 
       d2001 |  -.5908311   .7311608    -0.81   0.419    -2.025282    .8436201 
       d2002 |  -.4850339   .6386994    -0.76   0.448    -1.738087     .768019 
       d2003 |  -.4556584   .5259541    -0.87   0.386    -1.487518    .5762016 
       d2004 |  -.1850777   .4443288    -0.42   0.677    -1.056799     .686643 
       d2005 |  -.1870454   .3706179    -0.50   0.614    -.9141539    .5400631 
       d2006 |  -.2483097   .3014798    -0.82   0.410    -.8397775    .3431581 
       d2007 |  -.1869985   .2092488    -0.89   0.372      -.59752    .2235229 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |    2.35702   1.895994     1.24   0.214    -1.362696    6.076736 
          c5 |   2.501974   2.100234     1.19   0.234    -1.618438    6.622385 
          c6 |  (omitted) 
          c7 |   2.017098   1.756841     1.15   0.251    -1.429618    5.463813 
          c8 |   .7789348   .9307716     0.84   0.403    -1.047129    2.604999 
          c9 |   .3978618   .7295374     0.55   0.586    -1.033405    1.829128 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |   .8226872    2.21742     0.37   0.711     -3.52763    5.173004 
         c12 |   2.514816   2.012654     1.25   0.212    -1.433774    6.463406 
         c13 |   1.951344   1.494655     1.31   0.192    -.9809919     4.88368 
         c14 |   2.456023   2.182953     1.13   0.261    -1.826674     6.73872 
          s2 |  -.7603264   .1834158    -4.15   0.000    -1.120167   -.4004862 
          s3 |  -2.140034   .2165296    -9.88   0.000     -2.56484   -1.715229 
          s4 |  -.1852932    .183226    -1.01   0.312     -.544761    .1741746 
          s5 |  -1.609111   .2165958    -7.43   0.000    -2.034047   -1.184176 
          s6 |  -.2057085    .179393    -1.15   0.252    -.5576564    .1462395 
          s7 |   -.626032    .182978    -3.42   0.001    -.9850133   -.2670507 
          s8 |   -.198082   .1833286    -1.08   0.280    -.5577512    .1615871 
          s9 |  -.3850523   .1817988    -2.12   0.034    -.7417201   -.0283845 
         s10 |  -.6752637   .1815645    -3.72   0.000    -1.031472   -.3190555 
         s11 |  -.3444126   .1782365    -1.93   0.054    -.6940915    .0052663 
         s12 |   -.313625   .1779358    -1.76   0.078    -.6627141    .0354641 
         s13 |  -1.287006   .1946514    -6.61   0.000    -1.668889   -.9051231 
       _cons |   -8.02262   15.95534    -0.50   0.615    -39.32511    23.27987 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.11: Model 6.7 results 
 
. **Model 6.7 System GMM 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr1 lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransit 
> ion lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv(lnsec 
> edu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008  
> c2-c14 s2-s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d1996 dropped due to collinearity 
d1997 dropped due to collinearity 
d1998 dropped due to collinearity 
d1999 dropped due to collinearity 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
c14 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1017 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       129 
Number of instruments = 44                      Obs per group: min =         0 
F(40, 128)    =     70.73                                      avg =      7.88 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         9 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2549424   .1001758     2.54   0.012     .0567275    .4531573 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.6830495   3.491269    -0.20   0.845    -7.591121    6.225022 
   lntertedu |   .2359653   1.481796     0.16   0.874    -2.696022    3.167953 
    lnedutr1 |  -3.224424   3.169413    -1.02   0.311    -9.495648    3.046801 
      lnwage |   .0504303   .7695943     0.07   0.948    -1.472343    1.573204 
       lngdp |  -.3018161   1.099183    -0.27   0.784    -2.476737    1.873104 
 lntradefree |  -.5602262    .382225    -1.47   0.145    -1.316524    .1960713 
  lneconfree |   1.246827   .6718255     1.86   0.066    -.0824948    2.576148 
lntransition |   3.905563   2.387353     1.64   0.104    -.8182222    8.629349 
  lnictinfra |   .0002816   .5441693     0.00   1.000     -1.07645    1.077014 
indprivati~n |   1.466513   .4590689     3.19   0.002     .5581671    2.374859 
       d2000 |  -1.401019    .758449    -1.85   0.067     -2.90174    .0997016 
       d2001 |  -1.098527   .7649334    -1.44   0.153    -2.612079    .4150242 
       d2002 |  -.9821841    .668966    -1.47   0.144    -2.305848    .3414794 
       d2003 |  -.9826175   .6106534    -1.61   0.110      -2.1909    .2256645 
       d2004 |  -.4672128   .4164823    -1.12   0.264    -1.291294    .3568686 
       d2005 |  -.3543014   .3108645    -1.14   0.257       -.9694    .2607972 
       d2006 |   -.334569   .2284057    -1.46   0.145    -.7865087    .1173707 
       d2007 |  -.0433848   .1309225    -0.33   0.741    -.3024374    .2156677 
          c4 |   .7788852   .8728962     0.89   0.374    -.9482891    2.506059 
          c5 |    2.15048   3.988453     0.54   0.591    -5.741355    10.04232 
          c6 |  -.2718286   1.211196    -0.22   0.823    -2.668386    2.124729 
          c7 |   1.520359   2.478786     0.61   0.541    -3.384343     6.42506 
          c8 |  -.5059063   .9762386    -0.52   0.605    -2.437561    1.425749 
          c9 |   .3668426   1.871407     0.20   0.845    -3.336055    4.069741 
         c11 |   2.467365   3.546448     0.70   0.488    -4.549888    9.484618 
         c12 |   2.728538   2.826551     0.97   0.336    -2.864277    8.321352 
         c13 |    1.56813   1.554882     1.01   0.315    -1.508469     4.64473 
          s2 |  -1.091814   .3205895    -3.41   0.001    -1.726155   -.4574725 
          s3 |  -2.917215   .7118135    -4.10   0.000     -4.32566   -1.508771 
          s4 |  -.2058736   .2492766    -0.83   0.410      -.69911    .2873627 
          s5 |  -2.141548   .5583018    -3.84   0.000    -3.246244   -1.036853 
          s6 |  -.2532607   .2376626    -1.07   0.289    -.7235168    .2169955 
          s7 |  -.8301723   .2666017    -3.11   0.002    -1.357689   -.3026552 
          s8 |  -.2031554   .2264517    -0.90   0.371    -.6512288     .244918 
          s9 |  -.4462089   .2447109    -1.82   0.071    -.9304112    .0379934 
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         s10 |  -.9292377   .2630042    -3.53   0.001    -1.449636   -.4088389 
         s11 |  -.4211535   .2356199    -1.79   0.076    -.8873676    .0450606 
         s12 |  -.4006556    .292481    -1.37   0.173    -.9793792     .178068 
         s13 |  -1.702016   .3763542    -4.52   0.000    -2.446697   -.9573351 
       _cons |   2.265456    24.3354     0.09   0.926     -45.8863    50.41721 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree 
    lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 
    d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
    c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree 
    lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 
    d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
    c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.18  Pr > z =  0.029 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.13  Pr > z =  0.259 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(3)    =   9.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.020 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(3)    =   1.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.625 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.608 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.383 
  gmm(L.lnindfdistock, collapse lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.625 
 
.  
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. **Calculating long-run coefficients 
. nlcom _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.9167742   4.753547    -0.19   0.847    -10.32248     8.48893 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .3167075   2.018786     0.16   0.876    -3.677806    4.311221 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnedutr1]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnedutr1]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -4.327751   3.815281    -1.13   0.259    -11.87694    3.221434 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0676865   1.029851     0.07   0.948    -1.970049    2.105422 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   -.405091   1.450203    -0.28   0.780    -3.274566    2.464384 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.7519233   .5095328    -1.48   0.142    -1.760121    .2562743 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   1.673464   .8486342     1.97   0.051    -.0057042    3.352631 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   5.241962   3.592483     1.46   0.147     -1.86638     12.3503 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |    .000378   .7303502     0.00   1.000    -1.444745    1.445501 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   1.968322   .7891953     2.49   0.014     .4067642     3.52988 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.7 FE 
. xtreg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr1 lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
>  lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, fe  
note: lnedutr1 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c13 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c14 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s13 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1283 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       130 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2952                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.8341                                        avg =       9.9 
       overall = 0.5743                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(22,1131)         =     21.54 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5226                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .1934758   .0294962     6.56   0.000     .1356024    .2513491 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.6698671   1.501536    -0.45   0.656    -3.615976    2.276242 
   lntertedu |  -.3828825   .7326196    -0.52   0.601    -1.820329    1.054564 
    lnedutr1 |  (omitted) 
      lnwage |  -.5342059   .7749431    -0.69   0.491    -2.054694    .9862818 
       lngdp |   .4507245   .7466757     0.60   0.546    -1.014301     1.91575 
 lntradefree |   .0347742   .6023787     0.06   0.954    -1.147131     1.21668 
  lneconfree |    1.37947   .9375811     1.47   0.141    -.4601241    3.219064 
lntransition |   2.662767   2.919594     0.91   0.362    -3.065661    8.391196 
  lnictinfra |   .4709106   .4009703     1.17   0.240    -.3158187     1.25764 
indprivati~n |   1.268965   .2994998     4.24   0.000     .6813273    1.856603 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |   .0130319    .337859     0.04   0.969     -.649869    .6759329 
       d1998 |   .0687798   .3872561     0.18   0.859    -.6910413    .8286008 
       d1999 |   .1486281   .4313123     0.34   0.730     -.697634    .9948903 
       d2000 |  -.2516717   .4872503    -0.52   0.606    -1.207688    .7043445 
       d2001 |  -.0294384   .5631599    -0.05   0.958    -1.134394    1.075517 
       d2002 |   .1530985   .6228805     0.25   0.806    -1.069033     1.37523 
       d2003 |   .2521734   .6808485     0.37   0.711    -1.083695    1.588042 
       d2004 |   .5290596   .7427938     0.71   0.476    -.9283491    1.986468 
       d2005 |   .6040135   .8152234     0.74   0.459    -.9955066    2.203534 
       d2006 |   .5468484   .8829063     0.62   0.536     -1.18547    2.279167 
       d2007 |   .6100633   .9782966     0.62   0.533    -1.309417    2.529544 
       d2008 |   .8098976   1.059337     0.76   0.445    -1.268589    2.888384 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |  (omitted) 
          c5 |  (omitted) 
          c6 |  (omitted) 
          c7 |  (omitted) 
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          c8 |  (omitted) 
          c9 |  (omitted) 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |  (omitted) 
         c12 |  (omitted) 
         c13 |  (omitted) 
         c14 |  (omitted) 
          s2 |  (omitted) 
          s3 |  (omitted) 
          s4 |  (omitted) 
          s5 |  (omitted) 
          s6 |  (omitted) 
          s7 |  (omitted) 
          s8 |  (omitted) 
          s9 |  (omitted) 
         s10 |  (omitted) 
         s11 |  (omitted) 
         s12 |  (omitted) 
         s13 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |  -11.95249   15.26013    -0.78   0.434    -41.89383    17.98885 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.4583088 
     sigma_e |  1.2182688 
         rho |  .58896614   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(129, 1131) =     2.12           Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.7 OLS 
. reg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr1 lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13 
note: lnedutr1 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1283 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 44,  1238) =   75.16 
       Model |  5566.62764    44  126.514265           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2083.96973  1238  1.68333581           R-squared     =  0.7276 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7179 
       Total |  7650.59737  1282  5.96770466           Root MSE      =  1.2974 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .4778515   .0250706    19.06   0.000      .428666     .527037 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -.996562   1.596739    -0.62   0.533    -4.129175    2.136051 
   lntertedu |  -.2239122   .7790083    -0.29   0.774    -1.752235     1.30441 
    lnedutr1 |  (omitted) 
      lnwage |  -.5886715   .8231173    -0.72   0.475    -2.203531    1.026188 
       lngdp |   .5549401    .790297     0.70   0.483    -.9955293     2.10541 
 lntradefree |  -.1448079   .6402688    -0.23   0.821     -1.40094    1.111324 
  lneconfree |   .5732394   .9968057     0.58   0.565    -1.382376    2.528855 
lntransition |   2.432461   3.107627     0.78   0.434    -3.664335    8.529258 
  lnictinfra |   .2218436   .4265315     0.52   0.603    -.6149608    1.058648 
indprivati~n |   1.655353   .3044638     5.44   0.000     1.058031    2.252675 
       d1996 |  -.8193515   1.127264    -0.73   0.467     -3.03091    1.392207 
       d1997 |  -.6819054   1.012083    -0.67   0.501    -2.667494    1.303683 
       d1998 |  -.6334704   .9104454    -0.70   0.487    -2.419657    1.152716 
       d1999 |  -.5643722   .8483348    -0.67   0.506    -2.228705    1.099961 
       d2000 |  -.9730768   .8039344    -1.21   0.226    -2.550301    .6041477 
       d2001 |  -.5908311   .7311608    -0.81   0.419    -2.025282    .8436201 
       d2002 |  -.4850339   .6386994    -0.76   0.448    -1.738087     .768019 
       d2003 |  -.4556584   .5259541    -0.87   0.386    -1.487518    .5762016 
       d2004 |  -.1850777   .4443288    -0.42   0.677    -1.056799     .686643 
       d2005 |  -.1870454   .3706179    -0.50   0.614    -.9141539    .5400631 
       d2006 |  -.2483097   .3014798    -0.82   0.410    -.8397775    .3431581 
       d2007 |  -.1869985   .2092488    -0.89   0.372      -.59752    .2235229 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |   1.244041   1.145955     1.09   0.278    -1.004188    3.492269 
          c5 |   1.870444   1.793353     1.04   0.297    -1.647903     5.38879 
          c6 |    1.58697   1.591961     1.00   0.319     -1.53627     4.71021 
          c7 |     1.7172   1.581333     1.09   0.278    -1.385188    4.819588 
          c8 |   .8826534   1.029984     0.86   0.392    -1.138054    2.903361 
          c9 |   1.386442   1.298826     1.07   0.286    -1.161701    3.934585 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |   .4861865   2.229463     0.22   0.827    -3.887756    4.860129 
         c12 |   1.377434   1.707043     0.81   0.420    -1.971583    4.726451 
         c13 |   1.339142   1.120368     1.20   0.232     -.858889    3.537172 
         c14 |   1.343043   1.368146     0.98   0.326    -1.341097    4.027184 
          s2 |  -.7603264   .1834158    -4.15   0.000    -1.120167   -.4004862 
          s3 |  -2.140034   .2165296    -9.88   0.000     -2.56484   -1.715229 
          s4 |  -.1852932    .183226    -1.01   0.312     -.544761    .1741746 
          s5 |  -1.609111   .2165958    -7.43   0.000    -2.034047   -1.184176 
          s6 |  -.2057085    .179393    -1.15   0.252    -.5576564    .1462395 
          s7 |   -.626032    .182978    -3.42   0.001    -.9850133   -.2670507 
          s8 |   -.198082   .1833286    -1.08   0.280    -.5577512    .1615871 
          s9 |  -.3850523   .1817988    -2.12   0.034    -.7417201   -.0283845 
         s10 |  -.6752637   .1815645    -3.72   0.000    -1.031472   -.3190555 
         s11 |  -.3444126   .1782365    -1.93   0.054    -.6940915    .0052663 
         s12 |   -.313625   .1779358    -1.76   0.078    -.6627141    .0354641 
         s13 |  -1.287006   .1946514    -6.61   0.000    -1.668889   -.9051231 
       _cons |  -8.980017   15.97736    -0.56   0.574    -40.32571    22.36568 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.12: Model 6.8 results 
 
. **Model 6.8 System GMM 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransit 
> ion lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv(lnsec 
> edu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008  
> c2-c14 s2-s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d1996 dropped due to collinearity 
d1997 dropped due to collinearity 
d1998 dropped due to collinearity 
d1999 dropped due to collinearity 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1017 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       129 
Number of instruments = 44                      Obs per group: min =         2 
F(41, 128)    =     71.09                                      avg =      7.88 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         9 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2471913   .1338728     1.85   0.067    -.0176989    .5120815 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   .5316728    3.94001     0.13   0.893    -7.264311    8.327657 
   lntertedu |  -.2888301   1.690202    -0.17   0.865    -3.633183    3.055523 
    lnedutr2 |  -2.032767   2.538394    -0.80   0.425    -7.055412    2.989879 
      lnwage |  -.1769181   .7841293    -0.23   0.822    -1.728452    1.374616 
       lngdp |   .2387449   1.150458     0.21   0.836    -2.037632    2.515122 
 lntradefree |  -.3954479   .4186803    -0.94   0.347    -1.223878    .4329826 
  lneconfree |   1.130553   .6118557     1.85   0.067    -.0801082    2.341214 
lntransition |   2.575986   2.957642     0.87   0.385    -3.276215    8.428186 
  lnictinfra |   .2354257    .631623     0.37   0.710    -1.014348      1.4852 
indprivati~n |   1.092808   .6823433     1.60   0.112    -.2573253     2.44294 
       d2000 |  -2.596683   1.805602    -1.44   0.153    -6.169375    .9760097 
       d2001 |  -2.006699   1.478533    -1.36   0.177    -4.932228    .9188307 
       d2002 |    -1.6729   1.185281    -1.41   0.161    -4.018181    .6723822 
       d2003 |  -1.387378   .8659555    -1.60   0.112    -3.100819    .3260631 
       d2004 |  -.8642311   .6996054    -1.24   0.219     -2.24852    .5200577 
       d2005 |  -.6093439   .4821514    -1.26   0.209    -1.563363     .344675 
       d2006 |  -.4757525   .3122733    -1.52   0.130    -1.093639    .1421335 
       d2007 |  -.1519571   .2176071    -0.70   0.486    -.5825299    .2786156 
          c4 |    1.33198   1.630616     0.82   0.416    -1.894473    4.558433 
          c5 |   1.287664   4.466655     0.29   0.774    -7.550377     10.1257 
          c6 |    .264221   1.149067     0.23   0.819    -2.009405    2.537847 
          c7 |   1.460366   3.042518     0.48   0.632    -4.559776    7.480509 
          c8 |  -.0565919   1.098785    -0.05   0.959    -2.230726    2.117543 
          c9 |   .3943886   1.917376     0.21   0.837    -3.399467    4.188244 
         c11 |   2.650141   4.146407     0.64   0.524    -5.554234    10.85452 
         c12 |   1.923656   3.465959     0.56   0.580    -4.934336    8.781647 
         c13 |   1.717337   2.006856     0.86   0.394    -2.253571    5.688245 
         c14 |   1.073528   1.843067     0.58   0.561    -2.573295     4.72035 
          s2 |  -1.107974   .3492908    -3.17   0.002    -1.799106   -.4168429 
          s3 |  -3.041175    .855519    -3.55   0.001    -4.733965   -1.348385 
          s4 |  -.2345176   .2565837    -0.91   0.362    -.7422123     .273177 
          s5 |  -2.015386   .6452471    -3.12   0.002    -3.292118   -.7386545 
          s6 |  -.2603064   .2399599    -1.08   0.280    -.7351082    .2144953 
          s7 |  -.8620969   .2947679    -2.92   0.004    -1.445346   -.2788484 
          s8 |  -.2269404    .231945    -0.98   0.330    -.6858833    .2320024 
          s9 |  -.4470334   .2469849    -1.81   0.073    -.9357352    .0416683 
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         s10 |   -.963826   .2930736    -3.29   0.001    -1.543722   -.3839298 
         s11 |  -.4478979   .2490195    -1.80   0.074    -.9406255    .0448298 
         s12 |   -.420763   .2945916    -1.43   0.156    -1.003663    .1621368 
         s13 |  -1.744846   .4491459    -3.88   0.000    -2.633558   -.8561344 
       _cons |  -12.27674    30.0098    -0.41   0.683    -71.65625    47.10277 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree 
    lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 
    d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
    c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree 
    lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 
    d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
    c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.65  Pr > z =  0.098 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.20  Pr > z =  0.228 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   9.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.007 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.613 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.468 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.501 
 
.  
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. **Calculating long-run coefficients 
. nlcom _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .7062523   5.160208     0.14   0.891    -9.504101    10.91661 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.3836699   2.196171    -0.17   0.862    -4.729169    3.961829 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnedutr2]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnedutr2]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -2.700243   3.229872    -0.84   0.405    -9.091096    3.690609 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.2350107   1.049275    -0.22   0.823    -2.311181    1.841159 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .3171389   1.540019     0.21   0.837    -2.730053     3.36433 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.5252966   .5726001    -0.92   0.361    -1.658284    .6076904 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |    1.50178   .7594319     1.98   0.050    -.0008859    3.004446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   3.421833   4.271524     0.80   0.425    -5.030108    11.87377 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .3127298   .8127523     0.38   0.701    -1.295439    1.920899 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   1.451641   1.059848     1.37   0.173     -.645449     3.54873 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.8 FE 
. xtreg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
>  lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, fe  
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1997 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1998 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2000 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c13 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c14 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s13 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1017 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       129 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2078                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.5268                                        avg =       7.9 
       overall = 0.3421                                        max =         9 
 
                                                F(19,869)          =     12.00 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0871                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .1544423   .0342326     4.51   0.000     .0872541    .2216304 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -1.894348   2.840721    -0.67   0.505    -7.469826    3.681129 
   lntertedu |   1.545721   1.310463     1.18   0.239    -1.026321    4.117763 
    lnedutr2 |  -.0938979    3.07895    -0.03   0.976    -6.136945    5.949149 
      lnwage |  -.3209078    1.49617    -0.21   0.830    -3.257438    2.615622 
       lngdp |   .5656156   1.772983     0.32   0.750    -2.914213    4.045444 
 lntradefree |  -.2337731   .9473249    -0.25   0.805    -2.093085    1.625539 
  lneconfree |   .6178614    1.22272     0.51   0.613    -1.781968    3.017691 
lntransition |   5.546141   4.305803     1.29   0.198    -2.904849    13.99713 
  lnictinfra |  -.1636593   .6277883    -0.26   0.794    -1.395818    1.068499 
indprivati~n |    1.23547   .3524731     3.51   0.000     .5436719    1.927268 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |  (omitted) 
       d1998 |  (omitted) 
       d1999 |  (omitted) 
       d2000 |  (omitted) 
       d2001 |   .2822047   .5452607     0.52   0.605    -.7879773    1.352387 
       d2002 |   .4452692    .933336     0.48   0.633    -1.386587    2.277125 
       d2003 |   .5095087   1.267414     0.40   0.688    -1.978041    2.997059 
       d2004 |   .7581084   1.573375     0.48   0.630    -2.329951    3.846168 
       d2005 |   .8380035   1.857651     0.45   0.652    -2.808004    4.484011 
       d2006 |   .7767722   2.080451     0.37   0.709    -3.306525    4.860069 
       d2007 |   .7837934   2.280204     0.34   0.731    -3.691557    5.259144 
       d2008 |   .9360274   2.462257     0.38   0.704    -3.896639    5.768694 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |  (omitted) 
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          c5 |  (omitted) 
          c6 |  (omitted) 
          c7 |  (omitted) 
          c8 |  (omitted) 
          c9 |  (omitted) 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |  (omitted) 
         c12 |  (omitted) 
         c13 |  (omitted) 
         c14 |  (omitted) 
          s2 |  (omitted) 
          s3 |  (omitted) 
          s4 |  (omitted) 
          s5 |  (omitted) 
          s6 |  (omitted) 
          s7 |  (omitted) 
          s8 |  (omitted) 
          s9 |  (omitted) 
         s10 |  (omitted) 
         s11 |  (omitted) 
         s12 |  (omitted) 
         s13 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |  -11.82798   36.03991    -0.33   0.743    -82.56343    58.90747 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.5820625 
     sigma_e |  1.3444254 
         rho |  .58067024   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(128, 869) =     1.69            Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.8 OLS 
. reg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnedutr2 lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition l 
> nictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13 
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1997 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1998 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1017 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 41,   975) =   50.30 
       Model |  4150.22348    41  101.224963           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1962.08077   975  2.01239053           R-squared     =  0.6790 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6655 
       Total |  6112.30425  1016  6.01604749           Root MSE      =  1.4186 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .4451329   .0290356    15.33   0.000     .3881533    .5021124 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -2.632523   2.992398    -0.88   0.379    -8.504806     3.23976 
   lntertedu |   1.531901   1.379895     1.11   0.267    -1.176006    4.239808 
    lnedutr2 |   .4292342   3.246239     0.13   0.895    -5.941186    6.799655 
      lnwage |  -1.107588    1.57382    -0.70   0.482    -4.196053    1.980877 
       lngdp |   1.552048     1.8632     0.83   0.405    -2.104296    5.208393 
 lntradefree |   -.474813   .9983665    -0.48   0.634    -2.434007    1.484381 
  lneconfree |  -.1769781   1.288596    -0.14   0.891    -2.705718    2.351762 
lntransition |   5.104167   4.538738     1.12   0.261    -3.802653    14.01099 
  lnictinfra |  -.5899764   .6613697    -0.89   0.373    -1.887848    .7078956 
indprivati~n |   1.677037   .3538831     4.74   0.000     .9825765    2.371497 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |  (omitted) 
       d1998 |  (omitted) 
       d1999 |  (omitted) 
       d2000 |  -.4759498   2.596141    -0.18   0.855    -5.570617    4.618717 
       d2001 |  -.0688873   2.094454    -0.03   0.974    -4.179045     4.04127 
       d2002 |  -.0348804   1.678215    -0.02   0.983     -3.32821    3.258449 
       d2003 |  -.1123571   1.313952    -0.09   0.932    -2.690856    2.466142 
       d2004 |   .0590774   .9993407     0.06   0.953    -1.902029    2.020184 
       d2005 |   .0178162   .7142708     0.02   0.980    -1.383869    1.419501 
       d2006 |  -.0864832    .491783    -0.18   0.860    -1.051558    .8785917 
       d2007 |  -.1303724   .2851112    -0.46   0.648    -.6898746    .4291298 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |   .5814449   2.335642     0.25   0.803    -4.002018    5.164908 
          c5 |   1.144971   4.223447     0.27   0.786    -7.143123    9.433064 
          c6 |     .96893   2.866025     0.34   0.735    -4.655357    6.593217 
          c7 |  -.7278927   3.821175    -0.19   0.849    -8.226566     6.77078 
          c8 |   -.047864   2.062328    -0.02   0.981    -4.094976    3.999248 
          c9 |   .2621649   2.429661     0.11   0.914    -4.505802    5.030132 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |  -4.109911   5.034532    -0.82   0.415    -13.98968    5.769855 
         c12 |  -.6705151   4.253893    -0.16   0.875    -9.018355    7.677325 
         c13 |   .0326519   2.447407     0.01   0.989     -4.77014    4.835444 
         c14 |   .2891926   3.070155     0.09   0.925     -5.73568    6.314065 
          s2 |  -.7938639   .2249049    -3.53   0.000    -1.235217   -.3525104 
          s3 |  -2.178962   .2611222    -8.34   0.000    -2.691388   -1.666536 
          s4 |  -.1324733    .223882    -0.59   0.554    -.5718193    .3068728 
          s5 |  -1.527418   .2613289    -5.84   0.000     -2.04025   -1.014586 
          s6 |  -.2008726   .2204757    -0.91   0.362    -.6335342     .231789 
          s7 |  -.5856399   .2238317    -2.62   0.009    -1.024887   -.1463925 
          s8 |  -.1234263    .223889    -0.55   0.582    -.5627861    .3159335 
          s9 |  -.3441415   .2234159    -1.54   0.124    -.7825729    .0942899 
         s10 |  -.6756028   .2218567    -3.05   0.002    -1.110975   -.2402312 
         s11 |   -.280944   .2178379    -1.29   0.197    -.7084291     .146541 
         s12 |  -.2783651   .2174001    -1.28   0.201     -.704991    .1482608 
         s13 |  -1.336615   .2361049    -5.66   0.000    -1.799947   -.8732829 
       _cons |  -20.30152   36.23737    -0.56   0.575    -91.41374    50.81069 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.13: Model 6.9 results 
 
. **Model 6.9 System GMM 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnmanvacancy lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntra 
> nsition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv(l 
> nsecedu lntertedu lnmanvacancy lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
lnictinfra indprivatisation d199 
> 6-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d1996 dropped due to collinearity 
d1997 dropped due to collinearity 
d1998 dropped due to collinearity 
d1999 dropped due to collinearity 
d2000 dropped due to collinearity 
d2001 dropped due to collinearity 
d2005 dropped due to collinearity 
d2006 dropped due to collinearity 
d2007 dropped due to collinearity 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =       474 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       129 
Number of instruments = 39                      Obs per group: min =         2 
F(36, 128)    =     43.04                                      avg =      3.67 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .1623606   .0644369     2.52   0.013     .0348612    .2898599 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -5.26953   3.904006    -1.35   0.179    -12.99427    2.455212 
   lntertedu |   2.806031   2.042072     1.37   0.172    -1.234557     6.84662 
lnmanvacancy |   .2430967   .4795183     0.51   0.613    -.7057121    1.191906 
      lnwage |  -1.282527   2.259141    -0.57   0.571    -5.752624    3.187569 
       lngdp |   2.473552   2.157266     1.15   0.254    -1.794966    6.742071 
 lntradefree |  -1.476849   .7953757    -1.86   0.066    -3.050636    .0969372 
  lneconfree |    .412047   1.530543     0.27   0.788    -2.616393    3.440487 
lntransition |   1.482094   4.644855     0.32   0.750    -7.708545    10.67273 
  lnictinfra |  -1.457939   .8655539    -1.68   0.095    -3.170585    .2547076 
indprivati~n |   1.240731    .820201     1.51   0.133    -.3821771    2.863639 
       d2002 |   -.612343   .5666512    -1.08   0.282    -1.733559    .5088733 
       d2003 |  -.5903033   .4510315    -1.31   0.193    -1.482746    .3021396 
       d2004 |  -.2538604   .1969357    -1.29   0.200    -.6435313    .1358105 
          c4 |    1.18061   1.684804     0.70   0.485    -2.153061    4.514282 
          c5 |    3.84144   4.307167     0.89   0.374    -4.681026    12.36391 
          c6 |   3.273879   3.601662     0.91   0.365    -3.852625    10.40038 
          c7 |   .3011992   3.943585     0.08   0.939    -7.501858    8.104257 
          c8 |   .9411944   2.542453     0.37   0.712    -4.089483    5.971871 
          c9 |    2.04759   3.260275     0.63   0.531    -4.403422    8.498602 
         c11 |  -6.007371   5.815265    -1.03   0.304    -17.51387    5.499124 
         c12 |  -.4962372   4.499215    -0.11   0.912    -9.398703    8.406229 
         c13 |    1.18063   2.290358     0.52   0.607    -3.351234    5.712494 
         c14 |   .4342362   2.743247     0.16   0.874    -4.993747    5.862219 
          s2 |  -1.228538   .3167719    -3.88   0.000    -1.855326    -.601751 
          s3 |   -2.79709    .414308    -6.75   0.000    -3.616869   -1.977311 
          s4 |  -.2851709   .2888651    -0.99   0.325    -.8567398     .286398 
          s5 |   -2.51857   .8746722    -2.88   0.005    -4.249259   -.7878822 
          s6 |  -.3825483   .3030889    -1.26   0.209    -.9822616    .2171649 
          s7 |  -1.003216   .2856124    -3.51   0.001    -1.568349   -.4380832 
          s8 |  -.2999942   .2714149    -1.11   0.271     -.837035    .2370466 
          s9 |  -.6243253   .2902699    -2.15   0.033    -1.198674   -.0499767 
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         s10 |  -1.092421   .2796099    -3.91   0.000    -1.645677   -.5391649 
         s11 |  -.6080296   .2726269    -2.23   0.027    -1.147469   -.0685906 
         s12 |  -.5401891   .3342359    -1.62   0.109    -1.201532    .1211537 
         s13 |  -1.897566   .3328755    -5.70   0.000    -2.556217   -1.238915 
       _cons |   -23.5394   38.46843    -0.61   0.542    -99.65576    52.57697 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lnmanvacancy lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree 
    lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 
    d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
    c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lnmanvacancy lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree 
    lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 
    d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
    c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.13  Pr > z =  0.259 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.33  Pr > z =  0.185 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.412 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.514 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.393 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.438 
 
.  
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. **Calculating long-run coefficients 
. nlcom _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -6.290929   4.458424    -1.41   0.161    -15.11268    2.530824 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   3.349928    2.45272     1.37   0.174    -1.503198    8.203054 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnmanvacancy]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnmanvacancy]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .2902164   .5831119     0.50   0.620      -.86357    1.444003 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.531121   2.662295    -0.58   0.566    -6.798927    3.736685 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   2.953004   2.528501     1.17   0.245    -2.050068    7.956076 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.763109   .8885003    -1.98   0.049    -3.521158   -.0050591 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .4919145   1.807949     0.27   0.786    -3.085421     4.06925 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
525 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |    1.76937   5.487313     0.32   0.748    -9.088217    12.62696 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.740533   .9926776    -1.75   0.082    -3.704715    .2236497 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   1.481223   .9767697     1.52   0.132    -.4514828    3.413929 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.9 FE 
. xtreg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnmanvacancy lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransi 
> tion lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, fe  
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1997 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1998 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2000 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2001 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2005 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2006 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2007 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c13 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c14 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s13 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       474 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       129 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1655                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.0292                                        avg =       3.7 
       overall = 0.0200                                        max =         4 
 
                                                F(14,331)          =      4.69 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7028                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |  -.1317418   .0476066    -2.77   0.006    -.2253914   -.0380921 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -6.46421   5.429048    -1.19   0.235      -17.144     4.21558 
   lntertedu |    4.21239   4.146953     1.02   0.310    -3.945316     12.3701 
lnmanvacancy |   .5487969    .643979     0.85   0.395    -.7180107    1.815605 
      lnwage |  -.0080828    4.01237    -0.00   0.998    -7.901044    7.884878 
       lngdp |    1.06247   3.912538     0.27   0.786    -6.634106    8.759047 
 lntradefree |  -1.275542   1.119891    -1.14   0.256    -3.478544    .9274599 
  lneconfree |   1.585176   3.004957     0.53   0.598    -4.326045    7.496397 
lntransition |   1.319704    7.06918     0.19   0.852    -12.58648    15.22589 
  lnictinfra |  -1.283302    1.38941    -0.92   0.356    -4.016488    1.449885 
indprivati~n |    .256356   .4424349     0.58   0.563    -.6139829    1.126695 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |  (omitted) 
       d1998 |  (omitted) 
       d1999 |  (omitted) 
       d2000 |  (omitted) 
       d2001 |  (omitted) 
       d2002 |  -.8341406   1.128426    -0.74   0.460    -3.053931     1.38565 
       d2003 |  -.7396782   .6346449    -1.17   0.245    -1.988124    .5087677 
       d2004 |  -.3592856   .3091125    -1.16   0.246    -.9673583    .2487871 
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       d2005 |  (omitted) 
       d2006 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |  (omitted) 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |  (omitted) 
          c5 |  (omitted) 
          c6 |  (omitted) 
          c7 |  (omitted) 
          c8 |  (omitted) 
          c9 |  (omitted) 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |  (omitted) 
         c12 |  (omitted) 
         c13 |  (omitted) 
         c14 |  (omitted) 
          s2 |  (omitted) 
          s3 |  (omitted) 
          s4 |  (omitted) 
          s5 |  (omitted) 
          s6 |  (omitted) 
          s7 |  (omitted) 
          s8 |  (omitted) 
          s9 |  (omitted) 
         s10 |  (omitted) 
         s11 |  (omitted) 
         s12 |  (omitted) 
         s13 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |  -.7130584   74.03014    -0.01   0.992     -146.342    144.9158 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2.8747652 
     sigma_e |  1.0125354 
         rho |  .88963587   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(128, 331) =     2.55            Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.9 OLS 
. reg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lnmanvacancy lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransiti 
> on lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13 
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1997 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1998 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2000 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2001 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2002 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2006 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2007 omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     474 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 36,   437) =   30.85 
       Model |  1713.49929    36  47.5972025           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  674.304541   437  1.54303099           R-squared     =  0.7176 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6943 
       Total |  2387.80383   473  5.04821106           Root MSE      =  1.2422 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .3645601   .0426396     8.55   0.000     .2807559    .4483644 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -5.889452   6.647576    -0.89   0.376    -18.95465    7.175743 
   lntertedu |   1.690907   5.076813     0.33   0.739    -8.287098    11.66891 
lnmanvacancy |   .0338434   .7881219     0.04   0.966    -1.515137    1.582824 
      lnwage |  -1.712065   4.907729    -0.35   0.727    -11.35775    7.933621 
       lngdp |   2.917351   4.782743     0.61   0.542    -6.482687    12.31739 
 lntradefree |  -1.560958   1.370548    -1.14   0.255    -4.254642    1.132726 
  lneconfree |  -.3172042   3.680971    -0.09   0.931    -7.551812    6.917403 
lntransition |   1.239104   8.664374     0.14   0.886    -15.78992    18.26813 
  lnictinfra |  -1.425153   1.701448    -0.84   0.403    -4.769192    1.918886 
indprivati~n |   2.115254   .4673075     4.53   0.000     1.196804    3.033703 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |  (omitted) 
       d1998 |  (omitted) 
       d1999 |  (omitted) 
       d2000 |  (omitted) 
       d2001 |  (omitted) 
       d2002 |  (omitted) 
       d2003 |  -.0105919   .6495215    -0.02   0.987    -1.287166    1.265982 
       d2004 |   .3001285   1.061183     0.28   0.777    -1.785527    2.385784 
       d2005 |   .5384806   1.383676     0.39   0.697    -2.181005    3.257967 
       d2006 |  (omitted) 
       d2007 |  (omitted) 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |   .5139797   4.673235     0.11   0.912    -8.670831     9.69879 
          c5 |   3.113824   9.239284     0.34   0.736    -15.04513    21.27278 
          c6 |   5.267948   8.217458     0.64   0.522     -10.8827     21.4186 
          c7 |   .3717934    9.80899     0.04   0.970    -18.90687    19.65045 
          c8 |   2.289598    5.75841     0.40   0.691    -9.028022    13.60722 
          c9 |   3.491615   7.157883     0.49   0.626    -10.57654    17.55977 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |  -7.677295   13.10202    -0.59   0.558     -33.4281     18.0735 
         c12 |  -1.952978   10.25221    -0.19   0.849    -22.10275    18.19679 
         c13 |   .7223587   5.831507     0.12   0.901    -10.73893    12.18364 
         c14 |   .6273745   7.050386     0.09   0.929    -13.22951    14.48426 
          s2 |  -.9030392   .2900518    -3.11   0.002    -1.473109   -.3329692 
          s3 |  -2.195124   .3338397    -6.58   0.000    -2.851255   -1.538993 
          s4 |  -.1530693   .2876198    -0.53   0.595    -.7183593    .4122207 
          s5 |  -1.579224   .3487438    -4.53   0.000    -2.264648   -.8938006 
          s6 |  -.2894123   .2826688    -1.02   0.306    -.8449717    .2661471 
          s7 |  -.6909471   .2892021    -2.39   0.017    -1.259347   -.1225472 
          s8 |  -.1737184   .2875436    -0.60   0.546    -.7388588    .3914219 
          s9 |  -.5253628   .2879949    -1.82   0.069     -1.09139    .0406645 
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         s10 |  -.7666432   .2895425    -2.65   0.008    -1.335712   -.1975742 
         s11 |  -.3904962   .2813401    -1.39   0.166    -.9434441    .1624517 
         s12 |  -.3300268   .2809938    -1.17   0.241    -.8822941    .2222406 
         s13 |  -1.363044   .3065708    -4.45   0.000     -1.96558   -.7605071 
       _cons |  -25.14777   86.69812    -0.29   0.772    -195.5449    145.2493 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.14: Model 6.10 results 
 
. **Model 6.10 System GMM 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntran 
> sition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv(ln 
> secedu lntertedu lncognitive lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996- 
> d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c4 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
c14 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1190 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       118 
Number of instruments = 46                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(43, 117)    =     86.33                                      avg =     10.08 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2734133   .1381996     1.98   0.050    -.0002837    .5471104 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.6301696   1.050209    -0.60   0.550    -2.710053    1.449714 
   lntertedu |  -1.149708   .8957392    -1.28   0.202    -2.923672    .6242565 
 lncognitive |   9.368211   3.824135     2.45   0.016     1.794712    16.94171 
      lnwage |  -.3437998   .4970901    -0.69   0.491    -1.328261    .6406611 
       lngdp |   .2638605   .5614964     0.47   0.639    -.8481537    1.375875 
 lntradefree |   -.100903   .2775874    -0.36   0.717    -.6506502    .4488442 
  lneconfree |   1.666878   .6380633     2.61   0.010     .4032275    2.930529 
lntransition |   1.935826   1.116605     1.73   0.086    -.2755516    4.147203 
  lnictinfra |    .339383     .25291     1.34   0.182    -.1614919    .8402579 
indprivati~n |   1.284724   .8492116     1.51   0.133    -.3970955    2.966543 
       d1996 |  -1.131936   .8234994    -1.37   0.172    -2.762834    .4989609 
       d1997 |  -1.141214   .7948586    -1.44   0.154     -2.71539    .4329616 
       d1998 |  -1.070207   .7439904    -1.44   0.153    -2.543641    .4032268 
       d1999 |  -.9536596   .6820016    -1.40   0.165    -2.304328    .3970087 
       d2000 |   -1.20929   .5561669    -2.17   0.032    -2.310749   -.1078301 
       d2001 |  -.9418119   .5447399    -1.73   0.086    -2.020641    .1370169 
       d2002 |  -.8300337   .4687773    -1.77   0.079    -1.758423    .0983552 
       d2003 |  -.7541855   .4661597    -1.62   0.108     -1.67739    .1690193 
       d2004 |  -.3776078   .2844143    -1.33   0.187    -.9408754    .1856598 
       d2005 |  -.2919753   .2032158    -1.44   0.153    -.6944335     .110483 
       d2006 |   -.315483   .1531521    -2.06   0.042    -.6187928   -.0121733 
       d2007 |  -.1063216   .1067601    -1.00   0.321    -.3177544    .1051112 
          c5 |   .5802203   1.390917     0.42   0.677    -2.174419    3.334859 
          c6 |  -.2079396   1.060298    -0.20   0.845    -2.307804    1.891925 
          c7 |   1.274691   1.293719     0.99   0.327    -1.287452    3.836834 
          c8 |  -.4460709   .6871025    -0.65   0.517    -1.806841    .9146996 
          c9 |   .5002541   1.012936     0.49   0.622    -1.505812     2.50632 
         c11 |   .8723578   1.472593     0.59   0.555    -2.044035    3.788751 
         c12 |    1.52098   1.371451     1.11   0.270    -1.195106    4.237066 
         c13 |   .1058687   .6525713     0.16   0.871    -1.186515    1.398252 
          s2 |  -1.038786   .3528116    -2.94   0.004    -1.737511   -.3400612 
          s3 |  -3.094493   .8778612    -3.53   0.001    -4.833051   -1.355935 
          s4 |  -.2505053   .2541049    -0.99   0.326    -.7537467    .2527361 
          s5 |  -2.432572   .6680723    -3.64   0.000    -3.755654    -1.10949 
          s6 |  -.3380133    .223451    -1.51   0.133    -.7805463    .1045196 
          s7 |   -.849182   .2873255    -2.96   0.004    -1.418215   -.2801488 
          s8 |  -.3749078    .229595    -1.63   0.105    -.8296087    .0797931 
          s9 |  -.5279527   .2484098    -2.13   0.036    -1.019915   -.0359901 
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         s10 |  -.9398831    .300264    -3.13   0.002     -1.53454   -.3452259 
         s11 |  -.5393753   .2573897    -2.10   0.038    -1.049122   -.0296285 
         s12 |  -.3994759   .2807677    -1.42   0.157    -.9555216    .1565699 
         s13 |  -1.726833   .4534426    -3.81   0.000    -2.624852   -.8288136 
       _cons |  -20.10125   11.25469    -1.79   0.077    -42.39057    2.188071 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree 
    lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 
    d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
    c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree 
    lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 
    d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
    c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.03  Pr > z =  0.043 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.18  Pr > z =  0.238 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   4.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.086 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.583 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.430 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.500 
 
.  
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. **Calculating long-run coefficients 
. nlcom _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.8673013   1.470079    -0.59   0.556    -3.778717    2.044114 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.582341   1.024185    -1.54   0.125    -3.610686    .4460042 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lncognitive]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lncognitive]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   12.89345   3.853078     3.35   0.001     5.262634    20.52427 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.4731711   .7223765    -0.66   0.514      -1.9038    .9574578 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .3631508   .7907741     0.46   0.647    -1.202936    1.929237 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.1388726   .3945465    -0.35   0.725    -.9202513     .642506 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   2.294122   .8257607     2.78   0.006      .658746    3.929498 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   2.664274   1.452349     1.83   0.069    -.2120269    5.540574 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .4670922   .3853514     1.21   0.228     -.296076     1.23026 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   1.768163   1.387002     1.27   0.205    -.9787213    4.515047 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.10 FE 
. xtreg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransit 
> ion lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, fe  
note: lncognitive omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c13 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c14 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s13 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1190 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       118 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2873                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.8249                                        avg =      10.1 
       overall = 0.5735                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(22,1050)         =     19.24 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5084                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |    .193157   .0307219     6.29   0.000     .1328738    .2534403 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.5961464   1.580211    -0.38   0.706    -3.696876    2.504584 
   lntertedu |  -.3948972    .758344    -0.52   0.603    -1.882939    1.093145 
 lncognitive |  (omitted) 
      lnwage |  -.5827412   .8469517    -0.69   0.492    -2.244652    1.079169 
       lngdp |   .5104846    .779508     0.65   0.513    -1.019086    2.040055 
 lntradefree |  -.0199811   .6512587    -0.03   0.976    -1.297898    1.257936 
  lneconfree |   1.436007   .9727928     1.48   0.140    -.4728324    3.344846 
lntransition |   2.323538   3.052363     0.76   0.447    -3.665887    8.312963 
  lnictinfra |   .4880843   .4237924     1.15   0.250    -.3434921    1.319661 
indprivati~n |   1.398859   .3276367     4.27   0.000      .755962    2.041756 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |   .0184732   .3497666     0.05   0.958    -.6678479    .7047943 
       d1998 |   .0848514   .4026112     0.21   0.833    -.7051628    .8748656 
       d1999 |   .1664835   .4485618     0.37   0.711    -.7136961    1.046663 
       d2000 |  -.2317374   .5087994    -0.46   0.649    -1.230117    .7666419 
       d2001 |  -.0122579   .5888631    -0.02   0.983     -1.16774    1.143224 
       d2002 |   .1894574   .6507777     0.29   0.771    -1.087515     1.46643 
       d2003 |    .267036   .7069018     0.38   0.706    -1.120065    1.654137 
       d2004 |   .5404895   .7734003     0.70   0.485    -.9770965    2.058076 
       d2005 |   .6194095   .8517466     0.73   0.467     -1.05191    2.290729 
       d2006 |   .5497161   .9185275     0.60   0.550    -1.252642    2.352074 
       d2007 |   .5786153   1.018494     0.57   0.570    -1.419899     2.57713 
       d2008 |   .8586361   1.105387     0.78   0.437    -1.310382    3.027654 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |  (omitted) 
          c5 |  (omitted) 
          c6 |  (omitted) 
          c7 |  (omitted) 
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          c8 |  (omitted) 
          c9 |  (omitted) 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |  (omitted) 
         c12 |  (omitted) 
         c13 |  (omitted) 
         c14 |  (omitted) 
          s2 |  (omitted) 
          s3 |  (omitted) 
          s4 |  (omitted) 
          s5 |  (omitted) 
          s6 |  (omitted) 
          s7 |  (omitted) 
          s8 |  (omitted) 
          s9 |  (omitted) 
         s10 |  (omitted) 
         s11 |  (omitted) 
         s12 |  (omitted) 
         s13 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   -13.0252   16.02303    -0.81   0.416      -44.466    18.41559 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.4805195 
     sigma_e |  1.2593186 
         rho |  .58021217   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(117, 1050) =     1.97           Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.10 OLS 
. reg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransitio 
> n lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13 
note: lncognitive omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1190 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 43,  1146) =   70.98 
       Model |  5408.44026    43   125.77768           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2030.60261  1146  1.77190454           R-squared     =  0.7270 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7168 
       Total |  7439.04286  1189  6.25655413           Root MSE      =  1.3311 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .4553395   .0264225    17.23   0.000     .4034975    .5071814 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.8482964   1.667813    -0.51   0.611    -4.120607    2.424014 
   lntertedu |  -.2664939   .8003897    -0.33   0.739    -1.836887      1.3039 
 lncognitive |  (omitted) 
      lnwage |  -.6756286   .8930867    -0.76   0.449    -2.427897     1.07664 
       lngdp |    .624709    .818834     0.76   0.446    -.9818729    2.231291 
 lntradefree |  -.1647189   .6869072    -0.24   0.811    -1.512456    1.183018 
  lneconfree |   .6953723   1.026627     0.68   0.498    -1.318907    2.709652 
lntransition |   2.031659   3.224724     0.63   0.529    -4.295366    8.358685 
  lnictinfra |   .2866624   .4476191     0.64   0.522    -.5915826    1.164907 
indprivati~n |   1.845784   .3307288     5.58   0.000     1.196882    2.494686 
       d1996 |  -.8688525   1.167694    -0.74   0.457    -3.159911    1.422206 
       d1997 |  -.7394278   1.048316    -0.71   0.481    -2.796262    1.317406 
       d1998 |  -.6802325   .9432236    -0.72   0.471    -2.530871    1.170406 
       d1999 |  -.6125039   .8800233    -0.70   0.487    -2.339141    1.114134 
       d2000 |  -1.026664   .8395791    -1.22   0.222    -2.673948    .6206207 
       d2001 |  -.6557408   .7716987    -0.85   0.396    -2.169842    .8583601 
       d2002 |  -.5263284   .6750865    -0.78   0.436    -1.850872    .7982156 
       d2003 |  -.5156825   .5568241    -0.93   0.355    -1.608192    .5768265 
       d2004 |  -.2574877   .4721513    -0.55   0.586    -1.183866    .6688903 
       d2005 |  -.2449832    .396573    -0.62   0.537    -1.023074    .5331074 
       d2006 |  -.3215086   .3281966    -0.98   0.327    -.9654423    .3224251 
       d2007 |   -.290166   .2302025    -1.26   0.208    -.7418316    .1614996 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |  (omitted) 
          c5 |   1.863221   1.857155     1.00   0.316    -1.780584    5.507027 
          c6 |   1.703414   1.639006     1.04   0.299    -1.512374    4.919202 
          c7 |   1.814879   1.630983     1.11   0.266    -1.385169    5.014927 
          c8 |   .9619516   1.061126     0.91   0.365    -1.120015    3.043919 
          c9 |   1.421234   1.344774     1.06   0.291    -1.217261    4.059728 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |   .6367845   2.290316     0.28   0.781    -3.856898    5.130467 
         c12 |      1.371    1.77139     0.77   0.439    -2.104532    4.846531 
         c13 |   1.450388   1.152977     1.26   0.209    -.8117953    3.712572 
         c14 |   1.541986   1.450846     1.06   0.288    -1.304627    4.388598 
          s2 |  -.7770235   .1950266    -3.98   0.000    -1.159673   -.3943743 
          s3 |  -2.307871   .2316629    -9.96   0.000    -2.762402    -1.85334 
          s4 |  -.1664077   .1957271    -0.85   0.395    -.5504313    .2176159 
          s5 |  -1.849678   .2333013    -7.93   0.000    -2.307424   -1.391933 
          s6 |  -.2609348   .1915905    -1.36   0.173    -.6368423    .1149728 
          s7 |  -.6039828   .1944849    -3.11   0.002    -.9855691   -.2223964 
          s8 |  -.2568096   .1961128    -1.31   0.191      -.64159    .1279707 
          s9 |  -.4184957   .1899437    -2.20   0.028     -.791172   -.0458194 
         s10 |  -.6799648    .193197    -3.52   0.000    -1.059024   -.3009053 
         s11 |  -.3733324   .1899565    -1.97   0.050     -.746034   -.0006308 
         s12 |  -.2659208   .1892543    -1.41   0.160    -.6372446    .1054029 
         s13 |  -1.352761   .2078075    -6.51   0.000    -1.760486   -.9450348 
       _cons |  -10.72006   16.60593    -0.65   0.519    -43.30148    21.86137 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.15: Model 6.11 results 
 
. **Model 6.11 System GMM 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lntop lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
>  lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, 
laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv(lnsecedu 
>  lntertedu lntop lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 
>  s2-s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c4 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
c14 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1190 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       118 
Number of instruments = 46                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(43, 117)    =     86.33                                      avg =     10.08 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |    .273413   .1381993     1.98   0.050    -.0002834    .5471095 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.6301561   1.050211    -0.60   0.550    -2.710044    1.449732 
   lntertedu |  -1.149711   .8957391    -1.28   0.202    -2.923676    .6242529 
       lntop |   1.678539   .6851836     2.45   0.016     .3215685    3.035509 
      lnwage |  -.3438097   .4970922    -0.69   0.491    -1.328275    .6406552 
       lngdp |   .2638738   .5614991     0.47   0.639    -.8481457    1.375893 
 lntradefree |  -.1009019   .2775873    -0.36   0.717    -.6506491    .4488452 
  lneconfree |   1.666877   .6380634     2.61   0.010     .4032261    2.930529 
lntransition |   1.935819   1.116605     1.73   0.086    -.2755584    4.147197 
  lnictinfra |   .3393839     .25291     1.34   0.182    -.1614912     .840259 
indprivati~n |   1.284721   .8492123     1.51   0.133    -.3970998    2.966541 
       d1996 |  -1.131931   .8234982    -1.37   0.172    -2.762826    .4989641 
       d1997 |  -1.141209   .7948574    -1.44   0.154    -2.715383    .4329643 
       d1998 |  -1.070202   .7439895    -1.44   0.153    -2.543634    .4032306 
       d1999 |   -.953654   .6820005    -1.40   0.165     -2.30432    .3970123 
       d2000 |  -1.209285   .5561651    -2.17   0.032    -2.310741   -.1078292 
       d2001 |   -.941807   .5447392    -1.73   0.086    -2.020634    .1370204 
       d2002 |  -.8300299   .4687764    -1.77   0.079    -1.758417    .0983571 
       d2003 |  -.7541816   .4661584    -1.62   0.108    -1.677384    .1690208 
       d2004 |  -.3776055   .2844137    -1.33   0.187     -.940872     .185661 
       d2005 |  -.2919736   .2032154    -1.44   0.153     -.694431    .1104838 
       d2006 |   -.315482   .1531518    -2.06   0.042     -.618791   -.0121729 
       d2007 |  -.1063217     .10676    -1.00   0.321    -.3177542    .1051109 
          c5 |   -.369976   1.434863    -0.26   0.797    -3.211647    2.471695 
          c6 |  -.5854218   1.088117    -0.54   0.592    -2.740381    1.569537 
          c7 |   .4924199   1.213011     0.41   0.686    -1.909884    2.894724 
          c8 |  -.4757835   .6881803    -0.69   0.491    -1.838689    .8871216 
          c9 |   1.281046   1.113783     1.15   0.252    -.9247429    3.486834 
         c11 |  -.2205169   1.310681    -0.17   0.867    -2.816252    2.375218 
         c12 |   1.148921   1.318583     0.87   0.385    -1.462463    3.760305 
         c13 |  -.8040778   .7812519    -1.03   0.306    -2.351306    .7431507 
          s2 |  -1.038786   .3528113    -2.94   0.004     -1.73751   -.3400616 
          s3 |  -3.094495   .8778592    -3.53   0.001    -4.833049   -1.355941 
          s4 |  -.2505042   .2541047    -0.99   0.326    -.7537452    .2527367 
          s5 |  -2.432569   .6680709    -3.64   0.000    -3.755649    -1.10949 
          s6 |  -.3380128   .2234509    -1.51   0.133    -.7805455      .10452 
          s7 |  -.8491818   .2873251    -2.96   0.004    -1.418214   -.2801494 
          s8 |  -.3749067   .2295947    -1.63   0.105    -.8296071    .0797936 
          s9 |  -.5279517   .2484097    -2.13   0.036    -1.019914   -.0359893 
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         s10 |   -.939882   .3002634    -3.13   0.002    -1.534538    -.345226 
         s11 |  -.5393744   .2573894    -2.10   0.038    -1.049121   -.0296283 
         s12 |  -.3994754   .2807674    -1.42   0.157    -.9555205    .1565697 
         s13 |  -1.726834   .4534419    -3.81   0.000    -2.624852   -.8288157 
       _cons |  -.3424096   12.53785    -0.03   0.978    -25.17297    24.48815 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lntop lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree 
    lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 
    d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
    c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lntop lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.03  Pr > z =  0.043 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.18  Pr > z =  0.238 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   4.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.086 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.583 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.430 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.500 
 
.  
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. **Calculating long-run coefficients 
. nlcom _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.8672823   1.470082    -0.59   0.556    -3.778702    2.044137 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.582345   1.024185    -1.54   0.125    -3.610689    .4459988 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntop]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntop]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   2.310169   .6903694     3.35   0.001     .9429284    3.677409 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.4731846   .7223794    -0.66   0.514    -1.903819    .9574501 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .3631688   .7907777     0.46   0.647    -1.202925    1.929263 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.1388711   .3945461    -0.35   0.725     -.920249    .6425068 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   2.294119   .8257604     2.78   0.006     .6587444    3.929495 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   2.664264    1.45235     1.83   0.069     -.212039    5.540566 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .4670932   .3853514     1.21   0.228    -.2960749    1.230261 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   1.768158   1.387001     1.27   0.205    -.9787249    4.515041 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.11 FE 
. xtreg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lntop lnwage lngdp 
lntradefree lneconfree lntransition ln 
> ictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, fe  
note: lntop omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c13 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c14 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s13 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1190 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       118 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2873                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.8249                                        avg =      10.1 
       overall = 0.5735                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(22,1050)         =     19.24 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5084                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |    .193157   .0307219     6.29   0.000     .1328738    .2534403 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.5961464   1.580211    -0.38   0.706    -3.696876    2.504584 
   lntertedu |  -.3948972    .758344    -0.52   0.603    -1.882939    1.093145 
       lntop |  (omitted) 
      lnwage |  -.5827412   .8469517    -0.69   0.492    -2.244652    1.079169 
       lngdp |   .5104846    .779508     0.65   0.513    -1.019086    2.040055 
 lntradefree |  -.0199811   .6512587    -0.03   0.976    -1.297898    1.257936 
  lneconfree |   1.436007   .9727928     1.48   0.140    -.4728324    3.344846 
lntransition |   2.323538   3.052363     0.76   0.447    -3.665887    8.312963 
  lnictinfra |   .4880843   .4237924     1.15   0.250    -.3434921    1.319661 
indprivati~n |   1.398859   .3276367     4.27   0.000      .755962    2.041756 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |   .0184732   .3497666     0.05   0.958    -.6678479    .7047943 
       d1998 |   .0848514   .4026112     0.21   0.833    -.7051628    .8748656 
       d1999 |   .1664835   .4485618     0.37   0.711    -.7136961    1.046663 
       d2000 |  -.2317374   .5087994    -0.46   0.649    -1.230117    .7666419 
       d2001 |  -.0122579   .5888631    -0.02   0.983     -1.16774    1.143224 
       d2002 |   .1894574   .6507777     0.29   0.771    -1.087515     1.46643 
       d2003 |    .267036   .7069018     0.38   0.706    -1.120065    1.654137 
       d2004 |   .5404895   .7734003     0.70   0.485    -.9770965    2.058076 
       d2005 |   .6194095   .8517466     0.73   0.467     -1.05191    2.290729 
       d2006 |   .5497161   .9185275     0.60   0.550    -1.252642    2.352074 
       d2007 |   .5786153   1.018494     0.57   0.570    -1.419899     2.57713 
       d2008 |   .8586361   1.105387     0.78   0.437    -1.310382    3.027654 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |  (omitted) 
          c5 |  (omitted) 
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          c6 |  (omitted) 
          c7 |  (omitted) 
          c8 |  (omitted) 
          c9 |  (omitted) 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |  (omitted) 
         c12 |  (omitted) 
         c13 |  (omitted) 
         c14 |  (omitted) 
          s2 |  (omitted) 
          s3 |  (omitted) 
          s4 |  (omitted) 
          s5 |  (omitted) 
          s6 |  (omitted) 
          s7 |  (omitted) 
          s8 |  (omitted) 
          s9 |  (omitted) 
         s10 |  (omitted) 
         s11 |  (omitted) 
         s12 |  (omitted) 
         s13 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   -13.0252   16.02303    -0.81   0.416      -44.466    18.41559 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.4805195 
     sigma_e |  1.2593186 
         rho |  .58021217   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(117, 1050) =     1.97           Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.11 OLS 
. reg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lntop lnwage lngdp lntradefree 
lneconfree lntransition lnic 
> tinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c11 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1190 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 43,  1146) =   70.98 
       Model |  5408.44026    43   125.77768           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2030.60261  1146  1.77190454           R-squared     =  0.7270 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7168 
       Total |  7439.04286  1189  6.25655413           Root MSE      =  1.3311 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .4553395   .0264225    17.23   0.000     .4034975    .5071814 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.8482964   1.667813    -0.51   0.611    -4.120607    2.424014 
   lntertedu |  -.2664939   .8003897    -0.33   0.739    -1.836887      1.3039 
       lntop |   .3136591   1.128134     0.28   0.781    -1.899781      2.5271 
      lnwage |  -.6756286   .8930867    -0.76   0.449    -2.427897     1.07664 
       lngdp |    .624709    .818834     0.76   0.446    -.9818729    2.231291 
 lntradefree |  -.1647189   .6869072    -0.24   0.811    -1.512456    1.183018 
  lneconfree |   .6953723   1.026627     0.68   0.498    -1.318907    2.709652 
lntransition |   2.031659   3.224724     0.63   0.529    -4.295366    8.358685 
  lnictinfra |   .2866624   .4476191     0.64   0.522    -.5915826    1.164907 
indprivati~n |   1.845784   .3307288     5.58   0.000     1.196882    2.494686 
       d1996 |  -.8688525   1.167694    -0.74   0.457    -3.159911    1.422206 
       d1997 |  -.7394278   1.048316    -0.71   0.481    -2.796262    1.317406 
       d1998 |  -.6802325   .9432236    -0.72   0.471    -2.530871    1.170406 
       d1999 |  -.6125039   .8800233    -0.70   0.487    -2.339141    1.114134 
       d2000 |  -1.026664   .8395791    -1.22   0.222    -2.673948    .6206207 
       d2001 |  -.6557408   .7716987    -0.85   0.396    -2.169842    .8583601 
       d2002 |  -.5263284   .6750865    -0.78   0.436    -1.850872    .7982156 
       d2003 |  -.5156825   .5568241    -0.93   0.355    -1.608192    .5768265 
       d2004 |  -.2574877   .4721513    -0.55   0.586    -1.183866    .6688903 
       d2005 |  -.2449832    .396573    -0.62   0.537    -1.023074    .5331074 
       d2006 |  -.3215086   .3281966    -0.98   0.327    -.9654423    .3224251 
       d2007 |   -.290166   .2302025    -1.26   0.208    -.7418316    .1614996 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |  (omitted) 
          c5 |   1.160913   2.297914     0.51   0.614    -3.347676    5.669503 
          c6 |   1.079568   2.919758     0.37   0.712    -4.649103    6.808239 
          c7 |   1.165673   1.734713     0.67   0.502    -2.237896    4.569243 
          c8 |   .5394276   1.731556     0.31   0.755    -2.857948    3.936803 
          c9 |   1.158936   1.485655     0.78   0.436    -1.755972    4.073844 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |  (omitted) 
         c12 |   .9746285   1.157894     0.84   0.400    -1.297201    3.246458 
         c13 |   .7749077   1.726931     0.45   0.654    -2.613394    4.163209 
         c14 |   1.057091   1.647483     0.64   0.521    -2.175331    4.289512 
          s2 |  -.7770235   .1950266    -3.98   0.000    -1.159673   -.3943743 
          s3 |  -2.307871   .2316629    -9.96   0.000    -2.762402    -1.85334 
          s4 |  -.1664077   .1957271    -0.85   0.395    -.5504313    .2176159 
          s5 |  -1.849678   .2333013    -7.93   0.000    -2.307424   -1.391933 
          s6 |  -.2609348   .1915905    -1.36   0.173    -.6368423    .1149728 
          s7 |  -.6039828   .1944849    -3.11   0.002    -.9855691   -.2223964 
          s8 |  -.2568096   .1961128    -1.31   0.191      -.64159    .1279707 
          s9 |  -.4184957   .1899437    -2.20   0.028     -.791172   -.0458194 
         s10 |  -.6799648    .193197    -3.52   0.000    -1.059024   -.3009053 
         s11 |  -.3733324   .1899565    -1.97   0.050     -.746034   -.0006308 
         s12 |  -.2659208   .1892543    -1.41   0.160    -.6372446    .1054029 
         s13 |  -1.352761   .2078075    -6.51   0.000    -1.760486   -.9450348 
       _cons |  -9.357895   19.72994    -0.47   0.635    -48.06876    29.35297 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.16: Model 6.12 results 
 
. **Model 6.12 System GMM 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive medium high 
lncognitivemed lncognitivehigh 
>  lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation 
d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, gmm(l.l 
> nindfdistock, laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive  medium 
high lncognitivemed lncognitiveh 
> igh lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation 
d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13) two  
> robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c4 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
c14 dropped due to collinearity 
s9 dropped due to collinearity 
s12 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1190 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       118 
Number of instruments = 48                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(45, 117)    =     87.85                                      avg =     10.08 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2740962   .1376079     1.99   0.049      .001571    .5466214 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.6185799   1.052515    -0.59   0.558    -2.703031    1.465871 
   lntertedu |  -1.146813   .8958742    -1.28   0.203    -2.921045    .6274184 
 lncognitive |   7.105769   3.727214     1.91   0.059    -.2757837    14.48732 
      medium |  -4.393903   3.517494    -1.25   0.214    -11.36012    2.572311 
        high |  -9.843935   3.941758    -2.50   0.014    -17.65038   -2.037489 
lncognitiv~d |   2.427065   2.193241     1.11   0.271    -1.916533    6.770663 
lncognitiv~h |   5.928285   2.452042     2.42   0.017     1.072144    10.78443 
      lnwage |  -.3508278   .4964165    -0.71   0.481    -1.333955    .6322991 
       lngdp |   .2701066   .5623839     0.48   0.632    -.8436652    1.383878 
 lntradefree |  -.1003206    .277724    -0.36   0.719    -.6503384    .4496971 
  lneconfree |   1.667732   .6407266     2.60   0.010      .398806    2.936657 
lntransition |   1.922088   1.117154     1.72   0.088    -.2903764    4.134552 
  lnictinfra |   .3415843   .2527238     1.35   0.179    -.1589219    .8420905 
indprivati~n |   1.274273   .8507842     1.50   0.137    -.4106609    2.959206 
       d1996 |  -1.127069   .8241885    -1.37   0.174    -2.759331    .5051932 
       d1997 |  -1.136049   .7957171    -1.43   0.156    -2.711925     .439827 
       d1998 |  -1.065003   .7450535    -1.43   0.156    -2.540542    .4105367 
       d1999 |  -.9486019   .6830488    -1.39   0.168    -2.301344    .4041405 
       d2000 |  -1.205569    .557278    -2.16   0.033    -2.309228   -.1019087 
       d2001 |  -.9385927   .5466196    -1.72   0.089    -2.021144    .1439588 
       d2002 |  -.8267224   .4700724    -1.76   0.081    -1.757676    .1042315 
       d2003 |  -.7515406   .4670339    -1.61   0.110    -1.676477    .1733956 
       d2004 |  -.3754701   .2852928    -1.32   0.191    -.9404775    .1895374 
       d2005 |  -.2906699   .2040867    -1.42   0.157    -.6948529    .1135131 
       d2006 |  -.3145917    .153965    -2.04   0.043    -.6195113   -.0096722 
       d2007 |  -.1037174   .1060224    -0.98   0.330    -.3136892    .1062543 
          c5 |   .5516408   1.394756     0.40   0.693    -2.210599    3.313881 
          c6 |  -.2282548    1.06118    -0.22   0.830    -2.329867    1.873357 
          c7 |    1.25241   1.289792     0.97   0.334    -1.301956    3.806777 
          c8 |  -.4371925   .6823942    -0.64   0.523    -1.788638    .9142535 
          c9 |   .4984923   1.007512     0.49   0.622    -1.496831    2.493816 
         c11 |   .8848306   1.475147     0.60   0.550    -2.036621    3.806282 
         c12 |   1.550041   1.373342     1.13   0.261     -1.16979    4.269873 
         c13 |   .0898292   .6553447     0.14   0.891    -1.208047    1.387705 
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          s2 |  -1.026616   .3407383    -3.01   0.003     -1.70143   -.3518015 
          s3 |  -3.066186   .8668811    -3.54   0.001    -4.782999   -1.349374 
          s4 |  -.2424927   .2483548    -0.98   0.331    -.7343465     .249361 
          s5 |  -1.902161   .6082298    -3.13   0.002    -3.106728   -.6975938 
          s6 |   .0489277   .2395554     0.20   0.839    -.4254992    .5233546 
          s7 |  -.3198982   .2225223    -1.44   0.153    -.7605921    .1207956 
          s8 |   .1547029   .1843405     0.84   0.403    -.2103739    .5197796 
         s10 |  -.5604123   .2771262    -2.02   0.045    -1.109246   -.0115783 
         s11 |  -.1420308   .2413577    -0.59   0.557     -.620027    .3359655 
         s13 |  -1.721273   .4476254    -3.85   0.000    -2.607771   -.8347738 
       _cons |  -16.65516   11.12534    -1.50   0.137    -38.68832    5.377996 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive medium high lncognitivemed 
    lncognitivehigh lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
    lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 
    d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 
    c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive medium high lncognitivemed lncognitivehigh 
    lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra 
    indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 
    d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 
    s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.03  Pr > z =  0.043 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.18  Pr > z =  0.239 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   5.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.082 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.581 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.432 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.494 
 
.  
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. **Calculating long-run coefficients 
. nlcom _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.8521514   1.474776    -0.58   0.564    -3.772868    2.068565 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.579842   1.026869    -1.54   0.127    -3.613502    .4538177 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lncognitive]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lncognitive]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   9.788858   4.250107     2.30   0.023     1.371744    18.20597 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[medium]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[medium]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   -6.05301   4.610773    -1.31   0.192     -15.1844    3.078385 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[high]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[high]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -13.56094   4.586779    -2.96   0.004    -22.64481    -4.47706 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lncognitivemed]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lncognitivemed]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   3.343508    2.89519     1.15   0.251    -2.390263    9.077279 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lncognitivehigh]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lncognitivehigh]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   8.166764    2.87414     2.84   0.005     2.474681    13.85885 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   -.483298   .7220237    -0.67   0.505    -1.913228    .9466321 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .3720969   .7927868     0.47   0.640    -1.197976     1.94217 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   -.138201   .3950025    -0.35   0.727    -.9204828    .6440808 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   2.297455   .8284946     2.77   0.006     .6566652    3.938246 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   2.647855    1.45707     1.82   0.072    -.2377953    5.533505 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .4705642   .3852191     1.22   0.224     -.292342     1.23347 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   1.755429   1.388093     1.26   0.209    -.9936154    4.504474 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.12 FE 
. xtreg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive medium high 
lncognitivemed lncognitivehigh ln 
> wage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-
d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, fe 
note: lncognitive omitted because of collinearity 
note: medium omitted because of collinearity 
note: high omitted because of collinearity 
note: lncognitivemed omitted because of collinearity 
note: lncognitivehigh omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c13 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c14 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s13 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1190 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       118 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2873                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.8249                                        avg =      10.1 
       overall = 0.5735                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(22,1050)         =     19.24 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5084                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |    .193157   .0307219     6.29   0.000     .1328738    .2534403 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.5961464   1.580211    -0.38   0.706    -3.696876    2.504584 
   lntertedu |  -.3948972    .758344    -0.52   0.603    -1.882939    1.093145 
 lncognitive |  (omitted) 
      medium |  (omitted) 
        high |  (omitted) 
lncognitiv~d |  (omitted) 
lncognitiv~h |  (omitted) 
      lnwage |  -.5827412   .8469517    -0.69   0.492    -2.244652    1.079169 
       lngdp |   .5104846    .779508     0.65   0.513    -1.019086    2.040055 
 lntradefree |  -.0199811   .6512587    -0.03   0.976    -1.297898    1.257936 
  lneconfree |   1.436007   .9727928     1.48   0.140    -.4728324    3.344846 
lntransition |   2.323538   3.052363     0.76   0.447    -3.665887    8.312963 
  lnictinfra |   .4880843   .4237924     1.15   0.250    -.3434921    1.319661 
indprivati~n |   1.398859   .3276367     4.27   0.000      .755962    2.041756 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |   .0184732   .3497666     0.05   0.958    -.6678479    .7047943 
       d1998 |   .0848514   .4026112     0.21   0.833    -.7051628    .8748656 
       d1999 |   .1664835   .4485618     0.37   0.711    -.7136961    1.046663 
       d2000 |  -.2317374   .5087994    -0.46   0.649    -1.230117    .7666419 
       d2001 |  -.0122579   .5888631    -0.02   0.983     -1.16774    1.143224 
       d2002 |   .1894574   .6507777     0.29   0.771    -1.087515     1.46643 
       d2003 |    .267036   .7069018     0.38   0.706    -1.120065    1.654137 
       d2004 |   .5404895   .7734003     0.70   0.485    -.9770965    2.058076 
       d2005 |   .6194095   .8517466     0.73   0.467     -1.05191    2.290729 
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       d2006 |   .5497161   .9185275     0.60   0.550    -1.252642    2.352074 
       d2007 |   .5786153   1.018494     0.57   0.570    -1.419899     2.57713 
       d2008 |   .8586361   1.105387     0.78   0.437    -1.310382    3.027654 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |  (omitted) 
          c5 |  (omitted) 
          c6 |  (omitted) 
          c7 |  (omitted) 
          c8 |  (omitted) 
          c9 |  (omitted) 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |  (omitted) 
         c12 |  (omitted) 
         c13 |  (omitted) 
         c14 |  (omitted) 
          s2 |  (omitted) 
          s3 |  (omitted) 
          s4 |  (omitted) 
          s5 |  (omitted) 
          s6 |  (omitted) 
          s7 |  (omitted) 
          s8 |  (omitted) 
          s9 |  (omitted) 
         s10 |  (omitted) 
         s11 |  (omitted) 
         s12 |  (omitted) 
         s13 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   -13.0252   16.02303    -0.81   0.416      -44.466    18.41559 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.4805195 
     sigma_e |  1.2593186 
         rho |  .58021217   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(117, 1050) =     1.92           Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.12 OLS 
. reg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive medium high 
lncognitivemed lncognitivehigh lnwa 
> ge lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-
d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13 
note: lncognitive omitted because of collinearity 
note: medium omitted because of collinearity 
note: c4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s10 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1190 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 45,  1144) =   68.14 
       Model |  5417.70408    45  120.393424           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2021.33878  1144  1.76690453           R-squared     =  0.7283 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7176 
       Total |  7439.04286  1189  6.25655413           Root MSE      =  1.3292 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .4472093   .0266232    16.80   0.000     .3949736     .499445 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.8417746   1.665477    -0.51   0.613    -4.109507    2.425958 
   lntertedu |  -.2712395   .7992626    -0.34   0.734    -1.839425    1.296946 
 lncognitive |  (omitted) 
      medium |  (omitted) 
        high |  -7.734266   3.087944    -2.50   0.012    -13.79294   -1.675596 
lncognitiv~d |   1.940997   1.952861     0.99   0.320    -1.890594    5.772589 
lncognitiv~h |    4.41077   1.926957     2.29   0.022     .6300038    8.191536 
      lnwage |  -.6772831   .8918312    -0.76   0.448    -2.427091    1.072525 
       lngdp |   .6331922   .8176863     0.77   0.439    -.9711409    2.237525 
 lntradefree |  -.1633381   .6859588    -0.24   0.812    -1.509217     1.18254 
  lneconfree |   .7112104   1.025201     0.69   0.488    -1.300275    2.722696 
lntransition |    2.02372   3.220173     0.63   0.530    -4.294388    8.341828 
  lnictinfra |   .2932105   .4469963     0.66   0.512     -.583814    1.170235 
indprivati~n |   1.816172   .3305208     5.49   0.000     1.167677    2.464667 
       d1996 |    -.86738   1.166047    -0.74   0.457    -3.155211    1.420451 
       d1997 |  -.7379134   1.046836    -0.70   0.481    -2.791848    1.316021 
       d1998 |  -.6781001   .9418927    -0.72   0.472    -2.526131    1.169931 
       d1999 |  -.6090569   .8787825    -0.69   0.488    -2.333263    1.115149 
       d2000 |   -1.02247   .8383968    -1.22   0.223    -2.667438    .6224982 
       d2001 |  -.6561624   .7706106    -0.85   0.395    -2.168131    .8558063 
       d2002 |  -.5251843   .6741347    -0.78   0.436    -1.847863    .7974948 
       d2003 |   -.514148   .5560385    -0.92   0.355    -1.605118    .5768218 
       d2004 |  -.2560552   .4714853    -0.54   0.587    -1.181128    .6690176 
       d2005 |  -.2416745   .3960171    -0.61   0.542    -1.018676    .5353268 
       d2006 |  -.3183027    .327738    -0.97   0.332    -.9613376    .3247323 
       d2007 |   -.288655   .2298796    -1.26   0.209    -.7396879    .1623778 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |  (omitted) 
          c5 |   1.351072   1.873072     0.72   0.471    -2.323969    5.026114 
          c6 |   1.159314   1.660048     0.70   0.485    -2.097765    4.416394 
          c7 |   1.333946   1.647505     0.81   0.418    -1.898523    4.566416 
          c8 |   .5653086   1.079234     0.52   0.601    -1.552192    2.682809 
          c9 |   1.035051   1.357203     0.76   0.446    -1.627835    3.697937 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |   .2471034   2.296415     0.11   0.914    -4.258555    4.752761 
         c12 |    1.09896   1.775168     0.62   0.536    -2.383991    4.581911 
         c13 |   .9625966   1.178752     0.82   0.414    -1.350162    3.275355 
         c14 |   1.078748   1.469038     0.73   0.463    -1.803563    3.961059 
          s2 |  -.7807437   .1947639    -4.01   0.000    -1.162878   -.3986091 
          s3 |  -2.324189   .2314764   -10.04   0.000    -2.778355   -1.870023 
          s4 |  -.1649878   .1954564    -0.84   0.399    -.5484812    .2185055 
          s5 |  -4.967644   3.140565    -1.58   0.114    -11.12956    1.194271 
          s6 |   .4327556   .1938232     2.23   0.026     .0524667    .8130444 
          s7 |  -3.707247   3.124558    -1.19   0.236    -9.837755    2.423261 
          s8 |  -3.353586   3.120582    -1.07   0.283    -9.476293    2.769121 
          s9 |  -3.516236   3.118283    -1.13   0.260    -9.634433     2.60196 
         s10 |  (omitted) 
         s11 |   .3251242    .189685     1.71   0.087    -.0470454    .6972938 
         s12 |   .4344696    .190237     2.28   0.023     .0612171    .8077222 
         s13 |  -1.369156    .207641    -6.59   0.000    -1.776556   -.9617558 
       _cons |  -10.53859   16.58337    -0.64   0.525    -43.07582    21.99864 
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Appendix 6.17: Model 6.13 results 
 
. **Model 6.13 System GMM 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lntop medium high 
lntopmed lntophigh lnwage lngdp lntr 
> adefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-
s13, gmm(l.lnindfdistock, lagl 
> imit(1 2) collapse) iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lntop  medium high lntopmed lntophigh 
lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconf 
> ree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13) two robust 
small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c4 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
c14 dropped due to collinearity 
s9 dropped due to collinearity 
s12 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1190 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       118 
Number of instruments = 48                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(45, 117)    =     94.09                                      avg =     10.08 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2747524   .1374544     2.00   0.048     .0025313    .5469736 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.6192496   1.055669    -0.59   0.559    -2.709946    1.471447 
   lntertedu |  -1.140739   .8949205    -1.27   0.205    -2.913082    .6316046 
       lntop |   1.353072   .6591961     2.05   0.042      .047569    2.658576 
      medium |   .8872834   .6441342     1.38   0.171    -.3883906    2.162957 
        high |   1.375217   .6848358     2.01   0.047     .0189352    2.731498 
    lntopmed |   .5341413   .2488251     2.15   0.034     .0413563    1.026926 
   lntophigh |   .6702641    .255963     2.62   0.010     .1633428    1.177185 
      lnwage |  -.3520658   .4958906    -0.71   0.479    -1.334151    .6300196 
       lngdp |   .2718977   .5630781     0.48   0.630     -.843249    1.387044 
 lntradefree |  -.1041962   .2782747    -0.37   0.709    -.6553047    .4469124 
  lneconfree |   1.665476   .6426724     2.59   0.011     .3926971    2.938255 
lntransition |   1.915387   1.115326     1.72   0.089    -.2934581    4.124232 
  lnictinfra |   .3414675   .2524592     1.35   0.179    -.1585148    .8414497 
indprivati~n |   1.263367   .8569906     1.47   0.143    -.4338579    2.960592 
       d1996 |  -1.124484   .8256096    -1.36   0.176    -2.759561    .5105924 
       d1997 |  -1.135456   .7974377    -1.42   0.157     -2.71474    .4438272 
       d1998 |  -1.063377   .7471081    -1.42   0.157    -2.542985    .4162317 
       d1999 |  -.9468323   .6850767    -1.38   0.170    -2.303591    .4099262 
       d2000 |  -1.203742   .5584418    -2.16   0.033    -2.309707   -.0977776 
       d2001 |  -.9372839    .548921    -1.71   0.090    -2.024393    .1498253 
       d2002 |  -.8249611   .4717734    -1.75   0.083    -1.759284    .1093614 
       d2003 |  -.7502088   .4677077    -1.60   0.111    -1.676479    .1760619 
       d2004 |  -.3745764   .2860981    -1.31   0.193    -.9411787    .1920259 
       d2005 |  -.2901108   .2048857    -1.42   0.159    -.6958763    .1156546 
       d2006 |  -.3140316   .1546016    -2.03   0.044    -.6202121   -.0078512 
       d2007 |  -.1028822    .105242    -0.98   0.330    -.3113084    .1055441 
          c5 |  -.4176129   1.442499    -0.29   0.773    -3.274407    2.439181 
          c6 |  -.6082816   1.093475    -0.56   0.579    -2.773851    1.557288 
          c7 |   .4498709   1.210034     0.37   0.711    -1.946538     2.84628 
          c8 |   -.469632    .683442    -0.69   0.493    -1.823153    .8838891 
          c9 |   1.292147   1.095302     1.18   0.241      -.87704    3.461335 
         c11 |  -.2930605    1.30604    -0.22   0.823    -2.879605    2.293484 
         c12 |   1.148692   1.320234     0.87   0.386    -1.465962    3.763347 
         c13 |  -.8446192   .7944675    -1.06   0.290     -2.41802    .7287821 
          s2 |  -1.027942   .3222811    -3.19   0.002    -1.666203   -.3896815 
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          s3 |  -3.091186    .879531    -3.51   0.001    -4.833051    -1.34932 
          s4 |  -.2699002   .2437889    -1.11   0.271    -.7527113    .2129108 
          s5 |  -1.949007   .6034988    -3.23   0.002    -3.144205   -.7538089 
          s6 |   .0554885   .2407395     0.23   0.818    -.4212835    .5322605 
          s7 |  -.3246613   .2146717    -1.51   0.133    -.7498074    .1004848 
          s8 |   .1555045   .1753087     0.89   0.377    -.1916852    .5026942 
         s10 |  -.5523456   .2634429    -2.10   0.038     -1.07408   -.0306108 
         s11 |  -.1409758   .2355489    -0.60   0.551    -.6074681    .3255164 
         s13 |  -1.759596   .4560392    -3.86   0.000    -2.662757   -.8564338 
       _cons |  -1.359993   12.58258    -0.11   0.914    -26.27914    23.55915 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lntop medium high lntopmed lntophigh lnwage lngdp 
    lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 
    d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 
    c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 
    s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lntop medium high lntopmed lntophigh lnwage lngdp 
    lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 
    d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 
    c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 
    s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.02  Pr > z =  0.043 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.17  Pr > z =  0.240 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   5.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.079 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.581 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.433 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.493 
 
.  
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. **Calculating long-run coefficients 
. nlcom _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnsecedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.8538458   1.480284    -0.58   0.565    -3.785471     2.07778 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntertedu]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.572895   1.027491    -1.53   0.129    -3.607787    .4619965 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntop]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntop]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |    1.86567   .7219291     2.58   0.011     .4359268    3.295412 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[medium]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[medium]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   1.223421   .8327944     1.47   0.145    -.4258842    2.872727 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[high]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[high]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   1.896203   .8525542     2.22   0.028     .2077639    3.584642 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntopmed]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntopmed]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .7364951   .3042183     2.42   0.017     .1340067    1.338984 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntophigh]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntophigh]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .9241866   .3008574     3.07   0.003     .3283544    1.520019 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnwage]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.4854422   .7216971    -0.67   0.503    -1.914725    .9438411 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lngdp]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .3749033   .7945243     0.47   0.638     -1.19861    1.948417 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntradefree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.1436698    .396652    -0.36   0.718    -.9292183    .6418788 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lneconfree]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   2.296424   .8298805     2.77   0.007     .6528895    3.939959 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lntransition]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   2.641011   1.458867     1.81   0.073    -.2481989    5.530221 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[lnictinfra]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .4708289   .3849539     1.22   0.224    -.2915522     1.23321 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[indprivatisation]/(1-_b[l.lnindfdistock]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |    1.74198   1.396775     1.25   0.215    -1.024259     4.50822 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.13 FE 
. xtreg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lntop medium high 
lncognitivemed lncognitivehigh lnwage l 
> ngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 
c2-c14 s2-s13, fe 
note: lntop omitted because of collinearity 
note: medium omitted because of collinearity 
note: high omitted because of collinearity 
note: lncognitivemed omitted because of collinearity 
note: lncognitivehigh omitted because of collinearity 
note: d1996 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c13 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c14 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s13 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1190 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =       118 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2873                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.8249                                        avg =      10.1 
       overall = 0.5735                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(22,1050)         =     19.24 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5084                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |    .193157   .0307219     6.29   0.000     .1328738    .2534403 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.5961464   1.580211    -0.38   0.706    -3.696876    2.504584 
   lntertedu |  -.3948972    .758344    -0.52   0.603    -1.882939    1.093145 
       lntop |  (omitted) 
      medium |  (omitted) 
        high |  (omitted) 
lncognitiv~d |  (omitted) 
lncognitiv~h |  (omitted) 
      lnwage |  -.5827412   .8469517    -0.69   0.492    -2.244652    1.079169 
       lngdp |   .5104846    .779508     0.65   0.513    -1.019086    2.040055 
 lntradefree |  -.0199811   .6512587    -0.03   0.976    -1.297898    1.257936 
  lneconfree |   1.436007   .9727928     1.48   0.140    -.4728324    3.344846 
lntransition |   2.323538   3.052363     0.76   0.447    -3.665887    8.312963 
  lnictinfra |   .4880843   .4237924     1.15   0.250    -.3434921    1.319661 
indprivati~n |   1.398859   .3276367     4.27   0.000      .755962    2.041756 
       d1996 |  (omitted) 
       d1997 |   .0184732   .3497666     0.05   0.958    -.6678479    .7047943 
       d1998 |   .0848514   .4026112     0.21   0.833    -.7051628    .8748656 
       d1999 |   .1664835   .4485618     0.37   0.711    -.7136961    1.046663 
       d2000 |  -.2317374   .5087994    -0.46   0.649    -1.230117    .7666419 
       d2001 |  -.0122579   .5888631    -0.02   0.983     -1.16774    1.143224 
       d2002 |   .1894574   .6507777     0.29   0.771    -1.087515     1.46643 
       d2003 |    .267036   .7069018     0.38   0.706    -1.120065    1.654137 
       d2004 |   .5404895   .7734003     0.70   0.485    -.9770965    2.058076 
       d2005 |   .6194095   .8517466     0.73   0.467     -1.05191    2.290729 
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       d2006 |   .5497161   .9185275     0.60   0.550    -1.252642    2.352074 
       d2007 |   .5786153   1.018494     0.57   0.570    -1.419899     2.57713 
       d2008 |   .8586361   1.105387     0.78   0.437    -1.310382    3.027654 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |  (omitted) 
          c5 |  (omitted) 
          c6 |  (omitted) 
          c7 |  (omitted) 
          c8 |  (omitted) 
          c9 |  (omitted) 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |  (omitted) 
         c12 |  (omitted) 
         c13 |  (omitted) 
         c14 |  (omitted) 
          s2 |  (omitted) 
          s3 |  (omitted) 
          s4 |  (omitted) 
          s5 |  (omitted) 
          s6 |  (omitted) 
          s7 |  (omitted) 
          s8 |  (omitted) 
          s9 |  (omitted) 
         s10 |  (omitted) 
         s11 |  (omitted) 
         s12 |  (omitted) 
         s13 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   -13.0252   16.02303    -0.81   0.416      -44.466    18.41559 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.4805195 
     sigma_e |  1.2593186 
         rho |  .58021217   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(117, 1050) =     1.92           Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
.  
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. **Model 6.13 OLS 
. reg lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lntop medium high 
lncognitivemed lncognitivehigh lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13 
note: medium omitted because of collinearity 
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: c11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: s10 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1190 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 45,  1144) =   68.14 
       Model |  5417.70408    45  120.393424           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2021.33878  1144  1.76690453           R-squared     =  0.7283 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7176 
       Total |  7439.04286  1189  6.25655413           Root MSE      =  1.3292 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .4472093   .0266232    16.80   0.000     .3949736     .499445 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -.8417746   1.665477    -0.51   0.613    -4.109507    2.425958 
   lntertedu |  -.2712395   .7992626    -0.34   0.734    -1.839425    1.296946 
       lntop |    .121715   1.131139     0.11   0.914    -2.097624    2.341054 
      medium |  (omitted) 
        high |  -7.734266   3.087944    -2.50   0.012    -13.79294   -1.675596 
lncognitiv~d |   1.940997   1.952861     0.99   0.320    -1.890594    5.772589 
lncognitiv~h |    4.41077   1.926957     2.29   0.022     .6300038    8.191536 
      lnwage |  -.6772831   .8918312    -0.76   0.448    -2.427091    1.072525 
       lngdp |   .6331922   .8176863     0.77   0.439    -.9711409    2.237525 
 lntradefree |  -.1633381   .6859588    -0.24   0.812    -1.509217     1.18254 
  lneconfree |   .7112104   1.025201     0.69   0.488    -1.300275    2.722696 
lntransition |    2.02372   3.220173     0.63   0.530    -4.294388    8.341828 
  lnictinfra |   .2932105   .4469963     0.66   0.512     -.583814    1.170235 
indprivati~n |   1.816172   .3305208     5.49   0.000     1.167677    2.464667 
       d1996 |    -.86738   1.166047    -0.74   0.457    -3.155211    1.420451 
       d1997 |  -.7379134   1.046836    -0.70   0.481    -2.791848    1.316021 
       d1998 |  -.6781001   .9418927    -0.72   0.472    -2.526131    1.169931 
       d1999 |  -.6090569   .8787825    -0.69   0.488    -2.333263    1.115149 
       d2000 |   -1.02247   .8383968    -1.22   0.223    -2.667438    .6224982 
       d2001 |  -.6561624   .7706106    -0.85   0.395    -2.168131    .8558063 
       d2002 |  -.5251843   .6741347    -0.78   0.436    -1.847863    .7974948 
       d2003 |   -.514148   .5560385    -0.92   0.355    -1.605118    .5768218 
       d2004 |  -.2560552   .4714853    -0.54   0.587    -1.181128    .6690176 
       d2005 |  -.2416745   .3960171    -0.61   0.542    -1.018676    .5353268 
       d2006 |  -.3183027    .327738    -0.97   0.332    -.9613376    .3247323 
       d2007 |   -.288655   .2298796    -1.26   0.209    -.7396879    .1623778 
       d2008 |  (omitted) 
          c2 |  (omitted) 
          c3 |  (omitted) 
          c4 |  (omitted) 
          c5 |   1.078543   2.294967     0.47   0.638    -3.424274    5.581359 
          c6 |   .9172318   2.916634     0.31   0.753    -4.805319    6.639783 
          c7 |   1.082023   1.732695     0.62   0.532    -2.317594     4.48164 
          c8 |   .4013487   1.730444     0.23   0.817    -2.993852    3.796549 
          c9 |   .9332671   1.487764     0.63   0.531    -1.985785    3.852319 
         c10 |  (omitted) 
         c11 |  (omitted) 
         c12 |   .9451489   1.156457     0.82   0.414    -1.323865    3.214163 
         c13 |   .7004772   1.724836     0.41   0.685    -2.683719    4.084673 
         c14 |   .8905846   1.647382     0.54   0.589    -2.341645    4.122814 
          s2 |  -.7807437   .1947639    -4.01   0.000    -1.162878   -.3986091 
          s3 |  -2.324189   .2314764   -10.04   0.000    -2.778355   -1.870023 
          s4 |  -.1649878   .1954564    -0.84   0.399    -.5484812    .2185055 
          s5 |  -4.967644   3.140565    -1.58   0.114    -11.12956    1.194271 
          s6 |   .4327556   .1938232     2.23   0.026     .0524667    .8130444 
          s7 |  -3.707247   3.124558    -1.19   0.236    -9.837755    2.423261 
          s8 |  -3.353586   3.120582    -1.07   0.283    -9.476293    2.769121 
          s9 |  -3.516236   3.118283    -1.13   0.260    -9.634433     2.60196 
         s10 |  (omitted) 
         s11 |   .3251242    .189685     1.71   0.087    -.0470454    .6972938 
         s12 |   .4344696    .190237     2.28   0.023     .0612171    .8077222 
         s13 |  -1.369156    .207641    -6.59   0.000    -1.776556   -.9617558 
       _cons |     -10.01   19.70439    -0.51   0.612    -48.67081     28.6508 
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Appendix 6.18: Adding GDP per capita to Models 6.10-6.11 
 
. **Model 6.10 System GMM; gdppc added 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive lngdppc 
lnwage lngdp lntradefree lneconfre 
> e lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, 
gmm(l.lnindfdistock, laglimit(1 2) collaps 
> e) iv(lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive lnwage lngdp lngdppc lntradefree lneconfree 
lntransition lnictinfra indpriv 
> atisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c4 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
c14 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1190 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       118 
Number of instruments = 47                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 117)    =     87.83                                      avg =     10.08 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2826773   .1358295     2.08   0.040     .0136742    .5516805 
             | 
    lnsecedu |   -1.03974   1.060562    -0.98   0.329    -3.140126    1.060647 
   lntertedu |   -1.02306   .8876349    -1.15   0.251    -2.780975    .7348542 
 lncognitive |    12.5763   4.572086     2.75   0.007     3.521526    21.63108 
     lngdppc |  -3.062678   1.023764    -2.99   0.003    -5.090188   -1.035168 
      lnwage |  -.5801907   .4832202    -1.20   0.232    -1.537183    .3768016 
       lngdp |   3.766369   1.161199     3.24   0.002     1.466676    6.066062 
 lntradefree |  -.1789883   .2700003    -0.66   0.509    -.7137098    .3557332 
  lneconfree |    1.51049   .6259208     2.41   0.017     .2708868    2.750093 
lntransition |   2.062604   1.130506     1.82   0.071    -.1763042    4.301512 
  lnictinfra |   .3396273   .2500229     1.36   0.177      -.15553    .8347845 
indprivati~n |   1.274932   .8536178     1.49   0.138    -.4156129    2.965478 
       d1996 |  -1.102014   .8185308    -1.35   0.181    -2.723072     .519043 
       d1997 |  -1.046441   .7823572    -1.34   0.184    -2.595858    .5029766 
       d1998 |  -.9592046   .7288974    -1.32   0.191    -2.402748    .4843386 
       d1999 |  -.8014993   .6641724    -1.21   0.230    -2.116858    .5138593 
       d2000 |  -1.058805   .5430723    -1.95   0.054    -2.134332    .0167208 
       d2001 |  -.8021465   .5337963    -1.50   0.136    -1.859302     .255009 
       d2002 |  -.6835965   .4528925    -1.51   0.134    -1.580526    .2133334 
       d2003 |  -.6553299   .4614872    -1.42   0.158    -1.569281    .2586213 
       d2004 |  -.2694524   .2737047    -0.98   0.327    -.8115101    .2726054 
       d2005 |  -.2059684   .1972161    -1.04   0.298    -.5965445    .1846077 
       d2006 |  -.2869199    .154115    -1.86   0.065    -.5921365    .0182968 
       d2007 |  -.0981813    .105829    -0.93   0.355    -.3077701    .1114075 
          c5 |  -4.704319   2.125326    -2.21   0.029    -8.913415   -.4952219 
          c6 |     1.4346   1.260854     1.14   0.258    -1.062456    3.931656 
          c7 |  -4.094824   1.683057    -2.43   0.016     -7.42803   -.7616188 
          c8 |  -.4661012   .6776927    -0.69   0.493    -1.808236    .8760336 
          c9 |  -.8197154   .9414271    -0.87   0.386    -2.684162    1.044732 
         c11 |  -9.281254   3.102999    -2.99   0.003    -15.42658   -3.135927 
         c12 |  -6.169702   2.405264    -2.57   0.012     -10.9332   -1.406202 
         c13 |  -3.157996   1.202051    -2.63   0.010    -5.538596   -.7773959 
          s2 |  -1.024433   .3508764    -2.92   0.004    -1.719326    -.329541 
          s3 |  -3.058937   .8756762    -3.49   0.001    -4.793167   -1.324706 
          s4 |  -.2436914   .2536934    -0.96   0.339     -.746118    .2587351 
          s5 |  -2.409922   .6681235    -3.61   0.000    -3.733105   -1.086738 
          s6 |  -.3309459   .2230735    -1.48   0.141    -.7727312    .1108395 
          s7 |  -.8346848   .2840781    -2.94   0.004    -1.397287    -.272083 
          s8 |  -.3674799   .2291647    -1.60   0.112    -.8213285    .0863687 
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          s9 |  -.5185608   .2479504    -2.09   0.039    -1.009614    -.027508 
         s10 |  -.9252697   .2971595    -3.11   0.002    -1.513779   -.3367608 
         s11 |  -.5291376   .2559413    -2.07   0.041    -1.036016   -.0222594 
         s12 |  -.3899874   .2800385    -1.39   0.166    -.9445889    .1646141 
         s13 |  -1.684515   .4414265    -3.82   0.000    -2.558737   -.8102929 
       _cons |  -76.82609   22.79317    -3.37   0.001    -121.9668   -31.68542 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive lnwage lngdp lngdppc lntradefree 
    lneconfree lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 
    d1999 d2000 d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 
    c7 c8 c9 c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lncognitive lnwage lngdp lngdppc lntradefree lneconfree 
    lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 
    d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
    c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.05  Pr > z =  0.041 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.15  Pr > z =  0.250 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   5.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.055 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.533 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.422 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.433 
 
.  
.  
.  
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. **Model 6.11 System GMM; gdppc added 
. xtabond2 lnindfdistock l.lnindfdistock lnsecedu lntertedu lntop lngdppc  lnwage 
lngdp lntradefree lneconfree lnt 
> ransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13, 
gmm(l.lnindfdistock, laglimit(1 2) collapse) iv 
> (lnsecedu lntertedu lntop lnwage lngdp lngdppc lntradefree lneconfree lntransition 
lnictinfra indprivatisation d 
> 1996-d2008 c2-c14 s2-s13) two robust small orthog 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d2008 dropped due to collinearity 
c2 dropped due to collinearity 
c3 dropped due to collinearity 
c4 dropped due to collinearity 
c10 dropped due to collinearity 
c14 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: id                              Number of obs      =      1190 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       118 
Number of instruments = 47                      Obs per group: min =         1 
F(44, 117)    =     87.83                                      avg =     10.08 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        13 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
lnindfdist~k |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnindfdist~k | 
         L1. |   .2827064   .1358113     2.08   0.040     .0137392    .5516735 
             | 
    lnsecedu |  -1.039978    1.06058    -0.98   0.329    -3.140402    1.060445 
   lntertedu |  -1.022812   .8874795    -1.15   0.251    -2.780419    .7347944 
       lntop |     2.2532   .8191878     2.75   0.007     .6308419    3.875559 
     lngdppc |  -3.062019     1.0236    -2.99   0.003    -5.089205   -1.034833 
      lnwage |  -.5799838   .4831941    -1.20   0.232    -1.536924    .3769568 
       lngdp |   3.765335   1.160897     3.24   0.002     1.466239    6.064431 
 lntradefree |  -.1790447   .2699853    -0.66   0.509    -.7137365     .355647 
  lneconfree |   1.510521   .6259936     2.41   0.017     .2707737    2.750269 
lntransition |   2.062467   1.130488     1.82   0.071    -.1764051    4.301338 
  lnictinfra |   .3395753   .2500216     1.36   0.177    -.1555794      .83473 
indprivati~n |   1.275116   .8534632     1.49   0.138    -.4151233    2.965355 
       d1996 |  -1.102221   .8186037    -1.35   0.181    -2.723423    .5189804 
       d1997 |  -1.046644   .7824268    -1.34   0.184    -2.596199    .5029116 
       d1998 |  -.9593982   .7289661    -1.32   0.191    -2.403077     .484281 
       d1999 |  -.8017089    .664245    -1.21   0.230    -2.117211    .5137935 
       d2000 |  -1.058963     .54316    -1.95   0.054    -2.134663    .0167368 
       d2001 |   -.802337   .5338567    -1.50   0.136    -1.859612    .2549382 
       d2002 |  -.6837383   .4529507    -1.51   0.134    -1.580783    .2133068 
       d2003 |  -.6554832   .4615597    -1.42   0.158    -1.569578    .2586116 
       d2004 |  -.2695419   .2737409    -0.98   0.327    -.8116715    .2725877 
       d2005 |  -.2060397    .197243    -1.04   0.298    -.5966692    .1845899 
       d2006 |  -.2869638    .154138    -1.86   0.065     -.592226    .0182984 
       d2007 |  -.0981683   .1058275    -0.93   0.356    -.3077541    .1114176 
          c5 |  -5.977929   2.414348    -2.48   0.015    -10.75942    -1.19644 
          c6 |   .9273838   1.226012     0.76   0.451    -1.500669    3.355436 
          c7 |  -5.143368   1.873839    -2.74   0.007    -8.854409   -1.432327 
          c8 |  -.5060019   .6783128    -0.75   0.457    -1.849365    .8373611 
          c9 |   .2288126   .9881429     0.23   0.817    -1.728153    2.185778 
         c11 |  -10.74563   3.406038    -3.15   0.002    -17.49111   -4.000148 
         c12 |  -6.666898   2.500745    -2.67   0.009    -11.61949   -1.714305 
         c13 |  -4.378461   1.533492    -2.86   0.005    -7.415462   -1.341459 
          s2 |  -1.024422   .3508728    -2.92   0.004    -1.719307   -.3295366 
          s3 |  -3.058751   .8756045    -3.49   0.001     -4.79284   -1.324663 
          s4 |  -.2437071   .2537033    -0.96   0.339    -.7461532    .2587389 
          s5 |  -2.409998   .6681375    -3.61   0.000    -3.733209   -1.086786 
          s6 |  -.3309558   .2230802    -1.48   0.141    -.7727545    .1108429 
          s7 |  -.8346567    .284077    -2.94   0.004    -1.397256   -.2720571 
          s8 |  -.3675132   .2291768    -1.60   0.111    -.8213859    .0863595 
          s9 |  -.5185871   .2479621    -2.09   0.039    -1.009663   -.0275112 
         s10 |  -.9252718   .2971667    -3.11   0.002    -1.513795   -.3367487 
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         s11 |  -.5291518   .2559487    -2.07   0.041    -1.036045   -.0222588 
         s12 |  -.3899766   .2800521    -1.39   0.166    -.9446052    .1646519 
         s13 |  -1.684461   .4414049    -3.82   0.000     -2.55864   -.8102816 
       _cons |   -50.2829   17.74709    -2.83   0.005    -85.43007   -15.13572 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(lnsecedu lntertedu lntop lnwage lngdp lngdppc lntradefree lneconfree 
    lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 
    d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
    c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    lnsecedu lntertedu lntop lnwage lngdp lngdppc lntradefree lneconfree 
    lntransition lnictinfra indprivatisation d1996 d1997 d1998 d1999 d2000 
    d2001 d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
    c10 c11 c12 c13 c14 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lnindfdistock collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.05  Pr > z =  0.041 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.15  Pr > z =  0.250 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   5.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.055 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.533 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.422 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.433 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
